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 At 150 years following its founding in 1868, the University of 
California is regarded by many as the most successful and highly 
respected public research university in the world. Particularly 
impressive are the very high standings of its campuses in national and 
international rankings, the size of the ten-campus university, the high 
quality of the education it provides, the access and the route of upward 
mobility that it affords for students in the state, the success that it has 
had in developing new campuses that have achieved strong 
reputations in surprisingly short times, the attractiveness of the 
university to students and their families, and the substantial role that 
the university has played in the unparalleled technological innovation 
climate of California. 
 During my years in academic administration at the University of 
California and its Berkeley campus, I have encountered many visitors 
from other countries and from other states of the United States who 
have inquired about the University of California, how it works, and how 
it has become so successful and highly regarded. The purpose of this 
book is to explore the essential factors that answer those questions. 
 Any large institution has experienced problems and failures along 
with successes and has dealt with mixed situations where the balance 
between benefits and losses is difficult to determine. The University of 
California is no exception. This book therefore also includes mixed or 
lessons-learned types of experiences, along with the analysis of those 
positive factors that led to success overall. 
 The book is not a history of the University of California, per se. 
Several of those already exist, covering various periods during the 
development of the university. Instead, it is an analysis of the 
structural, policy, operational, and environmental matters that have 
contributed to the success of the University of California and a 
discussion of what makes UC tick and the approaches that have made it 
tick best. In that sense it is a selective, topical history and analysis for 
those subjects. Given my own background as an academic chemical 
engineer, it is essentially akin to an engineering analysis. The format is 
such that the book can serve as a reference work, and for that reason 




a substantial index and many citations in footnotes.1 Most chapters 
have summary conclusions, distilling the most important points. 
 The book is written from the point of view of one who has been 
concerned for many years with making the university work well 
academically, through successive positions as department chair, dean, 
and then provost for the professional schools and colleges on the 
Berkeley campus, and then vice provost for research for a year, 
followed by nine years as provost and senior vice president, academic 
affairs at the university-wide level. A subsequent decade directing the 
Center for Studies in Higher Education on the Berkeley campus gave 
me perspective and the opportunity to think about this subject broadly. 
Although many books have been written by ex-presidents of 
universities, many fewer have been written by ex-provosts. Yet 
because of the large extramural roles of presidents, it is probably the 
provosts who best know the inner academic operations of modern 
American universities, as they are totally immersed in them. 
 The book does not trace back to primary sources, nor is it based 
substantially on subject-specific interviews. It makes use of others’ 
collections of information along with my own varied experiences for 
analyses and judgments. I am therefore both grateful for and reliant 
upon the work of many other people.  
The intended audience for this book is the global higher-education 
community, as well as others interested in the University of California 
and the development and functioning of universities, and particularly 
public universities, in the United States. The book should be useful to 
those in governments who are concerned with public universities, as 
well as those in other states and other countries who would like to 
understand the University of California and assess what about it could 
                                                     
1 Several points about the references deserve mention. First, numbering of footnotes begins anew 
at the start of each chapter. Second, the full reference is given the first time a particular reference 
appears in any chapter but then subsequently in that chapter it is cited as simply author, year, loc. 
cit. (for references to the same page or location) and as author, year, op. cit., page number (for 
references to the same work, different page). Third, many references are to Internet sites. Since 
URL citations change continually and can be eliminated as well, I include the date of access along 
with URL citations, with the intent that the reader can use the Internet Archive 
(https://archive.org/index.php) to find references for which the cited URL no longer works. In 





be useful in connection with the development of their own systems 
and institutions of higher education. 
 I am grateful for the help of colleagues who have reviewed and 
provided me with insightful comments on drafts of the entire book or 
individual chapters. They include Patricia Pelfrey, Steven Brint, Ami 
Zusman, Saul Geiser, John Douglass, Paula Fass, Ellen Switkes, Paul 
Gray, Stephen Handel, Keith Alexander, and Stephen Arditti. Their 
thoughts have helped the book immensely, but of course I assume 
responsibility myself for the veracity of what is in the book.  Rachael 
Samberg, Scholarly Communications Officer of the Berkeley campus 
library, was very helpful in steering me in the right directions for open 
access publishing. 
 I owe a particular debt of gratitude to the institution about which I 
am writing. It has afforded me a rewarding career of fifty-five years and 
counting as well as opportunities that are unsurpassed. Thanks are in 
order to many other people as well—first of all, to many Berkeley and 
University of California colleagues, notably to Doris Calloway, Mike 
Heyman, Rod Park, Jack Peltason, Walter Massey and Dick Atkinson, all 
of whom selected me for administrative positions and with whom I 
enjoyed working; to Neil Smelser, Karl Pister, John Douglass, Patricia 
Pelfrey, John Prausnitz, Marian Gade, and colleagues in Berkeley’s 
Wellman Group,  with all of whom I have spent many hours discussing 
the University of California and higher education; to Ruth Fix, Gary 
Matteson, Jane Scheiber, Norma Esherick, Barbara Gerber, and Mark 
Sessler, who provided high-caliber administrative support throughout 
my career; and to Jenny Hanson, Carletta Starks, and Diana Gee, who 
provided noble assistance during my own campus-wide and university-
wide administrative years. My grandson, Christopher Hickey, capably 
joined me on the cover design. 
 But above all, my thanks go to my dear wife, Jeanne, who has 
been right there with me in all ways and totally supportive for what is 
now over sixty years. 
 







PREFACE TO THE SECOND PRINTING 
 In the Second Printing I have corrected errata from the original 
printing and have also endeavored to deal in a better way with the 
problem of “link rot” – changes in urls for web pages, continual 
modifications of web pages, and disappearance of web pages.  My 
main approach has been to create permanent links (Perma Links) to 
cited versions of web pages by using the services of use Perma.cc.  
These links serve to preserve web pages as I consulted them during the 
preparation of the book.  Perma Links do not have operative secondary 
links. Where the original url still exists, it can be reached by means of 
the “view the live page” feature of Perma.cc.  If the original url does 
not still exist or has been modified, searches on the content of the 
cited Perma Link and/or use of the Wayback Machine of the Internet 
Archive can be useful.  In a number of cases where Perma Links for 
some reason cannot be created and/or secondary links are important I 
have instead used citations to the Internet Archive itself or to other 
archiving sites.  I have changed some online references that were 
available to University of California readers through license but are not 
open access.  In general, page contents remain the same as in the 
original printing. 
 I am very grateful to my Berkeley colleague, Xia Teng, for carrying 
out conversions to Perma Link citations in the first half of the book, and 
also for her help in discovering typographical and formatting errors.  
 









The University of California: 
A Remarkable Success Story 
 
 
In the past 60 years, California has…led the world in policy and 
provision of higher education and university-based science, while at the 
same time leading the evolution of ideas about university education. 
California is unmatched in its concentration of high-quality public 
campuses (for example, University of California, Berkeley; University of 
California, Los Angeles; University of California, San Diego)…Only the 
Boston corridor, where private education plays a greater role, is in the 
same league as universities in California, and Boston lags behind 
—Simon Marginson1 
 
No aspect of our revised class of Research 1 universities is more 
arresting than the inclusion of all eight general campuses of the 
University of California. The eye-catching additions…are the UC 
campuses at Santa Barbara, Riverside, and Santa Cruz. The speed with 
which these institutions rose from modest beginnings is astonishing. 
—Hugh Davis Graham and Nancy Diamond2 
 
This university is truly the crown jewel of public higher education—not 
just in California—but in the country. If the great research universities 
deserve our support for what they do now and what they could do if 
given more support, then UC Berkeley is a special case in that we are 
not only supporting great work, we are supporting an important social 
concept—the importance of public education and universal access for 
our best and brightest students, irrespective of their ability to pay. 
—Walter Hewlett3 
                                                     
1 Simon Marginson, “California and the Future of Public Higher Education,” International Higher 
Education, no. 82 (Fall 2015), https://ejournals.bc.edu/ojs/index.php/ihe/article/view/8872/7943.  
2 Hugh D. Graham and Nancy Diamond, The Rise of American Research Universities: Elites and 
Challengers in the Postwar Era (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), p. 149. 






The University of California is struggling with budget woes that have 
deeply affected campus life. Yet the system’s nine colleges still lead the 






The University of California has been a major success when 
viewed from any of a number of different viewpoints. 
 
 
MEASURES OF SUCCESS 
 
 Institutional Stature within the Academic World. University of 
California campuses constitute fully 10 percent (six out of sixty) of the 
US member institutions of the Association of American Universities 
(AAU). 5  Quantitative ranking systems for universities, which have 
appeared profusely as the twenty-first century has begun, generally 
place the University of California, Berkeley, as the number-one public 
research university campus in the world, and the University of 
California, Los Angeles, often vies with the University of Michigan for 
the second spot among US public universities. These ranking systems 






                                                                                                                     
 https://perma.cc/EU9R-N32U. 
4 David Leonhardt, “California’s Upward Mobility Machine,” New York Times, September 16, 2015. 
5 “Membership in AAU is by invitation and is based on the high quality of programs of academic 
research and scholarship and undergraduate, graduate, and professional education in a number of 
fields, as well as general recognition that a university is outstanding by reason of the excellence of 
its research and education programs.” From Association of American Universities, “AAU 
Membership,” https://perma.cc/MG2T-2ZT2.33 




 Rapid Development of New Campuses to Eminence. Graham and 
Diamond6 have remarked upon, and have essentially built a book 
around, the extremely rapid development of the newer University of 
California campuses to eminence in the decades following World War 
II. UC San Diego, which first admitted graduate students in 1960, 
achieved AAU membership in 1982, only twenty-two years later. UC 
Santa Barbara and UC Davis both were elected to AAU membership 
thirty-seven years after being designated general campuses in 1958 
and 1959, respectively. UC Irvine achieved AAU membership thirty-one 
years after opening in 1965. UCLA was elected to the AAU in 1974, 
thirty-six years after giving its first PhD and only sixteen years after 
being accorded “equal opportunity” with Berkeley by President Clark 
Kerr and the UC Regents in 1958 (see chapter 2). 
 Research Quality and Impact. The University of California, through 
well-established peer-review processes, receives between 9 and 10 
percent of the research support awarded by the US federal 
government for university research. 7  The university is generally 
regarded as a major driver of the California economy, with many 
successful start-up companies utilizing University of California research 
and/or stemming from University of California faculty members. 
Particular examples, amplified in chapters 16 and 18, are the California 
agriculture and wine industries, the growth of Silicon Valley after its 
start from Stanford, and the San Francisco and San Diego clusters of 
the biotechnology industry. 
 Individual Faculty Accomplishment. A total of sixty-one faculty 
members associated with the University of California for part or all of 
their careers have so far won Nobel Prizes.8 Twenty-two Berkeley 
faculty members have been Nobel Laureates, as well as twenty-five 
Berkeley alumni, eighteen of them with PhD degrees from UC Berkeley, 
and eleven of those eighteen from chemistry alone.9  
 
                                                     
6 Hugh Davis Graham and Nancy Diamond, 1997, op. cit. 
7 University of California, Accountability Report 2015, section 9.3, “Research Activities,” 
https://perma.cc/2DZY-5XW3. 
8 University of California, “Nobel Laureates,” https://perma.cc/7LA2-ENUZ. 






As of 2015-16, University of California faculty had won 67 US 
National Medals of Science, and UC had 370 members of the National 
Academy of Sciences,10 over 500 members of the American Academy of 
Arts and Sciences, 11  168 members of the National Academy of 
Engineering,12 and over 200 members of the National Academy of 
Medicine (formerly Institute of Medicine). 13  UC faculty members 
constitute 16.4 percent of the National Academy of Sciences, 8.4 
percent of the National Academy of Engineering (only about half of the 
membership of which is from universities), and about 10 percent of the 
National Academy of Medicine. 
 Breadth of Accomplishment and Distinction. Although the figures 
in the previous section pertain to science, medicine, and engineering 
only, the distinction extends across the board. For example, 29 out of 
213 (14 percent) of new members of the American Academy of Arts 
and Sciences in 2016 were from the University of California.14 Faculty 
members from the university are solidly represented among winners of 
the National Humanities Medal, the Forbes 30 under 30 list, 
Guggenheim Fellowships, the Thomson-Reuters list of highly cited 
researchers, and other such measures of academic distinction, over a 
wide spread of disciplines. The surveys of the American Council on 
Education/National Research Council discussed in the appendix have 
consistently placed the Berkeley campus as having high distinction over 






                                                     
10 Search for “University of California” on “Member Profile Search,”  National Academy of 
Sciences, https://perma.cc/NVL6-EZWV, April 18, 2016. 
11 University of California Accountability Report, 2015, chapter 5, “Faculty and Other Academic 
Employees,” https://perma.cc/PL4L-RVZH. 
12 National Academy of Engineering, Directory of Members and Foreign Members, Washington, 
DC, 2015. 
13 University of California, “Six Members Elected to Institute of Medicine,” October 20, 2014, 
https://perma.cc/2YYL-S85V. 
14 “Twenty-Nine UC Scholars Elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences,” University of 
California Newsroom, April 20, 2016, https://perma.cc/M9Y5-JU8D. 




 Student Demand. Application pressure to the University of 
California is very high. The Los Angeles and Berkeley campuses received 
92,722 15  and 78,918 16  applications, respectively, for 2015 fall 
admission. UCLA receives the greatest number of applications for 
admission of all universities in the United States. Both these campuses 
could admit only 17 percent of applicants. By the California Master Plan 
for Higher Education, eligibility for the University of California is 
restricted to the top 12.5 percent of graduates of public high schools 
and those with equivalent records from private high schools. None of 
the eight undergraduate campuses—except the new campus at 
Merced—have the capacity that would enable them to admit all UC-
eligible applicants to the campus. 
 Access and the Mission to Make Higher Education Available to All 
Members of Society. Pell Grants, given by the US federal government, 
are generally available to all families making $50,000 or less per year, 
with most of the funding going to students from families making 
$30,000 or less per year. 17  In fall 2013, 42 percent of UC 
undergraduates were Pell Grant recipients, 42 percent were first-
generation college students, and 26 percent were from 
underrepresented minority groups. Pell Grant recipients for 2012–13 
ranged from 36 percent at the Berkeley and Los Angeles campuses to 
60 percent at the new Merced campus. These percentages are much 
higher than for comparable private and public institutions; in fact, each 
of five UC campuses individually admits more Pell Grant recipients than 
does the entire Ivy League.18 David Leonhardt of the New York Times 
has carried out analyses and rankings of US universities on a measure 
of public access that combines the fraction of the undergraduate 
student body with Pell Grants and the percentage of Pell Grant 
 
                                                     
15 University of California, Los Angeles, “UCLA Offers Admission to More Than 16,000 Talented 
Students for Fall 2015,” https://perma.cc/F57D-R53U. 
16 University of California, Berkeley, “In a Competitive Year, Berkeley Admits 13,321 Prospective 
Freshmen,” https://perma.cc/UBB8-SQZK. 
17 “Federal Pell Grant Qualifications,” College Loan Consultant, https://perma.cc/8SML-C2XJ. 








recipients who graduate with the average actual price (tuition and fees 
minus financial aid) paid by enrolled students (an inverse measure). Six 
of the top seven universities in the 2016 analysis were University of 
California campuses. 19 
 It is striking in view of these figures on student access that 
graduation rates at the bachelor’s level for UC are also high in 
comparison with other public universities—a six-year graduation rate 
of 85 percent for the 2011 entering freshman cohort. This increases to 
88 percent when students who transfer to non-UC institutions and still 
graduate within a total six years are taken into account. Freshman 
entrants take an average of 4.1 years to graduate. The 2011 entering 
group of transfer students had a four-year graduation rate of 88 
percent.20 Longer times to degree can often be rationalized in terms of 
students who need to have simultaneous employment. 
 Service to the State and Nation. The University of California has 
had a tradition of service to the state of California and the US 
government. Service to the state, treated in more detail in chapter 16, 
includes the extensive Cooperative Extension system for agriculture, 
the university as a whole functioning as the acknowledged research 
arm of the state government, and participation of UC faculty in many 
state panels and commissions. 
 Considering service to the nation by faculty from the Berkeley 
campus alone, Ernest Lawrence, Robert Oppenheimer, and many other 
faculty members were heavily involved during World War II in the 
Manhattan Project, resulting in the first three atomic bombs. Since 
1943 the US government has entrusted the university with 
management21 of three of its most vital national laboratories. Berkeley 
chemist Kenneth Pitzer served as director of research for the Atomic 
Energy Commission from 1949 to 1951, its critical early years. Berkeley 
chemist and Nobelist Glenn Seaborg served as chairman of the Atomic 
 
 
                                                     
19 David Leonhardt, op. cit.; also “College Access Index, 2015: The Details,” and “Top Colleges 
Doing the Most for Low Income Students,” New York Times, September 16, 2015. 
20 University of California, Accountability Report 2016, chapter 3, “Undergraduate Student 
Success,” https://perma.cc/2E3Y-YNWB. 
21 Now shared for two of the laboratories with various industrial companies. 




Energy Commission under three US presidents from 1961 to 1971. 
Berkeley economists Laura Tyson (1993–95), Janet Yellen (1997–99), 
and Christine Romer (2009–10) have all served as chair of the Council 
of Economic Advisors to the US president. From 2014 to 2018 Janet 
Yellen was chair of the US Federal Reserve Board of Governors, the 
most visible financial position in the country and perhaps the world. 
 
 
HOW DID THIS HAPPEN? 
 
What enabled the University of California to achieve this standing? 
It was surely not a foreordained or automatic outcome, considering the 
beginnings of the state. 
 The University of California was founded in 1868, just nineteen 
years after the California gold rush of 1849 brought an eclectic crowd 
of gold seekers, and a very rough and relatively lawless group at that, 
into the state. The start of the university was also just six years after 
the Morrill Act of 1862, which established the land-grant mechanism 
for the individual states of the United States to establish and fund 
public universities. Yet the University of California, then only at 
Berkeley, was highly respected by the early 1900s and was widely 
admired as of and after World War II, just eighty years after its 
founding. Even more impressive in some ways is the fact that newer 
campuses of the University of California have risen to the top tier of 
respect in even shorter periods of time, as already noted. 
 How did this happen, and what are the essential and perhaps 
unusual factors that led to this success? To explore that territory is the 
purpose of this book. The book is not intended to be a history. It is 
instead selective and analytical. It seeks to identify and distill out those 
factors that have been most important to the success that the 
University of California as a whole and its various campuses individually 
have achieved and to explore in depth the ways in which those factors 
have been important. I deal more with values, structures, policies, 
approaches, and environmental factors than with individual people. 






What Has Been Most Important for the Success of the University of 
California? 
 It should be helpful to the reader to have a broad list of the factors 
that have been most important to the development of the University of 
California and hence to its resultant stature. In that way the reader can 
be on the lookout for these factors as they come into the discussion, 
can follow the ways in which they developed and have been influential, 
and can continually come back to a single list. 
 I am not the first to seek to identify the most essential factors for 
the success of the University of California. Such efforts have been made 
to various degrees by former UC president David Gardner,22, 23 by 
Patricia Pelfrey in her short book on the history of UC,24 and by George 
Breslauer 25  for the Berkeley campus. Clark Kerr underscored 
constitutional autonomy and the unprecedented authority that was 
given to the Academic Senate.26 In table 1-1, I present my own list, 
keyed to chapters in this book. The order of items in the list is not a 
priority ranking. 
                                                     
22 David P. Gardner, Earning My Degree: Memoirs of an American University President (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2005), pp. 164–167. 
23 David P. Gardner, “The California System: Governing and Management Principles and Their Link 




24 Patricia A. Pelfrey, A Brief History of the University of California, 2nd ed. (Berkeley: University of 
California, 2004; distributed by University of California Press), pp. 1–3. 
25 George W. Breslauer, “What Made Berkeley Great? The Sources of Berkeley’s Sustained 
Academic Excellence,” Research and Occasional Papers Series no. 3.11 (January 2011), Center for 
Studies in Higher Education, Berkeley, CA, https://perma.cc/5D2P-NAQG. 
26 Clark Kerr, foreword, in Angus E. Taylor, The Academic Senate of the University of California 
(Berkeley: Institute of Governmental Studies Press, University of California, 1998), p. xi, 
https://perma.cc/S6CL-UJ7P. 




TABLE 1-1. Primary factors important to the success of the University 
of California 
 
 Hiring the best and the brightest faculty members and then 
empowering them to do creative research and teaching limited 
only by their own time and abilities (chapters 9 and 10) 
 A structure as a single university with multiple campuses, all having 
the same undifferentiated mission (chapter 6)G 
 The nature and effectiveness of the structured shared-governance 
roles of the Academic Senate (chapter 7)K, P, G 
 Career-long reviews of faculty members, evaluating and rewarding 
academic accomplishment, performance, and quality (chapter 11) 
 Building from within (chapters 6 and 10) 
 Historically high levels of support by the people and government of 
California (chapters 2 and 17)G, P, B 
 Constitutional autonomy (chapter 4)K, P, G 
 The 1960 California Master Plan for Higher Education (chapter 5)P 
 Location: geographic, intellectual, and economic (chapter 19) 
 Encouragement and facilitation of multidisciplinary research; 
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (chapters 13 and 14) 
 Integration of the professional fields fully into the academic 
mission and governance (chapters 7, 8, 11, 12, and 14) 
---------- 
Superscripts: 
B—Also identified by Breslauer 
G—Also identified by Gardner 
K—Also one of Kerr’s “two greatest gifts” 
P—Also identified by Pelfrey 
 
 
Most of the book explores these and other factors. I then try to 
generalize and address the needs for creation or development of a 
premier research university (chapter 20), after which I consider what 
are likely to be future models for the University of California itself as 
well as for other leading public research universities (chapter 21). 
 The inclusion of the list in table 1-1 and, indeed, the entire subject 
matter of this book do not constitute a prescription for what will work 





states within the United States. The factors that led to the success of 
the University of California are embedded in the history, culture, and 
other institutions of California and in the particular eras when they 
took place. These approaches may not work as well in another era, 
another locale, or another culture. But they can certainly serve as 
starting points for serious consideration. 
 
 
AN EMPHASIS ON SCIENCE 
 
Primary attention is given to science disciplines throughout this 
book. There are several reasons for that approach. Most reputational 
surveys and research-university ranking systems (see appendix) are 
tilted toward science. It was through science that a preeminent 
reputation for academic quality first developed in the University of 
California, and it is largely science that propelled several of the newer 
campuses—most notably San Diego, Santa Barbara, and San 
Francisco—rapidly to the forefront. Much of the interest in other 
countries in building and improving universities is for science and 
engineering and their commercial applications. Finally, my own 
disciplinary background is chemical engineering. 
 I do not want to convey an impression that I believe that 
disciplines other than science and engineering are somehow less 
important for a university. I firmly believe in the essentiality of 
comprehensive coverage of disciplines within universities and the 
resultant opportunities for liberal education and multidisciplinary 
interactions in research and teaching, including the need to combine 
areas other than science and engineering with sciences and 
engineering in both education and research. This is supplemented in a 
more specific area by my belief that breadth in the education of 
engineers is essential.27 
                                                     
27 C. Judson King, “Let Engineers Go to College,” Issues in Science and Technology 22, no. 4 





The History of the University of California 




Westward the Course of Empire takes its Way; 
The first four Acts already past. 
A fifth shall close the Drama with the Day; 
Time’s noblest Offspring is the last. 
—George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne1 
 
It is a “University,” and not a high-school, nor a college, nor an 
academy of sciences, nor an industrial-school, which we are charged to 
build. Some of these features may, indeed, be included in or developed 
with the University; but the University means more than any or all of 
them. The University is the most comprehensive term which can be 
employed to indicate a foundation for the promotion [and] diffusion of 
knowledge—a group of agencies organized to advance the arts and 
sciences of every sort, and to train young men as scholars for all the 
intellectual callings of life. 
—Daniel Coit Gilman2 
 
It was a stunning run. When [Pat] Brown was elected, the University of 
California had two major branches, plus a couple of satellites and two 
medical schools…When he left, there were eight campuses, five medical 
schools, and scores of other operations, a “multiversity,” in President 
Clark Kerr’s newly minted word, that, in its graduate faculties and 
programs, quickly became the equal of any research university on 
                                                     
1 George Berkeley, Verses on the Prospect of Planting Arts and Learning in America (1728), 
https://perma.cc/A6DV-8SUA. “Westward the Course of Empire Takes Its Way” is also the title of a 
noted painting by Emanuel Leutze currently displayed behind the western staircase of the House 
of Representatives chamber in the US Capitol Building. 
2 Daniel C. Gilman, “The Building of the University,” Inaugural Address as President of the 




earth, an enterprise so vast, ambitious, and all-encompassing that it 




The purpose of this chapter is a selective, rather than 
comprehensive, examination of historical aspects of the University of 
California. The goal is to identify those aspects of the history that have 
had greater effects, directly or indirectly, on the development, 
enhancement, and preservation of the academic quality and reputation 
of the university. What follows in the subsequent chapters is an 
exploration of particular subject areas that relate closely to academic 
quality. They constitute topical histories, supplemented by analysis. For 
a comprehensive history of the first one hundred years of the 
University of California, see Stadtman.4 For a general collection of 
historical material, see many individual items on Calisphere5 and the 
Online Archive of California,6 as well as the University of California 
History Digital Archives.7 For an engaging short history, see Pelfrey.8 
Kerr9 and Gardner10 cover many historical aspects of their times as 
University of California president and, in the case of Kerr, chancellor of 
the Berkeley campus as well. Pelfrey covers the period of Richard 
Atkinson’s presidency, 1995–2003.11 
                                                     
3 Peter Schrag, Paradise Lost: California’s Experience, America’s Future (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1998), p. 36. 
4 Verne A. Stadtman, The University of California, 1868–1968 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970). 
5 Calisphere, California Digital Library, University of California, https://calisphere.org/. 
6 Online Archive of California (OAC), California Digital Library, University of California, 
http://www.oac.cdlib.org/. 
7 University of California History Digital Archives,  
https://web.archive.org/web/20170709235449/http://www.lib.berkeley.edu/uchistory/.  (This is 
a static website, no longer being updated.) 
8 Patricia A. Pelfrey, A Brief History of the University of California (Regents of the University of 
California; distributed by University of California Press, 2004). 
9 Clark Kerr, The Gold and the Blue: A Personal Memoir of the University of California, 1949–1967, 
vol. 1, Academic Triumphs, and vol. 2, Political Turmoil (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2001, 2003). 
10 David P. Gardner, Earning My Degree: Memoirs of an American University President (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2005). 
11 Patricia A. Pelfrey, Entrepreneurial President: Richard Atkinson and the University of California, 
1995–2003 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013). 
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THE EARLY YEARS12 
 
The University of California grew out of a small private institution 
in Oakland known as the College of California and founded in 1853 by 
Henry Durant. It is striking how close that founding year of 1853 and 
indeed the founding date of 1868 for the University of California itself 
were to the major gold rush year of 1849, when California first received 
substantial immigration through the rapid influx of a large and unruly 
population of gold seekers. Before the Bear Flag Revolution of 1846, 
California had been a sparsely populated northern portion of Mexico. 
 Seeking larger facilities, Durant and the College of California 
acquired, between 1857 and 1861, 124 acres of land along Strawberry 
Creek four miles north of Oakland, directly across San Francisco Bay 
from the Golden Gate. At a meeting of the trustees of the College of 
California in May 1866, at what is now known as Founder’s Rock on the 
new land, it was proposed that the new site of the college and the 
surrounding area be called Berkeley, in commemoration of the author 
of the lines cited at the beginning of this chapter. Durant and several 
other founders were graduates of Yale University, to which Bishop 
George Berkeley13 had been a generous donor. One of the residential 
colleges at Yale, Berkeley College, has since been given his name as 
well. The close ties of the early founders with Yale also led to the 
selection of the school colors in 1868: Yale blue and California gold.14 
 The landmark Morrill Act,15 signed by President Abraham Lincoln 
in 1862 and named for Vermont senator Justin Morrill, who had 
introduced the bill, provided federal government funding in the form of 
title to what had been federal government land (“land grants”). The 
proceeds from the sale of this land could be used toward the creation 
of public universities that would include the agricultural and 
                                                     
12 More specifics on these early years are given by Stadtman, 1970, op. cit., from whom this 
description is largely summarized. 
13 The actual pronunciation of Berkeley’s name was, by English custom, “bark-ley.” The name, 
both in California and at Yale, has been given the American pronunciation, “burk-ley.” 
14 “California Golden Bears—Traditions,” Calbears.com, https://perma.cc/3GR3-BEN9. 




mechanical (A&M) arts.16 Through an organic act of 1866, the state of 
California originally pursued the development of a college of 
agricultural, mining, and mechanical arts that would utilize the Morrill 
Act funds for the state. However, in 1867 Benjamin Silliman,17 the 
noted professor of chemistry at Yale, delivered the commencement 
address at the College of California, a ceremony in which California’s 
governor, Frederick Low, also participated. Silliman urged that, instead 
of a college of agricultural, mining, and mechanical arts, the state 
should establish a full university, including the subjects specified in the 
Morrill Act but more in the intellectually broad model of the fine 
private universities in the eastern United States. Such a structure 
would still satisfy the requirements of the Morrill Act.  
Governor Low was convinced, reversed course, and arranged with 
the state government to accept an earlier offer from Henry Durant and 
the College of California to participate in a merger, wherein the 
formerly private College of California would become the public 
university of the state and contribute its Berkeley land. A second 
organic act,18 introduced by Assemblyman John Dwinelle, was signed 
into law by Governor Henry Haight on March 23, 1868, thereby 
establishing the University of California. 
 The initial faculty of the university numbered ten people. Most 
prominent among them were John and Joseph LeConte, who had been 
respected faculty members in physics (John) and geology, botany, and 
natural history (Joseph) in Georgia and South Carolina. Both those 
states had been in the Confederate States of America during the Civil 
War, and both LeContes had served in military operations. California 
was one of the few places in the United States where Confederate 
veterans could gain employment as faculty members in substantial 
universities. The two LeContes were endorsed to the university by 
Benjamin Silliman, Joseph Henry of the Smithsonian Institution, and 
 
                                                     
16 Interestingly, the substance of the Morrill Act had been proposed in previous years, but it was 
only after the secession of the southern states at the start of the US Civil War that the proportion 
of favorable votes in the US Congress was high enough for its passage. 
17 Arthur W. Wright, “Benjamin Silliman, 1816–1885,” Biographical Memoirs, National Academy of 
Sciences, Washington, DC, 1911, https://perma.cc/R4U9-CLGU. 
18 “The Organic Act—Chapter 244 of the Statutes of 1867–1868,” https://perma.cc/J4TN-Q2CX.  
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Louis Agassiz of Harvard, three of the most prominent science 
academics of their day. John LeConte was the first (acting) president of 
the university, serving until a permanent president could be found and 
brought on board. 
 Following a somewhat bizarre initial offer to former US general 
and unsuccessful 1864 US presidential candidate George McClellan, 
and another offer, also unsuccessful, to Daniel Coit Gilman,19 secretary 
of the Sheffield Scientific School at Yale, the regents in 1870 selected 
Henry Durant as the initial president, no longer with the adjective 
“acting.” Durant served for two years until he reached age seventy. 
Following his retirement the regents tried again, and this time 
succeeded in bringing Gilman in 1872 from Yale to Berkeley as 
president of the University of California. 
 Gilman vigorously and capably undertook development of the 
university, stressing academic components. He obtained a number of 
substantial private donations, including a gift from eccentric 
philanthropist James Lick20 for what would be the largest telescope in 
the world. He also arranged with surgeon-physician Hugh Toland21 for 
affiliation of Toland’s preexisting medical college in San Francisco with 
the university. However, two disruptive episodes arose after Gilman’s 
first year. Corruption charges surrounded the construction of the 
university’s first building, North Hall. These involved a regent and not 
Gilman, but they nonetheless weakened the university. The second 
matter involved Ezra Carr, the initial professor of agriculture, who 
surreptitiously and energetically worked to better the interests of 
agriculture as he saw them. Carr stimulated and engaged the support 
of the state grange,22 joining with UC literature professor William 
Swinton to seek to return the primary focus of the university to 




                                                     
19 Fabian Franklin, The Life of Daniel Coit Gilman (New York, 1910), 
https://archive.org/details/lifeofdanielcoit00fran. 
20 “The Lick Observatory Collections Project: The Life of James Lick,”  https://perma.cc/BV29-P9C5. 
21 “Hugh Huger Toland—Biography—A History of UCSF,”  https://perma.cc/LCW3-PBDH. 
22 State granges were fraternal organizations devoted to improving the life and circumstances of 




resources for that area. As well, they wanted to modify the structure of 
the university by expanding the Board of Regents through the addition 
of members elected by popular vote from each congressional district. 
Carr and the grange also claimed mismanagement of the university, 
charging it with operating counter to the specifications of the Morrill 
Act. This effort revived the original question of whether the university 
should focus entirely, or nearly entirely, on agriculture and mechanical 
arts. It also led to an investigation of the university by a joint senate-
assembly committee of the state legislature. The issues were hotly 
contested, but the finding was for Gilman and the university.23 
 Confronted with Carr’s activities and his insubordination, Gilman 
requested that Carr resign, which Carr refused to do. The regents then 
dismissed Carr, who, however, continued to have substantial support 
from those who believed that a highly practical education was what 
was needed in such a new state. Carr, in fact, ran for and was elected 
state superintendent of public Instruction on the statewide ballot in 
1875, after his dismissal from the University of California. In that post 
he was ex officio a regent of the university from 1875 to 1880.24 Carr 
continued to work toward his desired ends. Those efforts again did not 
succeed. 
 Discouraged by these episodes and the infighting, in April 1874 
Gilman tendered his resignation with these words: “For University 
fighting I have no training; in University work I delight.”25 The regents 
persuaded Gilman to withdraw his resignation, but shortly thereafter 
he was offered the opportunity to be the initial president of the new 
Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, which he accepted. Gilman is 
generally credited with having used the launch of Johns Hopkins to 
bring the German style of research-based education to the United 
States. That concept that has flourished over time and forms the basis 
for present US research universities. 
 
                                                     
23 John Aubrey Douglass, “How and Why the University of California Got Its Autonomy,” Research 
and Occasional Papers, no. 4-15 (April 2015), https://perma.cc/8KP4-3NLE. 
24 Regents of the University of California, p. 2, University of California, https://perma.cc/J37G-
W9RZ. 
25 Douglass, 2015, loc. cit. 
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 For unrelated reasons, the state of California called a 
constitutional convention in 1878, resulting in a new state constitution 
being adopted in 1879. As part of the development of that constitution, 
the nature and structure of the University of California were again 
argued, and by a narrow margin, the existing definition and structure 
were retained. As well a condition was added that has proven over 
subsequent years to be vitally important. That condition is 
constitutional autonomy, considered further in chapter 4. 
 The early years of the University of California were turbulent, but 
brought about two decisions that have been vital to the future of the 
university. One of these was the decision to build a full university 
rather than one limited to agriculture and the mechanical arts, and the 




THE LATER 1800S 
 
A period of relatively weak and uninvolved presidents ensued for 
most of the rest of the nineteenth century along with state-funded 
budgets that were barely adequate, if that. The regents actively 
exercised control much deeper into the university than is the case 
today. One reason for that was, of course, the much smaller size.26 The 
university had not yet grown much toward the degree of intellectual 
stature that it has today. There were, however, some significant 
events. 
Eugene Hilgard. The person hired to replace Carr as professor of 
agriculture proved to be an outstanding choice. He was Eugene 
Woldemar Hilgard, a native Bavarian who had been a faculty member 
at the University of Mississippi during the Civil War and then at the 
University of Michigan. Hilgard came to California after the transfer of 
Michigan’s agricultural activities from the University of Michigan to 
Michigan State University. Overcoming the displeasure among 
California farmers with Carr’s dismissal, Hilgard developed good 
relations with them and started field stations around the state, 
                                                     




including in Davis and at what became the Kearney Field Station near 
Fresno. He promoted a scientific, rather than practical, approach to 
agriculture with well-recognized results. Hilgard became interested in 
the potential of viticulture (grape growing) and the making of superior 
wines for California. He carried out studies on control of the grape-vine 
pest phylloxera, and was influential in bringing about as of 1880 an 
annual appropriation to the university from the California legislature 
for research that could foster a California wine industry.27 Hilgard is 
also generally recognized as a key founder of the field of soil science.28 
San Francisco Affiliates. Another important development was the 
establishment of institutions affiliated with the university. At the time 
of the 1868 Organic Act, the legislature also authorized the regents to 
enter into affiliation with “any incorporated College of Medicine or 
Law, or any other special course of instruction now existing, or which 
may hereafter be created, upon such compliance as to the respective 
corporations may be deemed expedient.”29 This language was probably 
spurred by the known desire of Dr. Hugh Toland to affiliate his existing 
Toland Medical College with the university. The affiliations had the 
essential purpose of providing professional education, with degrees 
given and certified by the University of California, but at no expense to 
the state (i.e., on fully self-supporting bases). 
Several affiliations were formed, all with institutions in San 
Francisco. After substantial political maneuvering, the Toland offer was 
accepted by President Gilman in 1873. As described in chapter 10, this 
affiliated institution was eventually taken fully into the university and 
became the heart of the UC San Francisco (UCSF) campus.30 Another 
affiliation entered into by President Gilman was with the California 
College of Pharmacy in 1872 and is now reflected in the School of 
Pharmacy with UCSF. A dental school was formed and affiliated as the 
Department of Dentistry in 1881. This too is now a school within UCSF. 
 
 
                                                     
27 Maynard A. Amerine, “Hilgard and California Viticulture,” Hilgardia 33, no. 1 (July 1962), 
https://perma.cc/ZFD4-3HJD. These efforts have now led to a major industry for the state. 
28 Hans Jenny, E. W. Hilgard and the Birth of Modern Soil Science (Pisa: Agrochimica, Instituto di 
Chimica Agraria dell’Università Pisa, 1961). 
29 Stadtman, 1970, op. cit., p. 125. 
30 “UCSF History,” UC San Francisco,  https://perma.cc/ZPH9-3KKB. 
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The final health-related affiliation was with the California Veterinary 
College in 1894, lasting until 1901. The university’s one School of 
Veterinary Medicine is now a stalwart of the Davis campus. 
Another interesting and complex story of affiliation is in the field 
of law. In 1878 Serranus Hastings, a highly successful lawyer, banker, 
and businessman and an early chief justice and attorney general of 
California, obtained legislation whereby in return for his contribution of 
$100,00031 to the state treasury, the “law department of the University 
of California” would be created in his name. This legislation was 
effectively an amendment to the Organic Act of 1868, and by 
incorporation of the Organic Act into the California Constitution of 
1879 became constitutionally protected. Such an act of the legislature 
defining the structure of the university was no longer possible after the 
implementation of the 1879 constitution, because of the concept of 
constitutional autonomy (chapter 4).  
The affiliation of the Hastings College of the Law with the 
University of California remains a legal curiosity. Although it identifies 
itself as “UC Hastings College of the Law,”32 the school has its own 
state-appointed board 33  and operates in San Francisco fully 
independently of UC. It does, however, share in the various University 
of California benefit programs and generally follows the Academic 
Personnel Manual of the University of California (chapter 11). The first 
law school fully within the University of California was established by 
the regents at Berkeley in 1912, through a gift of $100,000 from 
Elizabeth Joselyn Boalt, who followed up with $365,000 for endowed 
professorships. The Berkeley Law School was known until recently as 
Boalt Hall. The university now has five law schools, including ones at 
Los Angeles, Davis, and Irvine, in addition to Berkeley and Hastings. 
Land at Parnassus Heights below Mount Sutro in San Francisco 
was donated to the university in 1895 by San Francisco mayor Adolph 
Sutro. A legislative appropriation was obtained in the same year to 
erect buildings on the site for the medical affiliates and the Hastings 
College of the Law. However, in the earlier years, only one of the 
                                                     
31 Recognize that there has been substantial inflation since 1878. 
32 “UC Hastings College of the Law,”  https://perma.cc/B8QX-V72Z. 
33 Appointment of directors is by the governor, with confirmation by the state senate required 




affiliates, the California College of Pharmacy, actually moved to the 
site, leaving space available for other purposes, which included housing 
the extensive and valuable archeological and anthropological 
collections given to the university by Regent Phoebe Apperson Hearst 
(see below). The Parnassus site thereby became the UC home of Ishi, 
the last of the California Yahi tribe, whose life was famously studied by 
UC anthropologist Alfred Kroeber.34 These collections later moved to 
what is now the Phoebe Apperson Hearst Museum of Anthropology on 
the Berkeley campus. 
Yet another affiliate was and is the San Francisco Art Institute, 
with which the regents affiliated in 1893, when the mansion of railroad 
magnate Mark Hopkins atop Nob Hill was left to the regents “for the 
exclusive uses and purposes of instruction in and illustrations of the 
Fine Arts, Music and Literature…including the maintenance of galleries, 
reading rooms, and other suitable means of such instruction and 
illustration.”35 The mansion was subsequently torn down to enable 
construction of the Mark Hopkins Hotel, and the institute was moved 
to another site in San Francisco, but the affiliation with UC remains. 
Lick Observatory. As already mentioned, another gift secured by 
Gilman during his short presidency was the commitment from James 
Lick, an eccentric and successful San Francisco businessman, for what 
was at the time to be the world’s largest telescope. The telescope was 
built between 1876 and 1888 on Mount Hamilton above San Jose, 
California, and was turned over to the regents upon completion (see 
figure 2-1). It served to launch the university toward forefront 
prominence in astronomy (chapter 9) and served as the lure to attract 
a president of UC, Edward S. Holden, who simultaneously became the 
first director of the Lick Observatory. 
 
 
THE WHEELER ERA 
 
In 1899 the regents made only their third successful venture 
outside the university and the state of California for a president, the 
                                                     
34 Theodora Kroeber, Ishi in Two Worlds: A Biography of the Last Wild Indian in North America 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961). 
35 Stadtman, 1970, op. cit., p. 138. 
The History of the University of California as It Affects Structure, Governance, and Academics 
21 
 
previous ones having been Gilman and Holden. As had been done for 
Gilman, they went to a distinguished private university of the eastern 
United States. The target was Benjamin Ide Wheeler, professor of 





Figure 2-1. The Lick Observatory, 190036 
 
 
Wheeler was aware of the history of relatively weak presidents and 
close regental control. He presented four conditions to the regents for 
his acceptance,37 as follows: 
1. That the president should be in fact, as in theory, the sole 
organ of communication between the faculty and regents 
2. That the president shall have sole initiative in appointments 
and removals of professors and other teachers and in matters 
affecting salary 
                                                     
36 “Lick Observatory,” Wikipedia, https://perma.cc/YZA8-HJ8G. 




3. That the Board, however divided in opinion during discussion, 
should in all things the president is called upon to do regarding 
the faculty, support him as a unit 
4. That the president shall be charged with the direction, subject 
to the board, of all officers and employees of the university 
The regents accepted these conditions, and Wheeler thereby 
became president for a period of twenty years (1899–1919), over twice 
as long as the service of any of his predecessors. During his time as 
president, Wheeler brought the university to distinction and stability 
on a variety of fronts. His accomplishments included building and 
establishing the role and power of the president; overseeing a major 
expansion of enrollment and faculty; enhancing and improving 
relations with the regents, the state government, and the public; 
achieving large increases in both state funding and private philanthropy 
for core needs and initiatives of the university; launching and nurturing 
the way forward to preeminent research; and improving student 
behavior and decorum while also building and supporting student 
government. 
The Progressives and Public Funding.38 During Wheeler’s time, the 
Progressive movement came into being in California, having started as 
a resistance to the Southern Pacific Railroad and other monopolizing 
practices. The Progressives were essentially a reformist movement, but 
they recognized the value of public higher education as an avenue to 
reform. Wheeler worked with the Progressives and the state 
government to obtain major increases in state funding for the 
university and obtained recognition of the principle that increased 
enrollment should bring increased state funding, replacing a previous 
procedure whereby the university had, since 1886, been budgeted 
annually one cent (later raised to two, and then three cents) for every 
hundred dollars of taxable property in the state.39  That previous 
formula had borne no relationship to enrollment or development of 
the university. The dramatic rise in state funding during Wheeler’s time 
is shown graphically in figure 2-2. It was only then that state funding 
rose far above private funding. 
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Tripartite Public Higher Education. As Douglass41 describes, it was 
also during Wheeler’s time that the California model of tripartite higher 
education took form. The concept of junior colleges, which later 
became the community colleges, arose from and was promoted by 
Professor Alexis Lange of UC and David Starr Jordan, president of 
Stanford University. That movement, plus the establishment of roles 
for the state teacher’s colleges (later the California State Colleges and 
then the California State University) served to accommodate 
enrollment that otherwise would have logically needed to be 
subsumed by the University of California and thereby enabled UC to 
concentrate more on building academic quality. As later fleshed out 
through the Master Plan of 1960 (chapter 5) the tripartite structure 
also provided economic efficiency for the state and made California a 
large-scale pioneer in transfer education. 
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Geographical and Programmatic Expansion; Building Research. 
Although Wheeler emphasized cohesion and the core community of 
the university, there were also efforts during his time to bring the 
university into new geographical areas within the state. In fact, some of 
these initiatives formed the roots from which new campuses eventually 
sprang. Several of them were enabled by generous philanthropy. 
 In 1915, at the request of Wheeler, the regents created the Board 
of Research (chapter 9) equipped with $2000, which increased by 
another $1000 each of the next two years to cover the incidental 
costs of research, such as travel. This was the first explicit funding 
of research with university funds. 
 Among the off-site agricultural research locations were the 
University Farm at Davis and the Citrus Experiment Station at 
Riverside, both founded in 1905. 
 The development of scholarship and research in the humanities 
and social sciences was substantially enhanced through growth of 
the library collection and the completion of the Doe Library in 
1911, made possible by a gift from Charles Franklin Doe that 
provided over half the construction cost. 
 The Bancroft Library, a landmark collection on the history of the 
western United States, was purchased from Hubert H. Bancroft by 
the university in 1905. 
 Phoebe Apperson Hearst42 (figure 2-3), who was a regent for 
twenty-two years, from 1897 until her death in 1919, provided the 
funds for an architectural and planning competition for the 
Berkeley campus, completed in 1899. She also supplied generous 
funding for the construction of the Hearst Memorial Mining 
Building43  (1907) on the Berkeley campus. But, perhaps most 
significant of all, she sponsored and financed numerous 
archaeological expeditions that acquired artifacts relating to 
ancient mankind. She funded the university to receive and curate 
these materials, which now form the basis for the Phoebe 
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Apperson Hearst Museum of Anthropology,44 a massive research 
collection. Mrs. Hearst was the wife of miner and US senator 
George Hearst, for whom the building was named, and the mother 






 During the period 1903 through 1912, a private organization 
funded generously by the Scripps family (newspaper publishing) 
developed a marine-biology research facility in La Jolla, just north 
of San Diego, for the use of University of California researchers. 
When it was completed, ownership of this facility was transferred 
to the Regents of the University of California. Over the years this 
institution reached great distinction. 
 Since the days of Toland, the Medical Department of the university 
had been located in what had been the affiliated Toland College of 
Medicine in San Francisco, and instruction had been given by 
practicing physicians and surgeons. A new plan for medical 
education was created in 1902. By that plan, two-year, premedical 
education was given at Berkeley, and academic departments of 
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physiology, anatomy, and pathology were created at Berkeley as 
parts of that program. Private funding was secured for buildings, 
equipment, and some endowment. This plan was important in 
three ways: (1) as a transformation of medical education into a 
form based upon fundamental sciences; (2) as a precursor to the 
Joint (Berkeley-San Francisco) Medical Program, which was 
formally created in 1971 and exists to this day;45 and (3) as the 
rationale for the establishment of three of the multitude of biology 
departments that were transformed organizationally in the 
reorganization of biosciences at Berkeley in the early 1980s (see 
chapter 12). It should be noted that the University of California 
plan of 1902 preceded the Flexner Report46 of 1910 on medical 
education, which revolutionized medical education in the United 
States into its present form. 
These various programs and facilities that came into existence during 
Wheeler’s time served as vehicles for building the roles and stature of 
the university in academic research. It was also during Wheeler’s time 
that the university undertook major faculty recruitments with the 
specific aim of building topflight involvement and stature in research. 
In the physical sciences, that started with the 1912 recruitment of 
Gilbert Newton Lewis from MIT (chapter 9). 
Philanthropy. An important point is that the University of 
California received a very substantial portion of its total revenue from 
private philanthropy in its early years, as is shown in figure 2-2. The 
percentage of private support within total revenue decreased as the 
state budget for the university grew during most of the rest of the 
twentieth century. But as of about the early 1980s, major efforts were 
made at the more established campuses to generate increased private 
support, and enhanced private support has now become a necessity, as 
state support for public universities in California and most other states 
has become constrained—less in per-student, and, in many cases, 
absolute terms. In a very real sense, the University of California has 
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now returned to the days of high dependence upon private support 
that existed at the start of the twentieth century, a point developed 





Figure 2-4. Newly emeritus UC president Benjamin Ide Wheeler 
on stage at the Greek Theater with former Princeton University president 
Woodrow Wilson, then president of the United States, 191947 
 
 
It is interesting to explore and compare the apparent motivations 
of several of the early philanthropists who supported the University of 
California as it grew. James Lick was primarily devoted to the concept 
of building the world’s largest telescope. Even though the university 
had not yet achieved distinction, the University of California was a 
convenient home for it. Hugh Toland was driven by the opportunity to 
achieve prominence and sustained distinction for his preexisting 
medical college. The affiliation with UC satisfied both of those aims. 
Phoebe Apperson Hearst, a great philanthropist, was driven by a desire 
to build the stature and capabilities of the university of her home state. 
The Scripps family was driven by both interest in marine research and 
the desire to develop the San Diego area. It was natural, then, that lead 
 
                                                     




researchers for the Scripps project would come from the University of 
California, so as to be followed by a research-driven affiliation with UC. 
The Southland. When the university was chartered in 1868, only 
about 8 percent of California’s population lived south of the Tehachapi 
Mountains (i.e., in what are now the greater Los Angeles and San Diego 
areas). By 1910, the population of the Los Angeles area exceeded that 
of the San Francisco area, and that difference widened in subsequent 
years. Because of these trends, pressures that there should be a state 
university in the Los Angeles area increased during Wheeler’s 
presidency. The effort initially took the form of a proposed bill in the 
legislature in 1911 to convert the Throop Polytechnic Institute in 
Pasadena into a state university, to be called the California Institute of 
Technology, with an independent board of trustees. The University of 
California opposed that effort, not wanting to split authority, budget, 
and efforts between two institutions, and the relevant bill was 
defeated in the legislature.48 The Southern California initiative then 
evolved toward one of having the University of California develop core 
educational activities in the Los Angeles area. In response, UC gave 
extension courses and summer offerings and explored how it might 
incorporate the Los Angeles State Normal School, which was the most 
prominent public institution in the area at the time, into the University 
of California as the Southern Branch of the university. That transfer 
occurred in 1919, at the end of Wheeler’s presidency.  
From 1919 through 1923 the Southern Branch expanded from 
giving only the first two years to giving all four years of baccalaureate 
education. This entire process of developing the southern campus was 
one of initiatives and pushing from the south, coupled with reluctance, 
resignation, and then acceptance by the university in the north. The 
Southern Branch became the University of California at Los Angeles 
(UCLA) in 1927. 
The Southern Branch episode, although hardly planned, amounted 
to tacit adoption of the concept that the single University of California 
would serve the entire state of California and would do that by having 
more than one campus. 
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Monroe Deutsch, later longtime provost of the university (1931–
47) edited a book of Wheeler’s papers and speeches pertaining to his 
administration as president.49 Henry May, longtime professor of history 
at Berkeley, wrote concerning the various approaches and philosophies 
toward education during Wheeler’s presidency.50 
 
 
THE BERKELEY REVOLUTION 
 
The conditions sought and obtained by Benjamin Ide Wheeler as 
he accepted the presidency were needed and effective for bringing the 
university community together and focusing leadership for all the 
development and building that took place during his presidency. 
However, toward the end of his term, Wheeler had come to be seen by 
many on the faculty as being overly autocratic. Although the Academic 
Senate had existed formally since the beginning of the university, 
Wheeler circumvented the senate and dealt directly with deans and 
department chairs on matters such as the hiring and promotion of 
faculty, appointments of deans and chairs, allocation of the budget, 
and even selection of members of Academic Senate committees. He 
presided over senate meetings. Wheeler could take these two latter 
roles because the bylaws of the Academic Senate then and now state, 
“The President of the University is ex officio President of the Academic 
Senate.”51 
The situation was further complicated by the fact that Wheeler 
had come under attack for his seeming German sympathies during 
World War I and had begun to show signs of senility.52 Wheeler was 
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persuaded to end his presidency in 1919. With the departure of 
Wheeler as president, the regents decided to delay the selection of a 
new president for about six months (from July to December, 1919) and 
instead invested presidential authority in a three-man administrative 
board, something that did not work well in practice. 
During the period of the troika, the Academic Senate moved to 
deal directly with the regents to enhance the role of the senate. That 
process is described in chapter 7 and resulted in establishing that the 
president should consult with the Academic Senate on appointments, 
promotions, and dismissal of faculty members and on 
recommendations to the regents of appointments of deans and 
directors. As well, it was agreed that the president should give reports 
to the senate on matters of educational policy. The regents gave 
several roles directly to the faculty, including the rights for the 
Academic Senate to determine its own membership, select its own 
chair, appoint its own committees, determine the conditions for 
admission and degrees, supervise all courses of instruction, 
recommend candidates for degrees, and advise the president on 
budget matters.53 
David Barrows, a former dean of the faculties, was selected to 
become president in December 1919. The negotiations between the 
regents and the senate were not complete at that point, and Barrows 
did not participate in those negotiations going forward. Barrows was 
generally accepting of the results, although there remained some 
contention on the senate role during the remainder of Barrow’s three-
year presidency and into the subsequent presidency (1923–30) of 
William Wallace Campbell, who had been director of the Lick 
Observatory and continued to be so during his presidency.54, 55 
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ROBERT GORDON SPROUL 
 
Following Campbell, Robert Gordon Sproul became University of 
California president for a remarkable tenure of twenty-eight years, 
from 1930 until 1958. Sproul was a legendary figure with two 
impressive personal attributes—a booming voice and an amazing 
memory for names and facts. He was also not from the faculty. His 
background was in civil engineering, in which he had a 1913 bachelor’s 
degree from the university, and in finance. Before becoming president 
at age thirty-eight, he had been simultaneously vice president for 
business and financial affairs, comptroller, secretary of the regents, and 
land agent for the university. The appointment of Sproul effectively 
resolved the issues of the functions of the Academic Senate, since it 
was natural for the senate to have its roles and influences with the 
president having no faculty background. 
An early issue for Sproul was to deal with the effects of the Great 
Depression on the university. When it became necessary to cut state 
funding by 25 percent, the regents asked the president to consider 
salary cuts for faculty and pruning of the academic program. The 
president turned to the senate for assistance through the appointment 
of a Special Committee on Educational Policy, chaired by respected 
chemistry professor Joel Hildebrand (chapter 9), to consider the issues 
and provide advice. This committee recommended a formulaic means 
of applying salary cuts across the scale of faculty salaries, ranging from 
2 percent for the lowest-paid faculty members to 7.6 percent for those 
at the top of the scale and on up to 10 percent for those with salaries 
above the scale and senior administrators.56, 57, 58 The fact that the 
particular scheme for salary reductions had been devised by the faculty 
themselves greatly defused the intensity of the issue within the 
university. The senate valued the committee so greatly that they made 
it a standing committee, which it has been ever since, now both 
university-wide and on each campus. 
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Sproul was known throughout the state and was highly effective 
both in dealing with the state government in Sacramento and in 
building and sustaining public support for the university, even during 
the difficult years of the Depression. He was continually confronted 
with desires in various quarters of the state to create four-year state-
supported institutions by means such as converting teachers’ colleges, 
upgrading community colleges, or creating non-UC campuses de novo. 
There was also the matter of the status of, and prospects for, UCLA. 
Sproul’s consistent approach was to keep the University of California as 
one university with one administration and to discourage as much as 
possible efforts to create new campuses outside the University of 
California. He initiated independent, external studies of higher 
education in California at various times. 
Despite his different background, Sproul did as much as any UC 
president, except Clark Kerr, to build the university academically. He 
promoted the growth of research at Berkeley and more hesitantly at 
UCLA, including the remarkable development of the physical sciences 
at Berkeley described in chapter 9. He was key in keeping Ernest 
Lawrence well supported and encouraging his move to big science and 
what ultimately became the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory on 
the hill east of the campus in Berkeley (chapters 9 and 13). 
World War II. Several developments associated with World War II 
and its aftermath created major and permanent changes for the 
university. As described in chapter 13, both Ernest Lawrence as an 
individual and his laboratory as an institution became vital cogs in 
national science policy and in the Manhattan Project, which produced 
the atomic bomb. Calutrons (California University tron) offered the first 
large-scale separation method for enriching uranium-235 at the Y-12 
plant in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. These devices worked on the principle 
of the mass spectrometer, akin to Lawrence’s cyclotron. The calutrons 
(figure 2-5) reflected Lawrence’s own design, salesmanship, and 
doggedness in bringing them to sufficiently reliable working status. 
Lawrence was also instrumental in the selection of Robert 
Oppenheimer, his theoretical-physicist Berkeley faculty colleague, to 
be the scientific director for the atomic bomb project at Los Alamos in 
New Mexico. As a result of Lawrence’s efforts and World War II, the 
University of California came to manage three national laboratories: 
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Los Alamos, Livermore, and the Lawrence Berkeley National 
Laboratory. The wartime efforts of Lawrence and his associates placed 
the university in a favorable position for acquiring government grants 
for research as the number of these grants grew markedly after World 
War II, launched multidisciplinary research within the university 
(chapter 14), and gave faculty members who were also scientists in the 






On the economic front, the financial stringencies of the 
Depression of the 1930s finally ended, and the state developed a 
booming economy driven by defense industries, a budgetary surplus 
that was to benefit the university greatly in the years after the war, and 
a massive surge of population brought on by the first two factors. 
Another event of the World War II era was the transfer of the 
Santa Barbara State College to the University of California in 1944, as 
described more fully in chapter 10. That transfer ultimately gave the 
university the challenge of upgrading what had been a normal school 
into a campus of a research university. With that transfer, the 
university had eight locations: the two general campuses at Berkeley 
and UCLA; the medical, dental, and nursing programs in San Francisco; 
the University Farm at Davis; the Scripps Institution of Oceanography at 
La Jolla; the Citrus Experiment Station at Riverside; the Lick 
Observatory near San Jose; and the newly acquired Santa Barbara 
Figure 2-5. The alpha 
calutron “racetrack” at the 
Y-12 Plant, Oak Ridge, 
Tennessee, 1944. These 
devices prepared the initial 
enriched uranium-238 for 









campus—as well as two affiliates, which were at that point Hastings 
and the San Francisco Art Institute. 
Post–World War II. The postwar period brought major growth for 
the University of California, with a great surge of returning veterans as 
students funded under the GI Bill 59  as well as large general 
demographic growth because of the attractiveness of the climate, 
geography, and living conditions of the state of California and the 
economic opportunities that it provided. Primarily because of the GI 
Bill, the enrollment of the University of California (all locations) swelled 
65 percent from what had been a high of 29,767 in 1939–40 before and 
during the war to 49,122 in 1948–49, which was the high point of the 
postwar surge.60  This enrollment was accommodated primarily at 
Berkeley (53 percent) and UCLA (34 percent), with the remaining 13 
percent scattered among the other locations. 
Sproul was a strong believer in maintaining the structure as one 
university and doing so through a single central administration to an 
extent that was viewed by many as extreme. His approach was to 
administer the Berkeley campus himself and then to have provosts at 
UCLA, Riverside, and Santa Barbara; however, relatively little was 
delegated to those provosts. Over time, the seemingly picayune nature 
of many of the matters that had to be sent to Berkeley for decision or 
approval by Sproul became legendary. 
Shortly after World War II, in 1947, the University of California 
Regents commissioned a study to make “recommendations to the 
Regents for a properly balanced, coordinated administration.” To carry 
this out, they chose the Public Administration Service, a nonprofit 
consulting firm serving public agencies. The report, submitted in 1948, 
recommended a decentralized structure very similar to the 
chancellorial structure now used.61 However, Sproul effectively buried 
 
                                                     
59 Glenn Altshuler and Stuart Blumin, The GI Bill: The New Deal for Veterans (Oxford University 
Press, 2009). 
60 “Enrollment,” in Verne Stadtman, ed., The Centennial Record of the University of California 
(University of California Printing Department, Regents of the University of California, 1967), 
https://perma.cc/M8UT-8VV9.  
61 Eugene C. Lee, The Origins of the Chancellorship: The Buried Report of 1948 (Center for Studies 
in Higher Education and Institute of Governmental Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 
1996), https://perma.cc/3P29-H447.   
The History of the University of California as It Affects Structure, Governance, and Academics 
35 
 
this report, and it was not until 1952, under further pressures from the 
regents and the campuses, that he reluctantly formed separate 
chancellor positions for Berkeley and UCLA and created provost 
positions for Davis, Santa Barbara, and San Francisco, along with the 
one at Riverside. He did not define those positions well and did not 
pass along any substantial responsibilities to the two chancellors. Clark 
Kerr, who was appointed as the initial Berkeley chancellor, describes62 
the situation that he encountered, along with the ways in which he 
identified and built up desirable functions, notably in planning. 
Another very positive and important development following 
World War II was the transformative decision by the US government to 
build its support of university-based research. This decision was based 
heavily upon a well-known 1945 report63 from Vannevar Bush,64 the 
head of the wartime Office of Scientific Research and Development. 
The formation of the National Science Foundation in 1950 and the 
building of the research-grant functions of today’s National Institutes 
of Health; Environmental Protection Agency; and Departments of 
Energy, Defense, Interior, Agriculture, and so forth, are the result. As 
already noted, the University of California had an advantage in securing 
support from this infusion of federal funding, through the existence 
and distinction of Lawrence’s laboratory and everything that had gone 
into it, as well as the distinguished research that had come from 
Berkeley sciences (chapter 9). Lawrence’s Laboratory further 
blossomed and branched out into other areas in the postwar period, 
most notably through creation and identification of no fewer than ten 
transuranium elements (plutonium, americium, curium, berkelium, 
californium, einsteinium, fermium, mendelevium, nobelium, and 
element 106, now known as seaborgium) by Glenn Seaborg and his 
associates, all but the first in the period from 1946 to 1968.65 
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The Loyalty Oath Controversy. Another major, yet negative, event 
for the university in the postwar period was what became known as 
the loyalty oath controversy and is described comprehensively by David 
Gardner,66 Bob Blauner,67 and, from the view of a faculty member and 
Academic Senate leader, Angus Taylor.68 This was the first of three 
events over a fifty-year period from 1946 through 1995 when the 
regents involved themselves and the university politically in very visible 
and ultimately academically damaging ways. After World War II, there 
was considerable concern within the United States about subversion of 
the government by communists. This concern became manifest in 
many different ways, including through Senator Jack Tenney’s Un-
American Activities Committee within the California legislature and 
then later the well-known activities of Senator Joseph McCarthy on the 
national level.69 Prompted by the activities of the Tenney committee in 
California, University of California Regents John Francis Neylan and 
Farnham Griffiths spurred the board to require all employees of the 
university to sign an oath of allegiance to the Constitution of the United 
States, specifically acknowledging that they were not members of the 
Communist Party or any other organization advocating overthrow of 
the US government. This was viewed by many as an attempt to use 
such a requirement to deflect accusations coming from various 
directions that the university was harboring subversives within its 
ranks. 
An insightful summary analysis of the give-and-take surrounding 
the consideration of the loyalty oath issue is given by Stadtman.70 With 
advice from the leadership of the Academic Senate, but also without an 
appreciation of the full spread of faculty opinions and the strengths 
with which they were held, President Sproul worked with the regents 
and accepted a resolution worded as follows: 
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The following oath [shall] be subscribed to by all members of 
the faculty, employees and administration of the University: 
“I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support the 
Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of 
California, and that I will faithfully discharge the duties of my 
office according to the best of my ability; that I am not a 
member of the Communist Party or under any oath, or party 
to any agreement, or under any commitment that is in 
conflict with my obligation under oath.” 
This motion was adopted by the regents unanimously at their June 
1949 meeting. 
However, when the time came for the oaths to be signed in 
September of the same year, a large portion of the faculty chose not to 
do so; only 50 percent and 40 percent of faculty members at Berkeley 
and Los Angeles, respectively, had returned signed oaths.71 Substantial 
arguments were made in various venues by faculty members in favor of 
academic freedom and against coercion and excessive intrusion. Sproul 
endeavored to moderate the situation, but the stances of the regents 
and many on the faculty hardened. In February 1950, the regents 
adopted by a 12–6 vote a resolution indicating that any faculty 
members who had not signed and returned oaths by April 30 of that 
year should be considered to have severed their relationships with the 
university as of June 30.72 On March 1, Governor Earl Warren was 
quoted as criticizing the oath requirement as being one “that any 
communist would take…and laugh,” and three days later, President 
Sproul publicly objected to the enforcement of the oath requirement. 
Yet the regents held firm (barely) with a 10–10 vote on a motion to 
rescind, which thereby failed because of the tie.73 Ultimately, after 
review and consideration of individual cases, thirty-one faculty 
members were dismissed by the regents on August 25, 1950, by a 12–
..10 vote. Among those faculty members were noted psychologist 
Edward Tolman and physicist and later UC president David Saxon. 
 
 
                                                     
71 Stadtman, 1970, op. cit., p. 329. 
72 Taylor, 2000, op. cit., p. 66. 






Figure 2-6. Faculty press conference on the loyalty oath controversy, March 1, 
1950. Joel Hildebrand is fourth from the left.74 
 
 
The nonsigners then brought suit against the regents, and the case 
was ultimately decided by the California Supreme Court in October 
1952 in favor of the nonsigners, invoking an interpretation of state law 
that no state institution could separately require loyalty oaths or 
declarations other than those prescribed for all state employees. The 
regents chose not to appeal, and the faculty members were offered 
reinstatement, restoration of sabbatical-leave and pension benefits, 
and financial settlements equal to lost compensation above what they 
had received through any interim employment elsewhere. 
The loyalty oath controversy received much coverage at the time 
and was a blot on the image of the university. Kerr,75 Stadtman,76 and 
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Geiger77 all note an incident at a board meeting of the Center for 
Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford where, spurred 
by the loyalty oath controversy, Provost Paul Buck of Harvard initiated 
discussion on “Who Will Take Berkeley’s Place in the Big Six?”—the Big 
Six being Harvard, Yale, Columbia, Chicago, Michigan, and Berkeley. 
Ultimately, Clark Kerr’s answer, “no one,” proved to be correct. 
Research Recognition. One of the main reasons that Kerr’s “no 
one” proved to be the right answer was the extremely strong 
recognition being given to Berkeley’s research accomplishments at the 
time of the loyalty oath matter and in the years following it. No fewer 
than eleven Nobel Prize recipients of that period were or had been 
Berkeley faculty members in physics and chemistry whose recognized 
work had been done at Berkeley. Starting with Ernest Lawrence in 
1939, the Nobelists included William Giauque (1949), Glenn Seaborg 
and Edwin McMillan (1951), Emilio Segré and Owen Chamberlain 
(1959), Willard Libby (1960), Donald Glaser (1960), Melvin Calvin 
(1961), and Luis Alvarez (1968). Eight of these ten were associated with 
the Lawrence Laboratory, bearing out emphatically the wisdom of 
Sproul’s massive efforts to support and retain Lawrence (chapters 9 
and 13). Although it was the Nobel Prizes in chemistry and physics that 
captured public attention, research distinction was also growing 
immensely in other disciplines at Berkeley and at the newer campuses. 
 
 
CLARK KERR’S PRESIDENCY 
 
Clark Kerr faced a number of fundamental planning and 
organizational issues when he became president of the University of 
California in 1958 following the twenty-eight-year tenure of Sproul. 
One of these involved the roles and relationships of the three different 
sectors of public higher education in California. Another centered on 
the statuses, natures of, and relations among the different UC campus 
locations around the state. A third was planning for a predicted 
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forthcoming massive surge in college-age population. He attacked 
these issues simultaneously in a highly coordinated way. 
Demographics. Underlying everything was the matter of projected 
demographics. It was estimated that the annual number of graduates 
from California high schools would increase by a striking 175 percent, 
from 123,800 to 341,400, between 1957–58 and 1974–75.78  This 
prediction took into account births in California that had already 
occurred (a 210 percent rise from 1940 to 1959) along with an estimate 
of net migration into the state over the years to come and the increase 
in eighteen-year-olds associated with that net migration. For this 
purpose it was assumed that the rates of 1945–60 would continue. 
Another unknown factor would be the change in college-going rates of 
high school graduates, and, relating to it, changes in the California 
economy and the needs of the job market. 
The California Master Plan of 1960. Handling such a surge of 
enrollment in higher education required greater agreement on the 
relative roles of the three sectors of higher education in California and 
the enrollments anticipated for each of them. The California State 
Colleges came under the State Board of Education, as did the K–12 
school system of the state. The state colleges had for the most part 
started as teachers’ colleges and had spread toward more general 
higher-education roles after 1935. They were jockeying in a relatively 
uncoordinated fashion to add master’s and doctoral degree programs 
and to strengthen their positions relative to the University of California. 
Some community colleges sought wider roles and the ability to give the 
full bachelor’s degree. There was much sporadic involvement from 
members of the legislature. 
Clark Kerr, as the new University of California president, worked 
together with state assembly member Dorothy Donohue to arrange for 
a 1959 legislative resolution asking the Liaison Committee, the 
relatively ineffective body that was charged at the time with 
coordinating higher education in California, to produce a plan for 
California higher education. Importantly, the resolution also declared a 
two-year moratorium on legislative actions pertaining to higher 
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education while this process took place. In effect, the legislature said 
that we’ll give you two years to fix it yourselves, and then if you 
haven’t done it, we will do so. 
Although Kerr was not actually on the special committee that was 
formed, he was the principal figure in the negotiations that took place. 
The result was the 1960 Master Plan for Higher Education in California, 
which looks to many like a beautifully designed de novo plan, but was 
actually the result of multifaceted negotiations and compromise. The 
Master Plan served to fix the complementary roles of the sectors of 
higher education, establish the standards for eligibility of students and 
the criteria for transfer education, and methods of coordination, 
among other aspects. The path to the Master Plan, the reasoning 
behind it, and the effects of it are discussed in more detail in chapter 5. 
The Campuses and the Structure of the University. For several 
cogent reasons, Kerr took several major and difficult steps that had the 
effect of creating the multicampus, single-university system of equal-
opportunity campuses that the university has today. One driver, of 
course, was the fact that the size and geographical spread of the 
university were such that Sproul’s structure of a single administration 
in Berkeley simply could not work well. A second large driver was the 
enormity of the demographic projections mentioned above. And a 
third driver was the discontent, especially at UCLA, about the lack of 
local autonomy and recognition. 
The earliest step taken by Kerr was to affirm equal opportunity for 
UCLA—that is, that UCLA would given the same status as the Berkeley 
campus and would be able to develop to high distinction. This did away 
with the single-flagship-campus concept that has been part of 
university planning in other states and some countries. 
In the late Sproul years, it had already been acknowledged that 
there would be enhanced undergraduate roles for Davis, Riverside, and 
Santa Barbara. Davis had been the University Farm for agricultural 
research and had already taken on undergraduate students. Riverside 
had “Watkins College” (chapter 10), which had been opened in 1954. 
Santa Barbara had been brought into UC in 1944 but had not yet been 
brought up to the nature or standards of UC. The late Sproul years had 
also seen the initial planning that led to choices of the general 




the specific sites for all three were chosen—La Jolla, the Irvine Ranch in 
Orange County, and the Cowell Ranch above Santa Cruz. 
Upon his arrival as president, Kerr worked with the regents to 
establish that all six of these other campuses—the three new ones, 
along with Davis, Riverside, and Santa Barbara—would be general 
campuses, in that they would offer a wide spectrum of educational 
opportunities and would emphasize research and graduate education 
along with undergraduate education. They too would have the equal 
opportunity that UCLA was to have. Thus the multicampus university 
composed of campuses all with equal opportunity was fully 
established. Kerr and the regents believed that this large amount of 
expansion, made in recognition of a 27,500 per-campus cap on student 
enrollments on any one campus, was what was needed to 
accommodate the demographic surge projected for the years ahead. 
Another major change made by Kerr was marked decentralization 
of governance of the university. The two chancellors of 1952 became 
chancellors for all six campuses in 1958 and for the three new 
campuses as they were formed. Academic governance and many 
administrative support functions were devolved to campuses, as is 
described in chapters 6 and 8. 
Kerr took another important and vital step for the San Francisco 
campus when he acceded to the arguments of faculty leaders at that 
campus that the first chancellor, John Saunders, should be replaced. 
This enabled the launch of the singular and vital process that led in a 
remarkably short time to the rise of UC San Francisco to the very top 
levels of research (chapter 10). 
Campus Unrest and the Dismissal of a President. In fall of 1963, 
Kerr delivered three Godkin Lectures at Harvard University. These 
lectures became the book The Uses of the University and included a 
passage79 that was later cited in retrospect by Angus Taylor:80 
The undergraduate students are coming to look on 
themselves more as a “class”; some may even feel like a 
“lumpen proletariat.” A few of the “non-conformists” have 
another kind of revolt in mind. They seek, instead to turn the 
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university, on the Latin American or Japanese models, into a 
fortress from which they can safely sally forth with impunity 
to make their attacks on society. 
This is indeed what turned out to happen in a series of events starting 
in the fall of 1964 with the Free Speech Movement (FSM) at Berkeley. 
Student activism continued through the concern with People’s Park in 
1967 and several waves of other issues, many of which involved the 
Vietnam War. The surge of activism did not end until after the large 
student movement objecting to the invasion of Cambodia in 1970 and 
the shootings at Kent State University in Ohio that same year. 
Demonstrations and actions spread to university campuses throughout 
the United States, and indeed the world, but FSM at Berkeley was 
clearly the first.  
The story of what happened at Berkeley is told in a book edited by 
Cohen and Zelnik,81 in a documentary video,82 by Kerr from his own 
viewpoint in the second volume of his memoirs,83 by Taylor84 from his 
vantage point as chair of both the Academic Council and Assembly of 
the Academic Senate at the time, and by Smelser85 from the standpoint 
of a young faculty member brought into service in the Berkeley 
chancellor’s office because of his expertise on crowd dynamics. Student 
unrest spread to other University of California campuses as well. The 
situation for the San Diego campus has been described by McGill.86 
Kerr’s approach was one of mediation and seeking compromise, 
befitting his Quaker upbringing and his experience as a labor 
negotiator. But the activists wanted attention and media coverage, not 
compromise, and they succeeded greatly in getting public attention. 
The resultant prominence made the unrest and the nature of the 
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student demands a major political issue with much backlash. Former 
movie actor Ronald Reagan ran for governor of California in 1966 with 
“cleaning up the mess at Berkeley” as one of his main campaign issues. 
After he won election and became governor in 1967, the second large 
intrusion of state politics into the University of California of the second 
half of the twentieth century occurred. In January 1967 at the first 
regents meeting following Reagan’s inauguration, Kerr was dismissed 
as president by the regents at Reagan’s instigation by a vote of 14 to 8. 
Thus the academically most transformative president since Gilman was 
summarily removed over a political issue. 
This action threw the university into an uncertain state, which 
calmed somewhat as the well-liked vice president, Harry Wellman, 





The dismissal of Clark Kerr by the UC Regents was a major point of 
transition for the University of California. It coincided with a change 
from a time of relative affluence in the state budget and in funding of 
the university by the state to a period of budget difficulties and 
uncertainty. It also is the point in time at which the academic structure, 
modus operandi, and quality-supporting aspects of the university had 
effectively become established. Interestingly, it was also (almost) the 
centennial of the university as well as two-thirds of the time from 
founding to the present day. Following Kerr’s presidency, several 
challenges to academic quality arose, financial and otherwise. The main 
focus of building academic quality now changed to maintaining 
academic quality in the face of various stresses. 
This is also the point at which the historical narratives and 
reflections of Stadtman’s book and Kerr’s memoirs leave off. The 
historical surveys available for the ensuing years are more fragmented. 
The approach of this chapter beyond this point will be to identify the 
challenges intermixed with further development and maintenance of 
academic quality, more or less chronologically and issue by issue. Many 
of these matters are developed further in the remainder of this book. 
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THE HITCH AND SAXON ERAS 
 
Charles J. Hitch, the vice president for administration of the 
university, was appointed to succeed Kerr as president in 1968. Hitch 
was also a noted scholar of economics and had been one of the “best 
and the brightest” brought into the administration of President John F. 
Kennedy, where he had served as assistant secretary and controller in 
the Department of Defense. Previously he had been with the RAND 
Corporation. Hitch was succeeded in 1975 by David Saxon, a professor 
of physics from UCLA, who had been UCLA’s executive vice chancellor 
and who had also been one of the faculty members dismissed and then 
reinstated during the loyalty oath period. Saxon served until 1983. 
The terms of both these presidents were difficult times. Hitch was 
faced with dealing with continuing student activism and the resultant 
punitive desires of government officials. He did so effectively and 
without generating rancor himself. A tribute from three of the 
University of California’s best who worked closely with him at the time 
noted that “Charlie was superb. He had the determination, the 
endurance, the integrity. His great victory was in preserving one of the 
best of all universities during one of the worst of all possible times.”87 
David Saxon was described by himself and others as “a university 
president who is still a member of the faculty and is accepted as such, 
not as a foreigner but as a native of academe,” as well as someone who 
had an immense understanding of the workings of universities.88 Both 
were very well suited to their times. 
Tightening of the California State Budget. Both Hitch and Saxon 
were faced with state budget difficulties. The budgetary stringency 
resulted from several sources. One was a general downward 
adjustment of state revenue following the postwar boom. Another was 
the negative view of the university in legislative and gubernatorial 
circles stemming from student activism. A third was the tax revolt that 
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led in 1978 to Proposition 13,89, 90, the ballot measure that sharply 
reduced property-tax revenues to the communities of the state, 
thereby necessitating allocations of state funds to keep the public 
school system in operation. Yet a fourth cause was the unusual and 
inherently volatile nature of the revenue side of the state budget, 
described in the next section. 
Keeping the university going through this fifteen-year period with 
no loss in quality was a large challenge, but that is essentially what 
happened through the perseverance of these two presidents. 
The Volatility of California State Revenues and Budget. Since the 
1978 passage of Proposition 13, along with subsequent ballot 
initiatives, California’s state revenues have become both highly 
constrained and highly volatile. This situation strongly affects state 
funding of the University of California. 
State revenues change substantially from year to year in ways that 
can be large and difficult to predict. Since there are also now limits on 
deficit spending, 91  this means that state expenditures must drop 
sharply downward in some years, unless voters approve bond issues. 
An increase in state spending during a time of boom revenue, followed 
by a downturn in revenue and resultant stringencies, led to the recall of 
Governor Gray Davis in 2003 through a vote of the electorate. 
An unusually high percentage, 60 percent, of the revenue of the 
state of California now comes from income tax. The other major 
sources are sales tax and corporation tax. About 55 percent of income 
tax revenue comes from people with annual incomes of $500,000 or 
greater; that is, about half of income tax revenue comes from the top 1 
percent of income earners.92 This is the result of a wide distribution of 
incomes within the state and a highly progressive income tax structure. 
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income from taxation, and they take advantage of them. Income tax on 
capital gains constitutes a large portion of tax liability of the highest 
earners and hence a large portion of total income tax revenue to the 
state. Capital-gains-tax revenues vary sharply from year to year 
depending upon the economy and incentives for sales of stocks and 
other properties. This is a prime factor making for the large year-to-
year volatility in state revenue. 
Further complicating the situation, only about 10 percent of 
California state expenditures are discretionary to the legislature, and 
higher education appears in that discretionary portion of the budget 
along with prisons and other needs. The remaining 90 percent of the 
budget is mandated in various ways and is thereby not subject to 
legislative control. One cause of the high percentage of mandated 
expenditures was the 1988 passage by the voters of Proposition 98,93 
which specified the portion of the state budget that must go to school 
expenditures, including both K–12 public schools and community 
colleges. Although Proposition 98 provides schools and community 
colleges a specified 40 percent of the state budget,94 other aspects of 
the nondiscretionary budget require specified absolute payments. 
Hence the variability of the discretionary portion of the budget from 
year to year becomes, as a percentage, even greater than that of the 
state budget as a whole. The developments that led to these budgetary 
restrictions in California stemmed largely from voter-initiated ballot 
measures, as described in more detail by others.95, 96 Some of the 
initiatives have mandated expenditures without supplying the 
necessary corresponding revenue source. 
Finally, as for most states in the United States, retiree benefits are 
a growing portion of the state budget, both because of the burden of 
longer lives on defined-benefit plans and because contract settlements 
with public-employee unions have at times mortgaged the future by 
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increasing retirement benefits as an alternative to increasing current 
wages. 
The history and causes of fluctuations and restrictions in state 
funding for the University of California from the end of the Kerr era to 
the present have been well summarized and depicted by Wellman.97 
The fluctuations and constraints associated with state revenue 
have had continual effects upon the University of California, as is 
described in succeeding sections. Multiyear budgeting would be one 
way of smoothing out the booms and busts. The present governor of 
California, Jerry Brown, has encouraged the buildup of a “rainy day” 
fund that can be carried over from year to year; however, it is difficult 
to keep such funds from being spent without some sort of 
constitutional protection. Greater diversification of types of taxation 
revenue would be another avenue toward reducing the volatility. 
However, given the current antipathy of the public and hence 
politicians to increased taxation, that route too is difficult and might 
necessitate a constitutional convention in order to be accomplished. 
Development Operations. Looking to the future, Saxon strongly 
encouraged the campuses to grow their development, or private fund-
raising, activities.98 Although private funds had provided half or more of 
the financial support of the one-campus university in the early years, 
public funds had been dominant since the increases of the Wheeler 
era. Furthermore, there had been, in effect, a tacit arrangement 
between the University of California and the private universities, 
notably Stanford, that organized private fund-raising was an arena left 
for the private universities with the understanding that the private 
universities would support the budget requests of the University of 
33California to the state. UCLA and UCSF changed that course and built 
up fund-raising first, as did some professional schools (Business, 
Engineering, and Law) at Berkeley. Only in 1983 did Berkeley add its 
first true vice chancellor for development, who promptly went to work 
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on the matter of private funds to lever with state funding for the 
biosciences reorganization project that is described in chapter 12. 
Admissions Issues. It was also in the Hitch and Saxon eras that 
affirmative action for admissions crystallized as an issue. This is a 
complex and sensitive matter examined in chapters 15 and 16. 
As background, California has acquired and is still developing a 
population that is extremely diverse ethnically. As of 2014 it is the 
second state of the United States (after New Mexico) where the 
Latino99 population has exceeded the white or Caucasian population.100 
For 2014, California’s population (all ages) was 38.6 percent Hispanic or 
Latino, 38.5 percent non-Hispanic white, 14.5 percent Asian, 6.5 
percent black or African American, 1.7 percent American Indian, 0.5 
percent Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander, and 3.7 percent two 
or more (i.e., mixed) races.101 
The percentages of high school graduates from these ethnic 
groups achieving eligibility for the University of California differ greatly. 
The last eligibility survey102  done by the California Postsecondary 
Commission before it was defunded in 2011 examined eligibility data 
for students graduating from high school in 2007. It found that 29.4 
percent of Asians, 14.6 percent of whites, 6.9 percent of Latinos, and 
6.3 percent of blacks were eligible for the University of California, for 
an overall eligibility rate of 13.4 percent. The large differences among 
ethnicities reflect culture and traditions, income differences, and the 
considerable differences in quality of the public school systems around 
the state. The eligibility percentages for blacks and Latinos had been 
even lower in earlier eligibility studies, in the range of 3–5 percent. 
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Such disparities have major import for public universities, since 
they by definition emphasize access and are both seen and intended as 
routes of upward mobility in society. In addition to simply being 
matters of fairness, the differences are also politically important in 
dealings with the state government. 
More or less simultaneously with the arrival of national affirmative 
action policies in the 1960s, the University of California undertook 
efforts of various sorts to increase attendance by students from the 
underrepresented groups at the university. Since eligibility 
requirements were fixed and depended upon grade point averages in 
college-going courses and standardized test scores, efforts were 
directed in two directions: (1) outreach to underrepresented 
communities to increase the achievement of eligibility by students 
from those groups and (2) special considerations for underrepresented 
groups in admissions decisions by oversubscribed campuses as they 
chose among eligible students. These activities are considered in more 
detail in chapters 15 and 16. 
Using underrepresented-minority status as a criterion for 
admissions in public universities was, is, and will continue to be a highly 
charged political issue. In 1974 a lawsuit arose over what was then the 
practice of the UC Davis Medical School to put aside 16 percent of the 
slots in its entering class for underrepresented minorities. A denied 
applicant, Allan Bakke, contended that he had qualifications that were 
superior to those of some of the minority-group applicants who were 
admitted, and that therefore he should have been admitted. The case 
went ultimately to the Supreme Court of the United States, which in a 
complex, multiopinion decision declared that the quantitative quota 
was not constitutional but that it was permissible for under-
represented-minority status to be taken into account as one among 
many factors in making university admissions decisions. The Bakke 
decision then governed admissions policies at US universities, including 
the University of California, until the adoption of the UC Regents’ 
resolutions in 1995 (see below and chapter 15).103 
 
                                                     
103 Howard Ball, The Bakke Case: Race, Education, and Affirmative Action (Lawrence, KS: University 
Press of Kansas, 2000). 
The History of the University of California as It Affects Structure, Governance, and Academics 
51 
 
THE GARDNER ERA 
 
David Gardner became president of the University of California in 
1983. In his student days at Berkeley, he had been driver for Clark Kerr 
and had written a definitive book on the loyalty oath controversy as his 
doctoral dissertation project. He had been vice president of UC for 
extended academic and public service programs and then president of 
the University of Utah before returning to the University of California 
as president. 
A Surge in the State Budget for UC. Gardner arrived almost 
simultaneously with a new governor, George Deukmejian. The two 
bonded well, and together they were able to propose and work with 
the legislature toward approval of a state budget for 1984–85 that 
increased the state operating funds for the University of California by a 
remarkable 30 percent, the largest percentage increase in the history 
of the university. The strong budgets continued throughout most of 
Gardner’s presidency and Deukmejian’s eight-year governorship, 
although budget difficulties did develop again in the last two years of 
the Gardner presidency at the start of the 1990s. The 1984–85 increase 
enabled the university to recover within a single year from the 
stringencies of the previous sixteen years. State capital budgets for the 
university also increased greatly, by a factor of nearly fifteen(!), from 
$16.5 million in 1983 to $240 million in 1993.104 In his memoirs105 and 
an oral history,106 Gardner has provided his own analysis of the ways in 
which his relationship with Deukmejian developed and the arguments 
to the governor that were persuasive. 
The enhanced budget enabled the return of faculty salaries to the 
levels corresponding to the Comparison-8 methodology (chapter 17), 
facilitated numerous academic initiatives in both education and 
research, and considerably upgraded faculty morale, which had lagged 
during the sixteen years of stringent state funding. 
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Ten-Meter Telescopes.107 One venture that had begun during 
David Saxon’s presidency and reached fruition during David Gardner’s 
presidency was the project, joint with Caltech, for construction of two 
matched and interacting ten-meter telescopes (figure 2-7) atop Mauna 
Kea on the Big Island of Hawaii. These telescopes, still the largest in the 
world, are known as the Keck telescopes, named after the person who 
endowed the donor foundation. These telescopes have enabled the UC 
campuses and Caltech to have state-of-the-art observing facilities and 
have had much to do with the stature and accomplishments in 
astronomy at Caltech and on several of the UC campuses. The 
telescopes use an innovative adaptive segmented-mirror design, 
conceived by Jerry Nelson of the University of California.108 The first 
Keck telescope had first light in 1993, and the second in 1996. The 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) became an 




Figure 2-7. The Twin Keck telescopes atop Mauna Kea, Hawaii  
(“W. M. Keck Observatory,” Wikipedia, https://perma.cc/K7ZH-AGPR) 
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The Keck telescopes have an interesting story behind their 
funding. First, a naming gift109 for the original telescope was pledged to 
David Gardner by a wealthy widow who died unexpectedly the next 
day without the papers yet having been signed. Second, it was decided 
to build a second telescope to take advantage of capabilities created by 
the use of interferometry joining the two telescopes, which also 
enabled the gift from the Keck Foundation. Third, the Keck Foundation 
decided to fund both telescopes once the second telescope was put 
forward. Fourth, the Keck Foundation decided that it would fund the 
private university (Caltech) but not the public one (UC).110 UC then 
shared costs by providing operating funds for the first twenty-five 
years. 
A subsequent project for a still larger thirty-meter telescope, also 
using the segmented-mirror design and again the largest in the world, 
is currently (2017) being carried out by a partnership consisting of 
Caltech, the University of California, and governmental organizations of 
Canada, China, India, and Japan. The Gordon and Betty Moore 
Foundation is funding both UC and Caltech for this purpose.111 The 
estimated cost as of 2010 was about $1.5 billion. The telescope is 
intended for another site atop Mauna Kea but has been caught up in 
political and legal proceedings relating to siting and permitting. The 
University of Hawaii is landlord for the mountaintop, which is also 
considered to be sacred ground by native Hawaiian people. 
Initiative for a New Campus. Projections of enrollment made 
during the 1980s recognized that rates of net in-migration to the state 
were once again increasing and that there was a steady increase in the 
“take” rate, the percentage of UC-eligible students who actually 
enrolled. Also the “echo” of the post–World War II baby boom (the 
children of the “boomers”) would begin increasing student demand 
around 1995. From the data, it was apparent that in the early 2000s 
the university would run out of capacity to accommodate all eligible 
students.112 Recognizing these facts and the lead time required for 
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creating new campuses, President Gardner devoted a meeting of the 
regents in 1988 to long-range-enrollment planning, making a case for 
up to three additional campuses to open in the early 2000s as the way 
to accommodate growth under the Master Plan while not overtaxing 
the carrying capacities of the existing campuses.113, 114 After ensuing 
explorations with the legislature and others, Gardner limited the 
initiative to one new campus, to be opened around the year 2000. 
The processes of site selection and planning for the new campus 
were started soon thereafter, proceeding forward in stages. By virtue 
of constitutional autonomy, this process was carried out within the 
university under the auspices of the UC Regents, not within the state 
government. The first step was to examine three geographical bands—
northern, central, and southern—across the state to determine by 
needs analysis and other means which general area was most 
appropriate for the new campus. The central band, specifically the San 
Joaquin Valley, was determined as the most suitable general area, since 
the Valley was the largest unserved population area of the state and 
had a participation rate at the University of California only half the 
statewide average. In 1989, the regents established a Site Selection 
Task Force composed of regents and UC administrators to analyze and 
make recommendations for a San Joaquin Valley site.115 
The process slowed down through the early 1990s as the 
university went through the period of financial stringency described 
below. But in July 1995, the process had been brought to the point 
where there were three finalists from among which a site near the city 
of Merced was chosen. The other two finalist sites were closer to the 
city of Fresno, which has over six times the population of Merced. 
Reasons for the selection of the Merced site included the donation of a 
single large plot of land, secure water rights, and a well-organized and 
effective citizens’ group supporting the campus. 
Voluntary Early Retirement Incentive Programs. In the early 
1990s, California’s economy and revenues took major downswings. 
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Starting with the 1991–92 budget, state funding for the University of 
California fell below what a continuation of prior practices would have 
provided by hundreds of millions of dollars per year, with the shortfall 
growing continually over three years. In all, from 1990 to 1996, state 
appropriations to UC dropped by 20 percent. By contrast, the 
University of California Retirement System 116  was considered 
overfunded and had even been providing a “holiday” from both 
employer and employee contributions starting in 1990 and ultimately 
lasting until 2010. The overfunding and the lack of need for 
contributions reflected what had been very successful investment of 
funds already in the plan. 
The decision was made in the final year of the Gardner presidency 
to institute a Voluntary Early Retirement Incentive Program (VERIP).117 
When the state financial situation deteriorated further the next year, a 
second such program was offered, and when state finances worsened 
further in the third year, yet another such program was offered. The 
three programs had the effect of transferring massive amounts of 
salary expenditures from the state budget to the retirement system.118 
All told, nearly two thousand faculty members and over ten thousand 
staff members accepted retirement. The most generous of these 
programs, the third, added five years of service credit and three years 
of age in the retirement formula.119 
Since slightly over 20 percent of UC’s regular faculty members 
elected retirement under the VERIPs, there could have been very large, 
negative effects on academic standing if the university had lost its most 
recognized people in academic fields or if big names had retired from 
UC and transferred to other, competing universities. As well, 
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enrollments did not decline, and thus the burdens on the remaining 
faculty members could be expected to increase. The potential effects 
of those concerns were largely offset in several ways. Taking the 
Berkeley campus as an example, there was provision for continued 
office and laboratory space for VERIP faculty retirees, including the 
creation of a new title, professor of the graduate school,120 which 
would enable retired faculty members to continue research and 
supervise students. Second, if they wished, those newly retired faculty 
members could be recalled to do teaching at a much lower cost per 
course, and many did so. The third remedy, enabled by the fact that 
the “take” rate on the third VERIP was greater than anticipated, was a 
substantial rate of hiring of new faculty members, who were at earlier 
points in their careers and thereby drew lower salaries than the VERIP 
retirees had. Since this was a time of relatively low faculty hiring by 
universities across the United States, UC found itself in the pleasant 
situation of a buyer’s market for new faculty. The loss of support staff 
members was more of a problem and caused difficulties until time and 
readjustments improved the situation. 
The University of California VERIPs of the early 1990s have now 
formed a large database for retrospection and through which possible 
effects of such programs for other institutions can be judged (see, e.g., 
Switkes121 and Pencavel122, 123). 
The VERIPs were a clear success at the time as a way out of a very 
difficult budget situation. However, they did have two problematic 
longer-term effects. The first was the shock to the retirement system, 
which became significantly less overfunded and then dropped to being 
somewhat underfunded as the years went on (see below). The second 
effect is that the success of the VERIPs in absorbing state budget cuts 
may have created an unrealistic assumption at the state level that it 
 
                                                     
120 The title was initially professor in the graduate school, but then the resultant acronym was 
recognized. 
121 Switkes, 2001, loc. cit. 
122 John Pencavel, “The Response of Employees to Severance Incentives: The University of 
California’s Faculty, 1991–94,” The Journal of Human Resources 36, no. 1 (2001), pp. 58–84.  
123 John Pencavel, “Faculty Retirement Incentives by Colleges and Universities,” pres. at TIAA-CREF 
Institute Conference, Recruitment, Retention, and Retirement: The Three R’s of Higher Education 
In the 21st Century, New York, NY, April, 2004, https://perma.cc/49LC-PZMJ.  
The History of the University of California as It Affects Structure, Governance, and Academics 
57 
 
was not so difficult for the University of California to take budget cuts 
after all. Yet the VERIPs were a one-time possibility, relating to the 
overly comfortable funding of the retirement system at the time. 
 
 
THE TURN OF THE MILLENNIUM124 
 
Jack Peltason, chancellor of the Irvine campus, became University 
of California president in 1992 upon the departure of David Gardner. 
He was followed as president by Richard Atkinson, who served as 
president from 1995 until 2003. 
Affirmative Action, Redux. In 1995, after twelve years of 
Republican governors, the Regents of the University of California were 
very largely Republican appointees, yet in a state where the legislature 
had been heavily Democratic for years. The tensions surrounding 
affirmative action for admissions and employment were stoked up 
again that year during the short-lived campaign of the California 
governor, Pete Wilson, for the Republican nomination for the 
presidency of the United States.  That time coincided with the strong 
interest of several regents in doing away with preferences of any sort 
in UC admissions and employment. In connection with the presidential 
campaign, affirmative action was seen as a ”wedge” issue125 that would 
divide and/or draw supporters of other candidates. Thus came about 
the third large intrusion of politics into University of California affairs in 
the second half of the twentieth century. 
In July of 1995, the UC Regents adopted, by substantially split 
votes, two resolutions calling for an end to any kinds of preferences, 
including by race or ethnicity, in admissions and employment. They did 
so less than sixteen months before the passage of a statewide 
referendum, Proposition 209, which would, and did, accomplish the 
same end. The regents adopted these resolutions even though 
Proposition 209 was already under development for the ballot at the 
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time. Thus the university was placed in a singular position rather than 
being left to conform to state law however the ballot proposition 
turned out. The episode has been detailed and analyzed by both 
Douglass126 and Pusser,127 and is also explored at greater length in 
chapter 15. 
Another result of the passage of these two resolutions of the UC 
Regents was a sharp split between the UC Regents and the Democratic 
legislative leadership, and in particular the Latino Caucus within the 
legislature. That split brought about political complications for the 
university on budget and other state-government matters. 
Admissions Readjustment. As is described in more detail in 
chapter 15, the UC Regents’ resolutions and the adoption of 
Proposition 209 into the California Constitution led, over several years, 
to fundamental reexaminations by the University of California of its 
eligibility and admissions requirements. The significant changes made 
were (1) addition of the top percentage of each school as eligible; (2) 
institution of a comprehensive review policy consisting of fourteen 
allowable criteria for selection among eligible students applying to 
oversubscribed campuses; and (3) a change in national testing policies 
for the SAT, spurred by President Atkinson, a well-recognized scholar 
himself in psychology. 
Educational Outreach and School Partnerships. Part of the 1995 
resolution on admissions called for a large effort to design programs 
that could increase the eligibility rates of underrepresented classes of 
students. The university convened an Outreach Task Force, described in 
chapter 16, to define appropriate programs and the associated costs. 
The 1997 report of the task force defined two primary approaches—
expanding work with individual motivated but at-risk students and 
building partnerships with schools. Both avenues for outreach were 
funded by the legislature in the next state budget, and in 2000 total 
funding for school and student outreach programs through the 
University of California rose to $328 million per year. Of that, $184 
million came from the state, with the remainder from the federal 
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government, private foundations, and individuals.128 The expectations 
associated with this funding required an enormous gearing up of 
programs carried out largely through campuses and coordinated 
university-wide at the Office of the President. Unfortunately these 
activities were cut back substantially after the peak year of 2000, in the 
face of new financial stringencies facing the state. 
The California Digital Library and Online Research. The rapid 
growth of information-technology capabilities has unleashed new, 
more powerful, and faster avenues for doing research, bringing 
substantial changes and new capabilities to scholarship in many 
different disciplines.129 A major research university must therefore give 
high priority to enabling its faculty members and students to take full 
advantage of evolving research methodologies. The University of 
California has endeavored to be at the forefront of supporting faculty 
in those ways, in line with the goal of sustaining and enhancing 
academic quality. 
As well, during the last decades of the twentieth century, the cost 
of acquisitions of books and journals for university libraries grew 
sharply. This was the result of two major factors: (1) the continued 
exponential growth of knowledge, scholarly publications, and scholarly 
journals, and (2) control of much of the scholarly publishing industry by 
a few large conglomerate companies. In addition, storage needs for 
accumulated books and journals increased so much that in 1982 the 
University of California had to create two large regional storage 
facilities, one in the north at the Richmond Field Station near Berkeley 
and one in the south at UCLA. These facilities receive overflow books 
and journals from the libraries of northern and southern campuses, 
respectively, and are coupled with a system for rapid delivery of 
materials from them to users upon request, which in turn couples with 
a system for moving library books efficiently among campuses. 
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The University of California was then a leader in creating a digital 
library and associated capabilities that would provide a diverse digital 
collection and various means of utilizing modern information 
technology for research. It did so in the form of the California Digital 
Library,130 which was launched as a project in 1997 and brought online 
in January 1999.131 This online library provides access for UC users to a 
large collection of electronic books, journals, databases, and many 
other items and provides tools for working with them. It is one of the 
largest such libraries in the world in terms of accessible materials. 
Pursuing the digital library made enormous sense for UC for several 
reasons.  
First of all, there was a need to enable faculty members to have 
full access to ways of doing research more effectively and efficiently 
and to do it from their desktop or laptop computers. As well, anything 
available electronically could offset the need for up to ten print copies 
in the individual campus libraries. The digital holdings would provide an 
instant library for the new Merced campus and indeed for any new 
and/or remote location. Furthermore the purchasing and negotiation 
power of the University as a whole could be brought to bear upon 
licensing arrangements for content of the digital library. 
In line with UC’s role of service to the state of California, the 
digital library was designed for as much use by the public as would be 
consistent with licensing limitations and was therefore named the 
California Digital Library rather than simply the University of California 
Digital Library. Public-access components of the California Digital 
Library are described in chapter 16. 
The services restricted to University of California users, remotely as 
well as all UC locations, as of March 2016 were the following: 
 Over fifty thousand licensed electronic journals and thirty thousand 
open-access electronic journals 
 Digitized books, licensed from vendors (e.g., Springer), owned, or 
open-access 
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 The UC Curation Center (UC3), 132  which provides ways for 
researchers, museums, libraries, and the like to manage digital data 
and information. Within it, the Merritt Repository Service 133 
provides an interface and storage capacity for depositing, sharing, 
managing, and preserving data long-term, including providing 
control over access and permanent identifiers (persistent URLs). 
 The UC Shared Images project,134 providing a repository of shared 
images (art, maps, architecture, and so forth) that can be used 
interchangeably for instruction in University of California courses. 
Open-Access, Electronic, and Multimedia Publishing. In response 
to soaring library costs, monopolization practices within the publishing 
industry, and desires to maximize both rapid dissemination and the 
reach of faculty publications, the University of California as of the late 
1990s began an initiative to develop alternative publication methods 
that could break the cycle whereby the university’s researchers supply 
their papers to private journals, who then use university researchers as 
(usually unpaid) reviewers and then sell the journals containing the 
universities’ own research product back to the universities. This 
initiative has coincided with the worldwide open-access movement. 
In 1991 Paul Ginsparg at the Los Alamos National Laboratory had 
started arXiv135 as an open-access repository for physics preprints. Now 
hosted at Cornell University, arXiv has expanded to a number of other 
fields and as of March 2016 had received and posted over 1.1 million e-
prints. Following this example, in 2000 the University of California 
launched eScholarship, 136  an open-access electronic repository for 
publications by University of California authors. Placement of materials 
with eScholarship is at the author’s option and is subject to prior 
copyright considerations, although UC/eScholarship does not take 
copyright ownership itself. The Academic Senate of the University of 
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California adopted a resolution137 in 2013 asking faculty members to 
grant to the university a nonexclusive, irrevocable, worldwide license 
to their research publications so that the papers may be placed into 
eScholarship for open access. This does not preclude subsequent 
publication in journals, which, however, should be compatible with the 
nonexclusive license to UC. This policy was extended and became UC 
presidential policy138 in 2015. 
eScholarship contains research papers, working papers, books, 
journals, conference proceedings, and previously published works for 
which the authors have secured, reclaimed, or retained copyright. As of 
March 2016, it had over one hundred thousand publications. 
Component units of the University of California serve as individual 
publishers, as the Berkeley Center for Studies in Higher Education is 
doing for this book, and design their own editorial policies. Open access 
is often equated with a lack of peer review, but open access and peer 
review are two independent issues, and open access does not equate 
to a lack of peer review. The publishing units can exercise whatever 
peer-review policies they choose. Units of the university can also 
publish e-books and print-on-demand (POD) hard-copy books through 
any of the many self-publishing services and then make them available 
through various marketing services. 
Development and Opening of the Merced Campus. As noted 
previously, Merced had been chosen by the UC Regents in July 1995 as 
the site for the tenth campus. As Richard Atkinson became University 
of California president in October of the same year, the question 
became when and how to move forward on the Merced campus, and 
to what degree. This was primarily a matter of forecasting state 
funding, since it would be important to move along steadily once the 
project was launched to bring the campus into being. State budget 
projections were complicated by the year-to-year volatility of the state 
budget and slow recovery from the state financial stringencies of the 
earlier 1990s. There was also the question of when the campus would 
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be needed to absorb capacity and how long a time it would take to 
develop the campus after its opening so that it could absorb the 
needed capacity. Finally, there was the universal problem associated 
with new campuses—the fact that it was seen by the nine existing 
campuses as competition for precious state resources. 
As the budget decline leveled off in the mid-1990s and the VERIP 
programs absorbed much of the budget cuts, the decision was made to 
put the Merced campus in motion. A new position, vice provost for 
academic initiatives, was created in the Office of the President in 1997, 
with the Merced campus being primary among the initiatives for that 
vice provost. An agreement was reached with the state government to 
treat funding for the Merced campus as a separate line item in the 
state budget. This had the beneficial effect of visibly reducing 
competition between the Merced project and the budget for the nine 
existing campuses, but it also subjected the funding for the Merced 
campus to more political exposure and risk, and there were indeed 
powerful people within the state government who saw Merced as a 
low-priority use of the state budget.139, 140 
The university undertook a search for a Merced chancellor and in 
1999 appointed Carol Tomlinson-Keasey, who had been vice provost 
for academic initiatives. The project continued its turbulent course, 
complicated by permitting issues built around the presence of fairy 
shrimp, an endangered species, in vernal pools on the site. That matter 
provided an avenue for environmental lawsuits from those in the area 
who objected to the creation of the campus. There was then a decision 
to move the site to an adjoining golf course that had already received 
permits, followed by a need to finance the acquisition of the golf 
course, which was done with a grant from the Packard Foundation. This 
sequence of events was further complicated by ups and downs in the 
state budget and continual political dealings back and forth with the 
state government.141, 142, 143 The new campus finally opened in fall 2005. 
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The academic organization, approach, and subsequent growth are 
described in chapter 10.  This history contrasts sharply with the 
dynamic process through which the three new campuses of the 1960s 
were created. 
Budget Partnerships and Compacts. A review of the University of 
California budget, budgeting procedures, and dealings with the state 
government on budget from the 1990s to date has been given in recent 
annual budget documents of the university.144 After the budgetary 
stringencies of the early 1990s, the approach taken by the university 
with the executive arm of the state government was to establish a 
series of partnerships and compacts, which lasted through a succession 
of three governors. An effort to stabilize funding from year to year, 
these arrangements established an expected level of state funding for 
the university that was based upon enrollment and expected costs per 
student and/or student/faculty ratio. New initiatives could also be 
proposed and would be considered to the extent that additional 
funding could be made available. This approach did indeed provide 
stability for a number of years until 2008 and thereby facilitated 
planning. 
Two problems developed with this approach. One was that the 
state legislature was not a party to the agreements and thus would 
make its own changes. If those changes were reductions from the 
governor’s proposed budget, the governor could not add them back. 
The other problem was that in years of severe reduction in state 
income, often accentuated by the volatility of the state budget, both 
the Governor and the legislature would take whatever steps were 
needed to balance the budget regardless of the agreements. Following 
several years that were already quite stringent, the Great Recession of 
2008–09 occurred and precluded funding for the compact then in place 
with Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger. The approaches to state 
budgeting since then through 2017 have been much more ad hoc. 
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Research Initiatives. Another emphasis during the Atkinson 
administration was building appreciation of University of California 
research, and thereby building support for it at the state level. The 
Industry-University Cooperative Research Program (IUCRP) (chapter 18) 
was established in 1996 and then built up through a succession of add-
on budget initiatives, reaching peak funding of $40 million annually 
from state, industrial, and UC sources.  
Another state initiative during the Atkinson years stemmed from 
the interests of Governor Gray Davis, who through his previous service 
as a regent as lieutenant governor had come to appreciate the 
contributions of University of California research to the California 
economy. In 2000 he secured appropriation of capital funds ultimately 
in the amount of $400 million to establish what are now the four 
Governor Gray Davis Institutes of Science and Innovation (chapter 14). 
The state funding drew more than the required 2:1 match from 
nonstate sources, obtained mostly from industry. The four institutes 
deal with subjects that are considered important to the future 
economy of California—telecommunications and information 
technology, quantitative biotechnology, nanoscale systems, and 
information technology research in the interest of society. 
The four institutes have served as spin-off points for new 
corporations based upon technology from the institutes. As well, at 
Berkeley the Institute for Quantitative Biotechnology served as a 
springboard for two other large, extramurally funded research 
institutes—the Energy Biosciences Institute)145 ($500 million from BP 
over ten years, see chapter 18) and the Joint BioEnergy Institute146 of 
the U. S. Department of Energy, funded at $25 million per year and 
operated by a consortium of four national laboratories (including 
Lawrence Berkeley and Lawrence Livermore) and three academic 
institutions, including the Berkeley and Davis campuses of UC.  
National Laboratories. Historically, since World War II, the 
University of California has, by contract with the US government, 
provided management of three national laboratories—the Lawrence 
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Berkeley National Laboratory, the Los Alamos National Laboratory, and, 
once it was formed in 1952, the Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory. Because the latter two laboratories carry out nuclear 
weapons research and development and because of laws establishing 
openness of information, the two weapons laboratories are objects of 
particular attention from the media. During the Atkinson era, two quite 
public issues arose in connection with the Los Alamos laboratory 
(chapter 13). The first of these dealt with accusations that a laboratory 
scientist had removed classified material from the laboratory and 
possibly delivered it outside the country. The second involved the 
temporary disappearance of two classified portable computer hard 
drives within the laboratory for six weeks. 
Ultimately, in a 2004–05 competition for contract renewal, the 
university changed its management roles at Los Alamos and Livermore 
so as to focus on scientific management, joining with industrial firms to 
create two limited-liability corporations, each to manage one of the 
weapons laboratories (chapter 13). These arrangements bring in more 
industrial and business expertise but can also dilute university 
oversight of, and involvement with, the scientific program. This, in turn, 
can lessen the value of university management. 
 
 
THE DECLINE OF STATE FUNDING AND ADJUSTMENTS TO IT 
 
The Decline of State Funding. The most marked event for the 
University of California in the early years of the new millennium was a 
sharp reduction in state funding for the university. This decline was 
part of a general national trend, but the severity of this drop for the 
University of California was accentuated by the volatility of state 
revenues, the small portion of the state budget that remained 
discretionary, and competition from other state budgeting needs.  
The extreme severity of the reduction is shown in figure 2-8, 
where results for the California State University are also shown for 
comparison. Inflation-adjusted state funding per student for UC fell 
from about $25,000 in 2000–01 to about $10,000 in 2011–12. What 
was about 23 percent of university operations funding coming from the 
state at the start of this period became about 12 percent after the 
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drop. Yet another measure of the impact of reduced state funding is 
the student-faculty ratio, which increased from 17.6 in 1989–90 to 21.1 
in 2010–11.147 More detail on the nature of the budget changes in 






Figure 2-8.  State General Fund Appropriations per Enrolled Student  
over Time, Inflation-Adjusted.149  
[UC and CSU are top and bottom curves, respectively.] 
 
Adjusting to the Situation. Accommodating to this large drop in 
state funding has been a considerable challenge, and of course there 
has been a larger issue of maintaining the academic quality and stature 
of the university through such a precipitous drop in its core budget. In 
addition to seeking and gaining operating efficiencies and reducing 
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services, the university has increased student fees (now finally formally 
called tuition), selectively increased tuition further for specialized 
programs, admitted a greater number of nonresident students, and 
raised money from other sources. The resources were no longer 
present in the retirement fund to enable further incentive-retirement 
programs. One-third of all fee increases for undergraduates has been 
designated for need-based financial aid, now limited to California 
residents, so as to preserve access to the university. 
Over the decade between 2002 and 2012, undergraduate tuition 
for California residents more than tripled, from $3,834 in 2002 to 
$12,192 in 2012.150 Separate, much higher fees were instituted for a 
number of graduate professional programs.151 In addition, fully self-
supporting graduate professional-degree programs with still larger 
tuition charges have been created.152  The tuition for nonresident 
students also increased greatly, with the annual supplement over 
resident tuition roughly doubling from $12,000 in 2002 to $23,000 in 
2012. On the other hand, the steady dedication of one-third of fee 
increases to need-based financial aid for undergraduates has kept the 
University of California campuses at the very top among US universities 
in the percentages of their students who are from low-income families, 
as measured through Pell Grant data cited and analyzed in chapter 5 
and in annual surveys presented by David Leonhardt.153 
Historically, the University of California had been quite low in 
percentage of nonresident undergraduate students in comparison with 
other major research public universities. This reflected a view within 
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and as such should be primarily available to California residents. As a 
means of coping with the reduced state appropriations, the university 
undertook to increase the number of full-fee-paying nonresident 
undergraduate students, both from other states and from other 
countries, to bring in additional funds that could help support the 
education of in-state students. As of 2015 percentages of incoming 
freshman students who were not California residents had risen to 30-
31 percent at Berkeley, UCLA, and San Diego, and 23 percent for the 
university overall. In 2017, the UC Regents limited the percentage to 
the values existing at Berkeley, San Diego, UCLA, and Irvine for the 
2017–18 academic year, and 18 percent for the other undergraduate 
campuses.154 This issue is discussed further in chapter 15. 
An example of successful generation of funding from other 
sources to support the instructional program is a $113 million Hewlett 
Foundation gift155 made to the Berkeley campus in 2007. This gift 
supported half of each of one hundred endowed chairs, for which $220 
million of matching funds were raised in return for naming the chairs. 
After $25,000 scholarly allowance for the chair holder, one-third of the 
annual proceeds from the chairs are used for graduate student 
support, and two-thirds are used for the faculty salary pool, thereby 
defraying state funds that had been used for that purpose.156 Beyond 
the graduate student support, a 4.5 percent annual yield results in a 
permanent annual offset for over $8 million for faculty salaries. 
The Retirement System. Funding of the University of California 
retirement system interplays strongly with UC’s other budget issues 
because of the large size of the retirement system and the particular 
history of funding for it. In 1990, at the start of the twenty-year period 
during which employees and the employer (i.e., the state of California) 
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did not pay into the UC Retirement Plan, the plan was funded at 137 
percent of obligations. By 2010, through the payment holiday, less 
successful investment, and the use of the assets of the plan for the 
Voluntary Early Retirement Incentive Programs (VERIPs) of the early 
1990s, the assets of the plan had dropped to 75 percent of obligations. 
Employee contributions were therefore resumed. However, the state 
did not resume annual coverage of employer contributions in the UC 
budget and left them as a major unfunded liability for the university, 
even though the state had continually funded employer contributions 
for the California State University and the community colleges. This 
placed a major additional financial burden on the university. 
In 2016 an entirely new and financially more sustainable pension 
plan157 was adopted for new employees starting July 2016. The change 
in the retirement system was necessary in order to maintain financial 
viability, since the structure of the pre-2016 defined-benefit plan was 
based on shorter anticipated lifetimes after retirement than now occur. 
However, the change also converted much of the coverage from 
defined benefit to defined contribution, thereby lessening what has 
been a considerable inducement for University of California faculty 
members to stay with the university throughout their careers.158 
 
 
TROUBLED TIMES, 2005–08 
 
Executive Compensation. In addition to facing the decline of state 
funding for the university and the issues associated with it, the 
University of California underwent a crisis of public image over 
executive compensation practices and charges of an endemic culture of 
secrecy relating to these matters. The issue actually began in 1992–93 
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with outcries over the retirement arrangements made for departing UC 
president David Gardner, as described by Pelfrey,159 articles from the 
press at the time,160 and Gardner from his own viewpoint.161 The 
essential issue was that the UC Regents had established enhanced 
retirement packages for the president and certain other senior 
executives with a requirement of a minimum duration of service for 
them to be eligible to receive it. The regents’ procedures had enabled 
this arrangement to be set up by a subcommittee of the board without 
approval by the full board or release at the time as public information. 
When Gardner actually left the presidency, he was close to, but had 
not completed, that period of service. Because of the tragic and 
unexpected death of his wife, the regents approved granting the 
retirement package despite that fact. The objections to this 
arrangement that arose both in the media and the legislature related 
to the size of the packages, the less-than-public way in which it had 
been set up, and the ultimate exception to the original terms. 
In 1992, in response to this episode, the UC Regents established 
principles for review of executive compensation.162 These principles 
included approval of all aspects of compensation in open session of the 
regents and an annual summary report on executive compensation 
from the president to the regents. 
In 2006 a major media conflagration erupted once again over 
processes, secrecy, and specific practices for executive compensation 
at the University of California.163 This situation has been analyzed in 
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depth by Pelfrey.164 One factor involved was that efforts were made to 
augment compensation in new ways beyond base pay so UC would 
remain competitive in an intense market. A second factor was reliance 
upon the annual report of executive compensation to describe full 
compensation rather than putting all aspects of compensation into the 
UC Regents’ items for individual appointments. A third factor was the 
failure to submit the required annual reports for 2004 and 2005, 
apparently due to bureaucratic oversight. The university clearly made 
mistakes here, but, as Pelfrey shows in her referenced paper, both the 
media coverage and an external audit commissioned by the Office of 
the President made the departures from policy and process look much 
more widespread and secretive than they had actually been. The 
university could have defended itself more than it actually did but 
apparently made the choice not to do so and to take a mea culpa 
approach to the state government and the public instead. 
The executive compensation crisis of 2006 placed the university in 
a bad public light with unfortunate fallouts of several sorts. There was a 
tragic suicide by a chancellor. 165  The issues concerning executive 
compensation clashed in the public eye with the severe financial 
situation of the state and the university. After a crisis of confidence in 
UC president Robert Dynes, the regents chose to elevate the university-
wide provost to a position of chief operating officer for the university 
for a year, taking on many of the president‘s duties while a search was 
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TWO PRESIDENTS FROM OUTSIDE UC, 2008 TO DATE 
 
As a result of the events of 2006 and 2007, the leadership of the 
regents concluded that a new look from outside would be valuable, 
and that the roles of the president’s office should be revisited and 
probably downsized and refocused. The UC Regents engaged Mark 
Yudof, chancellor of the University of Texas System and former 
president of the University of Minnesota. He became the first president 
without previous University of California experience since Benjamin Ide 
Wheeler. About a month and a half before the announcement of his 
appointment Yudof had written a commentary167 in the Chronicle of 
Higher Education on the subject of public-university systems, 
contrasting the limited and focused functions of the chancellor’s office 
in the University of Texas system with those of the president’s office of 
the University of California. This may have contributed or been related 
to his selection as UC president. 
Soon after his arrival, Yudof and Russell Gould, chair of the Board 
of Regents, established the Commission on the Future of the University 
of California, which carried out an extensive set of deliberations, 
culminating in a 2010 report168 that provided guidance for improving 
the match of program and resources in the years ahead. The report 
cannot be regarded as a plan in the classic sense, since it was primarily 
advisory to the other established forms of governance that are 
described in chapters 6, 7, and 8. Interestingly, Fethke and Policano in 
their book on the new financial situation for public research 
universities label this report as recommending the easy and obvious 
steps without delving into the changes in “governance structures, 
budgetary process, or reward and incentive structure that…are critical 
as universities become more self-reliant.”169 Chapter 21 explores in 
more detail the extents to which such changes are needed and feasible. 
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Restructuring of the Office of the President. Yudof did reduce the 
size and budget of the Office of the President markedly, through both 
shifting of reporting lines of programs to campuses170 and eliminating 
functions and thereby positions. During his tenure (2008–13) and the 
subsequent administration of President Janet Napolitano (2013–
present), people with more diverse experience and professional 
backgrounds were brought into high-level positions. One result was 
that the number of executive and senior vice presidents grew from 
three to six, while the number of career academics in positions of 
associate vice president or vice provost and higher was reduced from 
what had been five to three.171 These changes may have accentuated 
the view from the campuses that the Office of the President is 
nonacademic or “corporate,” a point further explored in chapter 6. 
Innovations. Two effective innovations during Yudof’s time were 
annual accountability reports and the creation of an understandable 
financial pledge to low-income students. The accountability reports,172 
the first of which was for the year 2009, provide essential public 
information on the University of California and its accomplishments 
and were designed to take the initiative in meeting growing 
accountability interests in the United States. These reports and the 
surrounding circumstances are described further in chapter 4. The 
financial pledge, known as the Blue and Gold Opportunity Plan,173 
ensures that a California-resident undergraduate student whose total 
family income is less than $80,000 a year will receive full coverage of 
tuition and fees. The Berkeley campus has taken that a step further 
with its Middle Class Access Plan (MCAP)174 for students who are 
California residents and whose family income ranges from $80,000 to 
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$150,000 annually with typical family assets. For these students, MCAP 
assures that the contribution that parents make toward the annual cost 
of a UC Berkeley education (tuition, fees, and living expenses) is capped 
at 15 percent of their total income. Middle-income access has become 
an issue because of the increases in tuition, which are not offset by Pell 
Grants, Cal Grants, and other like programs. 
Statewide Coordination. A key element of the Master Plan was a 
mechanism for statewide coordination of higher education, advisory to 
the governor and the legislature. This function was first carried out by 
the Coordinating Council for Higher Education and then the California 
Postsecondary Education Commission (CPEC). CPEC was totally 
defunded by Governor Jerry Brown as of 2011 (see chapter 4), 
reflecting his view that it was not needed. This has left California 
without a mechanism of coordination. That lack is almost surely 
unstable. If the situation is left as it is, one or more major issues will 
arise to which the answer is that there should have been better 
coordination among the sectors of California higher education. That, in 
turn, could lead to a rush toward establishing a more draconian 
mechanism of coordination with line authority—a structure which has 
worked poorly in most states that have it because of the direct impact 
of politics and political pressures on the coordination body. It would be 
much better, and a guard against such overreaction, to keep the sort of 
advisory body that CPEC has been and restore state funding to it. 
A President with a Different Background. In appointing the 
president to succeed Mark Yudof in 2013, the UC Regents went in a 
different direction, selecting and securing Janet Napolitano, the 
secretary of Homeland Security in the federal government. Before that, 
she had been governor of Arizona, and she had not previously held a 
position in the university world. She is also the first woman to be 
president of the University of California. 
There have been precedents for the appointment of research 
university presidents from other walks of life, usually from government 
but sometimes also from the military and industry. That approach has 
been analyzed by Beardsley.175  Some other recent examples are the 
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appointments of former Indiana governor Mitch Daniels as president of 
Purdue (2013), former secretary of education Margaret Spellings as 
president of the University of North Carolina System (2016), and retired 
four-star admiral William McRaven as chancellor of the University of 
Texas System (2015). Some previous instances of this sort have, at least 
in part, brought unhappiness for the institutions and individuals 
involved (e.g., Robert King, legislator and budget director of the state 
of New York, who became chancellor of the SUNY system, 2000–05176; 
Tim Wolfe, former CEO of Novell Americas, who was president of the 
University of Missouri system, 2011–15;177  and even to a degree 
Dwight Eisenhower as president of Columbia University, 1948–53178). 
Other cases have been more successful, notably former Oklahoma 
governor and US senator David Boren, who was president of the 
University of Oklahoma for twenty-four years from 1994 to 2018, and 
Robert Gates, who, following a career in the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) that culminated in his being CIA Director, became 
president of Texas A&M University (2002–06). Gates then went on to 
serve as secretary of defense under a Republican and then a 
Democratic president (2006–11).  Subsequent to that (2012 to date), 
he has been chancellor of the College of William and Mary, a largely 
ceremonial post in the British tradition. 
A rationale for the appointment of university presidents or 
chancellors with high-level experience in government is that they will 
have the ability and insights to work effectively with the leaders of the 
state government to the benefit of the university. A former governor, 
cabinet secretary, military leader, or industrial executive will also have 
experience leading and managing a large and complex organization. 
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reasons described throughout this book, institutions oriented toward 
faculty enablement and consultative governance. This structure is often 
difficult and unnatural for those who come into top university 
leadership from other walks of life. There is a large adjustment to be 
made to the expectations of shared governance, for example. 
An interesting additional consideration for a person who comes 
from a successful political career to a university presidency is that he or 
she can be considered as a logical contender for statewide or national 
office. The relations of the university with the state government and 
the media can thereby become complicated by politics associated with 
that possibility. 
With a nonacademic as president of the University of California, 
there are also implications for the continuing evolution of the 
respective roles of the university-wide and campus administrations 
(chapter 6). President Napolitano has strong background to carry out 
the responsibilities of the Office of the President in dealing with the 
state government and being the focal point for the determination and 
negotiation of the state budget for the university. However, another 
natural result is for the determination of the academic vectors of the 
university to remain all the more with the campuses, and in that sense 
the Office of the President can evolve more toward being driven by 
political and business needs, rather than academic needs. This can 
accentuate campus perceptions of a gulf of understanding between the 
Office of the President and the campuses. It is important to have 
respected long-time academics sufficiently represented in senior 
positions at the Office of the President so that their experiences are 
reflected in the decisions that are made at that level. 
 
Summary Conclusion 
The historical events that have been most important for the 
development of the academic quality and stature of the University of 
California include the following: 
 the resolution of the Gilman-Carr disputes of the 1870s to have a 
university in the model of the great eastern US universities; 
 the provision of constitutional autonomy in the California 




 the development of early research facilities such as the Lick 
Observatory and the Scripps Institution of Oceanography and the 
demonstration by Hilgard and others of the utility of research to 
the state and to agriculture; 
 the leadership of President Benjamin Ide Wheeler in emphasizing 
academic quality and securing improved funding by working with 
the Progressive movement in California state government; 
 the leadership of Armin Leuschner, Edmund O’Neill, and Wheeler 
in recruiting Gilbert Newton Lewis in 1912, leading to the rise of 
physical sciences at Berkeley to the very top (see also chapter 9); 
 the Berkeley Revolution of 1919, whereby the modern role of the 
Academic Senate was established and the nature of shared 
governance became codified (see also chapter 7); 
 Ernest Lawrence and his laboratory, which developed many 
Nobelists and set Berkeley on a path of fostering multidisciplinary 
research (see also chapters 9 and 13); 
 the development of the tripartite system of public higher education 
in California in the early twentieth century, which lessened 
undergraduate enrollment needs for the University of California 
and enabled it to focus on research and doctoral education; 
 the subsequent codification of the tripartite system so effectively 
into the Master Plan for Higher Education of 1960 (chapter 5); 
 the decisions over the years and particularly in the Kerr era (see 
also chapter 3) leading to the structure of multiple campuses all 
with the same research mission and opportunities; 
 the state budgetary surplus that stemmed from World War II, and 
the high priority given by Governors Earl Warren and Pat Brown to 
using those funds to develop public higher education in general, 
and the University of California in particular; 
 the work of Clark Kerr during his presidency to promote academic 
quality, decentralize, and institute a highly consultative governance 
structure (chapter 3); 
 furtherance of multidisciplinary research, notably through the 
Governor Gray Davis Institutes for Science and Innovation (see also 
chapter 14); 
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 diversification of the student body economically and racially 
through emphasis on access as a high priority over the last five 
decades; 
 enablement of forefront approaches to research and scholarship as 
the information age has developed, through means such as the 
California Digital Library and open-access publishing and research 
opportunities; 
 sustaining the public and research missions and quality despite 
three large political intrusions into the university over the past 
seventy years; and 
 managing through a major loss of state funding over the past 
several decades so as to sustain academic quality and diversify 








The Kerr Legacy 
 
 
Clark Kerr…created the blueprint for public higher education in the 
United States while president of the University of California system in 
the 1950s and ’60s…“Clark Kerr did for higher education what Henry 
Ford did for the automobile,” said Arthur Levine, president of Teachers 
College, Columbia University. “He mass produced low-cost quality 
education and research potential for a nation that hungered deeply for 
both.” 
 —New York Times Obituary1 
 
[Clark Kerr’s] years at the helm—from 1952 to 1958 as chancellor of the 
Berkeley campus and from 1958 to 1967 as the university’s president—
were the golden years. Berkeley rose to the peak of scientific and 
scholarly stature during this period, and the contours for the rise of the 
University of California system to its preeminent place were laid with 
the invention and the consolidation of the 1960 Master Plan for Higher 
Education. As the university’s visionary, architect, leader, entrepreneur, 
fighter, and implementer for those years, Kerr established his deserved 
reputation as one of the century’s great figures in higher education. 
 —Neil J. Smelser2 
 
The basic reality for the university is the widespread recognition that 
new knowledge is the most important factor in economic and social 
growth. We are just now perceiving that the university’s invisible 
product, knowledge, may be the most powerful single element in our 
culture, affecting the rise and fall of professions, and even of social 
classes, or regions, and even nations. 
 —Clark Kerr, in 19633 
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The fact was that I had left the presidency of the university as I had 




It is striking to recognize how much of the University of California 
as we see it today stems directly from Clark Kerr. Kerr was, after all, 
chancellor of Berkeley for only six years (1952–58) and president for 
nine years (1958–67), not unusually long times. Part of the reason for 
Kerr’s importance is timing. He was chancellor at Berkeley as the 
chancellorship began, and he was president during a period of massive 
growth and restructuring of the university. But more of the reason was 
the nature of Kerr himself. 
It was during Kerr’s time as chancellor and president that 
 the Berkeley campus completed its climb to top overall distinction, 
 the decision was made to have a university composed of multiple 
campuses, all of whom would have the same mission and the same 
opportunities for development, 
 the decision was made to proceed with the conversion of three 
existing sites (Davis, Riverside, and Santa Barbara) and three new 
sites (San Diego, Irvine, and Santa Cruz) into general campuses to 
accommodate much increased enrollment, 
 the roles of the one president and now ten chancellors were 
defined in view of that model, and 
 the current modes of consultative leadership and continual 
substantive review for advancement of faculty members came into 
being in their present forms. 
Also, beyond the University of California, Kerr was the main intellectual 
force behind the 1960 California Master Plan for Higher Education and 
was, subsequent to his UC presidency, the leader of the Carnegie 
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Commission on Higher Education and then the Carnegie Council on 
Policy Studies in Higher Education, 5  which produced an array of 
insightful and influential studies that has not subsequently been 
matched. Such a broad swath of accomplishment and initiative by any 
one person is effectively unparalleled in the definition and leadership 
of higher education in the United States. Although we will meet these 
accomplishments again at various points throughout this book, it is 
worth reiterating and summarizing them here. 
 
 
KERR’S THINKING AND VALUES 
 
In his Godkin Lectures, presented at Harvard in 1963 and written 
up in a book6 that went through five editions with added chapters and 
prefaces in each new edition, Clark Kerr presented a highly insightful 
and prescient view of the ongoing development of the modern 
American research university. Among his themes were (1) the growing 
economic and social values of knowledge generated and codified by 
universities,7 (2) the strong influences of two great forces—the land-
grant (i.e., public-university) movement and the massive growth in 
support of research by the federal government after World War II, and 
(3) the consequent development of what he called the “multiversity,” a 
complex university of many different purposes and functions, reflecting 
the societal value of knowledge, growth of multifaceted research, 
service roles, and synergies among those missions. 
Kerr recognized three successive crucial struggles and resultant 
models that the University of California had gone through during its 
history.8 The first was the contention in the 1870s that resulted in 
establishing that the university would be comprehensive, 
constitutionally autonomous, and based on the model of the great 
                                                     
5 Arthur Levine, “Clark Kerr and the Carnegie Commission and Council,” chapter 2 in Sheldon 
Rothblatt, ed., Clark Kerr’s World of Higher Education Reaches the Twenty-First Century (New 
York: Springer, 2012). 
6 Clark Kerr, The Uses of the University (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963, 1972, 
1982, 1995, 2001). 
7 See the quote at the beginning of this chapter. 
8 Clark Kerr, The Gold and the Blue: A Personal Memoir of the University of California, 1949–1967. 




private universities in the eastern United States. He denotes this as the 
Yale-Gilman model. The second struggle was during the remainder of 
the 1800s, resulting in the appointment of Benjamin Ide Wheeler as 
president in 1899 with a large transfer to the new president of 
responsibilities and functions that had previously belonged to the UC 
Regents. This strong-president model, labeled by Kerr as the Wheeler-
Sproul-Academic Senate Model, continued through the first half of the 
twentieth century and the presidency of Robert Gordon Sproul. That 
model was substantially enhanced by the buildup of research eminence 
in the physical sciences (chapter 9) and other disciplines and by the 
roles given to the Academic Senate in the Berkeley Revolution of 1919–
20. The final stage Kerr calls the Twenty-First-Century Federal Model, 
marked by a more federated rather than unitary structure of the 
campuses of the university, the growth of government support of 
academic research, and an effective national policy of universal access 






Kerr’s thinking, his manner, and his styles of leadership have been 
examined by numerous subsequent writers, among them the varied 
authors of chapters in the book9 edited by Rothblatt, authors of books 
                                                     
9 Sheldon Rothblatt, ed., Clark Kerr’s World of Higher Education Reaches the Twenty-First Century 
(New York: Springer, 2012). 
Figure 3-1. Clark Kerr (1911–2003), 
first chancellor of the Berkeley 
Campus, 1952–58, and twelfth 
president of the University of 
California, 1958–67. 
https://perma.cc/9FX6-B7ST  
The Kerr Legacy 
85 
 
stemming from the UC Center for Studies in Higher Education’s Clark 
Kerr Lecture series on the Role of Higher Education in Society,10, 11, 12, 13, 
14 and the analysis carried out by Gonzalez.15 
 
 
THE STRUCTURE OF THE UNIVERSITY 
 
Multiple Campuses with a Common Mission and Equal 
Opportunities for Development. When he became the first Berkeley 
chancellor in 1952 and especially when he became president of the 
University of California in 1958 Kerr molded the university in ways that 
set the form that it takes today. 
The UC Board of Regents had already, by degrees over time, 
established that the university would have multiple campuses. That 
understanding came into being with the establishment of the Los 
Angeles campus in 1919, the acceptance of the Santa Barbara State 
College in 1944, the opening of a College of Letters and Science at the 
site of the Citrus Experiment Station in Riverside in 1954, and the 
general recognition that activities at Davis should be expanded. But it 
was Kerr, upon his arrival as president in 1958, who decided that these 
other campuses should become full general campuses of the university 
and persuaded the UC Regents to adopt that goal. 
As is described in chapter 5, it was also Kerr, as the principal 
motivating force behind the 1960 Master Plan, who secured the 
position of the University of California as the one and only public 
research university of the state and who established that the full 
                                                     
10 Harold Shapiro, A Larger Sense of Purpose: Higher Education and Society (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2005). 
11 Charles M. Vest, The American Research University from World War II to World Wide Web: 
Governments, the Private Sector, and the Emerging Meta-University (Berkeley: University of 
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12 Hanna H. Gray, Searching for Utopia: Universities and Their Histories (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2011). 
13 Neil J. Smelser, Dynamics of the Contemporary University: Growth, Accretion, and Conflict 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013). 
14 Simon Marginson, Clark Kerr, the Global Impact of the California Idea of Public Higher Education, 
and Its Growing Crisis at Home (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2016). 
15 Cristina Gonzalez, Clark Kerr’s University of California: Leadership, Diversity, and Planning in 




research mission (i.e., “equal opportunity”) would be available to all UC 
campuses. Assigning the public-university research mission to UC 
guarded against dilution through funding for that mission being spread 
to other public institutions. It also left to UC the important 
determination of how many research-university campuses there would 
be, their sizes, and where they would be located. Furthermore, the 
formal differentiation of mission among the three public sectors of 
higher education and the codification of the transfer function, both 
accomplished by the Master Plan, assured that the California State 
University and the California Community Colleges would both carry out 
substantial amounts of public undergraduate education. This enabled 
the University of California to give the attention to graduate education 
that would mesh with and build its research mission. 
Controlling Campus Size. Another result of planning initiated by 
Kerr while he was chancellor of the Berkeley campus was to identify 
27,500 as the enrollment cap for the campus.16 This cap was then 
extended to the other campuses. The cap was set by combining 
considerations of the physical capacity of the campus with attention to 
the quality and individuality of education. When the cap was extended 
to UCLA and other campuses, it provided a backdrop for manageable 
rates of growth on individual campuses within the university, even in a 
period of large overall growth. The 27,500 enrollment cap developed in 
the 1950s crept upward over the years to become about 30,000 by the 
end of the twentieth century) and in 2017 about 40,000. But, even 
though California is by far the largest state in population, the individual 
University California campuses are still smaller than those of a number 
of other large public research universities, such as Ohio State at 65,000, 
Minnesota at 51,000, and Arizona State at 83,000, all 2014–15 figures. 
 
Capacity and Quality of New Campuses 
Planning: Near-Disaster or Triumph? Peter Hall17 in his 1982 book, 
Great Planning Disasters, calls the expansion of UC’s campuses in the 
1960s a “near disaster” and says that when he initially planned the 
book it was “on the disaster list.” To understand this surprising 
                                                     
16 Kerr, 2001, op. cit., pp. 71–82. 
17 Peter Hall, chapter 7, “Two Near-Disasters: California’s New Campuses and Britain’s National 
Library,” in Great Planning Disasters (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), pp. 152–170. 
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comment, it is important to recognize that Hall’s book was published in 
1982.  What happened was that population growth was not as great as 
in the demographic projections that had guided planning, and state 
funding for higher education in California ran into difficulties. As Hall 
relates, the birth rate in California declined in the 1960s and 1970s, and 
net migration into California in the early 1970s became one tenth the 
rate of the 1960s. Total growth in University of California enrollment 
for the five-year period between 1974 and 1978 was a mere 4.25 
percent, and enrollment actually fell from 1976 to 1977. In the late 
1970s, it looked like enrollment might actually drop in the 1980s after 
the wave from the post–World War II baby boom had gone through. In 
addition, general fiscal stringency augmented by the reactions of 
government leaders to the student activism of the 1960s led the state 
of California to tighten allocations to the university. At the time some 
concluded that it had been a mistake to launch all three new campuses 
and that the needed growth could have been accommodated to a 
greater extent on existing campuses (see, e.g., Sinsheimer18). 
The actual enrollments over time, summed for all campuses, are 
shown in figure 3-2. Note the sharp rise in the 1960s, the leveling off in 
the 1970s, a rise in the late 1980s associated with the children of the 
postwar baby boom, a dip in the mid-1990s as that echo ended, and 
finally another rise as the new millennium started, reflecting in part the 
grandchildren of the baby boomers. 
Hall’s conclusion of disaster or near-disaster was from viewpoints 
twenty or twenty-five years beyond the 1960 Master Plan. We now 
have the advantage of looking back nearly sixty years after that plan. As 
is shown in table 3-1, the new campuses of the 1960s and the 
conversions to general campuses that shortly preceded them have now 
almost fully served their purposes in terms of accommodating 
enrollment, especially when it is recognized that enrollments at Santa 
Barbara and Santa Cruz are constrained by agreements with those two 
communities. The Master Plan, originally targeted for fifteen years, has 
served now for well over fifty years.  Only recently has the state 
approached the point of being unable to sustain California public 
                                                     





higher education. The new campuses were fully needed in the last part 
of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first. Fortunately, they 
were launched when it was feasible from a financial viewpoint. It would 
not have been financially possible to have such a massive physical 
development effort at any later time. It was indeed foresighted and 
opportune that the University of California, through Kerr, chose to 
undertake the massive development efforts that he did in the 1960s. In 
that sense the new campuses of the 1960s are an unmitigated planning 
triumph. The triumph is also attested to from an academic standpoint, 
borne out by the very rapid rises of the new campuses to academic 




Figure 3-2. Total University of California fall enrollment (general campus plus 
health sciences) versus year (data from Kerr20 and “Fall Enrollment at a 
Glance”21) 
                                                     
19 Hugh D. Graham and Nancy Diamond, The Rise of American Research Universities: Elites and 
Challengers in the Postwar Era (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), pp. 149–150, 
195–196. 
20 Kerr, 2001, op. cit., appendix 3, pp. 470–471. 
21 “Fall Enrollment at a Glance,” InfoCenter, University of California, 
https://www.universityofcalifornia.edu/infocenter/fall-enrollment-glance.  




TABLE 3-1. Total enrollments of University of California campuses, fall 
201622 
 
Berkeley 40,173 Riverside           22,990 
Davis 37,397 San Diego  35,816 
Irvine 33,467 San Francisco    4,857 
Los Angeles 44,947 Santa Barbara  24,346 




GOVERNANCE AND DECISION-MAKING 
As is amplified in chapter 6, when he became president, Kerr 
decentralized many governance responsibilities to campuses, giving 
them essentially full academic responsibility for their futures and 
devolving support services as well. Although decentralization did go 
further in subsequent years, it was Kerr’s steps that set the pattern. 
Kerr replaced the more autocratic governance style of Sproul and 
his predecessors with a highly consultative approach that he denoted 
“pluralistic decision making.”23 The Academic Senate had achieved its 
roles in principle in 1919–20 but had not been fully integrated into 
decision-making processes. Kerr recognized the capabilities and 
institutional supportiveness of many faculty members and built many 
mechanisms of consultation. The Academic Senate chose to reorganize 
itself from what had been separate Northern and Southern Divisions 
into its present structure, consisting of a university-wide organization 
(to advise the presidents and vice presidents) and a division of the 
senate on each campus (to advise the chancellor and vice chancellors). 
He also set up several other consultative mechanisms, as follows.24 
 The chancellors met with the president before Regents meetings. 
This meeting evolved over time to include the senior and then 
                                                     
22 “Fall Enrollment at a Glance,” InfoCenter, University of California, 
https://www.universityofcalifornia.edu/infocenter/fall-enrollment-glance.  
23 Kerr, 2001, op. cit., pp. 191–205. 




executive vice presidents. A dinner meeting before regents 
meetings continues, and supplements monthly, day-long Council of 
Chancellors meetings with the president, provost, and the more 
senior vice presidents on the first Wednesday of each month. 
 A president’s cabinet met similarly, attended by the president, the 
vice presidents, and the three officers of the regents—the 
secretary, the treasurer, and the general counsel. This group still 
meets, now with some additional attendees. 
 A Council of ASUC (Associated Students of the University of 
California) met quarterly with the president. These meetings still 
occur intermittently. 
 There were periodic meetings of those with like functions from the 
different campuses (e.g., deans of students, deans of letters and 
science, deans of graduate divisions, librarians, etc.). These 
meetings still occur (chapter 8). 
Another innovation by Kerr as UC president was to arrange with the UC 
Regents for the chair and vice chair of the Academic Council to sit at 
the table with the regents during their meetings with full opportunity 
for participating in the discussion. This status had been sought by the 
senate since the 1919 Berkeley Revolution, but had not theretofore 
been arranged.25 It still exists. 
Yet another innovation brought by Kerr to the Berkeley campus 
during his chancellorship was the Buildings and Campus Development 
Committee (BCDC), made up of twenty-seven faculty members from a 
wide range of disciplines, to advise the chancellor and administration 
on physical planning of the campus. BCDC had numerous 
subcommittees, and Kerr indicates26 that in his time 15 percent of the 
members of the faculty were engaged in the physical planning process 
in this way. That produced a sense of faculty ownership and pride in 
the grounds and buildings of the campus. The committee still exists. 
Himself a hobbyist gardener, Kerr took pride in beautification of 
the campus, originating the concept of “the campus in the park,”27 
which persists to this day. Strawberry Creek, running through the 
campus, was cleared and landscaped. Buildings are built in clusters, 
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26 Kerr, 2001, op. cit., p. 117. 
27 Kerr, 2001, op. cit., pp. 122–123. 
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with open space in between, with judicious use of California redwoods 
and other trees to create a sense of location and privacy for the 
buildings themselves. Not all was perfect. Kerr himself28 notes the 
harsh impact of several of the massive, brutalistic concrete buildings of 
the 1960s on the campus. Those buildings had the added disadvantage 
of ultimately being found to be seismically deficient, as building codes 
for earthquake-prone zones advanced over the years on the basis of 
knowledge gained from earthquakes around the world. 
 Over the years BCDC gained the substantial additional role of 
allocating building space among units on the Berkeley campus. It was 
cochaired by the author during his years (1987–94) as provost for 
professional schools and colleges at Berkeley. While effective for 
gaining participation in the process and acceptance of decisions, BCDC 
did prove at times to be a cumbersome mechanism for dealing with 
transfers of relatively small amounts of space. 
The creation of equal-opportunity situations among campuses and 
devolution of much of administrative governance to the campuses 
reflected both Kerr’s concept of a federated university and his own 
experiences as Berkeley chancellor. He was careful to make a 
distinction between a federation and a confederation as that issue 
arose in the aftermath of the Byrne report (chapter 6) and was pushed 
by UCLA’s chancellor Franklin Murphy and others.29 
 
 
BUILDING ACADEMIC STRENGTH 
 
Kerr’s contribution to the academic development of the University 
of California was large and should not be lost among his major changes 
in structure, governance, and decision-making processes. 
                                                     
28 Kerr, 2001, op. cit., pp. 123–125. 
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As he determined what to try to do in his newly created and ill-
defined (or really nondefined) job as Berkeley chancellor, Kerr 
concentrated upon academic planning, both because it had not been 
an area of emphasis and because the Berkeley campus was entering a 
decade where both growth and faculty retirements would be 
substantial. There were over a thousand new appointments or 
promotions to tenure between 1952–52 and 1962–63.30 Kerr created 
and chaired an academic advisory committee31 composed of deans and 
Academic Senate leaders, an approach that has been repeated in 
various forms from time to time over the years at Berkeley. Working 
with this committee, he undertook a process of selective academic 
building.32 Geiger33 describes a detailed example for sociology, for 
which Berkeley had had no department at all before 1946. A strong 
leader (Herbert Blumer) was brought in from the University of Chicago 
in 1952 and made a number of distinguished appointments, resulting in 
the department being top ranked in the 1964 survey. These selective 
developments were the result of well-chosen and focused releases of 
faculty positions by Kerr to the departments, as well as judicious 
replacement, selection, and recruiting of department chairs.34 
Kerr also paid particular attention to the review process for 
appointment, promotion, and advancement of faculty members, which 
is described in chapter 11. He strengthened the criteria for that process 
by scrutinizing the recommendations that came to him from the 
Budget Committee, the Academic Senate’s reviewing body. Although 
he indicates that he never appointed, promoted, or advanced anyone 
against the advice of the Budget Committee, he did decide negatively 
on a number of cases in which the Budget Committee had 
recommended positively. He indicates that he never had a protest from 
the Budget Committee concerning these actions.35 Geiger36 states that, 
“for a time, 20% of the recommendations that had passed all other 
                                                     
30 Kerr, 2001, op. cit., p. 62. 
31 Kerr, 2001, op. cit., p. 28. 
32 Kerr, 2001, op. cit., pp. 83–89. 
33 Roger l. Geiger, Research and Relevant Knowledge: American Research Universities since World 
War II (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 80–81. 
34 Kerr, 2001, op. cit., pp. 64–65. 
35 Kerr, 2001, op. cit., p. 63. 
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hurdles were refused” by Kerr. In this way Kerr established 
substantially higher standards for review of faculty advancement cases. 
As president, starting in 1958, Kerr did much for academic 
development of campuses throughout the university. Following the 
usual search process, he selected as his successor chancellor at 
Berkeley Glenn Seaborg, the Nobel Prize–winning chemistry professor 
and co-discoverer of plutonium, which meant that high academic 
standards comparable to Kerr’s own would continue to be applied to 
faculty personnel decisions. In similar fashion his selection for 
chancellor at Santa Barbara, where academic upgrading was a major 
issue, was Vernon Cheadle, who would similarly delve into personnel 
cases and exercise high standards of his own beyond the selectivity 
exerted by the Santa Barbara Committee on Academic Personnel 
(chapter 10). For the three new campuses—San Diego, Irvine, and 
Santa Cruz—Kerr worked with the Academic Senate to create the three 
faculty committees that served as the first Academic Senates for those 
campuses. That approach was repeated for the subsequent Merced 
campus. He was generally accepting and supportive of the ambitious 
Revelle plan for the San Diego campus, described in chapter 10, over 
the objections of chancellors and some regents who thought the 
approach to be too elitist and expensive. That plan led to the 
spectacular academic development of the San Diego campus. Seeking a 
superior education for undergraduates within a large public research 
university, he worked with Dean McHenry to create, launch, and 
cultivate the unique experiment of the Santa Cruz campus, which is 
also described in chapter 10. And, finally, he carried out the difficult 
removal of Chancellor John Saunders at UCSF when convinced of the 
academic need by a senior faculty group (again, chapter 10). 
 In the 1963 Godkin Lectures at Harvard, Kerr displayed a deep 
recognition of the influences that would come from massive support of 
university research by the federal government. In his structuring of 
university governance and administration, he factored research in with 
other academic endeavors, keeping as much integration of research 
with the rest of the academic world as possible. In line with what 
happened at other leading research universities, it was not until the 
1980s that the position vice chancellor for research was established at 










Clark Kerr defined and put into place what is essentially the 
modern version of the University of California and built the 
wherewithal for developing and sustaining academic quality, including 
 the structure of multiple campuses all with the same research 
mission and equal opportunity; 
 ambitious conversion of three specialized sites and three entirely 
new campuses, all to become general campuses, thereby providing 
enrollment capacity for sixty years ahead; 
 decentralized governance with the natures and scopes of academic 
programs defined by campuses individually, subject to presidential 
and regental approval of new colleges, schools, and programmatic 
initiatives with substantial budgetary impact; 
 highly consultative methods of decision-making; 
 substantial emphasis on building academic quality, including high 
standards and active involvement with and strengthening of the 
Academic Senate’s roles in the academic appointment, promotion, 
and advancement processes; and 
 strong involvement of the Academic Senate in the initial 
development of the three new campuses—San Diego, Irvine, and 




                                                     






Interactions with State Government: 
Constitutional Status and Oversight 
 
It will be a dangerous, a most dangerous experiment to hold these 
institutions subject to the rise and fall of popular parties, and the 
fluctuation of political opinions…Benefactors will have no certainty of 
effecting the object of their bounty; and learned men will be deterred 
from devoting themselves to the service of such institutions, from the 
precarious titles of their officers. Colleges and halls will be deserted by 
all better spirits, and become a theater for the contention of politics. 




The two greatest gifts to the University of California have been the 
institutional autonomy given to its Board of Regents in the Constitution 
of 1878 and the unprecedented grant of authority the board assigned 
to the Academic Senate in 1920. These two gifts constitute the 




[The University of California is a] constituent corporation…equal and 
coordinate with the legislature, the judiciary and the executive. 
—Edmund G. (Pat) Brown, while Attorney General of California3 
                                                     
1 Daniel Webster, “The Dartmouth College Case,” argument before the Supreme Court of the 
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Webster (Boston: Little, Brown & Co.), 
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We should be accountable to the Legislature, the parents, the 
taxpayers, the students. If someone says, did you have a good year at 
UC Santa Barbara, or did the Office of the President have a good year, 
or how is a particular research program doing, we ought not get away 
with, “We’re doing great, we had a good year, and if you just sent more 
money we’d be in fabulous shape.” People deserve an honest answer to 
the question of how you’re doing, and it needs to be backed up by 
statistical data. 




The public universities of the United States are creatures of the 
individual states rather than the federal (national) government. They 
are chartered by the states, making use of the provisions of the Morrill 
Act of 1862.5 They are overseen by the states under conditions defined 
by the individual states. The roles of the national government are 
largely limited to three areas—provision of financial aid to needy 
students through Pell grants and other means; sponsorship and funding 
of university research by specific government agencies; and regulation 
in areas such as safety, employee rights, and environmental laws. 
The relationship of public universities to the state governments is 
largely defined in four different ways: (1) the constitutional or charter 
status of the public university, (2) the composition and means of 
appointment to the governing board, (3) the mechanism of ongoing 
coordination and oversight, and (4) accountability measures that may 
be used in budgeting or in other ways. We shall consider each of the 
four areas in this chapter, with particular attention to the situation for 
the University of California, along with benefits and problems. 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
University, p. 487, footnote 16, eScholarship, University of California, 2014, 
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The structures for public higher education within the individual 
states of the United States differ greatly and do change from time to 
time. The Education Commission of the States (ECS) maintains an up-
to-date database of the structures and the oversight and coordination 
mechanisms for the fifty individual states of the United States.6 A 
survey report on the subject has been produced by the Midwestern 
Higher Education Compact, focused upon those states that compose 
the compact.7 A book8 edited by Tierney explores the complexities and 
variability of state governance of higher education in the United States. 
 
 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND/OR CHARTER STATUS 
 
Constitutional Autonomy 
The University of California is one of the few public universities in 
the United States or indeed the world to have a full form of 
constitutional autonomy. Only the fifteen public universities in 
Michigan9 and the University of Minnesota have comparable status 
within the United States.10 
 The Genesis of Constitutional Autonomy for the University of 
California. The contentions involving Daniel Coit Gilman, the State 
Grange, Ezra Carr, and others described in chapter 2 were still fresh in 
the minds of those involved in setting the second constitution for the 
state of California, which was developed through a constitutional 
convention in 1878–79. As a result, there was a considerable 
awareness of the issues surrounding the new university as well as a 
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8 William G. Tierney, ed., Governance and the Public Good (Albany, NY: State University of New 
York Press, 2006). 
9 “Public Colleges and Universities in Michigan: MEDC,” https://perma.cc/6FZ5-3QCT.  
10 N. H. Hutchens, “Preserving the Independence of Public Higher Education: An Examination of 
State Constitutional Autonomy Provisions for Public Colleges and Universities,” Journal of College 





strong desire by some of the people involved to protect the university 
from further political influence or domination. 
Douglass 11  describes how constitutional autonomy for the 
University of California came about during this constitutional 
convention. The 152 participants were divided among several political 
categories—fifty-one from the new Workingmen’s Party, eleven 
Republicans, ten Democrats, and two Independents, along with 
seventy-eight delegates who were formally nonpartisan and for the 
most part farmers and lawyers. The farmers were largely supporters of 
the State Grange of California. Continuing the stresses from the Carr-
Gilman contentions, the Grange and the Workingmen’s Party both 
wanted to constrain the university to be a vocationally oriented 
institution with no research mission and little or no liberal arts or 
graduate programs. The original higher-education draft for the new 
constitution called for that status. However, there was an education 
committee designated for the convention, and it was chaired by Joseph 
Winans, a nonpartisan lawyer from San Francisco, who chaired that 
city’s board of education and was also a regent of the University of 
California. Winans and a young UC graduate named Jacob Freud, who 
was a Workingmen’s Party delegate but broke with the party on this 
issue, argued forcefully for a Gilman-like position where the university 
would instead be “a public trust” and would thereby have the freedom 
to become like the great eastern universities. A key argument was that 
the University of Michigan had in 1849 been given constitutional status 
as a “coordinate branch of state government” and had become the 
most successful and effective of the state universities. Much jockeying 
back and forth occurred as the constitutional fate of the university 
swung between these two extremes. Ultimately, Winans, the guiding 
strategist, took advantage of the absence of key opposition leaders in 
the final days of the convention to steer the public-trust language to 
adoption. 
                                                     
11 John A. Douglass, “How and Why the University of California Got Its Autonomy,” Center for 
Studies in Higher Education, Research & Occasional Papers, no. 4.15 (April 2015), Center for 
Studies in Higher Education, University of California, Berkeley, CA, https://perma.cc/V99U-QMS2.  
See also, John A. Douglass, The California Idea and American Higher Education (Stanford 
University Press, 2000), pp. 61–69. 




What is striking about this history is that, without Winans, the 
issues almost certainly would have worked out the opposite way, 
toward a vocationally oriented institution with much control by the 
state government. Joseph Winans is a largely unrecognized hero of the 
University of California. 
The Substance of Constitutional Autonomy for the University of 
California. Article IX of the California Constitution is devoted to 
education, and Section 9 of Article IX to the University of California. The 
pertinent original (1879) language of Article IX, Section 9, with the key 
language for our purposes in bold, was as follows: 
The University of California shall constitute a public trust, and 
its organization and government shall be perpetually 
continued in the form and character prescribed by the 
Organic Act creating the same, passed March twenty-third, 
eighteen hundred and sixty-eight (and the several Acts 
amendatory thereof), subject only to such legislative control 
as may be necessary to insure compliance with the terms of 
its endowment, and the proper investment and security of 
its funds. It shall be entirely independent of all political or 
sectarian influence, and kept free therefrom in the 
appointment of its Regents, and in the administration of its 
affairs; provided, that all the moneys derived from the sale of 
the public lands donated to this State by Act of Congress, 
approved July second, eighteen hundred and sixty-two (and 
the several Acts amendatory thereof), shall be invested as 
provided by said Acts of Congress, and the interest of said 
moneys shall be inviolably appropriated to the endowment, 
support, and maintenance of at least one College of 
Agriculture, where the leading objects shall be (without 
excluding other scientific and classical studies, and including 
military tactics) to teach such branches of learning as are 
related to scientific and practical agriculture and the 
mechanic arts, in accordance with the requirements and 
conditions of said Acts of Congress; and the Legislature shall 
provide that if, through neglect, misappropriation, or any 
other contingency, any portion of the funds so set apart shall 





lost or misappropriated, so that the principal thereof shall 
remain forever undiminished. No person shall be debarred 
admission to any of the collegiate departments of the 
University on account of sex. 12 
The last sentence was remarkably forward-looking for the time. The 
Organic Act of 196813 referenced in this section served to create and 
organize the University of California (see chapter 2). The referenced act 
of Congress was the Morrill Act of 1862. 
In 1918, during the time of Benjamin Ide Wheeler’s presidency, 
Article IX, Section 9, was strengthened by adding language further 
restricting legislative control; was changed to omit mention of the 
Organic Act, thereby removing that act from constitutional status; and 
added the president of the alumni association to the Board of 
Regents.14 Through this and other amendments over the years,15 the 
current comparable language of Article IX, Section 9, has become the 
following,16 again with the key language in bold: 
The University of California shall constitute a public trust, to 
be administered by the existing corporation known as “The 
Regents of the University of California,” with full powers of 
organization and government, subject only to such 
legislative control as may be necessary to insure the security 
of its funds and compliance with the terms of the 
endowments of the university and such competitive bidding 
procedures as may be made applicable to the university by 
statute for the letting of construction contracts, sales of real 
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Adherence to state competitive bidding procedures was added by 
amendment in 1976. 
The Importance of Constitutional Autonomy for the University. 
Its standing as a public trust “with full powers of organization and 
government” and with the stated limitations on legislative influences 
has been crucial for the development of the university. It gives the 
Regents of the University of California a status and role that is unique 
within the state government and rare within the sphere of public 
higher education, empowering them to develop and operate the 
university as they see fit. Put another way, except for the specific 
exceptions stated in the constitution, legislation cannot be enacted 
that requires the University of California to do something. That can be 
done for the California State University and the California Community 
Colleges, which are chartered through statute, but legislation of that 
sort can only ask the Regents of the University of California to consider 
doing it. 
Aside from the public universities in Michigan and the University 
of Minnesota, universities in other states have substantially lesser 
degrees of constitutional autonomy, ambiguous situations surrounding 
constitutional autonomy, or no constitutional autonomy at all. 
Reviews, surveys, and legal analyses of constitutional autonomy for 
public universities in the United States have been written by 
Hutchens,17 Beckham,18 and Glenny and Dalglish.19 The latter authors 
also note ways in which constitutional autonomy can be and has been 
eroded over time, primarily through budget-related actions. 
Constitutional autonomy protects the academic enterprise in many 
ways. Some of the critical areas where legislative influence has been 
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California Community Colleges but that are protected for the University 
of California are 
 what may and may not be taught, 
 flexibility in use of budget, 
 whether, when, and where to establish new campuses, 
 the right to all planning, 
 autonomy for determining academic appointments, 
promotions, and advancement, 
 determination of salaries and salary scales, and 
 the establishment of tuition and fees, although the levels of 
these are often postulated within state budget language. 
The regents have often, but by no means always, chosen to conform to 
legislation that has been passed for the other public sectors of higher 
education and which they have been asked to consider. But, crucially, 
they do make individual deliberations and explicit decisions on all such 
issues. 
The list of specific instances in which constitutional autonomy has 
been important and even crucial for the University of California would 
be long. Four examples from recent decades display the value. 
 During the period 1989–2005, the University of California 
determined the need for at least one additional campus, 
conducted a detailed site-selection process, and determined 
the start-up schedule and methodology for the new campus, 
which ended up opening in 2005 in Merced. There are many 
ways in which constitutional autonomy protected that process. 
It enabled the regents to determine the need for the campus 
through academic and fiscal criteria rather than allowing the 
legislature to determine the need through political criteria. It 
enabled the site to be selected by an internal process and the 
regents, without undue influence from legislators who would 
seek a campus in their own district. It allowed the university to 
determine when there was sufficient prospective budget to 
enable a start on the project. And it enabled the university to 
determine what subjects would be offered, when each would 
be started, and the order in which faculty would be hired. 
 In the period 1988–94, the Berkeley campus carried out an 
extensive series of academic reviews of the School of Library 




and Information Studies (see chapter 12). These eventually 
resulted in the closure of the school and the creation of a new 
School of Information Management and Systems (now School 
of Information), which has addressed the growing field of 
information organization and use. As the continuation of the 
old school was threatened, there was a very large letter-writing 
campaign organized by librarians and their supporters 
throughout the state aimed at government officials as well as 
UC administrators. In the absence of constitutional autonomy, 
there would almost certainly have been legislative action on 
behalf of these constituents to fend off the closure and/or 
substantial alteration of the then-existing school. The ability of 
the university to define, control, and modify its own programs 
has kept the Berkeley campus at the forefront of one of today’s 
fastest growing fields. 
 In July 1995 the regents adopted two resolutions that banned 
consideration of race, ethnicity, and other demographic factors 
in employment and admissions at the University of California 
(see chapter 15). At the same time, the regents chartered 
programs of outreach that would be designed to improve the 
opportunities and abilities of students from all backgrounds in 
the state to attend UC (see chapter 16). There are a number of 
ways in which the state government and politics would 
probably have entered the situation in the absence of 
constitutional autonomy. For one, given that the Democratic 
Party had large majorities in both houses of the legislature, 
there would probably have been a strong legislative activity 
seeking to overturn the regents’ resolutions. Secondly, there 
would likely have been various resolutions seeking to define or 
limit UC’s new admissions policies. And third, disagreements 
between Republicans and Democrats over the relative merits 
of outreach to schools as opposed to outreach directly to 
students and families would surely have resulted in legislative 
actions seeking to define and limit the initiatives.  
 In 2009, in the aftermath of concern in the media about the 
size of salaries that had recently been approved by the regents 





Legislature proposed a constitutional amendment that would 
remove the constitutional autonomy of the university. There 
was clear political motivation for this action, both because of 
the linkage to the very specific issue of the two salaries and 
because of the strong support of several labor unions for the 
proposal. 20  If constitutional autonomy were removed, the 
unions could exert much more direct pressure in labor 
negotiations with the university by working through the 
legislature, where unions are major financial supporters of 
Democrats and therefore have strong influence with them. 
Amending the state constitution through the legislature 
requires two-thirds votes of both houses of the legislature, 
followed by passage by a majority on the general ballot, and 
the proposal did not progress beyond the initial stage. Thus the 
existence of constitutional autonomy served to protect against 
an essentially political action that would have removed 
constitutional autonomy and at the same time would have 
placed the university in a much more vulnerable position in 
labor negotiations. 
Political Influences, Nonetheless. Constitutional autonomy is not 
all-protective. First of all, there is the annual state budget process, and 
the legislature and governor can and often do endeavor to influence 
the university through that funding process. Indeed, the annual budget 
hearings for the university before the legislature most often equate to 
a series of hearings on various specific topics of interest to individual 
legislators and other government officials rather than covering the 
entire budget, per se. But, except for relatively few line items, the 
actual uses of the budget remain in the regents’ control. 
A second way in which political influences can enter is through 
influence of the governor on the regents, in particular those regents 
who were appointed by that governor. Notable examples during the 
past fifty years already mentioned in chapter 2 include the dismissal of 
Clark Kerr as president in 1967 by the regents soon after Ronald 
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Reagan was elected governor and the introduction and passage of 
regents’ resolutions SP-1 and SP-2 in 1995. When these resolutions 
were symbolically21 repealed in 2001,22 the composition of the board 
had changed because a Democrat, Gray Davis, had become governor in 
January 1999. Less direct, but still appreciable, influence on the regents 
from state-government officials, with the notable exception of 
Governor Earl Warren, came in the loyalty oath controversy of 1949, 
also discussed in chapter 2. 
Viewed through these examples, constitutional autonomy becomes 
a way of putting a valuable additional layer of insulation—the Board of 
Regents—between the university and the state political process. 
Finally, constitutional autonomy is a benefit that can be taken 
away through whatever methods a state uses to amend its 
constitution. Thus, again from a political standpoint, a university should 
be wary of independent actions that would inflame public opinion to 
the point where such an action might occur. In California, the 
constitution may be amended in either of two ways—by two-thirds of 
the votes in each house of the legislative and then a majority vote on a 
general-election ballot, or by gaining signatures of 8 percent of those 
voting in the previous general election, again followed by a majority 
vote on a general-election ballot. (Low turnouts in an election lead to a 
profusion of signature-gathering efforts for the next election.) 
 
 
COMPOSITION OF GOVERNING BOARDS 
 
Public universities typically have governing boards with members 
appointed by the governor of the state, often with confirmation by a 
legislative body being required. There are almost always also ex officio 
members who hold particular positions in the state government. The 
president of the university is usually a member. Sometimes there are 
members who represent the alumni of the university, and there are 
often one or two student members. Student members most often hold 
their board membership ex officio through their positions in student 
                                                     
21 Only symbolic because of the continued existence of state law with the same requirements. 
22 Patricia A. Pelfrey, Entrepreneurial President: Richard Atkinson and the University of California, 





government. There are, however, many variations reflected in board 
compositions among the fifty states of the United States. Some of the 
most common variants are described in the following sections. 
 
Elected Boards 
In four of the fifty states of the United States, the boards of public 
universities are elected directly by the people. This occurs for three 
universities in Michigan (the University of Michigan, Michigan State 
University, and Wayne State University) and for the Universities of 
Colorado, Nebraska, and Nevada. In these cases candidates run for 
board positions, raising issues that have political appeal. Board 
members accordingly have interests that relate directly to those issues. 
Thus, the political process enters into the governance of these 
universities in yet another way. This practice, although well ingrained 
where it takes place, has not spread more widely because of concerns 
about political influences on public universities. 
 
Tiered Boards 
Five state multicampus universities or university systems—the 
University of North Carolina, the State University System of Florida, the 
State System of Higher Education in Utah, the Higher Education 
Coordinating Commission of Oregon, and the State University of New 
York—have boards at both the all-university or system level and 
individual campus levels, with specific divisions of duties among them. 
An available document specifies the delegations from the main board 
of the University of North Carolina to the individual campus boards of 
trustees.23 For the State University of New York, there are college 
councils for each of the sixty-four campuses. Some of the duties 
delegated to the college councils are identified by Hyatt.24 
Ohio has another variant of a tiered structure in which the central 
board, known as the Board of Regents, is appointed by the governor of 
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Ohio and is advisory (only) to the state chancellor, who has duties and 
powers similar to those of the heads of state coordinating bodies. 
 
Mixed Public-Private Boards 
A few public universities have governing boards that are composed 
of both publicly appointed members and “private” members who are 
appointed either by all other board members or by the subset of the 
board composed of private members, rather than by a state-
government process. 
 Indiana University alumni elect three of the nine trustees, and 
Indiana’s governor appoints the other six, including one student.25 
 Clemson University, a public university in South Carolina, has a 
thirteen-member board, of which six are political appointees and 
seven are self-perpetuating, a situation that carries out the explicit 
language in the will26 of Thomas Clemson, who left the money that 
founded the university in his name. In accepting the funds, the 
state of South Carolina accepted the governance specifications 
embedded in the will. 
 The University of Vermont Board27 has a mixture of governmentally 
appointed and self-perpetuating trustees, reflecting the fact that 
the university was created by a merger of the University of 
Vermont, which was at the time a private institution, with the 
relatively new Vermont Agricultural College, which had been 
formed under the Morrill Act. 
 Twenty of the thirty-two members of the University of Delaware 
board are appointed by a vote of the majority of the full board, the 
remainder being publicly appointed or ex officio. 28  This 
composition reflects the origins of the university as Newark 
Academy, which was private, along with still a relatively low 
proportion of state funding.29 
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 In a different approach, six of the thirty-eight trustees of the 
Pennsylvania State University are elected by the full board to 




Statutory Colleges and Schools 
The state of New York has long had statutory colleges and schools, 
which are publicly funded portions of private universities. They can also 
be viewed as subject-specific public colleges and schools placed under 
the aegis of a private university (i.e., outsourced public colleges and 
schools). Cornell has four statutory colleges (Agriculture and Life 
Sciences, Human Ecology, Industrial and Labor Relations, and 
Veterinary Medicine) and one statutory school (Hotel Management). 
Alfred University has one statutory college (Ceramics). These units 
receive their funding through the state budget of the State University 
of New York (SUNY). Cornell has the unusual status of being a private, 
land-grant (Morrill Act) institution, as does MIT in Massachusetts. The 
membership of the Cornell Board of Trustees is heavily slanted toward 
successor (private) trustees. There are only six public members on its 
sixty-four-member board.31 
 
The University of California 
The University of California has twenty-six regents, of whom 
eighteen are appointed by the governor and must be confirmed by the 
state senate within a year after appointment in order to keep serving 
beyond that point. The terms are relatively long—originally sixteen 
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Article IX, Section 9, of the California Constitution. The long terms are 
designed to enable regents to develop in-depth knowledge of the 
university and the issues that surround it and to enable them to move 
beyond feelings of political commitment to the governor who 
appointed them. Terms and appointments for these eighteen regents 
are scheduled such that two regents are appointed in each of the last 
three years of a governor’s four-year term. 
Regents are considered to be representatives of the California 
public overseeing the university, although they are of course de facto 
representatives of the university as well. The criteria expressed in the 
California State Constitution for regents are quite broad:32 
Regents shall be able persons broadly reflective of the 
economic, cultural, and social diversity of the State, including 
ethnic minorities and women. However, it is not intended 
that formulas or specific ratios be applied in the selection of 
regents. 
In practice regents seem to have been selected through a wide variety 
of rationales, including prominence in the state; having been 
benefactors to the governor or the governor’s political party through 
campaign contributions or other means; geographical, occupational, 
and ethnic distribution; and knowledge of the university and/or higher 
education in general. Becoming a regent, even though the position is 
unsalaried, is considered by many people to be very desirable, and thus 
there is no shortage of interested persons. 
 Through amendment in 1974, the constitution specifies a 
committee that should work with the Governor:33 
In the selection of the Regents, the Governor shall consult an 
advisory committee composed as follows: The Speaker of the 
Assembly and two public members appointed by the Speaker, 
the President Pro Tempore of the Senate and two public 
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two public members appointed by the Governor, the 
chairman of the regents of the university, an alumnus of the 
university chosen by the alumni association of the university, 
a student of the university chosen by the Council of Student 
Body Presidents, and a member of the faculty of the 
university chosen by the academic senate of the university. 
Public members shall serve for four years, except that one 
each of the initially appointed members selected by the 
Speaker of the Assembly, the President Pro Tempore of the 
Senate, and the Governor shall be appointed to serve for two 
years; student, alumni, and faculty members shall serve for 
one year and may not be regents of the university at the time 
of their service on the advisory committee. 
In practice this requirement has not had much effect. The committee 
has sometimes met in advance of the selection of regents by the 
governor, but often it has met pro forma after the announcement of 
nominations, if at all. The requirement was well intended, and it would 
do the state well to follow it more closely. However, both the fact that 
this committee exists and the need for senate confirmation do place 
some restraints on appointments. 
It is unusual for appointed regents not to be confirmed by the 
state senate, but it does happen occasionally. A common situation has 
been when an appointment has been made during the last year of a 
governor’s term in office and confirmation has not occurred before the 
inauguration of a new governor from the other political party. Perhaps 
the best-known early example was the case of Leland Stanford, a 
former governor of California and one of the big four who oversaw the 
construction of the western portion of the first US transcontinental 
railroad. Stanford was appointed in 1882 by a Republican governor, but 
his nomination was withdrawn by the Democratic successor.34 Stanford 
and his wife then went on to found Stanford University in honor of 
their deceased son. One can speculate on how history might have 
changed had the withdrawal of Stanford’s nomination not happened! 
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Seven other regents serve ex officio. Four of these are elected 
state officials—the governor, the lieutenant governor, the speaker of 
the state assembly, and the state superintendent of public instruction 
(K–12). The governor attends regents’ meetings only rarely, although 
particular issues can draw more involvement from the governor. Their 
positions as regents provide the lieutenant governor and the 
superintendent of public instruction with one of the few public 
platforms that are useful to them as they pursue particular issues; 
therefore they almost always attend. The speaker of the assembly is 
partway between these extremes—busy but usually an attendee and 
involved participant. 
The other three ex officio members are the president of the 
university and the president and vice president of the alumni 
associations of the University of California, both of whom hold two-
year terms as regents while they move from vice president to 
president. 
The final regent is the student regent, who is appointed to a one-
year term by the regents themselves upon the recommendation of a 
special committee of the regents. That special committee receives 
three nominations from the board of directors of the University of 
California Student Association, selected from ten students nominated 
to them by northern and southern student nominating commissions 
who screen applicants and nominees from the campuses. The full 
procedure is available.35 
The chair and vice chair of the Academic Council, the university-
wide body of the Academic Senate, sit and participate with the regents 
in a nonvoting capacity and have the right to be recognized and speak 
at any time. 
The regents select a chair and a vice chair annually. The governor 
is president of the regents, but because the governor is rarely present, 
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STATE-LEVEL COORDINATION AND OVERSIGHT 
 
State-level coordination of higher education should be 
differentiated from board governance. The former coordinates among 
institutions and works with the legislature and the governor. The latter 
actually governs the institution. 
As is described by McGuinness36 and can be gleaned from the 
aforementioned ECS database, 37  coordination of public higher 
education takes very different forms in the various states within the 
United States. McGuinness categorizes the different approaches as 
follows.  
 Twenty-three states organize all of public higher education under 
one or two state boards, which have both governing and 
coordination functions. Utah, mentioned above, is an example. 
  Twenty-four states have coordinating boards. Of these, all but two 
have regulatory roles—twenty-two for approval of academic 
programs, fifteen with significant budget authority, and six with 
limited budget authority. An example of a state where the 
coordinating board has relatively large authority is Texas, for which 
the charter for the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board is 
available.38 California has been one of the two states with a board 
but no regulatory roles for it.  
 The remaining three states (Michigan, Delaware, and Pennsylvania) 
have planning or service agencies but no boards with roles 




The 1960 California Master Plan for Higher Education placed the 
coordinating role with the Coordinating Council for Higher Education, 
which was strengthened and succeeded in 1974 by the California 
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Postsecondary Education Commission (CPEC). A description of the roles 
of CPEC is available from the ECS database.39 
The commission is not a regulatory agency or governing 
board. Rather, it is an advisory group to the legislature, 
governor and postsecondary institutions regarding major 
education policies. It is required to establish a statewide 
database containing extensive information gathered from all 
institutions, public and private. The commission has statutory 
authority to review institutional budgets, to advise on the 
need for and location of new campuses, and to review all 
proposals for new academic programs in the public sector. 
The commission’s primary purpose is to prevent unnecessary 
duplication and to coordinate efforts among the education 
segments. The commission’s efforts are directed by its work 
plan, which sets out education goals and statewide issues, 
particularly those that concern large numbers of colleges, 
universities and proprietary schools. 
As is described in chapters 5 and 15, CPEC also had the role of 
compiling data for eligibility studies, which determine whether access 
to the University of California and the California State University stand 
at, above, or below the 12.5 percent and 33 percent levels prescribed 
in the 1960 California Master Plan for Higher Education. It was also the 
primary guardian of the California Master Plan for Higher Education 
(chapter 5). CPEC was generally effective over the years, and the “soft” 
(i.e., advisory) level of coordination was about right for the state. The 
strength of the relationship with the state government ebbed and 
flowed depending upon the particular people who were in leadership 
roles within the commission and the state government. 
As the state of California experienced budgetary woes, Governor 
Jerry Brown decided to withdraw all funding for CPEC, and it thereby 
ceased functioning as of November 2011. As of 2017 California has for 
six years had no statewide coordinating mechanism, a situation that 
leaves the University of California, California State University, and 
California Community Colleges to follow their own conclusions as to 
what will be best. Since CPEC still has statutory status, it remains to be 
                                                     





seen whether a new governor will restart the funding for it, or whether 
a new coordinating commission will arise in some altered form. In any 
event, it seems unlikely that the current situation of no coordinating 
mechanism can be ongoing, since some issue will surely rise in public 





Accountability has considerably increased as an issue over the past 
three decades for universities and colleges in the United States, 
particularly those in the public sector. The issue is to assure that higher 
education makes effective and efficient use of the government monies 
that are supplied to it. Whereas in earlier days it may have been 
possible to describe the situation as state officials being “content to 
‘leave the money on the stump’ with few questions asked,” 40 more and 
more states have sought and even demanded demonstrations of 
accountability from universities to confirm that funds are being spent 
in the best ways. The same is true for funding of research and need-
based financial aid by the federal government. The driving forces 
bringing states to pursue accountability are tighter and much more 
internally competitive state budgets, large tuition increases for public 
universities due to the reductions in state funding, rising student debt, 
and the need to assure access for deserving students. Federal funding 
of research has been caught up in questioning of specific research 
areas and projects, particularly those that are close to current political 
issues. Issues stemming from tuition concerns are graduation rates, 
employability, and unmanageable student debt. 
One difficulty is that accountability examinations by government 
can be another way in which political purposes are brought to bear on 
public universities. Often all of higher education has been lumped 
together for concerns that are expressed politically. Restrictions have 
been urged on tuition increases and the tax status of large 
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endowments at major nonprofit private universities, 41  with the 
concerns sometimes flowing over to public universities. Concerns for 
the for-profit private universities are large accumulated student debt, 
low degree-completion rates, and less employability of graduates. 
These concerns, too, can carry over to nonprofit privates and the 
publics. 
 
Developments to Date in the United States 
The general issues of accountability are explored by Schmidtlein 
and Berdahl. 42  Zumeta 43  analyzes the development of the 
accountability movement within the United States and considers in 
particular four states—Tennessee, Missouri, South Carolina, and 
Washington. In a subsequent publication, Zumeta and Kinne44 update 
accountability developments and focus on three additional states—
Ohio, Indiana, and Virginia—as well as considering Tennessee again 
along with several other states. Dougherty et al. 45  draw upon 
interviews with both government and university officials, concentrating 
upon Indiana, Ohio, and Tennessee to analyze incentives, obstacles, 
and unintended impacts of performance-based funding. Tennessee has 
substantially linked funding of higher education with accountability. 
Wellman and Harvey46 have also surveyed accountability efforts in the 
                                                     
41 See, e.g., Victor Fleischer, “Stop Universities from Hoarding Money,” New York Times, August 
19, 2015. 
42 Frank A. Schmidtlein and Robert O. Berdahl, “Autonomy and Accountability: Who Controls 
Academe?,” in Philip G. Altbach, Patricia J. Gumport, and Robert O. Berdahl, eds., American Higher 
Education in the Twenty-First Century: Social, Political, and Economic Challenges, 3rd ed. 
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011). 
43 William Zumeta, “Public Policy and Accountability in Higher Education: Lessons from the Past 
and Present for the New Millennium,” chapter 7 in D. E. Heller, ed., The States and Public Higher 
Education Policy: Affordability, Access, and Accountability (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2001), pp. 155–197. 
44 William Zumeta and Alicia Kinne, “Accountability Policies: Directions Old and New,” chapter 8 in 
D. E. Heller, ed., The States and Public Higher Education Policy: Affordability, Access, and 
Accountability, 2nd ed. (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011), pp. 173–189; Lara 
Pheatt and Vikash Reddy, Performance Funding for Higher Education (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2016). 
45 Kevin J. Dougherty et al., Performance Funding for Higher Education (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2016). 
46 Jane Wellman and Darcie Harvey, “Recent Statewide Reforms in Higher Education Financing and 
Accountability: Emerging Lessons from the States,” commissioned background research for 
“Securing the Public Trust: Practical Steps toward Higher Education Finance Reform in California,” 





different states, comparing and contrasting the extent to which they 
are incorporated into state budgeting or other considerations. In a 
series of three detailed reports, David Leveille47, 48, 49 has explored the 
dimensions of accountability and has reviewed those actions that have 
occurred in the various states so far. 
On a national scale, the Commission on the Future of Higher 
Education, also known as the Spellings Commission, after Margaret 
Spellings, the US Secretary of Education who chartered it, made 
accountability a prime component of its 2006 report50 in ways that 
were contentious within the commission. Secretary of Education Arne 
Duncan within the administration of President Barack Obama 
undertook an initiative to rate US colleges and universities 
quantitatively.51 Although there have been many rating and ranking 
systems undertaken by the media and other private organizations, as 
reported in the appendix, this was the first undertaken by the national 
government in the United States. The matter thereby took on elements 
of accountability measurement and generated questions regarding the 
appropriateness of this function for the federal government, as well as 
all the issues reflected below with regard to methodology and 
measurements.52 The initiative, which had started with much fanfare, 
was abandoned and turned into a project for a general information 
website after many complications became apparent.53 
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48 David E. Leveille, “Accountability in Higher Education: A Public Agenda for Trust and Cultural 
Change,” Report no. 20.06, Center for Studies in Higher Education, University of California, 
Berkeley, CA, December 2006, https://perma.cc/UT57-Z344.  
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Occasional Papers Series, no. 9-13, Center for Studies in Higher Education, University of California, 
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York Times, September 12, 2015. 




Issues Surrounding Accountability 
Of course institutions of higher education should be accountable 
to governments and the public for their expenditures of public money. 
But the great difficulty lies in establishing how, through what means 
and measures, and with what results accountability should be 
accomplished. 
First of all, should accountability be a matter of certain 
quantitative measures, and if so, should there be direct results on 
funding of an institution by the state—that is, should there be 
performance-based budgeting? If there are certain quantitative 
measures, the institutions will naturally point toward those particular 
measures, especially if the outcomes on those measures determine 
state funding. But strong performance on a certain set of measures can 
result in poorer performance in other areas that are also important. 
The desired functions of universities cannot readily be reduced to a 
manageable set of individual measurements, nor do various particular 
measures have the same importance for different types of universities. 
Public research universities have very different missions from 
private liberal arts colleges, and those in turn have very different 
missions from community colleges. Yet the diversity of the United 
States’ higher-education system has been one of its major strengths. If 
graduation rate is to be an accountability measure, as is frequently 
proposed, then universities and colleges will not take risks in 
admissions, and access for at-risk students will suffer. If employment of 
graduates is a measure, institutions will focus on majors that serve the 
immediate job market, to the detriment of the balance among 
disciplines and liberal education. Liberal education has been the 
hallmark of United States’ higher education, yet it does not lend itself 
readily to accountability measures. If the average salary of graduates is 
a measure, then universities will emphasize high-paying professions to 
the detriment of public service. The development of specific 
accountability measures and ways of using them is, as the Obama 









The University of California and Accountability 
Partnerships and Compacts. As already noted in chapter 2, in the 
mid-1980s and from 1995 until 2010, the University of California 
approach toward state funding was a “partnership” or “compact” 
model in which a governor agreed to seek a certain level of enrollment-
based funding in return for assurances of certain performance 
measures being met by the university. Additional budget for specific 
initiatives could also be sought. Taking as an example the budget for 
fiscal year 2002–03,54 the accountability measures were the following: 
 
 admitting all eligible students who wished to attend, 
 increasing graduate enrollment, 
 implementing the Eligibility in the Local Context program (see 
chapter 15), 
 increasing the number of in transfer students by 6 percent, 
 keeping average time to degree reasonable (thirteen quarters 
for students entering in 1994), 
 building state-supported summer instruction, 
 increasing engineering and computer science enrollments by 
one thousand per year, 
 building enrollment for the teaching credential, 
 not increasing university-wide student fees, 
 maintaining financial aid, 
 sustaining planning for on-time opening of the Merced campus, 
 building teacher professional development, a teacher-scholar 
program, and a Principal’s Leadership Institute, all for K–12 
education, 
 building the Institutes for Science and Innovation (see chapter 
14), 
 sustaining and building federal research funding, and 
 building further private support. 
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These measures were, in effect, the existing academic plan of the 
university. Except for the three initiatives directed toward K–12 
education, they did not require efforts beyond what the university 
intended to do anyhow, but they did constitute a pledge of deliverables 
to the state. 
The reasoning behind the partnership approach is described in a 
published interview with Lawrence Hershman, who was at the time the 
principal budget officer of the university.55 
 
An agreement of this sort does several things. First, it gets the 
governor to buy in. Second, it sets the stage for developing a 
budget—you have a basic agreement with the DOF [state 
Department of Finance] that is a starting point for a budget, 
and the overall hassle is cut way down, including developing 
the Regents budget.56 And last, it allows you to plan. I would 
be the first to admit that things are never going to work out 
exactly. But if you look at the history of these agreements, we 
have, as a matter of fact, usually gotten more, not less. 
George Deukmejian (1980s) did way better for UC than the 
original agreement over a period of years. Pete Wilson 
(1990s) also did better than the Compact, and Gray Davis 
(1999–2003) at first did a lot better than what we thought 
was already a good agreement. 
 
Accountability Reports. When Mark Yudof became president of 
the University of California in 2008, he took the initiative to start 
annual accountability reports for the University of California. The idea 
was to demonstrate the recognition by the university that it should be 
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accountable to the public and to the state government. The university 
could make and state its own case through a responsible selection of 
the measures and issues that would be put into the reports. The 
reports might satisfy accountability interests within the state, and/or 
they would provide a solid starting point for any future accountability 
program. There was considerable value to getting out in front on the 
matter. 
The most recent accountability report is available, along with an 
archive of past reports.57 The subjects covered in the 2011 report, 
taken as an example, are given in table 4-1. 
 
 
TABLE 4-1. Subjects in 2011 University of California accountability 
report 
 
1. Size and Shape of the University 
2. Undergraduate Students—Admissions and Enrollment 
3. Undergraduate Students—Affordability 
4. Undergraduate Student Success 
5. Graduate Academic and Professional Degree Students 
6. Faculty and Other Academic Employees 
7. Staff 
8. Diversity 
9. Teaching and Learning 
10. Research 
11. Health Sciences and Services 
12. University Budgets and Private Giving 
 
 
One could view the accountability reports as a form of annual 
report for the university. The difference is that the accountability 
report concentrates upon what the university concludes are the most 
critical measures of success in its mission. An annual report is usually 
more comprehensive and less quantitative. 
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With the transition in the presidency in 2013, the reports took on 
more varied content within categories and added some special topics 
such as Capital Program and Sustainability, University Finances and 
Private Giving, and Public Service. 
The reports are a useful source of university data for researchers, 
authors, the media, the public, and legislative staff. While they have 
not received great attention in the media or in the political world, they 
do effectively serve the purposes of evidencing university transparency 
and enabling questions to be answered by referring to the 
accountability reports. They also serve to stave off interest in what 
might be more draconian measures undertaken in the name of 
accountability. 
It is important that the reports be candid sources of data. A danger 
is that the reports could be seen more as the university selecting 
favorable material that it wants to get out to the public as opposed to 
objective measures that include the not-so-good along with the good. 
It could be even more effective to define the content jointly with one 
or more state agencies or seek requests from agencies and the 
legislature for specific content. 
 
Summary Conclusions 
The relationship of the University of California to the government 
of the state of California has been established in ways that are 
conducive to academic strength and less susceptible to political 
influence than occurs in many other states and countries. Key factors 
are 
 constitutional autonomy, which was established skillfully by 
Joseph Winans under difficult circumstances in the formulation 
of the state Constitution of 1879; 
 comparatively long terms for members of the Board of 
Regents—originally sixteen years and now twelve years—with 
possibilities of reappointment; 
 for fifty-one years after the Master Plan of 1960, the use of a 
statewide coordinating body that was advisory to the state 






 a recognition by recent UC presidents that it is important to get 
out in front of issues of accountability and provide access to 
both a large, open database and full public information on the 





The California Master Plan 
 
 
The vision of higher education he [Clark Kerr] negotiated into the 1960 
California Master Plan not only places him firmly in the pantheon of 
“shapers of higher education.” The particular model his vision 
contained combined universal access to post-school learning at the 
base of a coordinate system, which included the highest level of public 
research universities at its summit. It remains a yardstick against which 
the initiatives and progress of other nations may be compared. 
—Guy Neave1 
 
The particular Californian genius is that of combining public policy with 
private enterprise, of devising constructive competition and co-
operation between and among both public and private institutions. 
Each of the Californian segments of higher education is aware that it 
cannot fulfill its own distinctive mission without the existence of and 
support from the others. 
—OECD Report2 
 
What we were really engaged in was negotiating a treaty among the 
constituent parts of higher education in California that would, at the 
same time, be acceptable to the Governor and Legislature of the 
State…We did, at that moment, seize upon history and shape it rather 
than being overrun by it. At the time, it felt like the Perils of Pauline. In 
retrospect, it looks more like the triumph of good judgment. 
—Clark Kerr3 
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Public higher education in California falls under the Master Plan 
for Higher Education, which was created in 1960. The Master Plan was 
a clear success, setting a viable and financially achievable path for the 
major growth in higher education and access to it that occurred in the 
decades following the adoption of the plan. Much has been written 
about the Master Plan, including histories of its development4, 5, 6, 7 and 
speculations, pro and con, on its extensibility to other states of the 
United States and other countries.8, 9, 10, 11 Two websites12, 13 provide 
extensive collections of information on the Master Plan. 
 
 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE MASTER PLAN 
 
Background 
Although the Master Plan gives the impression of being a grand 
design put together starting afresh, it was in fact the result of complex 
negotiations in a contentious and politicized environment. The state 
colleges, which had for the most part originated as teacher-training 
institutions and later became the California State University, were not 
                                                     
4 Neil J. Smelser, “Growth, Structural Change, and Conflict in California Public Higher Education, 
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part of a coordinated system. New state colleges and community 
colleges were created through the political process by legislators.14 
Matters affecting higher education were addressed by the legislature 
through processes that were essentially ad hoc to the issue. There was 
no agreement on mission differentiation among institutions, and it was 
apparent that resources were not being used in an organized and 
efficient way. The University of California had its own Board of Regents, 
but the other portions of public higher education reported directly to 
the state board of education, which also oversaw K–12 education. That 
reporting line was a sore point for the state colleges. Since 1945 there 
had been a Liaison Committee, composed of the state superintendent 
of public instruction,15 the president of the University of California, 
three members of the California State Board of Education, and three 
UC Regents, but it was not effective. The issues and problems of this 
era have been analyzed by Smelser,16 Douglass,17 and Callan.18 
Engineering. In the late 1950s, presidents of five principal state 
colleges initiated a three-pronged effort to enhance the roles and 
status of the state colleges.19 The three initiatives were (1) transfer of 
the state colleges from the jurisdiction of the State Board of Education 
to a new, separate board for the state colleges; (2) authorization for 
the state colleges to provide professional degree programs in 
engineering as well as the doctorate of education (EdD); and (3) state 
funding for research in the state colleges. The situation with regard to 
engineering was especially controversial and contested. As described 
by Akera20 and Adams,21 ambitions on the part of presidents at San 
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Diego and San Jose State Colleges and elsewhere led to desires for 
some state colleges to provide engineering curricula and degrees. 
These interests were reinforced by the engineering manpower needs 
perceived by corporations—primarily in the South Bay area that would 
become Silicon Valley, but which in the 1950s was populated mostly by 
branch operations of major national companies. One of the arguments 
made was that the large bulk of engineers did not need degrees from a 
research university, since their employment would not deal with 
research, development, or even design. The Engineers’ Council on 
Professional Development, the engineering accrediting body that was 
the predecessor to today’s ABET, was still in its early years, and there 
were issues as to whether there could or should be multiple types of 
undergraduate engineering degrees within an engineering discipline. 
Given the pressures from the state colleges and areas of industry, 
the Liaison Committee commissioned two studies in the early 1950s. 
One of these, sparked by the University of California, was by a 
committee headed by Purdue University dean of engineering A. J. 
Potter. This study concluded that California needed no engineering 
colleges beyond those accredited by the ECPD and that, as the state’s 
land-grant university, the University of California had the right and 
obligation to be the state’s principal source of professional engineers.22 
The other study, sparked by the state colleges, was led by Stanford 
dean of engineering Fred Terman.23 Terman’s group saw a need of 
industry for engineers who were not necessarily prepared for graduate 
school and therefore supported the development of engineering 
programs in the state colleges. Terman was also concerned that 
 
 
                                                     
22 Yet, then and now California has consistently underproduced engineers in comparison with 
employment needs in the state, sometimes by as much as 50 percent. This situation has led to a 
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Stanford should not bear the burden of producing engineers of all sorts 
in the quantities needed by industry in the environs of Stanford. Both 
reports materialized in 1952. 
There followed a series of efforts and counterefforts. San Jose 
State College, in particular, continued to develop its engineering 
program. Dean O’Brien at Berkeley, working closely with Dean Boelter 
of UCLA’s still-new program (chapter 10), continued to oppose the 
state-college efforts and the eligibility of state colleges for engineering 
accreditation. He also promised, but continually stalled on, 
development of a University of California master’s program in 
engineering given in the San Jose/South Bay area. This politically 
difficult Catch-22 situation in the face of continual statements of 
engineering demand from industry and the aspirations of the state 
colleges was reported as a primary factor in Clark Kerr’s decision to 
replace O’Brien as Berkeley engineering dean when Kerr assumed the 
presidency of the University of California in 1958.24 
 
Moving Toward the Master Plan 
Driven by this history, Clark Kerr, then still a relatively new UC 
president, worked together with Assemblywoman Dorothy Donohue, 
who chaired the state assembly’s Committee on Education. Together, 
they secured passage in 1959 of a legislative resolution that called 
upon the Liaison Committee to prepare a master plan for higher 
education in California and present it to the legislature at the start of 
the 1960 session. The resolution also specified a two-year moratorium 
on legislation dealing with higher education, including the 
commissioning of new campuses for the state and community colleges. 
The Liaison Committee (i.e., higher education itself) was thereby given 
a specified period of time to present a solution. The implication was 
that, if the committee did not succeed, the legislature itself would then 
undertake the task. 
A Master Plan Survey Team (figure 5-1) was set up through the 
Liaison Committee to oversee the effort. The team included 
representatives of the private colleges and universities along with the 
University of California, the state colleges, and the community colleges. 
                                                     





The chairman was Arthur Coons, the president of Occidental College, a 
private institution. Discussions were heated and involved considerable 
maneuvering. 25  But eventually, and with a final compromise 
establishing the joint doctorate, the product was adopted and became 
the California Master Plan for Higher Education of 1960, with the 
legislature having approved salient parts.26 Callan27 points out that 
convergence was achieved by enabling all institutions to move forward 
toward their own aspirations in the context of the common policy goal 
of providing access to every high school graduate who could benefit 
from higher education. 
 
 
ELEMENTS OF THE MASTER PLAN 
 
The plan was a coordinated package with a number of elements,28 
as discussed below. 
 
Systems and Boards 
The state colleges became a single system, with a separate board 
and system-wide chancellor.29 The community colleges also became a 
looser system and received their own system-wide board in 1967, 
although much of the governance and fiscal responsibility remained 
and still remains with the individual Community College Districts 
around the state. 
                                                     
25 Douglass, 2000, op. cit., pp. 275–297. 
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Figure 5-1. The Master Plan Survey Team, 1959. Front row, left to right: Keith 
Sexton (aide to Assemblywoman Donahoe), Howard Campion (retired 
superintendent of the Los Angeles Public Schools), Arthur Coons (chair), Glenn 
S. Dumke (CSU), and Thomas C. Holy (UC staff). Back row, left to right: Dean 
McHenry (UC), Arthur Browne (State Board of Education staff), Henry Tyler 
(community colleges), and Robert Wert (Stanford U., independent colleges 
and universities).30 Affiliations from Douglass.31) 
 
Missions 
The missions of the three different systems, or sectors, of public 
higher education were clarified and made distinct from one another. 
The University of California was confirmed to be the public 
research university of the state of California, with near-exclusive rights 
to give the doctorate. UC de facto became the designated research arm 
of the state. UC also had the sole right to give professional degrees in 
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medicine, law, dentistry, veterinary medicine, and architecture. The 
restriction for architecture has since been removed. 
The California State Colleges, which subsequently became the 
California State University, were to be dedicated to undergraduate 
education and graduate education through the master’s degree, 
including other professional education. CSU thereby gained the right to 
give professional degrees in engineering. Faculty research is authorized 
for CSU consistent with the primary mission of instruction; however, 
state funding has not recognized research as substituting for some of 
the instructional mission. The CSU was chartered to give the doctorate 
only jointly with a UC campus or another independent doctoral-
granting institution. By subsequent actions of the legislature, the 
California State University was given the right to give the doctorate of 
education (EdD) on its own in 2005, and the rights to give the doctorate 
of physical therapy and the doctorate of nursing practice as of 2010.32 
These are professional degrees without the research component 
associated with the doctor of philosophy degree. 
The California Community Colleges have the mission of providing 
both academic and vocational instruction for students of all ages 
through the first two years (lower division) of undergraduate 
education. They can give the associate degree. More recently (2014) up 
to fifteen community college districts have been authorized on a trial 
basis to establish and offer one bachelor’s degree per district in fields 
in which degrees are not provided by CSU and UC.33 The community 
colleges are also authorized to provide remedial instruction, ESL 
(English as a Second Language) courses, adult instruction not for credit, 
and workforce training and community-service courses. 
 
Eligibility and Guaranteed Access 
The concept of eligibility was established and defined in terms of 
percentages of public high school graduates, ranked by statewide 
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criteria. The upper 12.5 percent would be eligible for admission to UC; 
the upper 33 percent would be eligible for admission to CSU, and the 
California Community Colleges would admit all students “capable of 
benefitting from instruction.” 
The criteria for ranking to establish eligibility are established by UC 
and CSU themselves. Historically, the criteria have involved grade point 
averages in specified high school, college-going courses (the A-G 
courses34) and standardized-test scores (SAT, ACT) on a sliding scale. 
Equivalent standards are applied for graduates of private high schools. 
Subsequent UC and CSU practice and eventually Master Plan policy 
evolved to provide that all eligible California residents who apply on 
time are offered a place somewhere in the particular university, 
although not necessarily at the campus or in the major of first choice.35 
Then, to take effect in 2012, the University of California created a 
category denoted “eligible to review” (ETR) consisting of students 
whose applications would be reviewed, but who are not guaranteed 
admission. The compatibility of that change with the Master Plan was 
not independently assessed because of the defunding of the statewide 
coordinating body in 2011 (see below). Because actual eligibility rates 
became too high, the ETR category was deactivated as of 2016. 
Eligibility studies are made at intervals to determine whether the 
eligibility criteria set by CSU and UC do indeed result in the specified 33 
percent and 12.5 percent eligibility rates. Until the most recent (2016) 
study, these have been carried out under the aegis of the statewide 
coordinating body. After an eligibility study, adjustments are made by 
the universities to their eligibility criteria, designed to return to 12.5 
and 33 percent eligibility for UC and CSU, respectively. 
Eligibility does not guarantee admission to a particular campus. In 
fact most University of California campuses and some California State 
University campuses receive substantially more applications from 
eligible students than they can accommodate. At the extreme, Berkeley 
and UCLA currently (2014–15) receive about six times as many 
applications from eligible students as can be accommodated in the 
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freshman class. Consequently, these oversubscribed campuses have 
separate admissions procedures for selecting among eligible applicants, 
using criteria that are chosen from an established, university-wide list. 
For UC these processes presently involve up to fourteen specified 
criteria implemented though a comprehensive review process. 36 
Eligibility is discussed in more detail in chapter 15. 
 
Transfer 
An important part of the Master Plan is transfer, wherein students 
take the first two years of undergraduate instruction (the lower 
division) at a community college and then complete the remainder 
(upper division) of a bachelor’s degree at either the University of 
California or the California State University. 
The Master Plan specifies that the ratio of upper division to lower 
division enrollments for both public universities should be at least 
60:40. The California State University makes this requirement with 
considerable room to spare. The University of California usually does 
meet the requirement university-wide37 but by much less of a margin. 
Given the array of residence times of students in both community 
colleges and UC, a typical percentage of bachelor’s graduates from UC 
who have come by the transfer route is 28 percent. For CSU that 
percentage is substantially greater, having dropped from a high in the 
range of 65 percent in 1993 to close to 50 percent at present.38 
There are also eligibility crteria39 for transfer, analogous to those 
for freshman eligibility. 
 
Tuition and Fees 
The original Master Plan reaffirmed the goal of tuition-free public 




                                                     
36 “How Applications Are Reviewed,” University of California Admissions, 
 https://perma.cc/2YLG-NJ6X. 
37 But not on all campuses individually. 
38 Hans Johnson, “Higher Education: New Goals for the Master Plan,” figure 5, p. 11, Public Policy 
Institute of California, April 2010, https://perma.cc/Z7ES-5269. 
39 “Transfer: Basic Requirements,” University of California, https://perma.cc/LGT8-W3XT. 
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fees for purposes such as recreational facilities and parking. Over the 
years, the state has not been able to keep this guarantee, with the 
result that an educational fee was instituted and has grown 
substantially over the years. It is now being called resident or 
nonresident tuition. Tuition and fees are set by the Regents of the 
University of California and by the Board of Trustees of the California 
State University. Community college fees are set by the credit hour and 
remain among the lowest in the United States. 
 
Cal Grants 
A program of need-based student financial aid, now known as Cal 
Grants,40 was included so as to assure that family or personal finances 
would not preclude a California-resident student from participating in 
higher education. Greater amounts are available for students attending 
private colleges and universities with higher levels of tuition, enabling 
the private colleges and universities of the state to alleviate some of 
the pressure for enrollment at the public institutions. The inclusion of 
this provision in the Master Plan drew the support of the private 
colleges and universities for the plan. 
 
Statewide Coordinating Entity 
The Master Plan established by statute a statewide coordinating 
body for higher education. This was originally the Coordinating Council 
for Higher Education, which in 1973 was replaced by the California 
Postsecondary Education Commission (CPEC). State funding for CPEC 
was ended as of 2011, and CPEC is thereby no longer operative. These 
bodies were advisory to the governor and legislature. Functions 
included collecting and serving as a repository for data; being the 
custodian and chief advocate for the Master Plan; performing analyses 
of state need, including advice on proposals for new campuses, 
schools, and the like from the individual sectors; reviewing proposed 
new degree programs throughout the state; and conducting the 
aforementioned periodic surveys of eligibility for UC and CSU.  
 
 
                                                     







The Master Plan drew considerable national attention as it was 
created and adopted, including a cover story in the weekly news 
magazine, Time.41 OECD, the international Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development, carried out a Study of the Master 
Plan.42 Delegations frequently came from other countries and states to 
California, the University of California, and other universities within 
California to inquire about the Master Plan. They still do so. 
 
 
BENEFITS OF THE MASTER PLAN 
 
The Master Plan provides an internally consistent basis and 
mutual understanding for the roles, structure, and goals of the 
components of public higher education in California. Potential changes 
can be conceived and judged in light of the plan, rather than occurring 
in haphazard and potentially contradictory ways. At the time of the 
creation of the California Master Plan, the principal benefits seen were 
a path-breaking commitment to opportunities for participation in 
public higher education; definition of the roles, sizes, and scales of the 
systems of higher education; and a framework to expand capacity and 
manage growth. The 1960 Master Plan was among the pioneering 
efforts in creating university systems and statewide coordination for 
public higher education in the United States. 
 
Mission Definition and Control 
The Master Plan defines and controls the mission of each of the 
three sectors of higher education such that the entire spectrum of 
needs is met, and the individual missions of the three sectors are both 
different and complementary. The differentiation enables the 
institutions of higher education to concentrate on their own missions 
and carry them out as best they can. One can denote the organizations 
of the three systems of public higher education in California as 
                                                     
41 “Clark Kerr,” Time, Oct. 17, 1960. 
42 OECD, loc. cit., 1990. 
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“horizontal,” reflecting the fact that all the constituent institutions in a 
given system have the same mission. In other states it is more common 
for university systems to be “vertical,” in the sense that a single system 
is composed of institutions of very different sorts (i.e., research 
universities, comprehensive universities, two-year colleges, and 




Since all universities are not trying to be all things, state financial 
resources are used efficiently. Also, since students can take the lower 
division at a community college close to home or even while living at 
home, the large element of transfer education in the plan means that 
there are large cost-of-living savings for students and/or the families of 
students, as well as for the state’s Cal Grants financial aid program. 
 
Planning and Appetite Control 
The governance system delineated by the Master Plan places the 
creation of new campuses and definition of programs with the 
university systems themselves, as was already the case for the 
University of California through constitutional autonomy. Planning 
occurs within each system, subject to governmental approval and 
funding of new initiatives. This considerably reduces the influence of 
state-level politics on the planning process. 
 
Potentially Efficient Transfer for Baccalaureate Education 
California has a higher proportion (74 percent in 2006–2007) of 
higher-education enrollments in community colleges than any other 
state of the United States.43 The state relies heavily upon the transfer 
route to the bachelor’s degree and probably uses planned transfer to a 
greater extent than any other state. The explicit definition of transfer 
routes, the 60-40 specification of the Master Plan, the eligibility basis 
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for transfer, and now the establishment of associate degrees for 
transfer between community colleges and the California State 
University (see “Articulation for Transfer,” below) all help the process. 
However, as is described below, there is a low completion of transfer 
by community college students initially interested in transfer, which is 
a substantial inefficiency. 
 
Ease of Students Starting College 
If the transfer system works well, it is easier for students to start 
college or even try it out experimentally. Students can remain near or 
at home with much lower tuition, and their expenses for the lower-
division years are therefore lower. This feature can be as important in 
promoting college access as is actual financial aid. Transfer also 
provides a vital and much used second-chance route to a bachelor’s 
degree for those students who were not eligible for UC or CSU as 
freshmen. 
 
The Bright Line of Eligibility 
The use of the same specified A-G courses in the determination of 
eligibility for both UC and CSU has defined the college-going curriculum 
for high schools throughout the state, with the result that the A-G 
courses are uniformly available. When changes have been made to the 
A-G course requirements by UC and CSU, those changes are rapidly 
taken up by the high schools. Furthermore, the simplicity of making the 
eligibility calculation from known grades and test scores means that 
students, families, and schools can readily determine whether or not a 
student is eligible for either UC or CSU. Before the addition of the ETR 
category in 2012, if a student was eligible, he or she was guaranteed 
admission, although not necessarily at the campus of choice. 
 
Feeding California’s High-Tech Economy through Research 
The University of California is positioned by the Master Plan to 
carry out research of the highest order. That research is fostered by the 
ability of UC to govern itself, in addition to the facts that research is an 
explicit component of the mission and is funded significantly by the 
state. Over the fifty-seven-plus years that the Master Plan has been in 
existence, UC research has spurred the California economy through 
The California Master Plan 
137 
 
continual technological innovation that has spawned, enabled, and fed 
the agriculture, wine, computer, electronics, and biotech industries, 
among others (see chapter 18). The existence and strength of the 
California State University has been vital to that result, since CSU has 
capably provided a large portion of baccalaureate education that UC 
would have otherwise had to supply, and which in turn would have 
considerably diluted UC’s research mission. 
 
Potential for Continual Adjustment 
The Master Plan has been continually reviewed with occasional 
updates. The balances among research-based and non-research-based 
undergraduate education and between two- and four-year 
undergraduate education can, in principle, be altered by changing the 
12.5 percent and 33 percent eligibility rates, although that has not yet 
been done in practice. 
 
 
CURRENT ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH THE MASTER PLAN 
 
No approach or plan for something as complex as public higher 
education can be perfect, if only because there are conflicting needs. 
Some problematic issues have been associated with the California 
Higher Education Master Plan from the start, and others have 
developed as societal and economic changes have occurred over time. 
 
Community College and Transfer Issues 
Imbalance of Enrollments and Degrees among the Sectors of 
Public Higher Education. At the time of the Master Plan and shortly 
thereafter, the distribution of enrollments among California’s three 
sectors of public higher education was balanced and comparable to 
those of other states of the United States. In 1960, of the total number 
of college students in California enrolled in public higher education, 48 
percent were in the community colleges, 30 percent at CSU, and 22 
percent at UC. Over the years since then, the portion of high school 
graduates going on to higher education has increased markedly, yet the 
12.5 percent and 33 percent eligibility criteria for the University of 





result is that there is now a considerable imbalance in undergraduate 
enrollments among California’s three sectors: 66.3 percent of FTE44 
enrollments in the community colleges, 20.4 percent in the California 
State University, and 13.3 percent in the University of California in 
2010, reflecting growths by factors of 11.9, 5.8, and 5.3, respectively, 
for the three sectors, or a factor of 8.6 overall in public higher 
education over the fifty years from 1960 to 2010.45 Head-count (per 
student, even if part-time) enrollment counts would be even more 
imbalanced.46 Put another way, while California stands second among 
the fifty states in higher education enrollment per one thousand 
population in the eighteen-to-twenty-nine age range, it stands dead 
last among the states in the proportion of those higher-education 
students (only 26 percent) being enrolled in four-year institutions. As 
well, California stands forty-third among the fifty states in bachelor’s 
degrees awarded to eighteen-to-twenty-nine-year olds, with only 23.8 
per 1000.47 
The need to grow the number of four-year degrees conflicts with 
the inability of the state to increase public spending for higher 
education. The Public Policy Institute of California forecasts that in 
2030, 38 percent of California’s jobs will require at least a four-year 
bachelor’s degree, whereas only 33 percent of workers will have such a 
degree, leading to a 1.1 million shortfall in workers with a bachelor’s 
degree.48 The predicted need for workers with bachelor’s degrees 
corresponds to the relatively large presence of high-tech businesses in 
the state. These results extend and update earlier studies, reflect the 
non-growth of the static 12.5 and 33 percent eligibility rates of UC and 
CSU,49 and have resulted in proposals from the Public Policy Institute of 
                                                     
44 FTE denotes full-time equivalent. 
45 Callan, 2012, loc. cit., Table 3.2. 
46 The figure of 74% of public higher education enrollment in California in 2006–07 cited above 
from Geiser and Atkinson, 2013, stems from IPEDS data collected by the US National Center for 
Education Statistics. The difference between it and the 66.3% figure cited here for a later year 
(2010) probably results from the difference between FTE and headcount tallies. 
47 Geiser and Atkinson, 2013, loc. cit., fig. 1 (2006–07 data). 
48 Hans Johnson, Marisol Cueller Meija, and Sarah Bohn, “Will California Run Out of College 
Graduates?,” Public Policy Institute of California, San Francisco, CA, October 2015, 
https://perma.cc/56XS-7BSC. 
49 Sean Randolph and Hans Johnson, “Reforming California Public Higher Education for the 21st 
Century,” Bay Area Council Economic Institute, December 2014, https://perma.cc/82V3-UL2B.  
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California and the Bay Area Council Economic Institute that the 
eligibility rates for UC and CSU be increased, over time, to 15 and 40 
percent, respectively.50, 51 
Growing Imbalance between the Two Essential Missions of the 
Community Colleges. As a result of the large growth in the portion of 
high school graduates enrolling in the community colleges without 
concomitant growth in transfers to UC and CSU, the enrollment in 
community colleges for vocational programs and for associate degrees 
as ends unto themselves has become much larger than the pretransfer 
enrollment. In the period from 1972 to 1987, transfers from the 
community colleges to CSU and UC were 32 to 35 percent of the total 
number of high school graduates entering community colleges two 
years earlier.52 Today that percentage is substantially less, with the 
result that a much smaller proportion of students within community 
colleges carry through on a transfer track. For the cohort of students 
entering in 2003, 15 percent transferred to a four-year institution 
within seven years.53 
Large Differences among Community Colleges in Producing 
Transfer Students. The 109 community colleges of California vary 
widely in production of transfer students. Data54 for the 15,650 transfer 
students arriving at the University of California in fall 2014, typical of 
other years, show that 27 percent came from just six (Santa Monica, 
Diablo Valley, DeAnza, Santa Barbara, Pasadena, Foothill) of the 113 
community colleges and that 45 percent of the transfers to UC came 
from just fourteen (13 percent) of the community colleges. Conversely, 
seventeen of the community colleges transferred 25 or fewer students 
per college to UC, for a total of 224 students, or 1.5 percent coming 
from 15 percent of the community colleges. 
                                                     
50 Johnson, 2010, loc. cit. 
51 Randolph and Johnson, 2014, loc. cit. 
52 OECD, 1990, op. cit., table 8.1, p. 73. Of course, only a fraction of students entering community 
colleges have transfer in mind. 
53 Ria Sengupta and Christopher Jepsen, “California’s Community College Students,” in Hans P. 
Johnson, ed., California Counts 8, no. 2 (November 2006), Public Policy Institute of California, 
https://perma.cc/FWJ2-QR2K.  






The large variation among community colleges in transfer 
effectiveness can be understood in several ways. The community 
colleges strong in transfer to UC all lie near UC campuses in relatively 
affluent areas, while those with very low transfer rates tend to be rural 
or inner-city, where the college-going tradition is much less. Proximity 
to a UC campus breeds familiarity and interest on the parts of students 
and their families. Community colleges with relatively few transfer 
students understandably tend to divert their resources more toward 
vocational programs, and potential transfer students are less able to 
locate suitable courses and to find and support one another on such 
campuses. Both those factors serve to compound the problem. 
Articulation for Transfer. As was already noted, many other states 
place institutions of differing sorts (research/nonresearch; two-
year/four-year; etcetera) together within systems. There are more 
direct administrative opportunities to coordinate transfer when both 
the source and receiving institutions involved in transfer education are 
within the same system. Articulation of courses for transfer has been a 
more complex issue for California. 
For general education there is an established and accepted 
Intersegmental General Education Transfer Curriculum (IGETC).55, 56 
Historically, to determine whether a course at a particular community 
college fulfilled requirements for a particular major at a particular 
University of California or California State University campus, a student 
has had to utilize a large online database known as ASSIST.57 Not all 
courses of the same title or number have been accepted by individual 
majors, especially at UC, because of faculty concerns about sufficiency 
and quality of content. This has led to situations where a student does 
not check into the situation soon enough and finds out after taking a 
course at a community college that it does not carry credit for the 
major at the UC or CSU campus concerned. In principle, these 
situations could be lessened by effective counseling and student use of 
 
                                                     
55 “IGETC – Intersegmental General Education Transfer Curriculum,” ASSIST, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20160405225727/http://www.assist.org/web-assist/help/help-
igetc.html.    
56 University of California, Admissions, “IGETC,” https://perma.cc/LSE4-EL7G. 
57 “Welcome to ASSIST,” 
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that counseling; however, budget stringency and the imbalance among 
the two missions (vocational and transfer) of the community colleges 
have reduced counseling for transfer at many community colleges. 
More recently, steps have been taken to alleviate these 
difficulties. In 2010 the California State University and the community 
colleges, working together with legislators toward an act of the 
legislature, established associate degrees for transfer, which bring 
preferred status for admission to CSU in a major that is similar to the 
area of the associate degree, as determined by CSU. The student is 
given junior-year standing upon transfer and needs to complete sixty 
additional prescribed units to qualify for the baccalaureate degree. The 
transfer student is not guaranteed admission to a specified major or 
CSU campus.58 The University of California has not adopted such a 
blanket path for transfer, but six University of California campuses 
(Davis, Irvine, Merced, Riverside, Santa Barbara, and Santa Cruz) have 
specific and more limited transfer agreements with community 
colleges,59 and blanket transfer agreements have been established for 
what in 2016 are twenty-one of the most popular UC majors.60, 61, 62 
These pathways provide students with a single set of course 
expectations that, if fulfilled, make them reliably competitive for 
transfer admission. 
Attrition of Potential Transfer Students. As has already been 
noted, many more students enter community colleges with transfer as 
a goal than actually transfer. There are also uncertainties regarding 
whether a student does or does not start off on a transfer track. 




                                                     
58 California State University, “The Student Transfer Achievement Reform Act.” 
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59 University of California, “Transfer Admission Guarantee,” https://perma.cc/H9F2-9YK7. 
60 “University of California Streamlines Paths for Community College Transfer Students,” 2015, 
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students who are initially “transfer-focused” upon entering community 
college actually do transfer. Shulock and Moore64 reported that about 
one-quarter of students who enter community colleges as “degree 
seekers” complete their degrees, either through transfer (18 percent) 
or through the associate degree (6 percent). Horn and Lew65, 66 (2007a, 
b) examined three annual cohorts (1993–94, 1998–99, 2000–01) of 
entering California community college students. They found that about 
one-third of entering students hoped to transfer and another 10 
percent hoped to obtain an associate degree or a vocational credential. 
They found that about 72 percent completed some transferable 
credits, about 40 percent completed at least twelve transfer and/or 
degree credits, about 27 percent completed thirty degree and/or 
transfer credits (half of what is needed for transfer), about 15 percent 
completed a transfer math course, and about 5 percent became fully 
transfer ready, meeting the minimum transfer requirements of UC and 
CSU. Two striking results were that fully one-third of students who 
became fully transfer eligible had not transferred within six years of 
their first entry, and that the majority of the students who did transfer 
(77 percent) were not fully transfer eligible and had to complete some 
requirements after entry to CSU or UC. Seventeen percent of students 
entering community college in 2000–01 had transferred to UC or CSU 
as of fall 2006. 
In addition to changing career plans and indecision, the heavy 
attrition reflects the lack of peer support from other would-be transfer 
students at many community colleges because of there being relatively 





                                                     
64 Nancy Shulock and Colleen Moore, “Rules of the Game: How State Policy Creates Barriers to 
Degree Completion and Impedes Student Success in the California Community Colleges,” Inst. 
Higher Ed. Leadership & Policy, California State University, Sacramento, February 2007, 
https://perma.cc/CTF9-ZAWH. 
65 Laura Horn and Stephen Low, “California Community College Transfer Rates: Who is Counted 
Makes a Difference,” MPR Research, 2007a, https://perma.cc/68WP-W2YH. 
66 Laura Horn and Stephen Low, “Unexpected Pathways: Transfer Patterns of California 
Community College Students,” MPR Research, 2007b, https://perma.cc/G2K9-FUCU. 
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the counseling that is available, and the complexities of transfer 
requirements for specific majors, as well as financial, career-
motivation, and geographical factors. This large loss of students initially 
interested in the transfer route is a major loss to the state, its 
economy, and the students involved. It also costs ethnic diversity 
within UC and to a lesser extent CSU, since community college students 
as a whole are much more diverse than are UC and CSU students. 
 
CSU Issues 
Joint Doctorate. Allowing CSU to give joint doctoral programs with 
University of California campuses and other PhD-granting institutions 
was to be the way for CSU faculty to have opportunities to participate 
in doctoral-level education. The twenty-six joint doctorates in existence 
as of 2015 are shown in table 5-1,67 where it can be seen that, for UC, 
the largest number (thirteen, or half) involve the San Diego campus. 
UCSD chose academic areas selectively and has used the joint 
doctorate to obtain a broader coverage of fields. Five more of the joint 
doctorates are outside UC with the Claremont Graduate University, a 
private university. The largest CSU user of the joint doctorate is San 
Diego State University, the most research-intensive CSU campus, with 
fully nineteen of the twenty-six. 
The reasons for the relatively small number of joint doctorates 
involving other UC and CSU campuses include the lack of incentives for 
UC departments to participate and the fact that most CSU faculty 
members have not been able to develop reputations in research of the 
distinction that would make them attractive to UC faculty for joint 
activities. The primary field for joint doctorates has been education, 
although the amount of joint activity in that area has lessened since 
2005, when CSU was given, through legislative action, the authority to 
offer the doctorate of education (EdD) on its own. Just before that 
time, all nine UC general campuses had joint EdD degrees with one or 
more CSU campuses, covering nearly all CSU campuses. 
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TABLE 5-1. CSU joint doctorates as of 2015 
 
CSU Campus Partner Degree Discipline 
 
Long Beach Claremont PhD Engineering & Ind. Appl. Math 
Los Angeles UCLA PhD Special Education 
Sacramento UCSB PhD Public History 
San Diego UCSD PhD Math & Science Education 
San Diego UCSD PhD Cell & Molecular Biology 
San Diego UCSD PhD Chemistry 
San Diego UCSD PhD Clinical Psychology 
San Diego UCD PhD Ecology 
San Diego UCSD PhD Bioengineering 
San Diego UCSD PhD Electrical & Computer Engg. 
San Diego UCSD PhD Mech. & Aerospace Engg. 
San Diego UCSD PhD Structural Engineering 
San Diego UCB PhD Evolutionary Biology 
San Diego UCSB PhD Geography 
San Diego UCSD PhD Geophysics 
San Diego UCSD PhD Lang. & Comm. Disorders 
San Diego UCSD PhD Public Health 
San Diego Claremont PhD Information Systems 
San Diego Claremont PhD Education 
San Diego Claremont PhD Computational Sc./Statistics 
San Diego Claremont PhD Computational Science 
San Francisco UCB PhD Special Education 
San Marcos UCSD EdD Education Leadership 
Sonoma UCD EdD Education Leadership 
San Francisco UCSF DPT Physical Therapy 
San Diego UCSD AuD Audiology 
 
 
Applied or Professional Doctorates. Professional doctorates are 
well established as the basis for practice in medicine, law, dentistry, 
and veterinary medicine, and for higher positions in K–12 and 
community college education through the EdD (doctor of education) 
degree. A number of other professional fields have turned recently to 
the doctorate as the expected professional degree. Examples include 
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physical therapy, audiology, and nursing practice.68, 69 Two of these, 
physical therapy and nursing practice, are the previously mentioned 
fields for which CSU was authorized as of 2010 to give professional 
doctorates.70 These trends have created new issues for the mission-
differentiation aspects of the Master Plan. The professional doctorate 
degrees are not research based. As they proliferate, questions arise as 
to whether the University of California can or should develop 
corresponding programs, and, if not, whether further roles should then 
be chartered for the California State University. 
Further muddying the water is the fact there is no national 
mechanism for determining what degree contents or fields warrant the 
title “Doctor.” The movements toward the doctorate as the 
professional degree have come largely from within the professions 
themselves. The title has been long been established for medical 
doctors, and leads to the colloquial term “doctor” for physicians. As the 
professional doctorate becomes extended to other fields, questions 
arise as to whether the content merits the title and the extent to which 
the movement reflects a quest for status and salary as opposed to 
there being sufficiently demanding and complex qualifications for the 
profession. Since most of the new professional doctorates relate to 
health-related services, these issues also interact with the whole 
matter of changes in the structure of health care delivery. Finally, the 
changes in degree requirements and qualifications do have impacts on 
the costs of education for service providers and hence on the supply of 
qualified professionals. To the extent that providers of higher 
education do not provide degree programs with enough capacity, the 
role may be filled by other institutions, notably for-profit universities, 
for which tuitions will be high and degree-completion rates may be 
low. However, so far for-profit institutions have not entered the 
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professional doctorate arena disproportionately, perhaps because of 
the higher costs associated with providing clinical education.71 
Dissatisfaction of CSU Faculty with the CSU Mission. CSU seeks 
faculty members who hold the PhD as a standard of academic 
qualification, and most CSU faculty members do hold the doctorate. 
Since they participated in research as they achieved the doctorate, 
they tend to enjoy research and see it as a high calling. Therefore, 
there has always been pressure from the CSU faculty to expand their 
roles in doctorate education and research. This is one of the factors 
associated with the interest of some CSU campuses in the newer 
professional doctorates, even though they are not research degrees. 
 
Statewide Coordination 
Johnstone72 and McGuiness73 have summarized a number of the 
issues involved in coordination. 
Coordination can, in principle, be accomplished in any one or 
more of three general ways—(1) through a body such as a state board 
of education with a line-management role, (2) through a body that is 
advisory to the state government, or (3) by coordination carried out 
directly among the systems or universities themselves. The line-
management approach can lead to political influences and frequent 
changes responding to shifting political dynamics. Coordination among 
the systems and/or universities themselves tends to be limited by self-
interest. The advisory role was specified in the California Master Plan 
and is what was used for forty-one years until the California 
Postsecondary Education Commission was defunded in 2011. 
The cessation of funding for the coordinating body in California 
reflected several factors. These include difficult working relationships 
among the commission and some members of government, a 
                                                     
71 Ami Zusman, personal communication, August 2016. 
72 D. Bruce Johnstone, “Higher Education Autonomy and the Apportionment of Authority among 
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penultimate director of CPEC who took an unusually aggressive 
approach toward the sectors of higher education, beliefs stemming at 
least in part from these causes that the commission was ineffective, 
loss of ability to fulfill its functions well because of a downward 
spiraling budget associated with numerous reductions over time, a lack 
of consensus on CPEC itself as to its mission, and ultimately a governor 
who did not see value in such coordination. Subsequent interviews of 
California legislators reported by Lambert74 confirmed an image that 
CPEC “had become ineffective.” Effective advisory statewide 
coordination requires that the coordinating agency be respected and 
allowed to have influence by the governor, the legislature, and the 
various sectors of higher education within the state. 
The removal of funding from CPEC left California with no 
coordinating body. Yet coordination needs persist.  
 
The Link of Research to the Top Tier of Students 
The Master Plan gives the most accomplished students access to a 
major research university for undergraduate education. This is the 
usual situation for public higher education in the United States. 
However, different sorts of undergraduate education are best for 
different students, a fact that has underlain the development of many 
different sorts of institutions of higher education in the US. Many 
liberal arts colleges without a substantial component of research do a 
fine job of preparing undergraduate students for whatever they want 
to do afterward, including graduate school and research. An issue 
raised by Shulock et al.75 and others is whether there should be a one-
to-one match between top students and research universities. 
Students in the top 12.5 percent may attend CSU instead of UC, and 
many do so. Some CSU campuses—for example, Sonoma State 
University76—endeavor to reproduce important aspects of education at 
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liberal arts colleges. Within UC, as is described in chapter 10, there 
were short-lived attempts in the early days of both the Santa Barbara 
and Riverside campuses to create nonresearch liberal arts programs, as 
well as an effort on a much grander scale to reproduce the liberal arts–
college experience within the research university in the original design 
of the UC Santa Cruz campus. None of these took root well, in part 
because of the lack of fit to the value systems and culture of the 
research university. 
 However, a more viable liberal arts undergraduate sector within 
California public higher education could be a per capita less expensive 
path to an education that still serves some strong students well. 
 
The Ability of the State of California to Finance the Master Plan 
The Master Plan was defined at a time of relatively strong finances 
for the state of California. Over the intervening more than five decades, 
the ability of the state to fund the Master Plan has diminished greatly, 
so that California residents now pay substantial tuition as opposed to 
what had been no tuition. The percentage of the state budget devoted 
to higher education has dropped from 18 percent in 1976–77 to 11.6 
percent in 2014–15.77 Callan78 (briefly) and Schrag79 (in substantially 
more detail) provide analyses of the causes of California’s financial 
stringency over the four decades since 1970. These include a series of 
ballot initiatives that have been financially restrictive and have also 
mandated major expenses without new income, as well as general 
growth in costs for areas such as public pensions, health care, and 
prisons, coupled with a reluctance to institute new taxes. 
Fees for California-resident students, now called tuition, have 
grown substantially from effectively zero in 1960 to about $13,000 and 
$6500 at UC and CSU respectively in 2014–15. At the University of 
California, need-based financial aid has been generated by devoting 
one-third of tuition and fee increases to that purpose. There are similar 
policies for CSU. Thus, UC and CSU maintain access essentially by 
charging substantial tuition for those who can pay and drawing from 
                                                     
77 Randolph and Johnson, 2014, loc. cit. 
78 Callan, 2012, loc. cit. 
79 Peter Schrag, Paradise Lost: California’s Experience, America’s Future (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1998). 
The California Master Plan 
149 
 
those funds to provide scholarship assistance for those of the lowest 
income. One measure of the success of enabling access in this way is 
the percentage of undergraduate students who are recipients of Pell 
Grants from the federal government. For the University of California as 
a whole, 42 percent of undergraduate students received Pell Grants80 
in 2011–12, ranging from a high of 58 percent (Merced) to a low of 33 
percent (Berkeley).81 These percentages placed UC at the top of major 
research universities in the proportion of recipients receiving Pell Grant 
aid. In 2011–12, students were eligible for Pell grants if family income 
was less than about $50,000.  
The shift from enabling access through charging no tuition to 
enabling access by returning large portions of tuition and fee increases 
to financial aid can be regarded as necessary to compensate for the 
state’s inability to support the Master Plan financially. It does not 
negate the other values of the Master Plan. From the Pell Grant data, it 
is evident that access of students from low-income families to the 
University of California has been maintained remarkably well despite 
the increase in tuition since the Master Plan was instituted. A recent 
report has compared enrollments of Pell Grant recipients among 
universities in the United States and confirms that the University of 
California stands remarkably high among selective universities in the 
percentage of undergraduate student enrollees who have Pell Grants.82 
The same conclusion comes from the annual ranking called the College 
Access Index published by David Leonhardt of the New York Times 
(chapters 1 and 2). 
Student debt is another growing issue for the United States as 
public investment in higher education becomes less and tuitions rise. 
About 55 percent of the 2012–13 University of California graduating 
class had debt, in the average amount of $20,500. These figures 
compare with average debts of $25,700 for public four-year, $30,700 
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for private nonprofit four-year, and $37,800 for for-profit institutions in 
the US the same year.83 This subject is explored in more depth in 
chapter 21. 
There have been extremely low fees at the California Community 
Colleges from the start. Although they have been increased in recent 
years, those fees remain among the lowest in the United States. Most 
of the community colleges in California are severely underfunded 
because of the very low fees, the funding structure for the community 
colleges within Proposition 9884 (passed in 1988), and great variability 
in auxiliary financing obtained through local community college 
districts. Since community colleges do not have the same opportunities 
that four-year institutions and research universities have for private 
fund-raising, they are more constrained financially. Higher fees are 
needed, but the political will has not been there. 
 
Demography, Access, and Participation 
On the surface, the design of the California Master Plan to 
accommodate all eligible students and the high percentages of Pell 
Grant recipients at both UC (42 percent, as mentioned above) and CSU 
(53 percent in 2013–1485) indicate that access and economic diversity 
of students are being maintained. As well, both systems have taken 
what steps they can to sustain ethnic diversity in enrollments subject to 
the limitations provided by the 1996 amendment 86  to the state 
constitution that barred preferences in admissions and financial aid on 
the basis of ethnicity and a number of other factors. But deeper and 
more nuanced analysis reveals shortcomings. 
First of all, as discussed previously, the eligibility rates of 12.5 
percent and 33 percent for UC and CSU, respectively, are too low for 
present-day needs and the nature of the California job market. 
Secondly, for reasons associated with diminished state funding, 
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participation of eligible students at both CSU and UC has slipped in 
recent years. For CSU as of 2016, seventeen of the twenty-three 
campuses are selective for freshman and/or transfer admission87; that 
is, they do not have the capacity to admit all eligible students who 
apply. Some eligible applicants are interested in only certain campuses, 
and the CSU system and individual campuses have taken various 
measures in recent years that effectively limit enrollment. As a result, 
CSU enrollment was essentially flat from 2008 to 201288 and since then 
still has not risen to the extent that the number of eligible students has 
increased.89 
For the University of California, all undergraduate campuses 
except Merced are now selective. Berkeley, UCLA, and San Diego are 
the most selective; then Davis, Irvine, and Santa Barbara; and then 
Riverside and Santa Cruz. Students can and do apply to multiple 
campuses (an average of 3.7 campuses per freshman applicant in 
2012), and eligible applicants can gain admission to another campus 
even if they are not admitted at one or more campuses. As well, 
eligible undergraduate students who do not achieve admission to any 
of the UC campuses to which they applied are offered the opportunity 
to request, and automatically receive, admission to a campus that is 
not fully subscribed, currently Merced. However, the percentage of 
students in that category who accept the proffered admission to 
Merced has so far been small, well under 5 percent, presumably 
because most of those students prefer opportunities that they have 
received at other universities rather than what they may perceive as 
the more limited offerings of a new campus. However, one can 
anticipate that this percentage will increase as the Merced campus 
further matures. In addition, the increasing denial rates for eligible 
applicants at other campuses have produced a significant decrease in 
the participation rate, the percentage of graduating high school senior 
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 who actually enroll at UC. That figure stood at 7.3 percent for 2012, 
the lowest level since the early 1980s. It had been at or above 8.0 
percent in the intervening years. In simpler terms, the access provided 
by UC and CSU, while still optimized in view of the state funding 
available, has resulted in more students deciding that they will be best 
served elsewhere rather than by the UC and CSU systems.90 
Another issue is degree-completion rates, a subject that has been 
analyzed by Bowen et al.91 for US public universities. The University of 
California stands relatively high among US public universities, with 
four- and six-year graduation rates of 63 percent and 83 percent 
respectively,92 reflecting in part the high academic caliber of entering 
students. The California State University has lower success rates, 
reflecting the greater eligibility rate and more student needs for 
income from employment. CSU has recently implemented an initiative 
to raise six-year graduation rates for freshmen from 54 to 60 percent.93 
Ultimately, campus capacities limit access to UC and CSU. To gain 
capacity, the two universities must create new campuses, substantially 
increase the capacities of existing campuses, bring in nonresident (e.g., 
computerized) methods of instruction to a large degree, and/or lessen 
degree contents. New campuses are expensive and require 
considerable time from inception of the project to opening (seventeen 
years for UC Merced). Maximum campus enrollments have crept 
upward over the years from Clark Kerr’s 27,500 to what is now 36,000 
to 45,000 for UCLA, Berkeley, Davis, and San Diego (table 3-1). 
However, most existing campuses are constrained in enrollment by 
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technology has come into use and will grow over time, but it is not yet 
clear to what extent it will reduce costs and release on-campus 
capacity. 
The Master Plan was written in a time of very different 
demographics in California than exist now. In 1960 the population was 
overwhelming Caucasian. Over the intervening years, the state has 
become one without an ethnic majority. The differences in UC and CSU 
eligibility among ethnic groups are stark, with the last CPEC eligibility 
study in 2007 having shown UC eligibility rates ranging from 6.9 and 6.3 
percent for Latinos and African Americans, respectively, to 29.4 
percent for Asian Americans. Corresponding 2007 figures for CSU range 
from 22.5 percent for Latinos to 50.9 percent for Asian Americans.94 As 
is documented by Johnson95 increasing eligibility levels for UC and CSU 
should increase ethnic diversity. 
The passage in 1996 of the constitutional amendment calling for 
race-neutral admissions, following the earlier regents’ resolutions on 
the same subject (chapter 15) had a negative effect on diversity in UC 
admissions, not because of any effect on eligibility criteria but because 
of lower admissions of Latino, African American, and American Indian 
applicants to the most selective campuses and removal of the ability of 
the university to target financial aid toward those students. More UC-
eligible students from those categories then chose to go to other 
universities than had been the case previously. (Private institutions and 
most public universities in other states have not yet been subject to 
race-neutral restrictions on admissions and financial aid.) 
There is also an unfortunate correlation between various 
measures of school quality and the ethnic composition of the student 
body of the secondary schools of California, reflecting geographic, 
demographic-clustering, and community-wealth factors (i.e., suburbs 
versus rural and inner-city). 96  This fact feeds the inequalities in 
eligibility. Any revision of the Master Plan should be sensitive to broad 
cultural differences among ethnicities. 
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The Master Plan and the California Public 
Marginson97  has provided an analysis of the sociological and 
economic factors which have affected views of the California public on 
the Master Plan, as well as the ability of the state to carry it out. 
The original Master Plan was clear, understandable, and relatively 
well accepted by the public in California. By virtue of the simple criteria 
for eligibility, it provided both a clear indication to schools of the 
college-going course curriculum and the ability for anyone to 
determine whether or not a particular student was eligible and thereby 
guaranteed admission to UC or CSU. Because of the clarity and 
sharpness of the eligibility criteria, people understood the criteria for 
admission to the two public universities and were generally accepting 
of them. 
The bright line of eligibility and the concomitant guarantee of 
attendance somewhere within UC or CSU have now been blurred in 
several ways. The 2012 change by the University of California to extend 
the possibility of eligibility and admission to more students through the 
category of “entitled to review” without a guarantee of admission at 
some campus created a category of students with uncertain eligibility 
status. Although use of that category was suspended in 2016, it is still 
something that has been approved by the Academic Senate for use if 
and when needed. The 2011 elimination of funding for the California 
Postsecondary Education Commission (CPEC) leaves no mechanism to 
assure that the Master Plan is enforced or periodically reviewed either 
directly or through advice to the state government. Another 
consequence had been that there were no eligibility studies for high 
school classes graduating between 2007 and 2016, although a 2016 
study is being conducted through the Governor’s Office of Planning and 
Research,98 a body with much wider scope than just higher education 
and less politically insulated than was CPEC since it reports directly to 
the governor. As noted by Geiser99 and others, there are clear signs 
that UC’s effective eligibility rate in 2017 is substantially above 12.5 
 
                                                     
97 Simon Marginson, “”, Higher Education Quarterly, v. 71, September 2017. 
98 “SB 103 Higher Education Eligibility Study Information,” Governor’s Office of Planning and 
Research, https://perma.cc/CXK2-R4GQ.  
99 Geiser, 2014, loc. cit. 
The California Master Plan 
155 
 
percent, perhaps as high as 16 to 20 percent. The expansion in the 
number of students who have good reason to regard themselves as 
eligible contrasts with the limitations on the capacities of UC and CSU 
that stem from budgetary factors. Because of these factors and a 
general lack of understanding of what is now a much more complex 
state of affairs, many more California students and their families are 
likely to believe that they may somehow have been unjustly deprived 
of a deserved resource. It can appear that admissions of full-fee-paying 
out-of-state and foreign students are the reason they were not 
admitted.  
The feelings are epitomized by a well-publicized statement from 
Governor Jerry Brown referring to Berkeley at a UC Regents’ meeting in 
2015: “It just feels that whatever used to belong to the normal people 
of California—assuming the Brown extended family is normal—it’s not 
available anymore. And so you got your foreign students and you got 
your 4.0 folks, but just the kind of ordinary, normal students, you 
know, that got good grades but weren’t at the top of the heap there—
they’re getting frozen out.”100 An aggressive 2016 report from the 
California State Auditor serves to stoke the same sorts of feelings.101 
There are, of course, answers, including the fact that the available 
enrollment capacities at Berkeley and UCLA are probably the smallest 
percentages of the total state population for a large public-university 
campus that exist for any of the fifty states. But the perception remains 
and is therefore a Master Plan issue. The situation cries for analysis and 
advisory coordination through a revival of the California Postsecondary 
Education Commission or something similar to it. 
 
 
OBJECTIVES FOR MODIFICATION 
 
Recently, there has been no shortage of recommendations for 
changes to the California Master Plan for Higher Education to bring it 
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up to date. Sources include the California Office of the Legislative 
Analyst;102 the Public Policy Institute of California;103 the Bay Area 
Council Economic Institute;104 the Little Hoover Commission;105 the 
Higher Education Policy Institute;106 the Institute for Higher Education 
Leadership & Policy of Sacramento State University;107 the Center for 
Studies in Higher Education of the University of California, Berkeley;108, 
109 the Institute for Research on Higher Education of the University of 
Pennsylvania;110 a joint effort between a former senior analyst of the 
University of California and an ex-president of UC;111 a former higher-
education reporter for the San Francisco Chronicle and program officer 
for the Hewlett Foundation;112 and the independent group California 
Competes.113 Despite all this interest, as of 2017 there has not yet been 
any formal effort to revise or rewrite the Master Plan. The last study of 
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2002 by the Joint Committee to Develop a Master Plan for Education114 
and covered both higher education and K–12 education. There has 
been no further effort by the legislature, probably in part due to the 
defunding of the California Postsecondary Education Commission. 
There are indeed continually growing necessities both to monitor 
and to update the Master Plan. The following discussion outlines what I 
believe are reasonable objectives for a revised plan and 
implementations of it, rather than recounting the assortment of 
recommendations that have been made in the various referenced 
papers. 
 
Differentiation of Mission and Transfer 
In any revision, the differentiation of the missions of the three 
sectors of public higher education should be retained. The economic 
efficiency gained by mission differentiation and the ability to focus 
research upon the University of California have accomplished much for 
the state and its economy. The resultant quality and utility of University 
of California research has become the envy of many other states and 
countries. Transfer education, enabled to work well through sufficient 
clear information and counseling, is also a vital component since it is 
less costly for students, families, and the state. Retention of transfer 
also implies retention of the dual vocational and transfer functions of 
the community colleges, along with improvement in managing that mix 
in the community colleges. The transfer system should be designed and 
supported so that a much higher percentage of students who enter 
community colleges intending to transfer do in fact transfer. 
 
Coordination 
A statewide coordinating body of the general nature of the former 
Postsecondary Education Commission is also needed. Without it there 
will be issues stemming from the inherent conflicts among voluntary 
coordination and the self-interests of the different sectors of public 
higher education. The present situation of lower state budgets and 
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The bright-line eligibility concept for UC and CSU has served 
California well historically, providing clear guidance to students and 
families as to what it takes for a student to be able to attend the 
University of California, as well as to schools regarding curricula needed 
for college-bound students. It has also served as a cogent argument 
over the years for full enrollment funding by the state.115 A revision to 
the Master Plan would do well to maintain this concept and to make it 
as clear as possible what does and does not constitute eligibility. 
 
More Bachelor’s Degrees 
As has already been noted, the state of California needs to 
increase the percentage of California residents achieving the bachelor’s 
degree so as to meet the needs associated with the quantity and 
spectrum of jobs in California. Increasing eligibility percentages for UC 
and CSU, as was recommended by the Public Policy Iinsitute of 
California (PPIC), is the best and most direct approach for 
accomplishing this goal; however, it does necessitate additional 
funding. 
Another approach that has been pushed is to allow the 
community colleges to give more bachelor’s degrees. However, the 
workforce needs of the state identified by the PPIC116 relate to the 
present bachelor’s degrees of CSU and UC, and to engender that 
capability in the community colleges would take extremely large 
change and expense. It would also result in loss of the financial and 
mission effectiveness associated with differentiation of missions. It 
would be much better to increase the effectiveness of transfer 
education and/or create additional capacity within CSU and UC. 
Support and Enhance Transfer Education and Make It More 
Uniform across the State. It is certainly desirable to keep and further 
build the concept of transfer education as a way of relieving capacity 
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pressures on UC and CSU, as a way of providing a baccalaureate 
education with lower overall cost for students and the state, and as a 
second-chance route for those not admissible to UC and CSU as 
freshmen. The two largest needs are to make transfer more nearly 
even across the entire community college system and to reduce the 
large attrition of would-be transfer students during their community 
college years. Without these steps, transfer will remain an unhappily 
inefficient mechanism. 
More plentiful and more effective counseling, best carried out as a 
jointly designed and overseen effort by the community colleges, CSU, 
and UC, is one obvious and much needed means of enhancing transfer 
efficiency. Transfer-guarantee programs are effective because they 
provide a clear path. Those that already exist should be developed 
further and made as comprehensive as possible. Programs of that sort 
should be particularly effective for improving transfer from those 
community colleges that have low transfer yields. Designing student 
financial support to cover the years both before and after transfer as 
seamlessly as possible should also be effective. 
Increased use of the less expensive transfer route could also be 
achieved in structural ways, one of which would be to relax the 
eligibility requirements for transfer to UC and CSU to some degree. To 
the extent that transfer is more straightforward and attractive, it may 
be used more even by those students who are eligible as freshmen for 
UC and CSU. That would be an economically attractive goal if transfer 
attrition rates can be greatly reduced. 
Maintaining the dual mission of the community colleges 
(vocational and transfer) has presented difficulties. As the ratio of 
vocational to transfer education has grown overall throughout the 
community college system, some colleges have directed services 
proportionately less to transfer. Consideration should be given to how 
best to reinforce the transfer function within the community colleges, 
while still recognizing the need for pretransfer education to be 
distributed geographically around the state. 
Satellite Lower-Division UC and CSU Campuses. Another 
approach could be to build UC and CSU enrollments by creating 





the author, 117  Geiser and Atkinson, 118  and Geiser. 119  The satellite 
campus would handle some of the undergraduate enrollment of the 
main campus, most likely in the lower division, with transfer to the 
main campus for the upper division being automatic and therefore not 
an issue for the students involved. By being located in different 
communities, such campuses could overcome any enrollment-
limitation agreements of the main campus with its own community.  
The UC Santa Barbara campus had such a satellite center in Ventura, 
1974-2009, and UC Riverside operates a satellite center in Palm Desert, 
but currently without undergraduate degree programs. 
A satellite campus within easy driving distance from the parent 
campus could utilize parent-campus faculty in its teaching. An example 
could be the use of the existing Richmond Field Station by the Berkeley 
campus for this purpose. Use of parent-campus faculty would be less 
feasible for a more distant satellite campus, but an offsetting benefit 
for more distant satellite campuses could be the opportunity to extend 
the reach of the parent campus to other parts of the state, notably 
those that are not served well by existing campuses. This may be the 
ultimate approach for UC to serve the large northern portion of 
California. Converting existing community college campuses to UC/CSU 
satellite campuses could minimize needs for land acquisition and new 
capital construction, but it would deplete capacity for vocational 
education in the area and raise questions of the extent to which 
existing faculty of the community college could be used effectively for 
the focused mission of university-level lower division instruction. 
 
Instructional Uses of Information Technology 
The rapidly advancing field of information technology has come 
into use in a variety of ways for university-level instruction. It is still 
very much a developing area and is continually being assessed in 
numerous ways. Despite significant successes, much hoopla, and much 
attention to it by state and federal government officials in searches for 
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financial panaceas, the use of information technology for instruction is 
still an evolving area with much uncertainty regarding its future roles. 
But as more is developed, known, and evaluated, it will certainly be 
both necessary and desirable to incorporate the educational uses of 
information technology into planning at higher levels such as a Master 
Plan. Clearly it will strongly affect matters such as the amount of time 
that students spend physically on campus and the distribution of needs 
for off-campus and on-campus instruction and activities. Good uses of 
information technology may alleviate much of the need for new 
campuses as the population continues to grow. 
 
Seek Leveraging of Funds 
The Master Plan and policies for implementing it should be 
structured so as to enhance leveraging of state funds to bring in other 
monies in support of public higher education, notably from private 
sources and the federal government. Many people and organizations 
value public higher education as a high priority, and there is 
consequently significant private money available in support of it. 
Within the University of California, total private funding now (2017) 
exceeds state funding for the Berkeley and UCLA campuses. A Master 
Plan and the implementing policies that surround it should help draw in 
such funding. State and federal tax policies should promote private 
giving to not-for-profit universities. There should be no barriers to the 
use of state funds in support of private fund-raising. 
 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The California Master Plan for Higher Education of 1960 greatly 
benefitted higher education in California and, within it, the University 
of California. As a product of negotiation and compromise among the 
sectors of higher education itself, it was an academically sensible plan 
that created efficiencies for the state and enabled the University of 
California to reach the level of academic and research distinction that it 
has achieved. The benefits of that research in the form of new societal 
concepts and scientific and technological innovations, as well as 





universities, have greatly enhanced the economy of the state. The 
Master Plan 
 identified separate and distinct missions for the three sectors 
of public higher education; 
 placed the research mission almost exclusively with the 
University of California, meaning that UC would be funded 
accordingly and that UC would be the de facto research arm of 
the state; 
 created the concepts of eligibility and guaranteed access for 
UC-eligible freshmen and transfer applicants, which became a 
“bright line” for eligibility whereby students, parents, schools, 
and community colleges could readily determine whether or 
not a student was eligible for freshman or transfer admission 
to UC and/or CSU, and whereby the secondary schools of the 
state knew exactly what college preparatory curriculum should 
be provided; 
 set a clear structure and path for transfer bachelor’s-level 
education, which would start with two years at a community 
college, thereby providing a convenient way of starting 
baccalaureate education close to home; 
 provided that transfer would assume a large portion of 
baccalaureate education within the state; 
 initially provided for public higher education with no tuition, a 
provision that has severely eroded over time; 
 established a program of Cal Grants, which would provide 
financial assistance for California residents, even for tuition at 
private universities and colleges; and 
 created statewide coordination of public higher education in 
the form of an independent organization that was advisory to 
the state government. 
Now over fifty years old, the Master Plan has not evolved 
sufficiently to meet the needs of the times. Some issues have been 
present from the start, and others have developed over time. Many of 
these deal with the community colleges and their dual missions of 
vocational education and transfer. They include 
 the fact that the community colleges have absorbed so much 
of the growth in enrollment in public higher education over the 
The California Master Plan 
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years, producing a great imbalance in which very high 
community college enrollments, mostly in vocational programs, 
contrast with a relatively low production of bachelor’s degrees 
thereby not matching the spectrum of skill levels needed for 
employment in the state, 
 a resultant imbalance between the dual community college 
missions, with transfer education a much lower percentage of 
the whole, meaning that less attention is paid to it at many 
community colleges, 
 a large and highly inefficient attrition of would-be transfer 
students during their community college years, and 
 very large differences among community colleges in production 
and preparation of transfer students. 
Other issues are 
 dissatisfaction of many faculty members in the California State 
University with the comprehensive university mission, fed in 
part by the lack of proliferation of joint doctorate degree 
programs, 
 defunding and hence dissolution of the state-wide coordinating 
mechanism, 
 inability of the state to finance the Master Plan over time, and 
 uneven access to higher education over segments of California 
society, both ethnically and geographically. 
There has been a recent profusion of recommendations on how 
the Master Plan might be altered or evolve. There are, however, some 
aspects of the Master Plan that are compelling for preservation. These 
include 
 differentiation of mission, which has given financial efficiency 
and has enabled the quality of research that has served 
California society and economy so well, 
 statewide coordination of an advisory nature in the model that 
existed until 2011, and 
 the eligibility concept, with a clear definition of eligibility that 
enables students and schools to know what it takes for a 







There are some additional needs: 
 More bachelor’s degrees are needed in California because of 
the employment spectrum needed by the economy. These 
could be gained by 
o increasing eligibility percentages for UC and/or CSU, 
o supporting and enhancing transfer better so as to 
make it more effective, with less attrition during the 
community college years, thereby increasing financial 
efficiency and ethnic diversity at UC and CSU, and/or 
o creating lower division satellite campuses of existing 
UC and CSU campuses. 
 UC, CSU, and the community colleges must continue to 
evaluate uses of information technology so as to bring in 
efficiently the methods that prove most useful. 
 State funding for public higher education should be designed 
so that it will best leverage other sources of funding, for 





Structure, Organization, and Internal Budgeting 




It was my conviction, both as chancellor and president, that the campus 
was the basic loyalty unit; that “universitywide” was an essential 
superstructure in service to the campuses; that we needed “one 
university” but one university with a pluralistic system of governance; 
that the campuses should control item-by-item decision making under 
general policy guidance unless there was a good reason to the contrary; 
that the chancellors should be the “executive heads” of their campuses 
as the Board of Regents had decided in 1951. 
—Clark Kerr1 
 
In the best kind of university system, the system office functions as a 
kind of corporate office and does not become an operating entity. The 
system does not offer academic programs or engage in research. The 
system does not confer tenure or award academic degrees. The system 
does not have a football team. Academic programs and decisions 
concerning them are campus based. The academic leadership is on the 
campuses and the [system head] does not function or represent himself 
or herself to be the chief academic officer of the campuses…In this 
ideal, the system provides services, including planning, architectural, 
engineering, budgeting, financial and investment, and legal services. 
The system undertakes lobbying efforts. It is the continuing 
responsibility of the chancellor to evaluate the performance of the 
presidents and maintain a high quality of leadership across the system. 
—Peter Flawn, former president, University of Texas at Austin2 
                                                     
1 Clark Kerr, The Blue and the Gold: A Personal Memoir of the University of California, 1949–1967 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), p. 193. 
2 Peter T. Flawn, A Primer for University Presidents (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1990), p. 
178. Note that in this passage the titles Chancellor and President are reversed from how they are 






Continuing struggles between the center and the parts are inevitable. 
Sheldon Rothblatt has observed that “Any federal system by the facts of 
its very existence undergo[es] periodic struggles for domination 




In my judgment, the pressures for constant extensions of chancellorial 
dominance have reached the point of challenging the effectiveness of 
the center in assuring state authorities and the people of the state that 
their financial support is being used to the maximum benefit of the 
people of the state. And therefore we need to take a new look at the 
proper role of the center as well as the autonomy of the parts. 
 —Clark Kerr (in 2001)4 
 
The universitywide system has no alumni, no students, no faculty, no 




The University of California is a single university within which all 
campuses have the full public-research-university mission. This 
structure contrasts with the more usual situations in the United States, 
where state systems are composed of more than one university or 
college, or where university systems are composed of campuses having 
different missions from one another. 6  This chapter concerns the 
structure, organization, and internal budgeting of the multicampus 
University of California, how it evolved, and where it is now.  
 
 
                                                     
3 Kerr, 2001, op. cit., p. 220. 
4 Kerr, 2001, op. cit., p. 220. 
5 Kerr, 2001, op. cit., p. 192. 
6 Examples of the former are the State University System of Florida, the University System of 
Georgia, and the Utah System of Higher Education. Examples of the latter are the State University 
of New York, the University of Texas system, and the University of North Carolina. 






The university started with a single campus at Berkeley. As is 
described in chapter 2, auxiliary operations covering particular areas of 
instruction (San Francisco) and particular topics of research (San Diego, 
Davis, Riverside) were then established over the years. A Southern 
Branch was developed in Los Angeles as of 1919. Later, that Southern 
Branch became a general campus, a state college in Santa Barbara was 
switched to UC, and the operations in Davis, San Diego, and Riverside 
were expanded into general campuses. The San Francisco operations 
remained dedicated exclusively to the health sciences but became a 
full-fledged campus. Entirely new grass-roots general campuses were 
started at Irvine and Santa Cruz in the 1960s and then in 2005 at 
Merced. With one exception (Santa Barbara), and technically another 
(Los Angeles), all the campuses beyond Berkeley have developed as 
growth of satellite facilities toward full and general education or as 
entirely new campuses spawned from within the university. 
The essential history of the University of California is then one of a 
succession of transitions from a single-location main campus with 
satellite facilities to the current ten-campus university. As the number 
of campuses multiplied, the university created chancellor positions to 
provide leaders for each of the campuses, along with campus 
administrations to which various administrative functions were 
delegated. The Academic Senate (chapter 7) divided first into a 
Northern Division and a Southern Division, and then into separate 
divisions for the individual campuses. As these changes occurred, the 
university has never forsaken the status of being a single university, 
and many aspects of its structure and operation reflect that fact. 
As one university, it is one corporate entity and has one mission, 
one state budget, and one set of dealings with the state government. It 
also has common standards, policies, and policy envelopes and the 
ability to grow from within by academic design rather than by 
amalgamation of preexisting entities. 
 
One Mission 
All campuses of the University of California have the same 





uniformity of mission means that the university can focus upon doing 
that one mission well and can share best practices internally, rather 
than having to consider conditions for campuses or universities of 
several different natures. The single mission has enabled all the 
campuses to grow toward premier research-university status at 
whatever rate they can, without being limited by imposed mission 
constraints. That fact has served the state well. 
 
One Corporate Identity 
The university has a single corporate identity as the Regents of the 
University of California, despite its size and the large number of 
campuses. This simplifies governance vis-à-vis the state of California 
and creates a clear chain of responsibility, avoiding any real or de facto 
existence of multiple masters. 
 
One State Budget 
The single-university structure means that there is one state 
budget for the University of California, as opposed to state structures 
where individual single-campus universities or university systems 
compete with one another for budget at the state level. As well, there 
is one Office of State Government Relations presenting a uniform voice 
on state legislative and executive matters, and one office for dealing 
with legislation at the national-government level, again with a single, 
uniform voice. The distribution of budget among campuses within the 
university and the formulation of single university stances on 
government issues are matters for decisions within the university, not 
for competition among the campuses at the state and national levels. 
An exception occurs when there is a competition for national institutes 
or large research operations funded by executive agencies of the 
federal or state government, industrial corporations, or foundations. 
For these the campuses do compete with one another. 
 
One Set of Standards, Policies, and Policy Envelopes 
Particularly because the university grew by additions of entirely 
new, or very small existing7  campuses to the original campus at 
                                                     
7 Los Angeles and Santa Barbara. 




Berkeley, the university has successfully spread the academic standards 
and culture that had developed at Berkeley to all the additional 
campuses and has benefited by integrating views from all campuses as 
it has gone further along. It has been important for that purpose that 
the Academic Personnel Manual (chapter 11) has been a university-
wide document and that numerous other academic policies 
establishing or related to academic standards are also university-wide. 
n som cases, it is policy envelopes that are university-wide, enabling 
campuses to implement their own specific policies so long as they fall 
within the constraints set by the policy envelope. An example of a 
policy envelope is undergraduate admissions policy (chapter 15), where 
university-wide policy allows the use of the fourteen criteria set by the 
overall policy of comprehensive review,8 but individual campuses may 
choose not to use some of the criteria and can determine their own 
methods of utilizing the criteria that they do use. 
 
The Ability to Grow New Campuses from within the University 
The one-university structure with new campuses being formed de 
novo or from very small preexisting campuses has meant that there is 
much involvement of the existing academic enterprise in defining and 
establishing the academic structure and culture of each new campus. 
The infusion of academic values has come in several ways, notable 
among them being the formation of an Academic Senate Task Force to 
work with the administration on the various aspects of the academic 
development of the campus, as was done for San Diego, Irvine, Santa 
Cruz, and Merced. As well, the academic development of new 
campuses has continually been under knowledgeable academic 
administrative leadership, starting with the university-wide provost 
once the project for a campus is approved, and then passing to the 
chancellor and the provost (or equivalent title) of the new campus. 
The Senate Task Force acts effectively as the division council of the 
Academic Senate for the new campus in shared governance (chapter 
7), and establishes senate committees as needed, an early one being 
the Committee on Academic Personnel, which reviews and advises on 
                                                     






appointments of faculty for the new campus. Douglass9 describes the 
structure and roles of the Academic Senate advisory functions for the 
three new University of California campuses of the 1960s, for which the 
senate task forces were called Special Advisory Committees. The 
charge, membership, and various documents of the Senate Task Force 
formed in 1998 for UC Merced are available on Internet Archive.10 The 
initial members of these committees are drawn from existing 
campuses. Over time, as faculty members are added to the new 
campus, the membership combines some members from the new 
campus with others from existing campuses. Then eventually the 
membership of senate committees is entirely from the new campus. As 
of 2015–16, the eleventh year after the 2005 opening of the Merced 
campus, the Division Council and all but two of the UC Merced senate 
committees were composed entirely of UC Merced faculty members. 
However, the Committee on Academic Personnel, which advises on 
appointments, promotions, and advancements, had six of its eight 
members from other UC campuses, and the Committee on Privilege 
and Tenure (dealing with faculty grievances) had the chair and one 
other member from other UC campuses, and another member from 
Merced itself.11 
A certain amount of tension develops naturally between the 
Academic Senate Task Force and committees, on the one hand, and the 
administration and faculty of the new campus, on the other hand. The 
typical issues are whether the campus is being given the latitude that a 
new campus needs and whether the appointments and standards for 
new faculty members fulfill the criteria of quality and promise that are 
sought throughout the University of California. In this regard there is a 
 
 
                                                     
9 John Aubrey Douglass, “Planning New UC Campuses In the 1960s: A Background Paper For UC 
Merced on the Role of the Universitywide Senate,” Research and Occasional Papers no. 2.98, 
Center for Studies in Higher Education, University of California, Berkeley, December 1998, 
https://perma.cc/XX77-A7X2.  
10 Academic Senate, “Task Force on UC Merced,”  
https://web.archive.org/web/20160103172004/http://senate.universityofcalifornia.edu/ucmerce
d/.  
11 Academic Senate, “Committees,” University of California, Merced, https://perma.cc/Y5AE-5TBM  




telling passage in a chapter12 by the founding provost of UC Merced 
bemoaning a case where “the Senate Task Force’s worry about signs of 
eminence in initial hired faculty undermined what would have likely 
been an excellent fit of a potential faculty member’s strengths with 
campus needs.” However, he then goes on to say, “In the final analysis, 
CAP’s absolute allegiance to quality was undeniable and will yield the 
ultimate benefit of creating a coequal UC campus.” The founding dean 
of engineering, who came from another university, observed13 that the 
task force “endeavored to impart the culture of UC shared faculty 
governance to new faculty and administrators, most of them also new 
to the University of California, and did so with patience and in many 
cases compassion.” But then he goes on to say, “For a start-up campus, 
the overhead of creating this version of faculty-shared governance 
combined with the need to create concurrently nearly all 
administrative and academic functions, resulted in a decision-making 
environment much less efficient and effective than that within a 
mature campus.” It would be interesting to have related observations 
from the Senate Task Force or the Committee on Academic Personnel. 
It clearly takes constructive administrators and senate leaders to 
make the shared-governance aspects of the development of new 
campuses within the university work well. But the challenges of 
bringing about the culture shifts and other changes associated with 
bringing a developed university campus from outside into the 
university as a new campus are much greater. Attesting to that fact are 
the difficulties encountered in the amalgamation of the Santa Barbara 
State College (formerly the Santa Barbara State Normal School of 
Manual Arts and Home Economics) into UC as the Santa Barbara 
campus, and the fusion of the Citrus Experiment Station and “Watkins 
College” to become the Riverside campus (both described in chapter 
10). The formation of the State University of New York14 is another 
                                                     
12 David B. Ashley, “Building Academic Distinction in a Twenty-First-Century Research University,” 
in Karen Merritt and Jane Fiori Lawrence, eds., From Rangeland to Research University: The Birth 
of the University of California, Merced, New Dimensions in Higher Education, no. 139 (San 
Francisco: Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 2007). 
13 Jeff K. Wright, “Building the School of Engineering,” Merritt and Lawrence, 2007, op. cit., p. 54. 
14 W. Bruce Leslie, John B. Clark, and Kenneth P. O’Brien, SUNY at Sixty: The Promise of the State 





example of the difficulties of bringing together disparate existing 
universities and colleges into a multicampus university. 
 
What Suffers 
The model of one university with many campuses all having the 
same research mission has many benefits, but there are of course 
some drawbacks, too. These relate primarily to the singularity of the 
mission. State boards of education and multimission state universities 
can do overall planning of higher education at the board level. The 
three public systems of higher education—the University of California, 
the California State University, and the California Community 
Colleges—operate under three separate boards, none of which has 
responsibility to coordinate overall coverage of all higher education. A 
particular problem is articulation for transfer students between two-





Sproul and Corley 
The original organization and governance of the University of 
California was entirely centralized, befitting its structure having a single 
main campus in Berkeley with several outlying operations. Even though 
the Southern Branch at Los Angeles had proceeded significantly toward 
maturity, this structure persisted until 1952, late in Robert Gordon 
Sproul’s presidency. By this point the lack of any appreciable 
decentralization was considerably impeding the operation of the 
university. Even though a vice president position, later changed to 
provost, had been created to oversee the Los Angeles campus, all 
decisions on personnel or financial matters were made at Berkeley. 
Stories abound15 of the hassles and delays that ensued when small 
matters that needed a decision that had to be transmitted from Los 
Angeles to Berkeley. The same was true for the main campus at 
                                                     
15 See, e.g., Angus E. Taylor, Speaking Freely: A Scholar’s Memoir of Experience in the University of 
California (Berkeley: Institute of Governmental Studies Press, University of California, 2000); Roger 
L. Geiger, Research and Relevant Knowledge: America’s Research Universities since World War II 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 135–43. 




Berkeley. Even seemingly small decisions went to Sproul, whose 
managerial style was to keep as complete control for himself as 
possible.  
Although the position “provost of the university” had been 
created in 1931 and filled by Monroe Deutsch, professor of classics at 
Berkeley, what was delegated to Deutsch was much less than for a 
provost today. Verne Stadtman observed:16 
In practice, the power enjoyed by Deutsch and Moore [Ernest 
C. Moore, Provost of the University of California at Los 
Angeles] on their respective campuses was limited. Sproul 
retained authority in all budget matters and in the 
appointment of tenured faculty members, department 
chairmen, and deans. Neither could easily contravene the 
directives of the comptroller on business matters affecting 
their campus. 
As noted in that quotation, another unusual feature of the Sproul 
presidency was the amount of latitude given to James M. Corley, who 
was “variously assistant comptroller, comptroller, university 
representative in Sacramento, and vice president—business affairs.”17 
He had dual reporting lines, both to Sproul as president and to the 
regents. Before becoming president in 1930, Sproul had held an 
assortment of positions that collectively were analogous to what 
became Corley’s role. The working arrangement with the two 
presidents before Sproul—David Barrows and William Wallace 
Campbell—was that the president dealt with academic matters, and 
Sproul functioned as vice president for business and financial affairs, 
comptroller, secretary to the Board of Regents, land agent, and 
representative for the university in Sacramento. Thus the arrangement 
between Sproul and Corley in many ways continued what had already 
existed. As was the case for Sproul, Corley kept tight control on things. 
In the 1940s several forces brought about pressures for some 
decentralization of governance. First of all, as described in chapter 10, 
several strong Southern California regents and UCLA deans sought both 
more localized governance and greater status for the Los Angeles 
                                                     
16 Verne Stadtman, The University of California, 1868–1968 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970), p. 272. 





campus. Secondly, there were rumblings from Berkeley itself, from 
both deans and in particular the Academic Senate. A speech to the 
Academic Senate in 1943 by Joel Hildebrand is credited by both Clark 
Kerr 18  and Eugene Lee 19  as having had considerable influence. 
Hildebrand, whom we will meet further in chapter 9, was a 
distinguished physical chemist, a longtime senate leader who had been 
prominent in the Berkeley revolution in 1919 (chapter  7), and a holder 
of a number of decanal positions. He was well known as a close 
associate and strong supporter of Sproul.20 Clark Kerr considered the 
speech so important that he transcribed it in an appendix to his 
memoirs.21 A passage from that speech follows: 
The fact is that the President divides his attention between 
seven campuses22 and numerous public affairs. He has but 
limited time, therefore, to devote to any one of the scores of 
departments directly responsible to him. His contacts with 
members of the faculty are rare. Even a department 
chairman may have to wait days for an interview and weeks 
for a decision. The administration seems to be trailing its 
business rather than steering it. There is little leisure for long-
range planning. There is little delegation of authority, even 
when the President is absent. The government is then carried 
on by mail. There is no administrative officer whose business 
is to sit down and discuss with a department chairman the 
work, welfare, and future of his department…I believe the 
Senate must take the initiative. 
Finally, in 1947, the university chartered a consulting firm, the 
Public Administration Survey, to examine the administration structure. 
 
                                                     
18 Clark Kerr, 2001, op. cit., p 43. 
19 Eugene C. Lee, The Origins of the Chancellorship: The Buried Report of 1948 (Berkeley: Center 
for Studies in Higher Education and Institute for Governmental Studies, University of California, 
1995), p. 7, https://perma.cc/EK5X-E687.  
20 One of pleasures of my life was to preside, as the relatively new dean of the College of 
Chemistry at Berkeley, over the massive hundredth-birthday celebration for Joel Hildebrand on 
November 16, 1981. A video of that occasion has been preserved, 
https://archive.org/details/cubanc_000113.  
21 Kerr, 2001, loc. cit., vol. 1, p. 43, 462–463. 
22 Presumably referring to Berkeley, Los Angeles, San Francisco, the newly acquired campus in 
Santa Barbara, and the facilities in Davis, La Jolla, and Riverside. 




That firm in its report recommended decentralization in a manner 
much the same as what was eventually done, but still with provost as 
the title for the primary administrators of campuses.23 Sproul divided 
the report into many sections, sending it different places for review 
and thereby buying more time. Finally, under pressure from regents 
and faculty, Sproul established chancellor positions for both the 
Berkeley and Los Angeles campuses to begin in 1952. Clark Kerr and 
Raymond Allen were appointed to those posts at Berkeley and UCLA, 
respectively. However, the roles of the chancellors remained ill defined 
at best. Kerr describes his first days in his new post as finding that he 
had a small office, nothing that he could do, and a business manager 
who still reported directly to Vice President Corley rather than to him.24 
Being Kerr, he found an outlet in long-range academic and physical 
planning and academic leadership directed toward further enhancing 
the academic stature of Berkeley.25 
 
Clark Kerr 
Kerr moved from the Berkeley chancellorship to the presidency of 
the University of California in 1958.26 Given his experiences as Berkeley 
chancellor and his view that the Sproul administration was by then 
overly centralized, Kerr moved promptly to make the major changes in 
the number and status of campuses that have already been outlined in 
chapters 2 and 3. 
Kerr also worked with the regents to undo the arrangement 
whereby James Corley had independent authority with a joint reporting 
line directly to the regents. The functions were separated, and both the 
new vice president of finance and the person in charge of state 
government relations now reported directly to the president.27 
 
                                                     
23 Lee, 1995, loc. cit. 
24 Kerr, 2001, op. cit., pp. 40–47. 
25 Kerr, 2001, op. cit., pp. 56–128. 
26 Kerr’s successor as chancellor at Berkeley was chemistry Nobelist Glenn Seaborg, who has left 
us what amounts to his diary covering his time in the post up until the point where he was called 
by President Kennedy to head the Atomic Energy Commission. Glenn T. Seaborg with Ray Colvig, 
Chancellor at Berkeley (Berkeley: Institute of Governmental Studies Press, University of California, 
1994). 







Figure 6-1. Robert Gordon Sproul (left) and Clark Kerr at the 
Inauguration of Kerr as UC President, Septermber 29, 195828 
 
 
The third set of changes made initially by Kerr was operational. He 
delegated to the campus chancellors the business affairs of the 
campus, the selection of department chairs, and oversight of grounds 
and buildings, architects and engineers, campus public affairs, police, 
intercollegiate athletics, and alumni associations. 
Fourth, as has already been noted, Kerr moved from unitary to 
pluralistic decision-making.29 He made consultation with the Academic 
Senate more meaningful and effective, bringing it to its present status 
(chapter 7). He initiated the monthly Council of Chancellors meetings 
that still persist today, bringing major issues to this meeting of 
chancellors and the more senior vice presidents for discussion. He 
initiated periodic meetings of administrative officials having like 
functions on the different campuses with their Office of the President 
counterparts (chapter 8). He created the post of vice president— 
 
                                                     
28 Online Photographic Collection, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 
https://perma.cc/EB8J-93ZF.    
29 Kerr, 2001, op. cit., pp. 191–205. 




academic affairs to interface more consistently with the Academic 
Senate. In addition, he created the position of vice president of the 
university and designated it as most senior vice president position and 
his second in command. For that position he chose Harry Wellman, 
who had been vice president for agriculture sciences. Details of these 
and other associated decentralization actions are given by Furtado.30 
Given these changes in the administrative structure, the Academic 
Senate decided to reorganize. In 1933 it had been divided into northern 
and southern divisions. In 1963 the senate changed from the two 
divisions so as now to have one division per campus. At this point, the 
Academic Council became the university-wide executive body of the 
senate (chapter 7). Concomitant with the reorganization by the 
Academic Senate, Kerr and the chancellors created deans of the 
graduate division on each campus, to correspond with the senate 
structure for consultation on graduate affairs. 
There were continued changes during Kerr’s time as president, 
influenced by ongoing considerations, the desires of some chancellors, 
and a regents’ study known as the Byrne Report.31 In 1964–65 the UC 
Regents delegated to President Kerr, and Kerr in turn delegated to the 
chancellors, full authority for faculty appointments and promotion, 
including tenure decisions and advancement to above-scale salary,32 as 
well as approvals for research grants and contracts. Budget transfers 
were also made to individual chancellors that would give them greater 
control over personnel actions, budgeting, fund-raising, and 
admissions. In his memoirs,33 Kerr notes reservations that he and 
various regents had at the time about possible uneven approaches 
among the campuses (notably San Diego) in awarding above-scale 
                                                     
30 Loren M. Furtado, Budget Reform and Administrative Decentralization in the University of 
California (Berkeley: Berkeley Public Policy Press, Institute of Governmental Studies, University of 
California, 2002), pp. 43–45. 
31 Jerome C. Byrne was an attorney who staffed a regents’ committee that examined the 
structure, organization, and governance of the university in light of the student unrest associated 
with the 1964 Free Speech Movement at Berkeley. The report recommended more radical 
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Stadtman, 1970, op. cit., pp. 471–472, and Kerr, 2001, op. cit., pp. 208–210. 
32 Except for the few very high salaries, most of them in medical schools, that are above a certain 
dollar value and still require approval by the regents. 





salaries. He also notes his retrospective belief that removal of the 
regents from the tenure-approval process should have been treated as 
a major issue to be given deeper consideration. But he also states his 
belief that things have worked out well enough over the years since the 
changes were made. 
These changes in the Kerr era transferred the large bulk of 
administrative functions from the Office of the President to the 
campuses. From 1957 to 1965, the percentage of all full-time positions 
in general administration, student services, and institutional services 
located at the Office of the President decreased from 46 percent to 9 
percent, and the percentage of faculty personnel actions with final 
approval by chancellors rose from 2 to 99 percent.34 
 
Further Changes in Budgeting 
Even with the 1964–65 budget transfers, the Office of the 
President still retained substantial resources in state and grant-
overhead funds to enable it to launch and support new initiatives 
within the university. Examples of these initiatives are planning and 
development of new campuses, major university-wide research 
initiatives such as the UC share of the operating funds for the twin Keck 
ten-meter telescopes built and operated jointly with Caltech atop 
Mauna Kea in Hawaii, and new academic programs such as engineering 
at Riverside and Santa Cruz. 
1996 Budget Decentralization. Up until 1996 there had been 
guidelines for the distribution of core funding to campuses that were 
based upon weighted enrollments: on a full-time equivalent basis, 
lower division students were weighted 1.0, upper division students 1.5, 
master’s and professional students 2.5, and advanced graduate 
students (i.e., students having passed their PhD qualifying 
examinations), 3.5.35 
In 1996, early in his term as president, Richard Atkinson instituted 
a new scheme for distribution of state funds and student fee revenue 
to campuses, whereby the allocations to date would be kept in place as 
a base, and funds for new enrollment growth would be distributed on 
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an unweighted basis. In addition, the funds passed on to campuses 
were now allocated on essentially a lump-sum basis, allowing the 
campus administration much more flexible uses of the funds. In 
addition Atkinson arranged a return of 94 percent of all University 
Opportunity Funds (the university share of indirect costs from grants 
and contracts) to the individual campuses that had generated the 
funds.36 The underlying logic was that leaving the existing distribution 
in place supported the greater concentrations of graduate and 
professional programs on the Berkeley, Los Angeles, and Davis 
campuses, while the different allocation of incremental funds still 
incentivized growth, particularly growth of undergraduate enrollment, 
in the same way that the state paid for it (i.e., on an unweighted basis). 
Determination of the portions of graduate-level enrollments on the 
various campuses would be left to the academic marketplace.37 Under 
this approach substantially lesser amounts remained available to the 
president for large initiatives. The new Merced campus was starting at 
the time, and care was taken to place start-up funding for it on 
separate and specific state allocations. 
It is significant that the two main occasions on which major 
decentralization actions took place were also points in time when a 
new president entered who had until then been a chancellor.38 
Funding Streams and “Rebenching” Initiatives, 2008–2018. 
Further review of budget allocations to campuses was started in 2008, 
with the primary aims of gaining clarity and transparency, incentivizing 
campuses to raise money in view of state funding reductions, and 
assuring equity in the distribution among campuses. Two innovations 
resulted—the Funding Streams Initiative, which was instituted in 2011, 
and “Rebenching” (i.e., rebenchmarking), which has been brought in 
over the six-year period from 2012–13 to 2017–18. The 
implementation of both initiatives is outlined in the UC Systemwide 
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Budget Manual, 39  with further background on the rebenching 
component in a report from the defining committee 40  and 
commentary41 from the Academic Senate members of that committee. 
An article42 in the media summarizes the initiatives. 
The Funding Streams Initiative specified that revenues other than 
the state allocation should go directly to the campus generating them. 
This includes tuition and fees, indirect cost recovery, net patent 
revenues, and investment earnings. There are two exceptions. The first 
of these is that financial-aid monies, such as from the designated 
return-to-aid portions that have typically been one-third of all tuition 
increases, go into the general pool for student financial aid. That pool is 
then distributed in accord with an education financing model43, 44 and 
the funding of the Blue and Gold Opportunity Program (chapter 2). The 
former allocates financial-aid funding among campuses on the basis of 
aggregate student need, which does differ from campus to campus. 
The latter covers tuition and fees for students from families with 
incomes up to a certain level ($80,000 per year for 2015–16). 
Secondly, the operations budget for the Office of the President, 
formerly a direct allocation, became effectively a tax placed on campus 
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allocation to operate the Office of the President became based equally 
upon three factors that are presumably more reflective of the actual 
services received from the university-wide office—the total 
expenditures from the campus, the total number of employees at the 
campus (reflecting personnel and benefits services), and the total 
number of students on the campus. Also included is a relatively small 
amount ($10 million as of 2016) for new university-wide initiatives at 
the discretion of the president. 
Rebenching46 was designed to be an equitable redistribution of 
state funds among campuses, carried out over a period of years so as 
to enable the redistribution to be done without any campus suffering 
an actual loss at any point. It distributes state funding on the basis of 
enrollment, after removing off-the-top of portions to provide (1) $15 
million per campus for fixed costs, (2) funding for designated 
university-wide programs such as the Agricultural Experiment Station 
and Student Academic Preparation and Educational Partnerships 
(chapter 16), and (3) funds for the Office of the President, which has no 
enrollment. Enrollment eligibility for funding is determined with 
weighting factors of 1.0 for undergraduates and nonresearch graduate 
students, 2.5 for research doctoral students, and 5.0 for health sciences 
students. San Francisco and Merced are treated differently, in ways 
described in the referenced manual, because of the lack of 
undergraduates at San Francisco and the newness of Merced. The state 
funding per undergraduate-equivalent student for each of the 
undergraduate campuses before the rebenching process is shown in 
table 6-1.  
After rebenching, the allocation per undergraduate-equivalent 
student would presumably be at a uniform level for all eight of these 
campuses. As can be seen in table 6-1, the net transfers were from 
campuses with more professional schools to those with fewer or none, 
reflecting in part that professional schools have more ways of deriving 
other revenue, such as through executive and continuing education. As 
noted above, historically enrollments in graduate professional schools  
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had been given additional weight. Note also that, going into 
rebenching, the largest campus per-student allocation of state funds 
(for UCLA) exceeded the smallest (for UCSB) by 50 percent. 
 
 
Table 6-1. Funding per undergraduate-equivalent student in 2009, 
before rebenching47 
 
Los Angeles: $6,413 
Davis: $6,129 
Berkeley: $5,749 
San Diego: $5,499 
Riverside: $5,401 
Santa Cruz: $5,215 
Irvine: $4,975 
Santa Barbara: $4,275 
 
  
 The funding streams and rebenching efforts serve to rationalize 
funding, subject to the assumptions reflected in the enrollment 
weightings, but they also do constrain the role of the president. The 
amount that can be utilized off the top for special university-wide 
initiatives, such as a new campus or operating costs for a special facility 
or program, is now limited by the amount of the budgetary allocation 
for new initiatives and the complications and sensitivities of securing 
additional funds through further direct assessment of the campuses. 
The situation can also give the appearance that the campuses are 
funding the Office of the President rather than vice versa—something 
of symbolic if not substantive importance. 
Equity. At the end of this process or at any other time, there will 
still be concerns about the equity of the distribution of funds among 
campuses for many reasons. Those concerns will not be answerable to 
the satisfaction of all, and contentions will continue within the 
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university. Campuses differ in the mix of academic programs that they 
offer, and different programs can have quite different costs from one 
another. Professional education tends to be more expensive than 
general undergraduate education, and among the professions costs 
vary widely, with engineering being substantially more costly per 
enrollee than, for example, law. The rebenching allocation is based 
strictly on instructional enrollment, yet research and tutorial 
supervision of student research are as much state-chartered missions 
of a research university as is ordinary instruction. Furthermore, costs of 
living vary substantially among the different regions of California. 
 
Academic Decentralization 
Originally, of course, academic administration and planning were 
done through the Office of the President. As already noted, the 
position provost of the university was created in 1931, but what was 
delegated by President Sproul to Monroe Deutsch in that position was 
much less than what is in the portfolio of a provost today. With Clark 
Kerr’s decentralization moves of 1958–59 and 1964–65, initiation and 
definition of academic programs were moved to the campuses, while 
review and approval functions remained with the Office of the 
President. Campuses would define their academic programs and their 
coverage of disciplines. If a new academic program required a new 
school or college, or if it required budget beyond what the campus 
already had, the proposal would come to the Office of the President for 
academic and budget review, the latter carried out by consultation 
with the Academic Council of the senate. Requests for approval of new 
colleges, schools, and other major initiatives would then go to the 
Board of Regents. 
In 1972, President Charles Hitch launched the Academic Planning 
and Program Review Board (APPRB),48 combining the functions of three 
separate bodies that had existed within the Office of the President. The 
APPRB consisted of seven members of the university administration, 
four faculty members, two undergraduate students, and one graduate 
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student. One of the faculty members was the vice chair of the 
Assembly of the Academic Senate (university-wide). The other faculty 
members were nominated by campus chancellors, who may have in at 
least some cases have consulted with the campus Academic Senate. 
The charge of the APPRB was to 
1. prepare guidelines and review and coordinate academic plans 
and proposals for new programs, 
2. prepare the university Academic Plan, 
3. prepare and revise university growth plans, 
4. review university academic and professional offerings, and 
5. prepare operating and capital budget recommendations for 
the president. 
Pelfrey49 describes the background that Hitch had with the Department 
of Defense that led him to this university-wide approach to planning 
and the tensions that existed with the campuses with regard to the 
appropriateness of the roles of the APPRB and the means by which it 
would carry out planning. 
The APPRB lasted through the presidencies of Charles Hitch and 
David Saxon. One of the outgrowths of the APPRB was the university-
wide review of programs in education, which led to the examination of 
the Berkeley School of Education described in chapter 12. Another, 
fulfilling item number two of the charge, was the 1974 university-wide 
academic plan.50 
The APPRB was discontinued when David Gardner became 
president in 1983. Functions one and three remained with the Office of 
the President. Function two became campus academic plans with a 
series of reports to the regents rather than a comprehensive, 
university-wide plan. Function four was devolved to campuses. 
Function five became the responsibility of the Budget Office under the 
direct supervision of the president, in consultation with the campuses 
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and bodies such as the Council of Chancellors and the Council of 
(Academic) Vice Chancellors. 
In the decades following Kerr’s decentralization, the principal 
university-wide academic position became the senior vice president for 
academic affairs. Functions kept at the university-wide level under this 
position were (1) coordination of academic policy development, 
including the Academic Personnel Manual (chapter 11); (2) enrollment 
and capacity planning and coordination; (3) oversight of eligibility and 
admissions policies and practices; (4) preparation of comprehensive 
reports to the UC Regents on university-wide academic matters on an 
ad hoc basis, and (5) administrative oversight of various university-wide 
academic programs, including multicampus organized research, the 
Education Abroad program, the University of California Washington 
Center, the University of California Press, and Continuing Education of 
the Bar (legal publishing and postdegree education). 
In 1992–93, the university took advantage of a presidential 
transition (Gardner to Peltason) to create a transition team, chaired by 
long-term UCLA chancellor Charles Young, to carry out “an examination 
of the structure and policies of the University’s administrative 
apparatus and organization, especially as they bear upon the 
relationship between the campuses and the Office of the President, 
and secondly to make recommendations with regard to the planning 
and implementation of external and internal communications 
programs required to obtain the support necessary for success in this 
effort.” 51  The report of this team recommended strengthening 
academic functions in the Office of the President in various ways, 
including adding the provost title for the senior vice president—
academic affairs, placing the Budget Office under the provost, and 
adding a vice provost for research. 
The changes recommended by the 1993 transition team were 
made, except that with the arrival of a subsequent president 
(Atkinson), the budget function was moved again to be a direct report 
to the president. Two other substantial university-wide academic 
functions that arose soon thereafter were planning and start-up for the 
                                                     






new Merced campus (chapter 10) and the California Digital Library52 
(chapters 2 and 16), which holds and licenses electronic material for all 
campuses in a single collection. As well, in the late 1990s, the university 
started centrally the eScholarship program53 (chapter 2), an initiative 
that provides digital, open-access publishing opportunities for UC 
authors. For reasons of gaining economic efficiency, buying power, and 
trust among campuses it made sense to carry out these two initiatives 
centrally on a university-wide basis. 
It is important that a sufficiently strong academic presence be 
kept at the Office of the President. One reason is that there are 
functions such as policy development for academic personnel and 
research, eligibility and admission, and other academic areas that must 
be coordinated university-wide. Another reason is that activities such 
as the digital library, scholarly publishing initiatives, and various 
specialized academic programs such as Education Abroad benefit in 
both academic richness and economic efficiency from being done for 
the entire university, as amplified below. There is also a need for senior 
officials at the Office of the President who have in-depth knowledge of 
the academic enterprise, so that academic knowledge can be built fully 
into university-wide deliberations and decisions. In addition, a large 
and complex operation such as the University of California cannot 
operate effectively and efficiently with academic planning occurring 
only on the campuses without some university-wide element. 
 
Location of the Office of the President; Symbolism 
Historically, the Office of the President of the University of 
California had been at the Berkeley campus. After Kerr’s conversion to 
the organizational structure with chancellors for all campuses, the 
Office of the President moved in 1959 to University Hall, a building 
directly adjoining the Berkeley campus to the west and specially 
constructed for occupancy by the Office of the President. 54 
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Subsequently, in 1967, the estate55 of Anson Blake in Kensington, just 
north of Berkeley, was acquired by gift from the owners and became 
the official residence for the president of the University of California, 
thereby liberating University House on the Berkeley campus to be the 
residence of the Berkeley chancellor. 
The location of the Office of the President, or the equivalent office 
for any university system or multicampus university, is a sensitive and 
complicated matter. If it is located on or adjacent to one of the 
campuses, other campuses will sense that there is favoritism to that 
campus. On the other hand, the chancellor or president of that campus 
will likely sense that the president or system head is too close at hand, 
continually looking over his or her shoulder. There may be rivalries on 
matters of status and recognition with regard to social affairs and 
ceremonies on that campus. Such contentions were a large issue 
between Chancellor Franklin Murphy of UCLA and President Clark Kerr 
(Chapter 10).  There may also be confusion as to who is really in charge 
of what, as evidenced by the following story from Richard Atkinson:56 
In an earlier period, there was a presidential order that the 
chancellor’s letterhead should have the president listed by 
name and title at the top lefthand corner with the 
chancellor’s name and title immediately below…On one 
occasion while I was chancellor, an individual came to my 
office. He handed me a letter that I had written to him and 
explained that he did not wish to deal with me but rather 
with the president of UC San Diego. 
Yet there are also disadvantages to having the multicampus 
university or system office away from any campus. First, employees 
working in that office will not have as many continual reminders of 
what campus life, values, and needs really are. Second, if the office of 
the multicampus university president or system head is in the state 
capital, that may lead to the perception andf/or the reality that the 
system office is too responsive to the interests of the state 
government. All these criteria conflict. The common resolutions are to 
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place the office in the state capital (State University of New York, State 
University System of Florida, University of Massachusetts System) or on 
or near the oldest and most established campus (University of Illinois, 
University of North Carolina, University System of Maryland) or both, 
when the oldest campus is in the same city (University of Texas System, 
University of Wisconsin System). 
During the Gardner years, the University of California Office of the 
President outgrew its quarters in University Hall, Berkeley, and the 
decision was made to move the headquarters to the Kaiser Center in 
downtown Oakland, California. The decision process is described by 
Gardner.57, 58 The Oakland site was selected for convenient airport 
access and so that Office of the President employees would not have to 
relocate their homes. Oakland is about six miles or twenty-five minutes 
by automobile or rapid transit away from Berkeley. 
Working from University Hall adjoining the Berkeley campus, the 
senior staff of the Office of the President would often go to seminars 
on that campus, have lunches at the Berkeley Faculty Club, and be 
included in Berkeley campus social affairs. Thus, they had a feel for 
campus life and were themselves a part of it. In Oakland that was no 
longer the case, and therefore Office of the President employees were 
reminded much less often of campus life and needs. As well, the 
particular location chosen in Oakland was a large, twenty-eight-story 
office building (figure 6-2) that had been world headquarters for Henry 
J. Kaiser’s industrial empire—aluminum, steel, ship building, and, for a 
while, automobiles. Completed in 1960, it was and still is Oakland’s 
tallest building and when built was the largest office tower west of the 
Rocky Mountains. Both the new location and the operations of the 
Office of the President caused the words “corporate culture” to be 
used often on the campuses to describe it, not without basis. 
 When Richard Atkinson became president in 1995, he indicated at 
an early press conference a desire to move the UC Office of the 
President back to the Berkeley campus.59 The aim was to regain 
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closeness to campus life and diminish both the image and the reality of 
corporate culture. But the idea was not received well by the 





Figure 6-2. The Kaiser Center (center), Oakland, California60 
 
 
 When the ten-year lease for the Kaiser Center space was up in 
1998, most of the Office of the President moved from the Kaiser Center 
to a newly constructed building in downtown Oakland. This has not 
alleviated the corporate image and remoteness from campus life. 
 
 
DISTRIBUTION OF FUNCTIONS AMONG UNIVERSITY-WIDE AND 
CAMPUS LEVELS 
 
The distribution of governance activities between the university-
wide and campus levels differs according to the nature of the function. 
                                                     





What follows is an attempt to summarize broadly the 2017 
distributions. 
If something is to be a university-wide function, there are several 
potential ways of doing it. One is to take it into the Office of the 
President as a role. Another is to designate a lead campus, with the 
Office of the President retaining any oversight that may be necessary. 
Yet another is to carry out the function through a committee or 
commission with representation from the various campuses. A 
comparison61 is available of the Office of the President functions at the 
University of California with the functions of the system or university-
wide office for eight other multicampus public universities62 and the 
Arizona Board of Regents. 
 
Administrative Appointments 
Administrative appointments are made following formal, 
structured, and consultative search processes and are typically 
recommended by the person to whom the appointee reports and 
approved by the person or board the next level up. Thus, the president 
selects and recommends chancellors and vice presidents, and the 
Board of Regents approve them. The provost selects and recommends 
vice provosts and deans, and the chancellor or president approves 




Program. As already indicated, selection and definition of 
academic programs remain with the campuses, and approval by the 
Board of Regents is needed for new campuses, new schools and 
colleges, and major initiatives. However, the size and nature of the 
University of California have enabled it to undertake some academic 
programs collectively for the entire university that would not be as 
viable if undertaken by individual campuses alone. Prime examples are 
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the digital library and open-access scholarly publication projects 
(chapter 2). Another earlier example was the Education Abroad 
Program (EAP),63 which was started through the Santa Barbara campus 
in 1962. EAP continues to operate university-wide, currently with 408 
programs in forty-three countries, many of them with resident UC 
faculty as station directors. Students typically take courses through 
host universities and have other group academic experiences. The 
Natural Reserve System64, 65 is another instance, with the program 
overseen by the vice president for research and graduate studies at the 
Office of the President, but with individual campuses overseeing 






Figure 6-3. The University of California Washington Center (center 
of photograph) adjoins a park with a memorial to Daniel Webster.66 
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Another example is the University of California Washington 
program (UCDC), which draws from all campuses to provide students 
with a semester or quarter in the nation’s capital, with some courses 
and opportunities for mentored internships. The Washington program 
joins with the UC Office of Federal Government Relations in the 
University of California Washington Center,67 located near Scott Circle 
in Washington, DC. The eleven-story building (figure 6-3) also provides 
housing space for students participating in the academic program. 
Subsequently, a similar Sacramento Center68 was started, focused on 
internships in the state capital. It serves students and programs 
university-wide but is now operated through the Davis campus. 
Faculty Hiring and Advancement. As already noted, selection, 
review, promotion, and advancement of the faculty, including tenure 
decisions, remain with the campuses. Regental approval is needed only 
for the highest salaries, which are typically in the medical schools. 
Academic personnel policies, including review criteria for faculty, are 
determined by a highly consultative, university-wide process. 
Libraries. The digital library (chapter 2) is university-wide, with 
campus options as to whether to join in licensing of specific material. 
Print libraries remain at the campuses but with rapid transportation of 
material among campuses. Less-used materials are kept in regional 
storage facilities, one for the north at Berkeley’s Richmond Field 
Station and one for the south on the UCLA campus. 
Research Oversight. The oversight of the three national 
laboratories (chapter 13) associated with the University of California is 
done through the Office of the President, with the Berkeley Laboratory 
overseen directly by the university and the Los Alamos and Livermore 
Laboratories managed through two limited liability corporations in 
partnership with industrial companies. 
Proposals for extramural research grants are submitted by 
individual campuses. Funding from successful proposals is received 
directly by the campus, subject to campus application of university-
wide policy on indirect costs. Indirect-costs rates do vary from campus 
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to campus. 69  A reduction or waiver of indirect costs counter to 
established policy requires approval at the university-wide level. 
Organized research units on individual campuses typically report 
to the vice chancellor for research of that campus. Agricultural research 
funded lhrough block grants to the entire university is overseen by a 
university-wide vice president. The project for the four Governor Gray 
Davis Institutes of Science and Innovation (see chapter 14), launched in 
2000 through a state budget initiative, was overseen at the university-
wide level through the competition that led to the approval of the 
subjects and locations of the four institutes. 
The University of California also has a group of multicampus 
research units (MRUs), which are similar to organized research units on 
individual campuses, except that they involve all campuses with 
research activities in the particular area. Management is accomplished 
through a lead campus. At the high point, there were about twenty-
three MRUs. In 2008, as there were severe reductions in the state 
budget, the funding for MRUs was lessened considerably, and much of 
the remaining funding was then converted into two competitive 
programs: Multicampus Research Programs and Initiatives and the 
president’s Catalyst Awards. For the latter two programs, proposals are 
sought every several years for planning and program grants for new 
multicampus research activities. The focus of those programs is on 
initiation of multicampus research that can become financially 
sustainable in other ways, rather than on provision of continuing 
support. As of 2017, thirteen MRUs were still active, and another six 
were pending approval.70 
One of the multicampus research units is the University of 
California Observatories (UCO),71 which operates the Lick Observatory 
(chapter 2), which is still functional and useful for research, even after 
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130 years. UCO also provides administrative support for the twin Keck 
telescopes atop Mauna Kea in Hawaii (chapter 2). 
Another MRU is the Humanities Research Institute, started by 
competition72 in 1987 and awarded to the Irvine campus, where it 
remains.73  UCHRI supports in-residence fellows and hosts working 
groups, seminars, conferences, and the like on topics traditional to the 
humanities, with emphasis on multidisciplinary research.   
Overall research policy is determined through a consultative 
process at the university-wide level. Applications of human-subject and 
animal-usage policies and other aspects of regulatory policy are made 
on the individual campuses. 
Planning. Planning for enrollments and overall enrollment 
capacity has been carried out university-wide under the auspices of the 
provost, including negotiations with individual campuses as necessary 
to accommodate overall enrollment demand from eligible applicants. 
Programmatic planning is carried out by individual campuses, with 
approval by the regents needed for major program initiatives. Long-
range development plans (LRDPs) are required by law and are drawn 
up by campuses looking ten or more years ahead on the basis of 
campus academic plans and overall university needs. Program reviews 
are carried out entirely by the campuses. 
Continuing Education. Continuing education is a self-funded 
operation under the name University Extension. It is carried out by the 
individual campuses subject to a university-wide delineation of 
geographical areas of coverage for each campus. University-wide 
enrollments are over 500,000 in over 17,000 courses.74 
 
Business, Financial, and Administrative 
Budget. Budget decentralization over the years was described in 
previous sections. The campuses receive formulaic, enrollment-based 
allocations of state funds. Other revenues, which are composed mainly 
of monies from tuition and fees, research grants, private gifts, and 
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auxiliary enterprises, are received at the campus level. Campuses have 
wide authority to transfer funds among different usage categories. 
Audit. Audit is a corporate responsibility of the UC Regents. There 
is a chief compliance and audit officer, which is one of three senior 
positions75 that report jointly to the regents and the president. That 
office is responsible for internal audit university-wide. There are also 
campus-level audit offices, reporting jointly to the chief compliance 
and audit officer and the chancellor of that campus. 
Benefits and Retirement. Employee benefits and retirement are 
handled university-wide. The university has its own retirement system, 
described in chapter 2. 
Investment. The chief investment officer handles the investment 
of the endowment and retirement funds university-wide, as well as the 
short-term investment pool. Originally this was done through 
investment processes supervised in-house, but now most of the 
investment is contracted to large investment firms. The individual 
campuses have their own foundations with separate management of 
investments. Donations made to campuses can be designated for 
either the campus foundation or the main investment pool of the 
university. 
Procurement. Purchasing is carried out by campuses, now with 
fully computerized systems for requests, approvals, and the purchasing 
itself. Large purchasing agreements are negotiated at both the 
university-wide and campus levels so as to gain purchasing power. 
Accounting and Human Resources. Both of these services are 
carried out at the campus level. 
Facilities and Real Estate. In early days many university buildings 
were funded privately for construction. During the 1900s state funds 
paid for much construction, especially in the decades immediately 
following World War II. The state then swung to issuing bonds for 
construction. Now the state is no longer funding buildings except for a 
few seismic projects. Campuses must, for the most part, fund new 
buildings through private donations and debt financing (i.e., bonds 
approved and issued by the UC Regents). The campuses provide 
maintenance and repairs to their own buildings. Campuses have 
                                                     





significant real estate operations, dealing in purchases and sales of 
buildings and acquisition of rental properties. 
 
External Relations 
Media. Relations with the media are carried out university-wide 
for university-wide matters and by individual campuses for campus 
matters. 
Federal Government. The Washington, DC, headquarters of the 
university (figure 6-3) houses the Federal Government Relations office 
along with the university-wide Washington academic program. 
State Government. The university maintains one Office of State 
Government Relations in Sacramento. Both the Office of Federal 
Government Relations and the Office of State Government Relations 
are parts of the Office of the President. 
Local Governments. Campuses deal directly with their own local 
(city, county) governments. Being a state agency, the university and its 
campuses are tax-exempt. However, on various occasions campuses 
have purchased items for the local government that relate to services 
to campuses (e.g., a new fire engine). These items have at times been 
the subject of negotiation, or an exaction,76 when a permit is sought 
from the city. 
Development. Development, or private fund-raising from alumni, 
friends, corporations, and other donors, has become a major operation 
even for public universities. Development operations for the University 
of California are done almost exclusively at the campus level, and at 
Berkeley, for example, are decentralized further to the level of 
individual colleges and schools, with the central development office 
serving the chancellor’s priorities and providing services such as donor 
research and databases for the operations of individual colleges and 
schools. The reason for the high degree of decentralization is that many 
alumni, especially those with graduate and professional degrees, feel 
more attachment to their campus and even their college, school, or 
department than to the university as a whole, and corporations are 
closest to the academic unit(s) from which they hire graduates. 
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Alumni Relations. Alumni relations (events for alumni, alumni 
magazines, summer camps, group trips, etcetera) are carried out at the 
campus and academic-unit levels separately from development. Alumni 
associations provide alumni with publications and events, as well as 
collecting information on the subsequent careers of graduates. 
 
Technology Transfer, Patent Licensing, and Relations with Industry 
These operations are now highly decentralized to campuses, as 
described in chapter 18. 
 
Legal 
Regents General Counsel provides institutional legal services to 
the university as a whole and reports jointly to the regents and to the 
president. The university maintains one centralized legal office in 
Oakland at the Office of the President, so that legal advice is 
coordinated and hopefully uniform. Individual campuses have their 
own counsel, typically one or two persons, who report jointly to the 
chancellor and the Regents General Counsel. Specialized external legal 
services are procured ad hoc as needed. 
 
Information Technology 
Management of computing and information technology services 
has had a varied history within the University of California as 
computing has gone through successive generations involving 
mainframe computers, personal computing, networking, and cloud 
technology. The bulk of academic and administrative computing has 
been campus based. The university-wide office works toward common 
standards and interchangeable software that will allow data to be 
collected consistently among campuses and is also undertaking to lead 
cybersecurity efforts. Desktop support has traditionally been highly 
localized. As part of its Shared Services initiative (see below), the 
Berkeley campus centralized oversight of desktop support while 
providing the services locally. Because of the very rapid advances of 
technology, the effectiveness of the organization of computing services 








UC has six schools of medicine—San Francisco, Los Angeles, San 
Diego, Davis, Irvine, and, as of 2013, Riverside. The university owns the 
associated hospitals or hospital systems, except in the case of 
Riverside. These belong to the particular campuses and are 
administered through them. At the university-wide level, UC Health, 
headed by an executive vice president, provides coordinating services 
and financial oversight for these operations as well as for the 
university’s two schools of public health (Berkeley, Los Angeles), two 
schools of dentistry (San Francisco, Los Angeles), four schools of 
nursing (San Francisco, Los Angeles, Irvine, and, as of 2010, Davis), two 




All campuses have vice chancellor offices overseeing student 
affairs. These are large and very multidimensional service operations, 
including oversight of admissions, the registrar, student housing and 
eating facilities, financial aid, the dean of students, the career or 
placement center, student conduct, student activities centers, health 
services, and ombudsman services. As already noted, at the university-
wide level, financial aid is coordinated across campuses following an 
education financing model that gauges need-based aid. Also at the 
Office of the President, an admissions office oversees and coordinates 
eligibility policy and the envelope of admissions policies for the 
university and provides what coordination there is with other sectors 
of California higher education on admissions. 
 
Athletics 
For most campuses intercollegiate athletics is a very large 
undertaking, with much interest on the parts of students and local 
supporters. It is also a very large enterprise financially, and much 
national concern today deals with the financial dominance of 
intercollegiate athletics and its effects upon the rest of the academic 
enterprise at universities and colleges within the United States.  
Intramural athletics, sports, and recreation are quite different and 
are supported by student fees on campuses. Intramural activities are 




designed for all students and in many cases faculty, staff, and even 
local constituents as well. Both intercollegiate and intramural athletics 
are entirely decentralized to the campus level. 
 
Competition among Campuses 
Contrary to the situation for many other multicampus universities 
or university systems around the world, the University of California 
campuses compete directly against one another in several ways. Even 
though competition can bring economic inefficiencies, the overriding 
benefit is that competition hones quality and enables campuses to 
reach for high attainment, thereby greatly enhancing the overall quality 
of the university. Campuses compete against one another in 
recruitment of faculty, staff, and students. Campuses can recruit 
faculty members from other UC campuses. Limits are placed upon the 
amount of salary increase and the size of recruitment packages for 
intercampus recruitments. 77  Campuses often compete against one 
another for federal government grants and major institutes and for 
industrial grants and contracts. The selection of the four Governor Gray 
Davis Institutes for Science and Innovation (chapter 14) was a large 
internal competition within UC, overseen by the Office of the President 
and utilizing outside reviewers and panels. 
 
 
THE OPTIMAL DEGREE OF DECENTRALIZATION 
 
There are many differences among public-university systems and 
multicampus universities with regard to what is centralized and what is 
not. There have also been large changes in that balance within the 
University of California over time, and, as noted in the quote at the 
start of this chapter, Clark Kerr did in 2001 express the view that what 
was the situation at that time may have gone too far in the direction of 
decentralization. Yet decentralization has proceeded further since 
then. It is therefore logical to ask the question, “What is the optimal 
degree of decentralization?” 
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The term subsidiarity78 connotes that decisions should be handled by 
the smallest, lowest, or least centralized authority capable of handling 
the matter effectively. Among the results should be more informed and 
expedited decisions and less remoteness of governance. Subsidiarity is 
an explicit organizing principle of the European Union,79 the Catholic 
Church,80 and a variety of other multitiered organizations. Although the 
word was caught up in politics in the United States recently with 
rhetoric that strayed from the basic concept, the essential sense of the 
concept of subsidiarity is still valid.81 It has particular relevance to 
institutions where the principal strength lies at the grass-roots level 
(i.e., the faculty in universities). It has the greatest implications for 
large and complex organizations, which include many universities, 
multicampus universities, and university systems. 
 
Optimal Decentralization 
As we have seen, administrative decentralization has already 
proceeded to a large extent for the University of California through a 
series of changes over the years. There is continual interest in more 
decentralization, and there are also cogent arguments for 
recentralization of some functions so as to exercise responsible 
oversight for the state or other funding entities and/or so as to gain 
economic efficiencies and consistency in decisions that affect the edges 
of overall policy. What is optimal will change over time and will be 
continually open to deliberation and dispute. 
One can consider at least five aspects of decentralization—
administrative decision-making, budget control, academic program, 
services, and board-level governance. 
Administrative Decision-Making. On the whole, it appears that 
the degree of decentralization of administrative decision-making 
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currently operative within the University of California is about right in 
terms of the subsidiarity concept. A problem that does arise by virtue 
of the size of the university and the division (some might say 
stovepiping) of functions among many offices is a sort of paralysis 
brought about by different offices having responsibility for different 
parts of a matter that requires a single overall decision.82 It is difficult 
to generate a decision when those involved have different views of the 
elephant, tend to take strict yes-no positions that they believe are 
imposed on them from above, and/or are in reporting lines within the 
university that are separate from the decision-maker. 
Budget Control. As described above, there is now a large 
decentralization of the University of California budget to the campuses 
as well as further down the administrative line on campuses. This is 
healthy in terms of giving budgetary flexibility to chancellors, provosts, 
vice chancellors, and deans. However, the changes in budgeting within 
the university over the years have now placed the University of 
California in a situation where the president now holds a much smaller 
amount flexibly to support major university-wide initiatives, such as 
new campuses or major new programs (e.g., schools of medicine or 
law, or energy, climate, and water institutes) to be carried out on still-
developing campuses. Yet the population of California continues to 
increase substantially, the vast northern portion of the state has no UC 
campus, and the new Merced campus needs the ability to undertake 
large initiatives. The starts of major new initiatives must now be 
funded by increased “taxation” of the campuses, privately, and/or by 
the full load of political negotiations and give-and-take in Sacramento. 
In the latter case, the university loses control, and some of the key 
advantages of constitutional autonomy are lost through the lack of 
flexible, central budget. 
As former Irvine chancellor and UC president Jack Peltason said in 
his oral history, “The Office of the President has to champion the new 
campus. I now know that from my own experiences three decades 
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later. Existing campuses don’t understand the need for new 
campuses.”83 To which his interviewer replied, “They’re a competitive 
threat, aren’t they?” 
 Academic. The UC academic program is decentralized to 
campuses and on campuses further decentralized very largely to 
academic departments. New programs are initiated by campuses, 
reviewed university-wide with involvement by the Academic Council’s 
Coordinating Committee on Graduate Affairs (for graduate programs) 
or Committee on Education Policy (undergraduate programs), then 
approved by the provost and then the president, and finally approved 
by the UC Regents if the program involves creation of a college or 
school or represents a major academic or budgetary initiative. 84 
Historically, this process has been entirely bottom-up; academic 
programs have not been “assigned” to campuses. There have not yet 
been many issues of program elimination or consolidation within the 
university, and those that have arisen have been handled locally on 
campuses. Examples where these actions have been considered or 
done are criminology, education, biological sciences, and library and 
information studies at Berkeley (all four described in chapter 12); the 
elimination of the nascent School of Architecture at San Diego; and the 
Professional Schools Restructuring Initiative at UCLA.85, 86 The latter two 
and the Berkeley School of Library and Information Studies occurred 
during the state budget crisis of the early 1990s. Complete attention to 
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mechanism for examining the full panoply of academic offerings among 
campuses to see where there may be inadequate coverage, excess 
capacity, or opportunities for fruitful collaboration among campuses. 
This was a function of the Academic Planning and Program Review 
Board during the Hitch and Saxon administrations. A university-wide 
mechanism for those purposes is needed, and the present full 
decentralization of the academic program makes it difficult to achieve. 
The university-wide Academic Planning Council, which has existed since 
1994, is more of a consultative and informational body than an actual 
planning body. Program elimination will become more of a necessity to 
the extent that campus budgets tighten further. 
A challenge for all universities is getting faculty members from 
individual academic departments to participate in general-education 
and multidisciplinary courses and degrees (chapter 14). This need calls 
for incentive and reward structures that act across departmental 
boundaries. In these senses the curriculum can no longer be delegated 
fully to the level of academic departments. This issue is academically 
important and is not limited to the University of California. 
 Services. With the exception of retirement, benefits, the digital 
library in its wider contexts, and areas such as large procurement 
contracts, support services to the academic enterprise are almost 
entirely at the campus level. On the campuses, the tension in the 
design of support services is between centralization on the campus to 
gain efficiency, on the one hand, and expertise and placement locally in 
units so as to gain closeness and responsiveness to the needs of faculty 
and other users, on the other hand. A classic example of this tension 
has been in the area of computing services, as documented in a 2006 
report of a UC Berkeley external/internal review committee chaired by 
the author.87 Tracing back to the days of mainframe computers, the 
Berkeley campus has had a large centralized computing operation, now 
known as Information Services and Technology, under an associate vice 
chancellor who was also chief information officer. Over the years, 
computer support systems had been built up by the various units of the 
campus, academic and nonacademic, providing services that often 
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went well beyond desktop support and had been direct and specific to 
the needs of the units. Reasons for the units developing localized 
services themselves were the seeming remoteness of the centralized 
staff and the problem of a “computer-ese” communication barrier. 
As part of a drive to reduce overall costs, the Berkeley campus 
commissioned a study by Bain and Associates focused upon 
administrative efficiency and carried out from 2009 to 2010.88 This 
study led off an initiative denoted Operational Excellence, the design 
and operation of which are described by Szeri et al. 89  A major 
component of that initiative has been shared services.90 The general 
goal of shared services is to gain economic efficiency, greater depth of 
knowledge by service performers, and operational effectiveness by 
centrally providing and coordinating services that have been at the 
individual-unit level. Areas covered have been research administration, 
information technology including desktop computer support, human 
relations and academic personnel support, and business and financial 
services. This has been one of several such efforts at UC campuses (five 
others so far) and other universities.91 
These endeavors have been controversial, with a significant 
number of misfires in early years. One large issue is whether the 
employees of the shared-services unit are truly responsive to those in 
the units that they serve, since their reporting relationships are now 
outside the unit. A second issue is whether there is an added load upon 
the staff employees who remain in the unit stemming from needs to 
nurse along the shared-services effort in order to make it work for the  
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unit. The answers to such questions and the extent to which such 
shared efforts will indeed make substantial cost savings are still not 
clear. In the case of Berkeley shared services, units were initially placed 
in a location about 2.5 miles and twenty to thirty minutes (allowing for 
parking) from the campus. As it became apparent that this 
geographical remoteness compounded the problems of remoteness of 
allegiance of the staff, shared-services activities were moved back and 
distributed to various locations on the main campus itself. As of 2017, 
the campus was rethinking the entire idea and trying some efforts to 
centralize services for groups of similar units (e.g., physical sciences). 
This is a step in between a single set of campus shared services and full 
distribution of services to the level of individual units. 
 
 
SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS  
 
The structure of the University of California as one university with 
multiple campuses provides many advantages, including 
 a single mission upon which the university can focus, 
 a single corporate identity—one state budget to the university 
as a whole rather than to individual campuses, 
 one set of standards, policies, and policy envelopes, and 
 the ability to grow new campuses from within with standards 
and policies extant from the start and with oversight and 
guidance from faculty from existing campuses through the 
Academic Senate structure. 
What can suffer, on the other hand, is coordination among the three 
segments of higher education, especially articulation for transfer. 
Decentralization of governance has continued at intervals over 
time, with state funding now being allocated to campuses almost 
entirely formulaically. Decentralization of budget has now gone far 
enough so that the president does not have as much ability to nurture 
new initiatives directly from discretional funds as was the case in 
earlier years. The degree of decentralization and relocations of the 
Office of the President have also created more tendencies for it to be 





The academic program belongs to the individual campuses, with 
the exception of certain activities that benefit in terms of academic 
efficiency and/or critical size from being at the university-wide level. 
Academic programs at the university-wide level include Education 
Abroad, the Washington and Sacramento Centers, the California Digital 
Library, services for open-access publishing, the University of California 
Press, and large, shared facilities such as the Natural Reserve System 
and the Keck ten-meter telescopes. 
During the presidencies of Charles Hitch and David Saxon, 
university-wide academic planning was overseen by the Academic 
Planning and Program Review Board. There remains an Academic 
Planning Council, university-wide, but with a weaker and more 
generally consultative role. Planning for needed university-wide 
initiatives should be strengthened in a way that still recognizes the 
individual determinative roles of the campuses. 
For such a large organization as the University of California with its 
programmatic strength dispersed at the level of individual departments 
and faculty members, the concept of subsidiarity in governance is 
valuable. Following it, decision-making should be placed at the lowest 








The two greatest gifts to the University of California have been the 
institutional autonomy given to its Board of Regents in the Constitution 
of 1878 and the unprecedented grant of authority the board assigned 
to the Academic Senate in 1920. These two gifts constitute the 




Faculty governance is rarely simple, is frequently ponderous, and is 
sometimes frustratingly ineffective. The degree of faculty participation 
may be low and variable. Overall, however, it has served the 
universities well, and it remains an essential factor in the vigour of 
university life. 
—Frank H. T. Rhodes2 
 
At its core, shared governance is simply a methodology for managing a 
particular kind of diverse and complex organization, and like any 
methodology, it can go awry if implemented poorly. 
—James C. Garland3 
 
The contemporary university is too complex and fragmented to allow 
for substantive faculty involvement in the broader governance of the 
university. 
—James Duderstadt and Farris Womack4 
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Faculty in their collective behavior have a tendency to be individualistic, 
self-centered, and short-sighted; therefore, they should not have any 




The term “shared governance” denotes participation of the 
faculty in the governance of a university. The practice is widespread in 
name, particularly in public universities, but it is very different in 
practice from one university to another. Because of its wide-ranging 
implementations and degrees of effectiveness from institution to 
institution, shared governance is controversial and is often denigrated. 
That fact explains, in part, the very different attitudes expressed in the 
quotations above, which come from former presidents of the 
University of California, Cornell University, Miami University of Ohio, 
the University of Michigan, and the University of Geneva, respectively. 
The University of California is probably the institution in the 
United States where shared governance is most developed, structured, 
and well regarded. It is one of the keys to the success of the university 
and therefore is worthy of detailed examination. The approach of this 
chapter is to start by considering the ways in which shared governance 
developed at the University of California and then how it operates 
there in practice. We then look more generally at shared governance—
the reasons for having it, what it takes in order to work well, what can 
go wrong, and ways in which it needs to evolve with the times. 
 
SHARED GOVERNANCE AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 
How It Developed 
An Academic Senate was established in the Organic Act of 1868 
(chapter 2) that originally established the University of California. 
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However, the Academic Senate had limited and ill-defined 
responsibilities, which resulted in it being relatively ineffective. The 
presiding officer was the president of the university, and thus 
delineation between the senate and administration was indistinct, and 
the senate was largely a means for the president to consult with the 
faculty if and when he chose to do so. The history of the Academic 
Senate during the period before 1919 is outlined by Stadtman.6 
As we have seen in chapter 2, President Benjamin Ide Wheeler 
took many steps during his administration (1899-1919) that set the 
University of California on the road to greatness. However, he operated 
in largely dictatorial fashion. Examples of his approach were hiring, 
promoting, and dismissing faculty without consultation; making his 
own appointments to committees of the Academic Senate; and, when 
he did consult, seeking and taking counsel largely from those who 
would agree with him. 
As the Wheeler presidency ended in July 1919, the Board of 
Regents chose not to appoint a new president immediately but instead 
placed the administration of the university temporarily under a three-
man administrative board while a more thorough search was made for 
a new president. As is the case for most attempts to carry out 
administration by troika, the administrative board did not work well. It 
was plagued by members working at cross-purposes and seeming to 
seek and value the views of the faculty even less than had been the 
case while Wheeler was president. 
The Berkeley Revolution.7, 8, 9 The methodology used by Wheeler 
during his years and the situation with the new administrative board 
caused the faculty, working through the Academic Senate, to seek 
meetings of their leaders with the regents so as to effect change. The 
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faculty initiated the process by adopting a memorial10 to the regents, 
outlining their desires. The aim was to work out a better form of 
governance and in particular more structured and effective roles for 
the faculty. On the basis of extensive interviews that he conducted 
much later with Hildebrand and Louderback, Hutson11 reports that the 
leaders of the faculty group within the senate were Joel Hildebrand and 
Gilbert Lewis of chemistry, Armin Leuschner of astronomy, and Frank 
Louderback of geology, with Andrew Lawson, also of geology, as floor 
manager and strategist. What is very significant here is that all five of 
those individuals were renowned scholars who had key roles in building 
the University of California to eminence (see chapter 9). They were 
true intellectual leaders of the faculty. Coincidentally or not, all five 
were physical scientists, leaders of an area that was then developing to 
national research prominence (also see chapter 9). 
The faculty group ultimately meeting with the regents was 
Lawson, Lewis, and Louderback, along with George Adams of 
philosophy and Orrin McMurray of law. The latter two were also 
recognized intellectual leaders and served to widen the disciplinary 
base across the campus. The negotiations of this group with an ad hoc 
committee of the regents brought about a set of agreements relating 
to the roles of the Academic Senate that are essentially what is in place 
today and is described in the following sections. 
In December of 1919, the UC Regents selected as the new 
president David Barrows, former dean of the faculties of the university, 
who had been on leave for eight months as an intelligence officer with 
the Allied Expeditionary Forces in Siberia. Barrows was given the 
opportunity to review what had been worked out by the regents with 
the faculty leaders, and he found it to be acceptable, although he did 
later object that those faculty members who had opposed the new 
arrangements were being shut out of committee membership. The 
senate then took steps to remedy that perception. Then in March 1920, 
the regents formally adopted the portion of their standing orders 
pertaining to the Academic Senate. Through this sequence of events, 
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often called the “Berkeley Revolution,”12 the roles, structure, and 









The Roles of the Academic Senate in Governance 
Standing Orders 105.114 and 105.215 of the regents delineate the 
roles of the Academic Senate. They specify that the Academic Senate 
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 may determine its own membership within constraints, its own 
organization, its own officers and committee memberships, and 
how it wishes to delegate responsibilities internally; 
 subject to the approval of the Board of Regents, shall determine 
the conditions for admissions of students and for degrees and 
certificates and shall be consulted in connection with the award of 
honorary degrees;16 
 authorizes and supervises all courses and curricula; 
 may select committees to advise chancellors on campus budgets 
and to advise the president on the university-wide budget; 
 may present to the Board of Regents, through the president, its 
views on any matter pertaining to the conduct and welfare of the 
university; 
 should advise the president and chancellors on the administration 
of the libraries; and 
 should select a committee to approve the publication of 
manuscripts by the University of California Press. 
 
Another major role of the Academic Senate stemming from the 
1919 negotiations is review, evaluation, and recommendation of 
faculty members for promotion and advancement along the 
professorial scale of ranks and salaries.17 This process, in which the 
administration has final approval authority but the Academic Senate 
has the primary role, is described in chapter 11. Only rarely does the 
administration decide counter to the recommendations from the 
                                                     
16 Honorary degrees were suspended, by presidential policy in 1972. The triggering event was the 
refusal of the regents to approve an honorary degree for Mayor John V. Lindsay of New York City, 
which had been recommended by the Berkeley campus with Academic Senate consultation. There 
were apparent political reasons for the regental nonapproval, since Lindsay was a very liberal 
Republican, of different politics from the more conservative members of the board. (See, e.g., 
Martin Snapp, “Honor Roll: Colleges Dole Out Honorary Degrees for Star-Studded, Curious Cast,” 
California, California Alumni Association, May 12, 2016, https://perma.cc/54F3-H3PS.) An 
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“Conferring of Honorary Degrees and Suspension of Bylaw 29.1,” PowerPoint, presented at 
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senate faculty review process, and then only after further consultation 
with the senate. 
In practice, the administration brings virtually all major matters 
pertaining to the governance of the university to the leadership of the 
Academic Senate for its advice. The senate may also bring up issues of 
its own. Senate advice in these other areas is taken seriously but is not 
as controlling in administrative decisions as it is in the area of 
promotion and advancement of faculty. 
The chair and the vice chair of the Academic Council (the 
university-wide executive body of the Academic Senate) take part in 
regents’ meetings, sitting at the table with the regents and speaking 
when they wish. In line with the desires of the Academic Senate, they 
have no vote, following the rationale that they would not be able to 
represent the senate membership on issues that have not yet been 
taken up formally by the senate. 
University of California practice is for deans, provosts, chancellors, 
and the president to undergo formal but confidential reviews of 
performance at five-year intervals. There is a role for the Academic 
Senate in all of these reviews, with a selected committee and/or the 
senate leadership receiving review materials and advising for both 
initial appointments and the five-year reviews. If a high administrator is 
not working out well on a campus, it is usually the senate that most 
effectively communicates the point in a review, and in some cases 
without waiting for a review. 
Functionally, the Academic Senate has direct authority for courses, 
curricula, the conditions for admission of students, and for self-
organization. It has the primary influence, but without actual decision 
authority, for promotion, advancement, and dismissal of faculty, and 
for program review. It has “soft” power—that is, the right to be 
consulted but not to decide, on other major issues, including 
appointments and reappointments of senior administrators. 
 
How the Academic Senate Works 
All tenure-track faculty (i.e., assistant, associate, and full 
professors) are members of the Academic Senate, along with emeriti18 
                                                     




holding those titles, certain high administrative officers, and holders of 
a few other academic titles. The Academic Senate exists both at the all-
university level and as divisions on each campus. One feature of the 
Academic Senate that stands in contrast with some other research 
universities is that all faculty members—junior as well as senior and 
from professional schools as well as academic disciplines—have the 
opportunity to become equally involved with campus-wide issues. Thus 
the views from the senate reflect faculty from the entire campus. 
There are a few meetings of the full senate membership on the 
campuses each year. These regular meetings are usually mostly 
informational and attended by a small portion of the faculty, although 
attendance will rise substantially if there is a major issue on the 
agenda. Special meetings can be called when large issues arise, and 
those meetings are typically much better attended. For example, 
meetings of membership of the Berkeley Division were frequent during 
the Free Speech Movement and other crises during the 1960s and were 
attended by a majority of the faculty. 
The main body at the all-university level is the Academic Council, 
composed of the chairs of the campus divisions, chairs of major 
university-wide senate committees, and the chair and vice chair 
(incoming chair) of the Academic Council, who are elected by the 
Academic Council itself. Similar bodies exist for each of the ten campus 
divisions, typically called the Division Council. The ultimate university-
wide legislative body for the senate is the Assembly of the Academic 
Senate, comprised of elected representatives from the campuses along 
with the chairs of the campus divisions and the university-wide senate 
officers. In a sense, the Academic Council is the executive arm of the 
assembly. 
Both the Academic Council and the divisions have large numbers 
of committees on various subjects. The 2015 Committees of the 
Academic Council are shown in table 7-1. Those for the Berkeley 
Division are shown in table 7-2. These committees typically meet 





Table 7-1. Committees of the Academic Council, 2016-719 
 
Academic Computing and Communications 
Academic Council (executive body) 
Special Committee on [National] Laboratory Issues 
Academic Freedom 
Academic Personnel 
Affirmative Action, Diversity, and Equity 
Board of Admissions and Relations with Schools  
Committees 




Task Force on Investment and Retirement 
Task Force on the Future of UC Health Care Plans 
International Education 
Intersegmental Committees of the Academic Senates 
Library and Scholarly Communication 
Planning and Budget 
Preparatory Education 
Privilege and Tenure 
Research Policy 
Rules and Jurisdiction 
                                                     










Academic Planning and Resource Allocation 
Admissions, Enrollment & Preparatory Education 
American Cultures 
Assembly Representation 
Budget and Interdepartmental Relations  
Committees 
Courses of Instruction 
Demonstrations and Student Actions 
Diversity, Equity, and Campus Climate 
Divisional Council (the executive body) 
Educational Policy 
Faculty Awards 






Panel of Counselors 
Privilege and Tenure 
Prizes 
Research 
Rules and Elections 
Senate Athletics Council 
Teaching 
Undergraduate Council 
Undergraduate Scholarships, Honors, and Financial Aid 
                                                     






The Committees on Committees, at both the campus and 
university-wide levels, have the function of identifying and selecting 
members for the various other committees, as well as gaining the 
acceptance of those selected. The members of the campus Committee 
on Committees and those positions on the campus Division Councils 
that are not filled ex officio are elected by the division (campus) 
membership of the senate. Those are typically the only senate 
positions elected by the full membership. 
Here are some responsibilities of committees at the university-
wide level: 
 The Board on Admissions and Relations with Schools (BOARS) 
has the role of determining the conditions (requirements) for 
eligibility and admissions (chapter 15), subject to approval by 
the Academic Assembly and then the Board of Regents. 
 The Editorial Committee works with the University of California 
Press and exercises final approval for publications brought in 
through the various subject-matter editors of the press.21 
 All three sectors of public higher education (UC, CSU, and the 
community colleges) have academic senates, and the 
Intersegmental Committees of the Academic Senates provide 
liaison among the sectors at the senate level. 
Committees for the Berkeley Division of the Academic Senate have 
the following responsibilities: 
 The Committee on Budget and Interdepartmental Relations 
carries out the processes of review and evaluation for 
promotions and step-level advancement of Berkeley faculty. 
The analogous committees on all other campuses are known as 
Committees on Academic Personnel. The university-wide 
Committee on Academic Personnel coordinates policy, most 
notably having a substantial role with regard to changes in the 
Academic Personnel Manual. 
 The Committee on Academic Planning and Resource Allocation 
provides consultation to the chancellor and vice chancellors on 
matters of budget, planning, and associated policies. At the 
                                                     




university-wide level, the Committee on Planning and Budget 
has the same role with respect to the President. 
 The Committee on Admissions, Enrollment, and Preparatory 
Education deals with the criteria for campus-level admissions, 
including choosing among UC-eligible applicants. 
 The American Cultures Committee oversees the American 
Cultures requirement for bachelor’s degrees.22 
 The Committee on Courses of Instruction evaluates all courses 
proposed by individual departments and must approve a 
course in order for it to be offered. 
 The Committee on Privilege and Tenure (P&T) hears and 
recommends actions to the administration on complaints 
received from faculty members regarding matters of academic 
privilege, appointment, tenure and promotion, and works with 
the Panel of Counselors, which is available to advise faculty 
members having issues that are considered by the P&T 
Committee. 
Many faculty members are members of at least one committee.23 
The involvement of so many different faculty members and the layered 
structure of responsibility within the Academic Senate are both 
designed to discourage undue influence from any one or a small group 
of people on the outcomes of senate deliberation processes. 
University-wide senate bodies are composed of one member from 
each of the campuses plus any ex officio members. This seemingly 
democratic aspect of the senate, which works very much by consensus, 
has been a source of tension at times. Larger and older campuses can 
believe that their interests are being outvoted by newer and smaller 
campuses, and vice versa. It is therefore important that the senate 
evaluate the issues that are taken up at various levels to determine 
which issues are indeed university-wide and which are appropriately 
left to campuses. This division of issues should also correspond to the  
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administrative division of issues between campus and university-wide 
administrations. 
For those who would like to dig deeper, the nature of shared 
governance within the University of California has also been discussed 
by Taylor, 24  Douglass, 25  Simmons, 26  Switkes, 27  and Hollinger. 28  The 
system is well entrenched and generally understood and accepted by 
both faculty members and administrators. It makes for decisions that 
are consultative, well considered, and recognized as valid. The process 
also has its difficulties and potential dangers, which I will consider in 
the following discussion of shared governance in universities in general. 
 
 
SHARED GOVERNANCE IN RESEARCH UNIVERSITIES 
 
Why Have It? 
Universities are unusual, but not unique, in having shared 
governance. A search on the term “shared governance” will turn up at 
least as many entries for nursing management as for academic 
governance. But the approach is very different from what is normally 
done in the world of business and thus can strike people as a slow and 
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In research universities faculty members are selected on the bases 
of creativity and knowledge of specific subject matter. It makes sense 
to make use of that expertise in decision processes and governance.  
There are other, more pragmatic reasons for shared governance 
as well. Involving the faculty in governance has the result that faculty 
members appreciate and care for the university as an institution. It 
increases faculty allegiance to the university, something that can be of 
considerable value in retaining faculty members who receive job offers 
from other institutions, and sustains care and concern for the 
university as a whole. Also, with effective shared governance, serious 
breaks between the faculty and university leadership are much less 
likely. 
Shared governance tends to be stronger in public universities than 
in private universities. Concomitantly, more crises of leadership (e.g., 
petitions from the faculty to have the president replaced) occur in 
private universities than public universities. If the voice of the faculty 
has been sought and demonstrably considered in administrative 
decision processes, potential breaks between the faculty and the 
administration will usually have been recognized and resolved before 
reaching the stage of public accusations and lines drawn in the sand. 
Service in the Academic Senate provides a good way for members 
of the faculty to find and come to know one another. One of the major 
changes in research universities over the past fifty years has been the 
tendency for faculty members, even ones in the same department, to 
drift apart. In the sciences, engineering, and some social sciences, a 
cause has been the extensive time and care required for funding, 
supervising, and securing the future of faculty members’ individual 
research enterprises. Service together in the Academic Senate builds 
bonds and appreciation for the institution as a whole. Multidisciplinary 
research and teaching collaborations among faculty members have 
been launched by service together within the Academic Senate. 
Examples. Shared governance, if structured and operating well, 
provides an established, clear, understandable, and accepted path for 
dealing with complex and difficult issues. Several examples from this 
book help show this. Two of the points in the history of the University 
of California where the availability of shared governance was essential 




Depression-era budget cuts of the early 1930s (chapter 2) and bringing 
the university into compliance with the regents’ 1995 resolutions 
limiting affirmative action (chapter 15), while at the same time 
preserving the core values of the university as best possible. The roles 
of the specially established ad hoc Academic Senate committees for 
consultative academic oversight of the San Diego, Irvine, Santa Cruz, 
and Merced campuses when they were initiated were invaluable in 
establishing University of California standards from the start (chapter 
10). The role of the Academic Senate in helping define the continual, 
most productive paths ahead is apparent from the discussion of the 
creation of the School of Information at Berkeley (chapter 12). Senate 
reviews of UC management of the Los Alamos and Livermore national 
laboratories were helpful to the university for establishing contract 
conditions that would enhance the quality of science at those 
laboratories (chapter 13). More effective use of the Academic Senate 
also accounts for the much more favorable Berkeley campus reaction 
to the agreement with BP for the Energy Biosciences Institute in 2007 
than had been the case for the hotly contested agreement with 
Novartis Corporation in 1998 (chapter 18). 
 
What Is Necessary for Shared Governance to Work Well? 
There are several essentials for shared governance to work well. 
 There should be a faculty culture where institutional needs and 
building and preserving academic quality are the highest shared 
values. 
 A large majority of faculty members, including the intellectual 
leaders within the faculty, should have the interest and willingness 
needed to participate actively. 
 The campus leadership and administration should work 
constructively and effectively with the faculty in ways such that it is 
clear that faculty views and advice are given full consideration in 
the decision process. Consultation should occur before decisions 
are made, not after. 
 
It was particularly important for the establishment of the present-
day roles of the University of California Academic Senate for the 




lead roles in meeting with the regents in 1919 and designing shared 
governance. That involvement gave shared governance the impetus 
and level of respect from the faculty that has helped it work well. A 
sense of hard-won victory also probably instilled satisfaction and pride, 
which helped and enabled shared governance to come into being 
effectively. 
 
What Can Go Wrong with Shared Governance? 
Much will be lost if an Academic Senate functions more like a 
labor union for faculty than as a positive force for academic quality and 
institutional strength. The senate is then being used in an adversarial 
fashion, seeking job benefits that can readily clash with, and submerge, 
the pursuit of academic quality. An academic senate should be hatched 
with a culture and goal of seeking academic excellence, with the senate 
being an important path for doing so. An effective senate can reduce 
interest among the faculty in having a labor union, and it has done so 
at the University of California, where the only campus with a faculty 
union is Santa Cruz, even though in the 1970s Governor Jerry Brown 
authorized union elections on all campuses of the university. The 
faculty of the California State University is unionized. 
In a related vein and as has already been noted, shared 
governance works best when the respected intellectual leaders of the 
campus are interested and take active parts. A lack of participation, or 
worse yet disdain, from the most respected faculty members carries a 
message that the work of the senate is not regarded as sufficiently 
important and is something best left for those who have idle time 
available. If faculty participation in shared governance is low, then 
there is a greater chance that individuals with personal agendas will 
come to dominate the senate, not reflecting general faculty views and 
impeding constructive progress.  
Confrontation is not beneficial to shared governance. The 
administration and senate should both strive to work together 
positively, recognizing that solutions to problems and constructive 
progress are both needed and that these can best be gained by 
working together in a respectful fashion. It is important that the 
Academic Senate leadership be well aware of faculty views and the 




senate leadership not being sufficiently aware of faculty views occurred 
in the loyalty oath controversy of 1949–50 (chapter 2), when the 
senate leadership communicated a degree of acceptance of the 
proposed loyalty oath that was quite different from the actual run of 
faculty opinion. 
 
Attitudes within Universities and Colleges toward Shared 
Governance, Nationwide 
Surveys have been made periodically to ascertain how faculty 
members and administrators within universities view shared 
governance. One example is a survey made by Tierney and Minor29 
covering 1,199 department chairs, 411 academic vice presidents or 
provosts, and 400 Academic Senate leaders from four-year universities 
and colleges in the United States.  
The following passages from their report summarize results from 
the survey. First, faculty senates are commonplace: “A total 93 percent 
of doctoral institutions, 90 percent of master’s institutions, and 82 
percent of baccalaureate institutions have such senates, while only 13 
percent of surveyed schools do not.“ 
Second, there is widespread concern about the effectiveness of, 
and faculty interest in, shared governance: 
At those institutions that had faculty Senates, 22 percent of 
respondents reported that the Senate was not an important 
governing body, 53 percent indicated a low level of interest in 
Senate activities, 43 percent stated that involvement in the 
Senate was not highly valued, and 31 percent felt the goals of 
the Senate were not clearly defined, even though there 
appeared to be clarity about the domains of faculty 
influence—that is, there was clarity about areas of decision-
making where faculty have authority. This dissatisfaction was 
particularly strong at doctoral universities, where only 19 
percent of respondents agreed that the faculty had high 
levels of interest in Senate activities. By contrast, 54 percent 
of respondents from baccalaureate institutions and 39 
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percent of respondents from master’s institutions reported 
high levels of interest in Senate activities. 
These results underscore the first need stated above for shared 
governance to work well—a faculty culture where institutional needs 
and academic quality are the highest shared values. 
Another extensive survey, the 2001 Survey of Higher Education 
Governance, was made by Kaplan,30 and covered a wide variety of US 
academic institutions. Attitudes on various aspects of shared 
governance clustered toward the middle of the scale, avoiding 
extremes of enthusiasm or concern. The survey found that Academic 
Senate influence is mostly over policy development. 
A recent survey by the Association of Governing Boards31 obtained 
the views of presidents and chancellors, as well as governing board 
members, primarily from nonpublic institutions, on shared governance. 
While the results were generally accepting of shared governance and 
its utility, the wide swath of institutions covered makes it difficult to 
discern attitudes and effectiveness in any detail. A large shortcoming of 
these general surveys is that many different types of colleges and 
universities are lumped together and therefore many different forms of 
shared governance are lumped together. Some are intense and active; 
others are pro forma. Research universities, comprehensive 
universities, liberal arts colleges, and sometimes community colleges, 
public and private, are pooled. 
Although I am not aware of quantitative data on attitudes toward 
shared governance within the University of California, fifty-five years of 
UC experience and myriad conversations during that time have given 
me the sharp impression that both attitudes toward and participation 
in shared governance are much more positive for UC than are 
expressed for the nation as a whole in the nationwide surveys. 
 
What Is Inherently Problematic in Shared Governance? 
Many views have been expressed about shared governance by 
present and former university administrators. These range from rather 
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monolithic condemnations by authors such as Duderstadt and 
Womack,32 to a collection of varied views in a volume emanating from 
one of the Glion Conferences,33 and to in-depth analyses such as those 
in books authored by Bowen and Tobin34 and by Garland,35 among 
others. In their book, Bowen and Tobin also trace the development of 
shared governance in the United States and the issues that surround it 
and examine shared governance in more depth for four quite different 
institutions—Princeton University, the University of California, 36 
Macalester College, and the City University of New York. In their 
chapter 4, they consider shared governance in each of six different 
areas: (1) selection and tenure of the president, (2) the faculty 
appointments and dismissals process, (3) advice on matters of all kinds, 
(4) budgetary and staffing questions including non-tenure-track faculty, 
(5) academic standards in admissions, and (6) curricular content, 
grading, and authority to determine teaching methods. 
Typical concerns raised about the value and effectiveness of shared 
governance are the following: 
 It is a slow process that may inherently not be able to keep up 
with the needs of fast-changing times. 
 Faculty members represent only one of the interest groups 
within the university, albeit a very important one. Faculty 
members cannot recognize and balance needs across groups, 
and/or they are self-interested and will serve their own 
interests. 
 Faculty members are typically conservative, well satisfied with 
the status quo, and reluctant to change. 
 Shared governance tends to draw a cadre of faculty members 
who are less active in research and/or have particular issues 
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other than academic quality. The busiest faculty members, 
who tend also to be the most respected, see shared 
governance as an ineffective use of their time. 
 Current needs are for changes so great that they cannot be 
accomplished by traditional means of governance. 
 Times have changed, such that faculty now have much more 
allegiance to their disciplines than to their institutions. They 
thus cannot, or will not, see the broader picture beyond their 
disciplines. 
 Shared governance, because it reflects so many different 
interests and requires frequent and thorough consultation, 
can be dysfunctional and lead to inabilities to confront and 
solve problems and to move with the needs of the times. 
 Shared governance, even if done well, is inherently expensive 
in its use of faculty time. Garland presents results of an effort 
to calculate the cost of shared governance for Miami 
University of Ohio, concluding that the cost was about 15 
percent of faculty time, or $13 million per year.37 A national 
1993 survey by the National Center for Education Statistics 
cited by Lyall38 concluded that 11 percent of faculty time goes 
to operations of shared governance. 
It is instructive to read the various discourses on shared 
governance in terms of what they imply about the management styles 
of the author of the paper, who is much more often than not a former 
university president or provost. 
Many who have expressed concerns have done so in the context 
of a belief that shared governance is still needed and valuable. Because 
of the very nature of outstanding research faculty, it is difficult to 
conceive of an effectively operating research university of high caliber 
where shared governance is absent. Faculty members do not care for 
situations where there is no mechanism for them to be heard, and 
without shared governance it becomes too easy for the top 
administration to get too far out in front of the faculty. 
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Ways of Nurturing Shared Governance39  
There are a number of different ways in which concerns about 
shared governance can be mitigated or overcome. 
Have Structure with Clarity on Roles, and Use the Process. A clear 
structure for shared governance and an established and agreed-upon 
delineation of the responsibilities of the different parties guard against 
misunderstandings and confusion. 
Weingartner 40  defines three different types of collaborative 
decision-making: (1) consultative decision, where the faculty should be 
consulted, but the administration is determinant, (2) codeterminative 
decision, for which the faculty organization should advise and consent 
(as is the role for the US Senate in certain presidential appointments), 
and (3) all but determinative decision, where a faculty decision is 
overruled by the administration only for strong reasons explicitly 
stated. To this could be added cases where the faculty senate has full 
determinative authority, such as for courses, curricula, and the 
conditions for admission within the University of California. What 
forms of governance and what decisions are in which category should 
be well understood. An explicit written document can serve as a 
continual point of reference and should minimize misunderstandings of 
roles. Clark Kerr41 noted a need for such a document even for the 
University of California, despite it being a university where shared 
governance is more structured and for which some written descriptions 
do exist. Vagueness generates misunderstanding and controversy. 
A related concept is that senate functions should be real and have 
clear impact, as has also been observed by Weingartner.42 Not only 
does this promote the goals of shared governance; it also provides a 
strong and attractive rationale for participation in shared governance. 
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It is also important to recognize and avoid situations where 
problems can occur because shared governance, although established, 
has not been used in the intended way. The UC Online initiative, 
discussed in chapter 12, is a case in point. There the university-wide 
administration implemented a top-down initiative that left the 
Academic Senate in a reactive mode instead of working with the senate 
to create a jointly defined effort on an inherently academic matter. 
Involve the Most Respected Faculty Members and Intellectual 
Leaders of the Campus. Personal requests to faculty members from the 
president, provost, or respected leaders of the faculty can be effective 
for this purpose. It will help for it to be abundantly clear and accepted 
that the faculty senate has meaningful roles in governance and that its 
contributions are valued by the campus leadership. Respected but busy 
faculty members may respond to requests for them to take on the 
project of working collectively to build an Academic Senate into a more 
meaningful body with the specific overriding goal of promoting and 
maintaining academic quality. After all, the academic quality of the 
institution is very important to faculty members personally. In 
comparing shared governance at Michigan and Berkeley, David 
Hollinger43 notes both the involvement of the most respected faculty 
members at Berkeley, and the boost that gives to senate activities. 
Serving as a principal officer of the Academic Senate is both time-
consuming and filled with pressures because of the large number of 
constituents and highly varied issues. It is a small and very worthwhile 
investment to provide temporary released time from teaching to these 
officers so that they can do their jobs most efficiently and effectively. 
Faculty Senate Positions Should Turn Over and Not Be Sinecures. 
Scheduled turnover, through means such as one- or two-year terms of 
office, should be the norm or even required for Academic Senate 
positions. This lessens the impact of situations where a faculty member 
with a particular agenda—or one who is unsuited to effective 
committee work or is underperforming—becomes ensconced in a 
senate position. It also increases the number of faculty members who 
participate in shared governance and thereby enables more faculty 
                                                     




members to be aware of governance and to meet and work with other 
faculty members outside their disciplines.  
Make Full Information Available to All Parties. Again, to avoid 
misunderstandings and enable advice to be fully informed, both the 
senate and the administration should have access to full information 
on subjects being considered, except for information protected for 
personal privacy. This is all the more possible today because of 
computerized databases and websites that can be password protected. 
An open environment with all information available also builds trust 
and an understanding of the pressures that bear upon either party. 
Seek Ways to Expedite the Consultation Process. One of the 
hindrances to effective shared governance is that events and needs for 
decisions can move faster than does the consultation process, 
especially if there are successive layers of consultation or multiple 
relevant committees. There are several approaches that can be 
pursued to speed things up. First, modern information technology can 
be used to the full extent of its capabilities, not only for making 
background information available to all but also for overcoming hurdles 
of scheduling, geographical separation, and differences in time zones. 
When there are successive layers of consultation (e.g., both all-
university and campus levels within the University of California), 
simultaneous rather than sequential processing can be utilized. This 
applies to considerations internally within both the administration and 
the senate, as well as to interactions between the administration and 
senate. In that way, concerns expressed by those involved at the higher 
levels can be known and taken into account more efficiently by those in 
the process at lower levels. 
For particularly fast-moving issues, it can help to establish a joint 
administration-senate body to carry out consultation in real time. As 
noted in chapter 15, that approach was used to bring the University of 
California into compliance in the difficult and fast-moving situation that 
followed the regents’ motions in 1995 relating to affirmative action. 
From time to time, it has been advocated within the University of 
California Academic Senate that the senate should maintain a fully 
arms-length relationship with the administration so as to assure 




basis of less information and slower consultation, and there is a greater 
likelihood of a sense of obstruction. It does not fit today’s world well. 
Enable Academic Choices to Be Made with Budgetary Awareness. 
Bowen and Tobin44 note the tendency for faculty evaluations and 
advocacy on academic matters to be done without awareness or 
consideration of budgetary implications. This may also be inferred from 
discussions within the recent book by Smelser.45 The best solution is to 
make relevant budgetary information available to Academic Senate 
faculty as they consider academic matters and for the administration 
continually to reference budgetary issues when communicating with 
the Academic Senate. The senate members can then have budgetary 
trade-offs in mind as they consider issues and provide advice. 
Enable and Engender Changes to Meet Evolving Needs and 
Opportunities. The Academic Senate and the administration should 
continually work together to identify changes in their approaches and 
modes of interaction that can better meet evolving needs and 
conditions. As Neil Smelser46 wrote and has also been quoted by 
Bowen and Tobin,47 “Given both the value and indispensability of 
shared governance and its deterioration, the only proper course is for 
administration and faculty to confront one another openly and frankly 
about their values and frustrations, about what is working and not 
working in shared governance, and initiate joint efforts to diagnose 
problems, identify points of vulnerability, and attempt to overhaul and 
streamline archaic structures.” 
A fully candid discussion among principals of the senate and 
administration expressly for that purpose at the beginning of each 
academic year would be a useful mechanism. As circumstances and 
opportunities evolve, it is important to examine modes of operation 
and interaction. Some examples of current relevant major changes that 
afford both needs and opportunities include the expanding capabilities 
of information technology, state-funding stringencies for public 
universities, the resultant diversification of the base of finances and 
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constituents of the university, and the very different habits and uses of 
social media by succeeding generations of faculty and students. 
Functional Correspondence. The delegation of functions from the 
university-wide level to the campus level within the Academic Senate 
should correspond to board and administrative delegations, so that 
consultations occur at the appropriate level. For the University of 
California, the last major changes in Senate organization were made in 
1963, when the move was made to convert from the then-existing 
Northern and Southern Divisions to individual campus divisions of the 
Academic Senate, 48 , 49  and when division councils and various 
committees were then created on the campuses. The senate should 
continually examine its structure, delegations, and roles at various 
levels in light of the administrative decentralization that has occurred 
during recent decades. As well, the senate should examine continually 
ways in which it can enable its leaders to act in an informed fashion for 
the senate when time is short. 
Interactions between Administration and Senate. The most 
common stereotypical negative views about shared governance are 
that the administration tries to stiff-arm the senate and that the senate 
is inherently naysaying to change. For effective shared governance, 
these descriptions will not pertain. However, both parties must take 
steps to avoid either the reality or the perception of these images. The 
administration should bring important current issues of governance to 
the senate, but the senate should also take the initiative in raising 
issues that the members believe are important for shared governance 
but which the administration has not yet brought to them. The senate 
should seek to respond on issues in ways that provide avenues to go 
forward as opposed to an impasse. 
Within the University of California, substantive senate 
communications with the administration have traditionally been 
accomplished by memo, although there are also meetings for 
discussion between the senate chairs and vice chairs and 
administrative officers. Memos do serve to create a useful written 
record of interactions, but they are not as efficient as conversation, nor 
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do they clear up misunderstandings or assure that both parties have a 
good familiarity with all the background that might bear upon a 
decision. One way of enabling both parties to have sufficient 
knowledge of the factors involved in a decision is to use the 
information bank described above. But conversational interaction is 
vital, including meetings between senate principals and individual 
administration leaders. 
There are additional steps that can be taken to increase the 
familiarity of the senate leadership with the breadth and depth of 
administrative matters and their dimensions. At the Office of the 
President of the University of California, the chair and vice chair of the 
Academic Council occupy offices on the same floor of the building as 
the president and the provost and meet with them regularly. In 
addition the president and provost and some other administrative 
leaders meet with the full Academic Council monthly. During most of 
the time that I served as university-wide provost (1995–2004), at the 
initiative of President Richard Atkinson, the chair of the Academic 
Council participated in the president’s weekly meeting with the senior 
members of the administration.50 This was a two-hour period during 
which all major current issues were taken up. It therefore provided a 
very effective way of keeping the senate leadership up on things. 
For issues where the senate role is advisory rather than 
determinative, the senate should make any substantially held minority 
positions within the senate known to the administration as part of 
consultation. The reason is that complex situations should not be 
reduced to a single senate point of view. That is only fair to significant 
minorities within the senate. As well, the administration should be 
made aware of the full spectrum of opinion within the faculty so as not 
to be blindsided on issues. At UC, numerical votes at full meetings of 
the campus divisions and votes of the Assembly of the Academic 
Senate generally become known; however, the Academic Council and 
corresponding division councils act as executive bodies taking single 
stances, and votes within them are typically not known. It would help if 
those votes were disclosed and substantial minority positions relayed 
                                                     





and explained. This could be viewed as reciprocity for the inclusion of 
the senate chair in meetings of bodies such as the president’s cabinet 
and/or the various other means by which the spectrum of views within 
the administration becomes apparent to the senate. 
 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Shared governance, meaning participation of faculty in university 
governance, exists in many forms in universities and colleges around 
the United States. Surveys show that attitudes toward its effectiveness, 
overall, are often tepid. However, there are great advantages to shared 
governance done well, including involvement of outstanding minds and 
increased faculty satisfaction and allegiance. The University of 
California is an example of an extensive, highly structured, and 
generally effective system of shared governance. Although shared 
governance was nominally present from the start of the university, it 
was greatly enhanced and brought into the present form in the so-
called Berkeley Revolution of 1919, during which the intellectually most 
respected members of the faculty dealt directly with the regents during 
an interregnum in the presidency. 
The essential roles of the faculty Academic Senate in shared 
governance at the University of California include 
 full responsibility for courses, curricula, and the conditions for 
admission of student applicants; 
 responsibility for determining its own membership and 
organization; 
 rights of presenting faculty views directly to the regents, including 
having its two primary leaders participating (but not voting) at the 
meeting table with the regents; 
 carrying out reviews of faculty members for appointment, 
promotion, and advancement along the professorial scale; 
 participating in reviews of programs and for appointment or 
continuation of academic administrators; 
 approval of manuscripts for publication by the university press; and 
 provision of advice to the administration on budget, libraries, and 




The Academic Senate exists at the levels of both the university-
wide administration and individual campuses. On campuses, there is 
typically a division council, composed of both elected and ex officio 
members. There are many committees, members of which are selected 
and secured by the Committee on Committees, an elected nominating 
committee. A similar structure exists university-wide, where there is an 
executive Academic Council and a legislative Assembly of the Academic 
Senate, along with many committees, one of which is the Committee 
on Committees. Faculty members from professional schools are every 
bit as involved in campus and university-wide shared governance, as 
are faculty members from the academic disciplines. 
There are several ways in which effective shared governance can 
be nurtured. These include 
 defining a meaningful structure and clear roles, and using the 
resultant process, 
 seeking to interest and involve the most respected intellectual 
leaders on campus, 
 designing the senate so that positions turn over regularly, 
 making full information on any issue under consideration available 
to both the senate and the administration, 
 carrying out regular evaluations, joint between the senate and the 
administration, of how to make consultation more effective and 
efficient and to move with the times, 
 enabling academic decisions to be made with relevant budgetary 
information in mind, 
 assuring equivalent delegation within the senate and the 
administration, and 
 continually seeking positive and constructive interactions between 









While not technically part of management, the Senate plays an indirect 
part in virtually every major decision within the university. Funding of 
new academic initiatives for example, funding for the construction of 
new or the renovation of older facilities, for our libraries, computer 
centers, clinics, and hospitals and the like; issues of compensation for all 
personnel, allocation of faculty positions across the university, 
fellowship funds and so forth, all involve consultation with the Senate. 
—David P. Gardner1 
 
The University of California is among the more difficult systems to 
govern effectively because it is among those most subject to internal 
and external tensions. It is one of the larger systems and the most 
academically prestigious of them all, with individual campuses of 
national and international standing and proud of their positions. It has, 
along with the University of Michigan, the most autonomous Board of 
Regents, the most empowered Academic Senate…and a highly 
competent and somewhat arrogant student body…Yet the University of 
California has become academically supreme above all other systems. If 
the measure of the quality of governance is not internal tensions but 
academic results, then the University of California has had superb 
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The two previous chapters have dealt with the organization and 
governance structure of the university with its multiple campuses 
(chapter 6) and the system of shared governance that was launched in 
1919 and has developed into what may be the most structured and 
truly involved such systems in existence anywhere in the academic 
world (chapter 7). The tiered organization, the shared-governance 
structure, and the sheer size of the university make for a very complex 
governance situation. The complexity begs the question of how it really 





Formal Mechanisms. Figure 8-1 shows components of academic 
governance for the University of California. The central, vertical stream 
shown in roman capitals depicts the administrative reporting structure, 
with the downward, unidirectional arrows showing who reports to 
whom. On the left side, in italic capitals, is the Academic Senate, with 
horizontal, bidirectional arrows showing pairings for consultation. The 
divisions of the senate on the campuses have consulting relationships 
with the campus administrations, and the university-wide Academic 
Senate has them with the university-wide administration. In the second 
column from the left is a standing university-wide joint administration-
senate committee, the Academic Planning Council. It and an Executive 
Budget Committee were both started as a result of the transition team 
report3 of 1993. These two bodies were created to enable a continuing 
consultative dialog between the administration and the Academic 
Senate and included chancellors and vice chancellors from campuses as 
well as university-wide officials. As of 2017 the Academic Planning 
Council still exists4, while the Executive Budget Committee does not. 
The lines without arrows denote individuals composing a formal group. 
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         This structure enables senate consultation at both the campus and 
university-wide levels, and it has enabled both joint reflection and 
more rapid action when needed through ad hoc joint senate-
administration bodies, which are not shown. Care must be taken by the 
participants to deal with university-wide issues at the university-wide 
level and campus issues at the campus level, not to mix the two levels, 
and to avoid a campus issue being brought to the university-wide level 
before it is appropriate to do so. This could happen, for example, if a 
division senate took a concern to the Academic Council and from there 
to the president before the chancellor and the division senate had 
dealt with the matter. 
Informal Mechanisms. The lower right-hand side of figure 8-1 
shows the various meetings of persons with like responsibilities on 
campuses with their Office-of-the-President counterparts.  These were 
started in the days when Clark Kerr was president. The figure shows 
several groups of an academic nature, but there are also many more. 
Virtually every group with like administrative functions on the various 
campuses meets with regularity somehow—personnel managers, 
labor-relations managers, affirmative-action officers, planning and 
budget officers, risk-management officers, those involved with the 
many student-support services, and so forth. 
These meetings enable those with like roles on campuses and in 
the university-wide administration to share best practices and address 
common problems. They serve as key mechanisms for keeping 
university-wide officers aware of what the issues on the campuses are 
and how those issues are seen by the campuses. They build bonds and 
friendships, such that an administrator on one campus is comfortable 
calling up a counterpart on another campus or university-wide to 
discuss a thorny issue. Alternatively, such an issue can be taken up 
within the university-wide group. 
These groups should not be viewed as being controlled or even 
chaired by the university-wide official. They are in no way top-down. 
Usually one of the campus officers is chair, facilitator, or convener, and 
the agenda is set by all participants through that person. They 
represent an entirely different dimension of governance, in that a 
campus participant may even use discussion in the group to derive 
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arguments to use in considerations of a contended policy issue on that 
participant’s campus. 
Historically, the Council of Chancellors (campus chancellors plus 
executive and/or senior vice presidents) has met monthly all day on 
first Wednesdays and for dinner the evening before Board of Regents’ 
meetings. These meetings enable chancellors to bring issues to other 
chancellors and the president and executive/senior vice presidents, 
and they often identify needs for administrative studies or problem 
solving to be done. By contrast, the Council of (Academic) Vice 
Chancellors and other councils of vice chancellors (Administration and 
Finance, University Relations, etc.) are more in nature problem-solving 
groups, endeavoring to identify and create the actual paths forward. 
In addition to formal and informal structures, contacts and good 
will among people are essential for effective academic governance. Full 
awareness and understanding of the roles of the Academic Senate on 
the parts of both the administration and the senate are important. As 
described in chapter 7, things are at their best if both the 
administration and the Academic Senate regard each other positively 
and with interest and respect, rather than with suspicion. Similarly, an 
open, transparent atmosphere of governance is best. The same needs 
exist for relations between campus and university-wide officials. 
Academic Departments. Definition and delivery of the academic 
curriculum are left almost totally to the academic departments. The 
one exception is the need for review and approval of proposed courses 
by the campus Committee on Courses of the Academic Senate; 
however, in practice, very few courses are turned down, although 
aspects of them are questioned. The campus-wide committee does not 
have much basis for disagreeing with the collective academic judgment 
of a department. This practice enables the curriculum to be guided by a 
deep understanding of the subject matter in a discipline but hampers 
multidisciplinary instruction (chapter 14). 
 
 
PAROCHIALISM, UNDERSTANDING, AND RESPECT 
 
A challenge with which academic governance, or almost any 




governance and administration. Department chairs view the world 
from the standpoint of their own discipline and the health and standing 
of their department within it. Deans of colleges must take a broader 
view, looking across their disciplines and being concerned with 
building, preserving, and enhancing their colleges as a whole, as well as 
encouraging interactions among the departments within the college. 
Provosts concern themselves with building, preserving, and enhancing 
the entire academic enterprise and seek synergies and cooperation 
among their units. Chancellors must balance the needs of nonacademic 
operations with academic ones and must seek and choose those 
relatively few major initiatives that are most critically needed for the 
campus as a whole. Within the multicampus university, the president 
must evaluate the needs and opportunities for the entire university 
and will often find it necessary to do things that will build and enhance 
newer campuses but that the more mature campuses may not see as 
serving their own needs well. For a public university or university 
system, regents represent the public and cannot as readily be 
cheerleaders for the university as are trustees of private universities. 
To the extent that these tensions can be overcome or eased, 
governance will work better. To the extent that the persons interacting 
among the different tiers of governance understand one another’s 
situations and needs, governance should work better. For example, it is 
beneficial for the provost to meet with the full ensemble of deans to 
discuss common concerns and crosscutting campus issues. Deans will 
thereby have an awareness of campus-wide needs and tensions. As 
well, it is good for a provost to meet frequently with individual deans 




WHAT CAN GO WRONG 
 
There are, of course, many things that can go wrong with 
university governance, even despite the best of structures. Some of the 
most common problems within the United States are the following. 
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The President Gets Too Far Out in Front of the Faculty 
 The most common high-visibility problem is for the president to 
get too far out in front of the faculty on one or more major initiatives. 
If the president then encounters active resistance or votes of no 
confidence from the faculty, the trustees are put in a difficult situation. 
Often the ultimate result is a negotiated departure of the president. 
After all, the faculty is the heart of the university, and there are no 
straightforward steps to change the composition of the faculty, other 
than very slowly over time through retirements, resignations, and so 
on. Situations of this sort have been rare at the University of California 
because the Academic Senate’s consultation mechanism serves to 
identify potential problems of this sort before they develop to crisis 
stage. The senate mechanism also provides a formal way to discuss and 
resolve contentious issues internally. The very fact that formal 
consultation has occurred and the faculty organization has been heard 
is itself a defusing mechanism. 
One of the important roles of deans—and of provosts in 
particular—is to be on the lookout for situations where the president 
or chancellor of the campus may be getting too far out in front of the 
faculty and then protect the president by keeping keep him or her 
aware of the situation and working to smooth things out. 
 
The President and Board Members Work without Sufficient Synergy 
or Even at Cross-Purposes  
Public flare-ups between board members and presidents are 
generally counterproductive. It is much better that such matters be 
solved or at least ameliorated within the university through effective 
governance practices. 
Three examples discussed in chapter 2 reflect the entry of state 
politics into board governance of the University of California, and all 
three also set members of the Board of Regents against the president 
publicly: (1) the loyalty oath controversy of 1948–50, (2) the dismissal 
of Clark Kerr as president in 1967 following incoming governor 
Reagan’s campaign promise to “clean up the mess at Berkeley,” and (3) 
the passage in 1995 of the two Board of Regents’ resolutions 
precluding attention to race, gender, etcetera, in university admissions 




primary campaign by the governor of California for the Republican 
nomination for the US presidency. In another example from the 
University of California, some years after the aforementioned regents’ 
resolutions of 1995 and a subsequent successful state ballot 
proposition on the same subject, the chair of the Board of Regents 
wrote a leaked report and then an article5 in the national press 
accusing the Berkeley campus of applying favoritism to the admission 
of underrepresented minority students, thereby circumventing state 
law and the regents’ resolutions. In this case a result was a breach 
between this regent and most of the rest of the board, which 
ultimately led to censure of that regent by the board and a subsequent 
resignation of the regent before his term had been completed. 
Public flare-ups of this sort are not unique to the University of 
California, but are much more characteristic of public universities than 
of private ones, both because of the different natures of the boards 
and because of public-records laws that make documents, e-mails, and 
the like, from public institutions much more readily available to the 
media. Another prominent example of public conflict between a board 
and a president was the 2012 dismissal of the president of the 
University of Virginia by the Board of Visitors of that university over the 
issue of not moving fast enough on online instruction. The dismissal 
was followed by reinstatement of the president in response to 
pressures from the faculty and the public, the latter generated by the 
attention given in the media.6 In another conspicuous recent (2014) 
case, there was an ongoing, very public, politically driven dispute on 
faculty tenure, admissions, and other issues between regents of the 
University of Texas and the Governor of Texas, on the one hand, and 
the president of the flagship Austin campus and much of the UT-Austin 
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The Faculty Senate Does Not Act Constructively 
As noted throughout chapter 7, it has been vital for the success of 
shared governance at the University of California for the Academic 
Senate to draw the involvement and leadership of respected faculty 
members whose allegiances to the institute outweigh any personal 
agendas. This feature is crucial for developing trust in the governance 
process by both the faculty as a whole and the administration. If not 
guarded carefully, the situation can go astray. 
Busy faculty members join into shared governance if they 
conclude that their involvement will be meaningful and truly important 
for overall governance. Thus, having effective shared governance 
becomes a criterion for drawing capable and very active faculty 
members to shared governance, and drawing such faculty is in turn a 
criterion for the effectiveness of the governance. Building successful 
shared governance requires both from the start. 
 
The Faculty Does Not Act Cohesively 
Faculty lives are busy and full of pressures. In the world of academic 
science and engineering, teaching responsibilities are coupled with 
supervision of graduate students and postdocs and the need to nurture 
what may be three or even four major sources of external financial 
support for research. Department-chair positions have become less 
attractive. They require capable, institutionally oriented people who 
will generate the time needed to do the job well and are capable of 
gaining the respect and confidence of the faculty members of the 
department and drawing them together. However, because of the 
many pressures upon faculty members, community-minded individuals 
with good leadership qualities seem to be much rarer now than they 
were forty or fifty years ago. That sort of person may simply not exist in 
a department, or the faculty members who do have those attributes 
may be unwilling to take on the job or not be able to generate the time 
needed to do the job well. Even with a capable and dedicated chair, 
department dynamics may deteriorate because everybody leaves it all 
for the department chair to do. These factors, economic efficiency, and 
the negative effects of narrow disciplinary or subdisciplinary interests 
are strong reasons for encouraging larger department sizes and 





If faculty members are not motivated to do their best or conclude 
that they are not being well supported by their department or 
institution, both performance and quality will suffer. As a result, the 
education of students and the reputation of the institution will also 
suffer. A vital role of university governance is to support and incentivize 
the faculty so that they will remain motivated toward their careers and 
their students. The administration must have the ability to sense 
morale continually and address it effectually when necessary. An 






Creating Research Excellence: 
Physical Sciences at Berkeley 
 
 
[Armin] Leuschner has done more than almost any other single person 
to make this a great university, although few people know it. He knew 
what a university should be. 
—Joel H. Hildebrand1 
 
There are ancient cathedrals which, apart from their consecrated 
purpose, inspire solemnity and awe. Even the curious visitor speaks of 
serious things, with hushed voice, and as each whisper reverberates 
through the vaulted nave, the returning echo seems to bear a message 
of mystery. The labor of generations of architects and artisans has been 
forgotten, the scaffolding erected for their toil has long since been 
removed, their mistakes have been erased, or have become hidden by 
the dust of centuries. Seeing only the perfection of the completed 
whole, we are impressed as by some superhuman agency. But 
sometimes we enter such an edifice that is still partly under 
construction; then the sound of hammers, the reek of tobacco, the 
trivial jests bandied from workman to workman, enable us to realize 
that these great structures are but the result of giving to ordinary 
human effort a direction and a purpose. Science has its cathedrals, built 
by the efforts of a few architects and many workers. 
—Gilbert Newton Lewis2 
 
I shall always be grateful for the wise and generous guidance and help 
that our work has received from the University Board of Research, and  
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especially from Professor Leuschner, Chairman of the Research Board, 
in the early years of organization of the laboratory, and above all may I 
acknowledge my deep appreciation of the support of the President of 
the University [Robert Gordon Sproul], who whole-heartedly has been 
all along such a stimulus to our activities. It may truly be said that this 
Nobel Award is yet another tribute to his great academic leadership. 
—Ernest O. Lawrence, Nobel Prize Acceptance Speech3 
 
Chemistry was a “college,” not a department, as it remains to this 
day…It has been, and still is, in my judgement, the outstanding unit 
within the University of California—superb in research, superb in the 
teaching of both undergraduate and graduate students, and superb in 
the contributions of its faculty members to university governance. 
 —Clark Kerr4 
 
 
Research excellence has been at the heart of the reputation of 
the University of California, starting with the original Berkeley campus 
and going forward to the newer campuses. This chapter and the 
succeeding three explore how that excellence came about both initially 
and then university-wide, and how it is sustained. 
In order to understand research excellence, we need to define it. 
The appendix explores that issue, utilizing both qualitative and 
quantitative approaches, including many surveys and rating systems 
that have appeared within recent decades. Many of the quantitative 
measures have to do with research.  The quantitative approaches can 
and should be challenged, but they do provide a view of what is 
considered important. 
Respected research hardly ever results from happenstance. In 
order to have well recognized and highly effective research, an 
institution must devise and carry out a workable plan to identify 
outstanding or potentially outstanding people, attract those people or 
                                                     
3 Ernest O. Lawrence, Nobel Prize Acceptance Speech, Berkeley, CA, 1940, https://perma.cc/5GZ6-
M6W5. The prize was presented in Berkeley rather than Oslo because of the onset of World War 
II. 
4 Clark Kerr, The Gold and the Blue: A Personal Memoir of the University of California, 1949–1967, 
vol., 1, Academic Triumphs (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), p. 61. 
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grow them de novo, and fully enable and support them in their careers. 
The institution must draw effectively upon distinguished researchers in 
the selection and evaluation of other researchers, and it must spread 
and maintain a culture of research excellence throughout the 
institution. By contrast, it is next to impossible to convert a midcareer 
person into an outstanding researcher. 
In the present chapter, we explore how that culture and the 
tradition of excellence were initially built at the University of California 
in the physical sciences. Chapter 10 then examines how that culture 
spread to the other campuses of the University of California as they 
came into being. Next, chapters 11 and 12 deal with ways in which that 
culture has been supported and maintained through assessment of 
people and through reviews and changes in programs. 
I have chosen the physical sciences to illustrate the initiation of 
research excellence at Berkeley for several reasons. First, the physical 
sciences are to a large, but by no means exclusive, extent where the 
move to research excellence at the University of California was 
launched. Second, the physical sciences have contributed much of the 
stature of the Berkeley campus, although, as is underscored by 
reputational surveys, that stature is remarkably widespread across the 
disciplines. Third, the development of the physical sciences is relatively 
well documented and presents a clear path of development displaying 
the interconnectedness of the people involved and mutual support 
among disciplines. Finally, it is what I am most familiar with myself, 
having now spent fifty-five years as a chemical engineering faculty 
member within Berkeley’s College of Chemistry. 
 
 
ASTRONOMY, THE LICK OBSERVATORY, AND ARMIN LEUSCHNER 
 
The Lick Observatory 
 An act of serendipity coupled with the talents of Daniel Coit 
Gilman began the rise of the University of California to research 
eminence. James Lick,5 a wealthy San Francisco businessman, decided 
                                                     
5 “James Lick the ‘Generous Miser,’” Lick Observatory Historical Collections, 




in 1873, toward the end of his life, that he wanted to use a substantial 
amount of his fortune to enable construction of the world’s most 
powerful telescope. As he worked with various advisors, including 
President Gilman,6 the project underwent many major changes. The 
site was originally intended to be in downtown San Francisco, then at 
an altitude of 10,000 feet (3,000 meters) in the Sierra Nevada 
mountains, then near Lake Tahoe, and finally atop Mount Hamilton at 
4,360 feet (1,329 meters) above San Jose, California. The gift and hence 
the project budget started at $1.2 million but then came down to 
$700,000. Several types of telescope were considered, with the 
ultimate choice being a thirty-six-inch refracting telescope. The original 
idea was to give the telescope, once built by the Lick Trust, to the 
California Academy of Sciences in San Francisco. However, when the 
final trust was established in 1875 a year before his death, Lick had 
been persuaded by Gilman and others to entrust the telescope upon 
completion to the University of California.7 
The Lick Observatory brought fame, interest, and highly capable 
people, among them two presidents of the University of California. 
Edward S. Holden, the original director of the Lick Observatory, was 
identified for the post as early as 1874 by Simon Newcomb of the US 
Naval Observatory in Washington, DC. Although still employed 
elsewhere, he was involved with the Lick project during the fourteen 
years of planning and construction. When the presidency of the 
University of California became open in 1885, UC Regent John Hager, 
Daniel Coit Gilman (now president of Johns Hopkins University), and 
President Charles Eliot of Harvard all recommended Holden to become 
president of the University of California. In an unusual move, Holden 
was recruited as both director of the Lick Observatory and UC 
president, with the understanding that he would assume the Lick 
directorship full-time upon completion of the telescope, which indeed 
                                                     
6 Stadtman, 1970, op. cit., p. 108. 
7 F. J. Neubauer, “A Short History of the Lick Observatory,” Popular Astronomy 58 (1950); part 1: 
no. 5, pp. 201–221; part 2: no. 7, 318-333; part 3: no. 8, pp. 369-387. 
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occurred in 1888.8 Lick’s body was reburied at the foot of the telescope 
one year earlier.9 
With the approval of the regents, Holden established a graduate 
school in astronomy at the Lick Observatory. Equipped with that 
opportunity and what was then the world’s most capable telescope, he 
was able to recruit top-notch astronomers. Among these were William 
W. Campbell,10 who became a noted astronomer in his own right, the 
third director of the observatory (1901–30), and ultimately president of 
the University of California (1923–30) while still retaining the 
directorship of the Lick Observatory. Campbell later served as president 
of the National Academy of Sciences. Campbell had a number of 
important accomplishments in astronomy.11 He was a major figure in 




The University of California more systematically started its rise to 
research eminence during the twenty years that Benjamin Ide Wheeler 
was president, 1899–1919. Much of the credit for guiding the initial 
years of that rise goes to Armin Leuschner. For example, Paul Herget,12 
in his biographical memoir of Leuschner for the National Academy of 
Sciences, observes, “It was his insight and perseverance, perhaps more 
than any other individual, who raised the University of California to the 
level of a great university.” In addition to his quote at the beginning of 
this chapter, Joel Hildebrand stated about Leuschner from firsthand 
experience, “He knew what a university should be and the kind of men 
who should constitute its faculty. He had attended a German 
 
 
                                                     
8 This arrangement was made even though Holden’s only administrative position had been the 
directorship of the Washburn Observatory in Madison, Wisconsin. It is symbolic of the UC 
presidency having been a relatively weak position in the latter half of the nineteenth century. 
9 Neubauer, 1950, loc. cit. 
10 W. H. Wright, “William Wallace Campbell, 1862–1938,” Biographical Memoirs, National 
Academy of Sciences, 1947, https://perma.cc/JR6S-ZEMT.   
11 Wright, 1947, loc. cit. 
12 Paul Herget, “Armin Otto Leuschner, 1868–1953,” Biographical Memoirs, National Academy of 




university, he was a distinguished astronomer, he knew how to apply 
high standards to graduate study, he was a very patient man, but very 
persistent. If he didn’t win his point on one attempt he would return to 
it at the next opportunity. He was reasonable and sympathetic. He was 
a most valuable counselor.” Hildebrand indicated as well that 
Leuschner “helped a great deal to educate Wheeler in what a real 
university should be.” 13 To Wheeler goes the credit for selecting 
growth toward research eminence as a prime goal and for recognizing 





 Leuschner was born in the United States in 1868, but moved to 
Germany with his mother for his precollege schooling after the early 
death of his father. He returned to the University of Michigan, from 
which he graduated in 1888. From there he became one of the first 
graduate students hired by Holden for the Lick Observatory, which had 
opened that same year. He then became instructor (1890) and 
assistant professor (1892) of mathematics at Berkeley, before 
converting to assistant professor of astronomy and geodesy in 1894. 
He went next to the University of Berlin for an unusually rapid PhD, 
1896–97 and then returned to his position at Berkeley.14 
                                                     
13 Hildebrand, 1962, op. cit., pp. 132, 140. 
14 S. Einarsson et al., “Armin Otto Leuschner, Astronomy, Berkeley,” In Memoriam, University of 
California, Berkeley, 1958, https://perma.cc/Y3DU-EJA3. 
Figure 9-1. Armin O. Leuschner 
(“Armin Otto Leuschner,” 
Wikipedia, 
https://perma.cc/MD8F-F37R.) 
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 Astronomy at Berkeley had been separate from the graduate 
program at the Lick Observatory. The subject was originally taught at 
Berkeley by George Davidson, chief of the Pacific Division of the US 
Coast and Geodetic Survey, and then by Frank Soulé, who housed it 
within Civil Engineering until the subject was turned over to Leuschner 
in the early 1890s. During Leuschner’s long tenure (1907–38) as 
department chair, astronomy at Berkeley achieved distinction in the 
field, both by producing students who would go on to postgraduate 
work and for Leuschner’s own work on the discovery of orbits of 
comets and asteroids. Under Leuschner, the astronomy programs at 
Berkeley and Lick were progressively interwoven. Students received 
instruction at Berkeley but did much of their actual observation work 
using the facilities at Lick. Of those graduates awarded PhDs by the 
Department of Astronomy between 1898 and 1965, about half held 
fellowships at Lick.15 
 A person blessed with sharp insights and great energy, Leuschner 
was also a noted effective leader on the national scale. He took the 
initiative16 in convening the meeting of presidents and other leaders of 
US universities in 1900 in Chicago that resulted in the founding of the 
Association of American Universities (AAU). He was active in the 
National Research Council and in 1919 was both executive secretary 
and chairman of its Division of Physical Sciences. He was also President 
of the American Association of University Professors (AAUP), 1923–25. 
Within the university he served as dean of the Graduate Division 
(1913–18, 1920–23), as founder and long-term chairman of the Board 
of Research (1915–35), and as one of the faculty members who met 
with the Board of Regents in 1919–20 to establish the current roles of 
the Academic Senate (see chapter 7). 
 
Further State-of-the-Art Astronomy Facilities 
 The University of California has continued to have state-of-the art 
astronomical observing facilities over the years. That fact has helped 
the university recruit faculty members whose work has kept the UC 
astronomy departments at the top ranks. The Hat Creek Radio 
                                                     
15 “UC Berkeley Astronomy Department History,” https://perma.cc/T848-GRXP. 




Astronomy Laboratory was completed in 1958 and produced important 
discoveries. Management of it was passed to SRI International in 2012. 
The twin ten-meter Keck optical telescopes (chapter 2), built and 
administered jointly with Caltech atop Mauna Kea in Hawaii, were put 
into scientific use as of 1993 and 1996. The National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration (NASA) later joined as a third partner. The Keck 
telescopes use a segmented-mirror design developed by Jerry Nelson 
of UC. They also utilize a complex adaptive-optics system to 
compensate for turbulence in the boundary layer of earth’s 
atmosphere, thereby sharpening images. A design using interferometry 
enables the two telescopes to operate together to provide some 
features of a telescope almost an order of magnitude larger. As of 2017 
a partnership composed of UC, Caltech, and the national astronomical 
societies of China, Japan, India and Canada was working to obtain final 
permits to initiate construction of the Thirty-Meter Telescope, also 
atop Mauna Kea, with the Canary Islands as a back-up site. This too 
uses segmented mirrors and adaptive optics. 
 
 
THE BOARD OF RESEARCH 
 
 As dean of the Graduate Division in a governance system in which 
the provost position had not yet been established, Leuschner had the 
key leadership role in building the research faculty and serving as a 
close academic advisor to Presidents Wheeler, Barrows, and Campbell. 
He also had strong influence through his chairmanship of the Board of 
Research,17 which was formed by the regents upon Wheeler’s request 
in 1915. This board was chartered to use funds in support of the best 
research within the university, especially at critical early points in 
faculty careers. The amount was initially not large, $2,000 in 1915–16, 
growing to $4,000 in 1917–18.18 The purpose, since the beginning, has 
                                                     
17 Victor H. Henderson, “A Board of Research,” University Record, University of California 
Chronicle, vol. 18, p. 80, January 1917,. 
https://books.google.com/books?id=lk8MAQAAIAAJ&pg=PA72&source=gbs_toc_r&cad=4#v=one
page&q&f=false.  
18 Recognize, however, that there has been considerable inflation since this era. The sum of 
$4,000 at the start of 1917 is equivalent to $83,000 one hundred years later (InflationData.com, 
https://perma.cc/CL3M-7H24. 
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been to help cover incidental expenses associated with research, such 
as travel. The board was, and still in its present form is, entirely a 
faculty-run operation, following the belief that distinguished 
researchers among the faculty would know how best to use the funds. 
 The rationale for creation of the Board of Research is reported by 
Raymond Birge,19 who was a member of the board for sixteen years 
and chair of it for the last eight of those years, succeeding Leuschner in 
1935. Specifically, it was to enable faculty members to apply for scarce 
funds in support of their research directly, without the need of seeking 
those funds from, or even obtaining the approval of, the department 
chair. For departments with a strong sense of cooperation, there could 
be a departmental request for a block grant to be administered by a 
committee or even by the department chair, but the approach of 
individual applications and grants also dealt with situations in which a 
chair was not particularly friendly to research.  
The funding for the Board of Research grew substantially over the 
years, from the initial 1915 annual allocation of $2,000 to over 
$200,000 in 1951. Even allowing for inflation, the amount of funding 
probably seems small by today’s standards, but it was crucial in the 
days before massive support of research by the federal government. 
Birge indicates that the major portion of the research funds of the 
physics department, for many years, came from just this one source. 
The Board of Research launched both G. N. Lewis and Ernest O. 
Lawrence on their ways (see below). It also helped overcome the 
problem of distance from other leading research universities by 
enabling trips that Birge, Loeb, Hildebrand, and others made to the 
East Coast of the United States to present papers at meetings of 
scholarly societies and simultaneously to learn of faculty prospects. The 
board supported numerous other faculty members at critical points in 
their careers. In 1938, when UCLA was given its own equivalent of the 
board, the names of the boards for both campuses were changed to 
Committee on Research. These committees, now as formal committees 
of the Academic Senate, continue to this day on all UC campuses and 
provide enabling, flexible annual grants to faculty members. For 
                                                     
19 Raymond T. Birge, History of the Physics Department, vol. 1 (Berkeley: University of California, 








THE COLLEGE OF CHEMISTRY AND GILBERT NEWTON LEWIS 
 
Early Days 
 The early years of Berkeley’s College of Chemistry saw a 
succession of colorful figures, who are described in more detail by 
Jolly.21 Robert A. Fisher was appointed as professor of chemistry, 
mining, and metallurgy in the founding year of 1868 and learned from 
the newspaper of his dismissal by the regents for budgetary reasons in 
1870. Ezra Carr was appointed to the imposing position of professor of 
agriculture, chemistry, agricultural and applied chemistry, and 
horticulture in 1869. Chapter 2 gives a summary of his actions with the 
legislature in contention with President Gilman, which led to his 
dismissal by the regents in 1874. Willard Rising was appointed 
professor of chemistry in 1872 by Gilman and effectively led chemistry 
at the University of California for the rest of the nineteenth century. 
Rising doubled as state analyst for the State Board of Health, working 
effectively on improvement of drinking water around the state. He was 
not designated as dean of the College of Chemistry until 1896. The 
decanal role had fallen instead to Irving Stringham of mathematics (see 
below), who had a position known as dean of the College of Letters and 
the Colleges of Science. 
 Edmond O’Neill was appointed to the chemistry faculty in 1879 
and served as dean from 1901 until the arrival of Lewis in 1912. He was 
a marvelous citizen of the university and the broader community, 
working with many of the student honorary societies, cofounding the 
Faculty Club and serving as its president for a decade, co-organizing 
and being president of the California Alumni Association, chairing the 
Faculty Committee on Athletics, and leading the movement to create a 
chapter of the American Chemical Society in the Bay Area. In his estate, 
                                                     
20 “Indirect Cost Recovery (ICR),” Berkeley Executive Vice Chancellor and Provost, 
https://perma.cc/8BQR-3UX8. 
21 William L. Jolly, From Retorts to Lasers: The Story of Chemistry at Berkeley (Berkeley: College of 
Chemistry, University of California, 1987). 
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he left an endowment for the purchase of an organ (now several 
organs) and support for the university organist. A new chemistry facility 





Figure 9-2. An 1899 photo of the Old Chemistry Building at Berkeley23 
 
Frederick Cottrell 
Through these early years, some research of an applied nature 
was present here and there, but no concerted effort was made to 
develop research. The notable exception was Frederick Cottrell, who 
served on the chemistry faculty from 1903 to 1911. While he was at 
Berkeley, he consulted with the DuPont Corporation at its plant in 
nearby Pinole, California, on the problem of mist formation associated 
with the contact process for making sulfuric acid. In connection with 
that effort, Cottrell invented the extremely successful electrostatic 
precipitator, which has become universally used for the removal of 
particles and mists from effluent gases.  
                                                     
22 When I arrived as an assistant professor in January, 1963, this building was still standing for a 
few months until it was taken down to provide the site for Hildebrand Hall. 




Cottrell was a brilliant and accomplished man who could have had 
an illustrious academic and research career and might himself have 
been the initiator of distinguished research within the College of 
Chemistry. However, with the clear success of the precipitator, he 
decided to move on to other ventures. One was a career with the US 
Bureau of Mines, of which he eventually became director, and the 
other was to launch an innovative corporation to utilize the royalty 
income from the patents on the electrostatic precipitator. The 
Research Corporation24 , 25  devoted the patent proceeds and their 
growth through investment to the support of scientific research. It was 
a vital source of support for scientific research before the large growth 
in government sponsored research following World War II. The 
Research Corporation still exists, now as the Research Corporation for 
Scientific Advancement. Upon coming to Berkeley, G. N. Lewis urged 
that Cottrell remain associated with the university as a “nonresident 
professor,” and Lewis did seek and rely upon Cottrell’s counsel, an 
example being in the recruitment of Joel Hildebrand (below). 
 
The Hiring of Gilbert Newton Lewis 
Benjamin Ide Wheeler, president of UC from 1899 to 1919, 
recognized the need to build chemistry. Upon the recommendations of 
both Armin Leuschner and Edmond O’Neill,26 he contacted Gilbert 
Newton Lewis, a rising star, who was part of an outstanding group of 
physical chemists at MIT that had been put together under the 
leadership of Arthur A. Noyes in the Research Laboratory of Physical 
Chemistry, which operated on the German model of research.27 Still a 
young man at the age of thirty-six, Lewis was invited by Wheeler to 
come to Berkeley in December 1911 to look over the situation and 
make recommendations. The recommendations, which are contained 
in a report letter from Lewis to Wheeler that is cited in full by Jolly28, 
                                                     
24 David C. Mowery et al., Ivory Tower and Industrial Innovation: University-Industry Technology 
Transfer before and after the Bayh-Dole Act (Stanford University Press, 2004), pp. 58–84. 
25 T. D. Cornell, Establishing Research Corporation: A Case Study of Patents, Philanthropy, and 
Organized Research in Early Twentieth-Century America (Tucson, AZ: Research Corp., 2004). 
26 Jolly, 1987, op. cit., p. 28. 
27 Roger L. Geiger, To Advance Knowledge: The Growth of American Research Laboratories, 1900–
1940 (Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 87–88. 
28 Jolly, 1987, pp. 50-52. 
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were well designed, ambitious, and seemingly unlikely to be accepted. 
However, they were almost fully accepted by Wheeler and resulted in 
Lewis coming to Berkeley. Among the commitments were the 
opportunities to hire and dismiss faculty, several new faculty positions 
and a substantial support budget, a free hand in defining the 
development of the department, and a new building. This building 
became Gilman Hall29, named for Daniel Coit Gilman.  Gilman Hall is 
both one of the least imposing and one of most successful science 
buildings of all time, anywhere.30 
 
Contention at MIT 
There is a story behind the recruitment of Lewis to Berkeley, told 
in more detail by Servos,31 Geiger,32 and Weber.33 Within the Research 
Laboratory of Physical Chemistry, there was a Research Laboratory of 
Applied Chemistry, organized and headed by William H. Walker, which 
eventually formed the basis for the Department of Chemical 
Engineering at MIT. There was bitter tension between Walker and 
Noyes, with Walker pushing for closer ties with industry, which he 
needed to fund his operation. Noyes, on the other hand, valued pure 
science and resisted influences from industry. The fact that Lewis 
shared Noyes’s views on these matters and that Walker seemed to 
have the upper hand no doubt contributed to Lewis’s willingness to 
move to Berkeley in the fall of 1912. His experience at MIT also left 
Gilbert Lewis with a lifelong aversion to ties with industry, a factor that 
substantially delayed the introductions of both organic chemistry and 
chemical engineering at Berkeley. 
                                                     
29 Harvey Helfand, University of California, Berkeley: The Campus Guide (New York: Princeton 
Architectural Press, 2002), pp. 93–95. 
30 The American Chemical Society has also designated Gilman Hall as a National Historic Chemical 
Landmark. Room 307 in Gilman Hall, where Seaborg and associates first isolated plutonium, is 
both a US Historic Landmark and a National Nuclear Landmark of the American Nuclear Society. 
31 J. W. Servos, “The Industrial Relations of Science: Chemical Engineering at MIT, 1900–1939,” Isis 
71, no. 4 (1980): pp. 530–549. 
32 Geiger, 1986, op. cit., pp. 177–191. 
33 Harold C. Weber, “The Improbable Achievement: Chemical Engineering at MIT,” in W. F. Furter, 
ed., History of Chemical Engineering, Advances in Chemistry Series, vol. 190, American Chemical 
Society, Washington, DC, pp. 77–96, 1980; republished in book form, Dept. of Chemical 




The president of MIT, Richard Maclaurin, found himself with an 
impossible situation and a fear that he would lose both Walker and 
Noyes.34 In the spring of 1919, Walker threatened to resign if Noyes 
was not removed as head of the chemistry department, under which 
the two laboratories fell. Since Maclaurin felt a need for strong industry 
relations to support overall MIT finances, he did remove Noyes, and 
adopted a plan that was designed to bring considerably more funding 
from industry. A Division of Industrial Cooperation and Research was 
formed to cement these ties, and Walker was put in charge of it.  
This action hardly ended Noyes’s career. He left MIT to join the 
Throop Institute of Technology in Pasadena, California, and had a major 
role, along with George Ellery Hale and Robert K. Millikan, in leading 
the conversion of it to the California Institute of Technology (Caltech).35 
Walker too left MIT in the early 1920s, thereby bearing out Maclaurin’s 
fear that he would lose both men. Finally, in 1930 the trustees of MIT 
concluded that the institute had lost too much ground in academic 
science through its heavy orientation toward industry and selected a 
distinguished physicist from Princeton, Karl T. Compton, to become 
president and rebuild the sciences. Compton was President of MIT for 
eighteen years, until 1948. 
 
Lewis’s Methods and Style 
When G. N. Lewis (figure 9-3) arrived at Berkeley in 1912, he 
started a deanship of the College of Chemistry that lasted virtually 
continuously for thirty years until 1941. That deanship was much more 
a role of strong intellectual leader than the administrative role of which 
that one would think today. 
Intellectual leadership was manifest in Lewis’s approaches to 
research, building the faculty, and encouraging research and 
interactions of ideas among his colleagues. Administration was done 
through a very capable assistant, Mabel Kittredge (later Wilson), who 
literally would come to Lewis’s side as he stood in the laboratory or in 
another conversation, tell him what needed to be done or decided, and 
either await his decision or be told to come back later after Lewis had 
                                                     
34 Weber, 1980, loc. cit. 
35 Judith R. Goodstein, Millikan’s School: A History of the California Institute of Technology (New 
York: W. W. Norton, 1991). 
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been able to think about the matter.36 This form of multitasking 
sometimes led to important matters falling between the cracks. For 
example, Jolly notes that Berkeley lost Linus Pauling as a potential 





Lewis himself did not teach undergraduate courses. He also saw to 
it that there were no graduate-level courses, per se, in chemistry, 
although there were a few senior-level undergraduate honors courses 
that were, in fact, mostly taken by graduate students.38 Lewis believed 
that graduate education was best accomplished and creativity fostered 
through the intensive interactions of doing research and in research 
discussions without the distraction of courses. 
The main event of the week and Lewis’s only real personal 
teaching activity was the research conference, described by Jolly,39 
                                                     
36 Jolly, 1987, op. cit., p. 60. 
37 Jolly, 1987, loc. cit. 
38 Kenneth S. Pitzer, interview by Sally Smith Hughes and Germaine LaBerge, Kenneth Sanborn 
Pitzer: Chemist and Administrator at UC Berkeley, Rice University, Stanford University, and the 
Atomic Energy Commission, 1935–1997, pp. 51–52, oral history, Regional Oral History Office, 
University of California, Berkeley, 1999, 
http://content.cdlib.org/view?docId=kt3s20030f&query=&brand=calisphere.   
39 Jolly, 1987, op. cit., pp. 62–63. 
Figure 9-3. Gilbert Newton Lewis, 
1925 (courtesy College of Chemistry 






Hildebrand,40 Pitzer,41 and Coffey.42 There were two components to the 
research conference—a review by a graduate student of a published 
paper and then a presentation by a faculty member, postdoc, or 
advanced graduate student of a paper nearly ready for publication. 
Lewis led the discussion and asked intensely penetrating questions. In 
the research laboratory and in encounters around Gilman Hall as well, 
Lewis also invited and stimulated debate on research matters.43 New 
ideas, cross-fertilization, and challenges abounded. Thus, graduate 
education was accomplished in the real world of continual awareness 
of, and wrestling with, current research issues. 
Interestingly, Lewis himself did not supervise many research 
students. However, he often had a personal research assistant to 
whom he would assign research. Among these, over the years, were 
Melvin Calvin, Glenn Seaborg (two future Nobelists), Merle Randall, 
Samuel Ruben (a near Nobelist), and Philip Schutz, who later was hired 
to bring chemical engineering to Berkeley. 
Lewis personally built chemistry at Berkeley around his own 
widespread interests generally focused upon physical chemistry, a field 
that was in an era of rapid expansion of knowledge.44 He seems to have 
had his design for Berkeley chemistry in mind when he arrived in 1912. 
From the Research Laboratory of Physical Chemistry at MIT, he brought 
with him William Bray and Richard Tolman (later with a very 
distinguished career at Caltech) as assistant professors and Merle 
Randall as a personal research assistant.45 The preexisting professorial 
faculty members at Berkeley were encouraged to depart, or they 
assumed subsidiary roles, except for O’Neill, who ably aided Lewis in 
administration of the department as director of the chemical 
laboratories.46 In the year following his arrival at Berkeley, Lewis hired 
                                                     
40 Joel H. Hildebrand, “Gilbert Newton Lewis, 1975–1946: A Biographical Memoir,” National 
Academy of Sciences Biographical Memoirs, vol. 31, pp. 225–235, 1958; https://perma.cc/2VPH-
H6GC. 
41 Pitzer, 1999, op. cit., pp. 48–50. 
42 Patrick Coffey, Cathedrals of Science: The Personalities and Rivalries That Made Modern 
Chemistry (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 124–125. 
43 Pitzer, 1999, op. cit., p. 50. 
44 Coffey, 2008, loc. cit., gives a description of the main actors of the day and the synergies and 
rivalries among them. 
45 Jolly, 1987, op. cit., p. 54. 
46 Jolly, 1987, op. cit., p. 28. 
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Hildebrand48, 49 (figure 9-4) put his own stamp on the college in 
concert with Lewis. In addition to being an accomplished researcher in 
his own right, Hildebrand authored an extremely successful and long-
used freshman textbook, Principles of Chemistry (seven editions, 1918 
through 1964), was a classroom teacher extraordinaire who taught an 
estimated forty-thousand-plus students in freshman chemistry in 
memorable style,50 was a prime actor in the Academic Senate, and held 
a variety of administrative posts, including being a dean three times 
(twice for chemistry during absences of Lewis and once for letters and 
science) “for periods as short as I could decently make them.”51 He also 
had wider interests, having been president of the Sierra Club (1937–40) 
and manager of the 1936 US Olympic skiing team.52 , 53  With his 
daughter, he coauthored a widely used book54 on camp cooking.  He 
was a prime contributor, as were two of his sons, to a how-to book on 
mountain travel.55  Hildebrand was a nearly perfect complement to 
Lewis in the building of the chemistry program. 
How Hildebrand was found and recruited is revealing. Apparently 
Bray had heard a paper that Hildebrand presented before the American  
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Chemical Society in 1912 and was favorably impressed. Frederick 
Cottrell, no longer on the faculty but in continued close contact with 
Lewis, was then asked by Lewis to pay a visit to Hildebrand at the 
University of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia so as to size him up further. 
Cottrell did so and returned a favorable report.56, 57 Hildebrand was 
then invited to come to Berkeley for a visit in March 1913 “to inspect 
and be inspected,”58  greatly liked what he found there, made a 
continued strong and positive impression on Lewis, and received an 
offer of an assistant professorship at an annual salary of $2,000 per 
year. He turned down a competing offer of $3,500 from the National 
Bureau of Standards and accepted Berkeley. 
 
 
Hildebrand’s rationale for coming to Berkeley is also pertinent to 
the story. At Penn he had taught eighteen hours per week59 and was 
not allowed to supervise research students of his own. The research 
conference at Penn, such as it was, was conducted by a professor who 
did no research.60 Hildebrand wrote, “Arriving in Berkeley, I felt like I 
had escaped from a dungeon into sunshine.”61 
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Figure 9-4. Joel H. Hildebrand, 1924 
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Further Building of the Faculty 
Lewis then grew the faculty of the chemistry department by a 
form of inbreeding that was eminently successful at the time but would 
no longer be looked upon with favor in the United States. After 1913, 
all new faculty appointments were filled with Berkeley graduates until 
the appointment of Melvin Calvin as instructor in 1937. Many of the 
hires from within during that period proved to be outstanding (e.g., 
Gerald Branch, Wendell Latimer, William Giauque, Willard Libby, and 
Kenneth Pitzer), for all of whom Jolly62 provides brief biographies. 
Although Gerald Branch was in a sense a theoretical organic chemist, 
his interests were close to those of Lewis and on the border with 
physical chemistry. There was no other organic chemistry and, in line 
with Lewis’s experiences at MIT, no applied chemistry, analytical 
chemistry, or chemical engineering. 
 
Nobel Prizes 
Remarkably, the research atmosphere during Lewis’s time 
produced six recipents of the Nobel Prize, a feat that has not been 
duplicated. Those six were the following (all in Chemistry): 
 1934: Harold Urey (Berkeley PhD, 1923 with Lewis), “for his 
discovery of heavy hydrogen (deuterium)”; work done 
subsequently at Columbia 
 1949: William Giauque (Berkeley PhD, 1922 with Gibson), “for his 
contributions in thermodynamics, particularly concerning the 
behavior of substances at extremely low temperatures”; work done 
at Berkeley 
 1951: Glenn Seaborg (Berkeley PhD, 1937 with Gibson; research 
assistant with Lewis), “for his discoveries with Edwin McMillan in 
the chemistry of trans-uranium elements”; work done at Berkeley 
 1960: Willard Libby (Berkeley PhD, 1933 with Latimer), “for his 
method to use carbon-14 for age determination in archaeology, 
geology, geophysics, and other branches of science”; work done 
subsequently at University of Chicago 
 1961: Melvin Calvin (UC Berkeley instructorship, 1937, carrying out 
research with Lewis, 1937 through about 1944, and then UC 
                                                     




Berkeley professorship; PhD at University of Minnesota), “for his 
research on carbon dioxide assimilation in plants”; work done at 
Berkeley 
 1983: Henry Taube (Berkeley PhD, 1940, with Bray), “for his work 
in the mechanisms of electron-transfer reactions, especially in 
metal complexes”; work done subsequently at Uiversity of Chicago 
In addition, Samuel Ruben, who died as the result of an unfortunate 
laboratory accident in 1943, would otherwise have been a strong 
contender for sharing the carbon-14 Nobel Prize with Libby, based 
upon his pioneering important work in that area with Kamen.63 
Lewis himself never received the Nobel Prize but was nominated 
and considered often. Coffey64 explores this matter in detail, reporting 
and speculating on the politics and rivalries that surrounded the issue. 
 
University Service 
Finally, it is worth noting that Lewis and his colleagues also had 
strong and very positive roles within faculty governance, thereby 
spreading their influence and affecting matters of academic quality at 
Berkeley in other ways. As was noted in chapter 7, Lewis had a prime 
role in stimulating the actions that led to the Berkeley Revolution 
establishing the role of the Academic Senate, and he led the committee 
that negotiated directly with the regents on behalf of the Academic 
Senate in 1919–20.65, 66 This was only six years after Lewis had come to 
Berkeley. Lewis also proposed, and succeeded in having set up, a 
faculty search and recruiting effort cutting across the university, which 
consisted of sending the best researchers to meetings of scholarly 
societies and to other universities seeking promising young prospects. 
Hildebrand was also very active in the Academic Senate in the 
crucial period of the Berkeley Revolution67 and throughout his long 
career. He chaired a special committee of the Academic Senate that 
took on the thorny problem of salary reductions in the Depression era 
of the early 1930s (chapter 2). As was described in chapter 6, he had a 
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key role in the decentralization of authority within the university that 
led ultimately to the creation in 1952 of chancellor positions for the 
individual campuses. Hildebrand was still a leader of the Academic 
Senate at the time of the loyalty oath crisis of the late 1950s and had a 
prominent and somewhat controversial role in the senate’s initial 
responses to it.68, 69, 70 
 
Post-Lewis 
 After Lewis was required to step down as dean in 1941 because 
he had reached age sixty-five, Wendell Latimer became dean. Lewis 
died in 1946 in a laboratory accident. With the transition in authority, 
several substantial changes came about. One was that faculty hiring 
moved beyond Berkeley and became largely extramural. Second, 
Latimer expanded the disciplinary coverage of the college and moved 
hiring into two fields not previously well represented on the faculty—
organic chemistry and chemical engineering. The method of selecting 
faculty to be hired continued to be personal evaluations by one or 
relatively few people. Kenneth Pitzer, who was dean from 1951 to 
1960, described the method in his oral history.71 Essentially, Pitzer 
would rely on his own judgment or that of a trusted colleague, typically 
Robert Connick for chemistry and Charles Wilke for chemical 
engineering. Their judgments would be based on personal contacts 
with the individual and recommendations from people whose acumen 
they respected. This worked very well for the development of organic 
chemistry and chemical engineering in particular, but would not stand 
scrutiny today because of the lack of opportunity for equal inputs from 
the rest of the faculty and the lack of a widespread search. 
 
Chemical Engineering 
Despite Lewis’s disinterest in the field as a discipline within itself, 
there had been some earlier elements of applied chemistry or chemical 
engineering in the College of Chemistry dating all the way back to 
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Frederick Cottrell, who was followed with applied and engineering 
interests by Randall and Giauque. However, their activities were 
specific to particular areas of research rather than in the discipline per 
se or in providing degrees within the field. As one of the two areas 
started in earnest by Latimer and the college after the death of Lewis, 
chemical engineering was launched within the College of Chemistry as 
a full-fledged program at Berkeley as of 1946. In Lewis-like fashion, 
Philip Schutz, who had been research assistant with Lewis, had 
obtained his PhD with Latimer, and then had helped start chemical 
engineering at Columbia University, was hired to guide the 
development of the program; however, Shutz tragically died in 1947. 
The other five founding members of what became the Department of 
Chemical Engineering were hired by Latimer and Pitzer, following the 
methodology just described. Subsequent faculty recruitments were 
made in the same personal way by Charles Wilke, one of the five, after 
he became division head in 1953 and then department chair in 1957. 
Interestingly, even though there had been a College of Engineering 
going back to 1931, with roots in three colleges (Mining, Mechanical 
Arts, and Civil Engineering) going back to the start of the university, 
there had been no serious effort to start chemical engineering in that 
college before World War II. An interdepartmental Graduate Group in 
Chemical Engineering was formed in 1942 and could give the master of 
science degree in chemical engineering, but fell into contention 
between the College of Chemistry and the College of Engineering over 
issues of domain. In 1945 Provost Monroe Deutsch relayed an 
administrative decision, involving shared governance, to place chemical 
engineering within the College of Chemistry. Subsequent negotiations 
dealt with splitting the subject matter, placing those subjects shared 
with mechanical engineering (e.g., heat transfer and fluid dynamics) 
into the College of Engineering under the name process engineering 
and the remainder of the curriculum under the name chemical 
engineering into the College of Chemistry. This history is summarized 
by Jolly72 and Lostuvali.73 The Dean of the College of Engineering, 
Morrough (Mike) O’Brien, went ahead with process engineering as a 
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degree curriculum within the College of Engineering, as did the College 
of Chemistry with chemical engineering. These two programs existed in 
parallel and competition, and for a time (1949–51), both had 
accreditation from the American Institute of Chemical Engineers. 
In 1954 chancellor Clark Kerr set up a committee to adjudicate the 
conflict and, following their recommendation, chartered the program 
in the College of Chemistry to continue as the official and accredited 
program, while Mechanical Engineering could continue to teach 
courses emphasizing the mechanical engineering aspects of process 
engineering. Process engineering then withered away within the 
College of Engineering. 
Why was that decision made in favor of the College of Chemistry? 
In his memoirs74 Clark Kerr observed, “He [O’Brien] was, however, very 
unhappy that I had decided to leave chemical engineering in the 
College of Chemistry where it had an outstanding record and where its 
faculty members were very satisfied. A hot dispute, but Mike 
reluctantly accepted my decision.”  
In his oral history, Pitzer75 observes, “By that time, our chemical 
engineers had made quite a name for themselves nationally, and the 
people that were appointed under the term ‘process engineering’ had 
essentially done their job locally but didn’t have a national reputation. 
So they were allowed to serve out their careers in the Department of 
Mechanical Engineering. The Department of Mechanical Engineering 
has various sub-groups in it, so that they were not completely out of 
place there. But that’s all developed very successfully, and in the last 
national survey,76 our chemical engineering was number three in the 
country.” In fact, Chemical Engineering was rated number five in the 
country in the first such survey, carried out in 1966 for the American 
Council on Education,77 just twenty years after its start—a substantial 
credit to the hiring and start-up practices of the College of Chemistry. 
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Jolly78 notes some other factors that may have contributed to the 
decision to sustain chemical engineering within the College of 
Chemistry. The program there attracted substantially more students 
than did the one in the College of Engineering; it had teaching 
assistantships in freshman chemistry available for the support of 
incoming graduate students; and it had a block-grant program for 
chemical engineering set up within the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, 
administered by Wilke for start-up of the research of new faculty 
members. That block grant program was very helpful at the start, and 
lasted into the mid-1960s.   
 
Why a Separate College? 
It is also striking that the College of Chemistry has remained in 
place as the structure over time, whereas there is no other College of 
Chemistry, per se, in the United States, and nearly everywhere 
chemistry is part of a college of arts and sciences or simply a college of 
sciences, and chemical engineering is part of a college of engineering. 
That fact begs the question “Why?” The short answer is that the 
College of Chemistry was created by the legislature at the request of 
President Gilman in 1872,79 and it never changed. Chemical engineering 
was originally placed with chemistry at the University of Illinois at 
Urbana-Champaign and still is part of a Division of Chemistry and 
Chemical Engineering at Caltech, but there is no other structure at a 
university in the United States putting the two disciplines together into 
an actual college. Although the separate college, having the same 
status as the College of Letters and Science and the College of 
Engineering, can be regarded superficially as administrative 
inefficiency, it affords the College of Chemistry a unique ability to 
govern and control its own affairs. In reviewing the advantages of this 
situation, Pitzer 80  observed, “Over the long period of time…[this 
structure has] helped Chemistry; the College of Chemistry has 
prospered. One of the things that Hildebrand used to say, and I’ve said 
many times, is that it’s very important that we continue to manage our 
own affairs so that we don’t cause any problems elsewhere on the 
                                                     
78 Jolly, 1987, op. cit., pp. 200–201. 
79 Jolly, 1987, op. cit., p. 19. 
80 Pitzer, 1999, op. cit., pp. 56–57. 
Creating Research Excellence: Physical Sciences at Berkeley 
269 
 
campus. Then we can always use that argument, as I’ve said before, ‘If 
it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.’” It hasn’t been, and is unlikely to be, “fixed.” 
As part of an abortive, top-down academic reorganization effort of 
2015–16, a number of restructuring proposals were placed on the table 
by a relatively new campus administration in which the chancellor and 
provost both came from careers elsewhere. One of these proposals 
was to eliminate the College of Chemistry, probably by placing the 
Department of Chemistry with the Division of Physical Sciences within 
the College of Letters and Science and the Department of Chemical 
(now Chemical and Biomolecular) Engineering with the College of 
Engineering. This proposition received attention in the press and led to 
a student-generated online petition81 in opposition to the proposal 
which drew forty-five hundred signatures within ten days. The proposal 
was withdrawn by the administration when it became apparent that 
the proposal did not meet any academic needs and would do little, if 
anything, to improve the budget situation of the Berkeley campus.82 
 
 
PHYSICS, RAYMOND BIRGE, ERNEST LAWRENCE, AND THE LAWRENCE 
BERKELEY LABORATORY 
 
Despite a history tracing back to John LeConte, one of the first 
faculty members and an early president of the university, physics at 
Berkeley in the early 1900s was a relatively ordinary department with 
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distinguished research not having yet flowered. Research eminence 
developed following the appointments of Raymond T. Birge (figure 9-5) 
and Leonard Loeb. 
 
Raymond Birge 
Birge, who was appointed as instructor in 1918, became the first 
member of the National Academy of Sciences from Berkeley physics 
(1932) and showed strong management and leadership ability as chair 
of the Physics Department from 1932 to 1955. One manifestation of 
Birge’s accomplishments in building and leading physics at Berkeley is 
that by the time of his death in 1980, the Berkeley Department of 
Physics had moved to a position where it had more members in the 
National Academy of Sciences than any other university physics 
department in the United States. 
Birge’s life, research, and administrative and leadership abilities 
are well documented by Helmholz,83 in Birge’s own oral history,84 in a 
dissertation by Seidel,85 and even in a thorough and detailed history86 
of the Berkeley Department of Physics that Birge himself wrote. The 
latter work covers the period from 1868 up to 1932, when Birge 
became department chair.  
Finding Birge and getting him to accept a faculty position were not 
challenges. He had been at Syracuse University for five years, serving as 
instructor and then assistant professor, after his graduation with a PhD 
from the University of Wisconsin. He had not found the atmosphere at 
Syracuse to be sufficiently stimulating intellectually, and so he applied 
for one of two open instructor positions at Berkeley. Recognizing the 
attraction of Birge as an established researcher in his own field of 
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Berkeley Physics Department, upgraded the salary of one of the 
positions and offered it to Birge, who accepted and arrived in 1918. 
Thus both Birge in physics and Hildebrand in chemistry were attracted 
to Berkeley because they had reasons to believe that the world of 
research at Berkeley would be much more stimulating and offer more 




Figure 9-5. Raymond T. Birge at his desk, circa 192087  
 
Although G. N. Lewis had undertaken a number of actions to build 
research in physics, and perhaps also to extend the influence of 
chemistry over physics, 88  there had been very little interaction 
between the chemistry and physics departments before Birge’s arrival. 
In a very real sense, the two departments were competitors, with 
physics envying the status that had been given to chemistry through 
the conditions to which the university administration had agreed in the 
recruitment of Lewis. Birge overcame that barrier by choosing to 
attend the weekly research conference in chemistry held by G. N. 
Lewis.89 Lewis welcomed him and made what was probably his first 
entry into a physics building for many years in order to attend a 
seminar given by Birge on the determination of Planck’s constant.  
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Differing theories of the atom and discussion over them also provided 
an avenue for intellectual interactions between Birge and Lewis. The 
Bohr theory of the atom was relatively new, and Birge was a proponent 
of it. However, Lewis had his own cubic theory of the atom, which had 
been the subject of considerable controversy between Lewis and Irving 
Langmuir over credit for the origination of the model. 90  Birge 
considered one of his greatest accomplishments to have been 
eventually winning Lewis over on the subject of the Bohr atom.91, 92 
 
Leonard Loeb 
Leonard Loeb was hired by E. S. Lewis and Armin Leuschner in 
1923. He had been a Berkeley undergraduate student and was the son 
of a former head of the Department of Physiology there. After 
receiving his PhD at the University of Chicago with Robert Millikan, he 
had returned as a National Research Council Fellow to Chicago, where 
his research concerned electrical phenomena in gases. He saw the 
position at Berkeley as a way to participate centrally in the 
development of an outstanding physics department. 93  A factual 
summary of Loeb’s career is given by Birge.94 
Upon the death of E. S. Lewis in 1926, Armin Leuschner was asked 
by then-president Campbell to chair the search committee to find a 
new chair for the physics department, with the intention of hiring 
someone from outside who could build research further.95 G. N. Lewis 
was also a member of that committee.96 Following an effort to hire 
Arthur Compton97 of Washington University and subsequently the 
University of Chicago and a Nobelist (1926), Campbell then settled 
upon Professor Elmer E. Hall from within the department, who served 
as chairman until his death in 1932. At that point, Birge was the 
obvious choice and was chairman for the next twenty-three years. 
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During the period in which Hall was department chairman, Birge 
and Loeb handled matters of faculty recruitment because it was 
recognized that they were most intimately involved with the physics 
research arena and could best judge research. Hall, on the other hand, 
was near retirement and not current in research.98 Birge and Loeb 
settled upon a strategy of seeking promising researchers at earlier 
points in their careers when they were not yet embedded securely at 
their present institutions. One promising source was National Research 
Council fellows, who were drawn from among the top 5 percent of 
science PhDs.99 During this time and as a result of this strategy, the 
addition of Ernest O. Lawrence was made. 
 
Ernest O. Lawrence 
Lawrence had an enormous effect upon physics, upon the 
development of large-scale science at Berkeley and elsewhere, and on 
government support of science and science policy. Much has been 
written about him, and here I shall concentrate only upon the way in 
which he was attracted to Berkeley and retained in the face of outside 
offers, the ways in which he derived financial support for his research, 
and the ways in which the university and others supported him in those 
endeavors. He was the quintessential self-initiator and driver. 
Lawrence had grown up in rural South Dakota and was drawn to 
physics research through his association as a student with W. F. G. 
Swann, a pioneer in cosmic-ray research. As Swann moved from the 
University of Minnesota to the University of Chicago and then on to 
Yale University, Lawrence followed him, obtaining his PhD with Swann 
at Yale in 1925. A year later, while Lawrence was still a National 
Research fellow at Yale, Loeb “found” him and was highly impressed. 100 
Birge and Hall agreed with Loeb that they should offer Lawrence a 
faculty position at the higher of what were then the two steps of 
assistant professor (see chapter 11 for the step system). Yale countered 
with an offer of an assistant professor position, and Lawrence then 
chose to accept the Yale offer, probably on the bases of Yale’s prestige 
and Swann still being at Yale. Birge and his entire family (wife and 
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three- and five-year old children) then visited Lawrence in New 
Haven,101 and Birge was similarly impressed firsthand. At the initiative 
of Loeb and Birge, Berkeley then decided to offer Lawrence an 
associate professor position, something most unusual for someone at 
such an early career stage. This set off a large effort to convince 
Lawrence to accept. The written correspondence between Birge and 
Lawrence, which is quite extensive, is given in full by Birge102 and is 
summarized by Heilbron and Seidel.103 The salary offered was increased 
substantially during the recruitment. Key factors in Lawrence’s decision 
to come to Berkeley were Yale’s reluctance to provide an associate 
professor position so early in his career; the opportunities to supervise 
graduate students in research and teach graduate-level courses, which 
were not yet open to him at Yale; and his perceptions of the 
atmosphere and upward vector of the Berkeley department. 
Only six months after arriving in Berkeley, Lawrence conceived the 
principle of the cyclotron, upon which he built his scientific career. The 
cyclotron was an original invention, building upon the idea of 
Norwegian physicist Rolf Wideröe that ions can be accelerated in a 
straight line through a linear series of charged electrical gaps. 
Lawrence’s essential invention was that the same thing could be 
accomplished in a much more compact form by using magnetic fields 
to create a circular path in which charged particles would pass 
repeatedly through such gaps. The compact circular path could then be 
the equivalent of an extremely long ion accelerator. Lawrence 
recognized that with the right design, it should be possible to reach 
very high energies for the particles, thereby greatly increasing the 
ability of experimenters to bring about reactions within atomic nuclei. 
The sketch of the operating principle from the original patent 
application is shown in figure 9-6. Heilbron and Seidel104 describe the 
physics involved in more detail and analyze the scientific advances as 
Lawrence developed the concept further and implemented and tested 
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it over the years in successively larger devices. Hiltzik105 describes the 




Figure 9-6. Sketch of the operating principle of the cyclotron,  
from the original patent application106 
 
Upon arrival in Berkeley in 1928, Lawrence lived at the Faculty 
Club on campus, as did Gilbert Lewis at the time. The two became well 
acquainted and traded thoughts in discussion over nightly dinners 
there.107 Thereby Lewis became familiar with Lawrence’s interests and 
became a strong supporter of him. The two were also occasional 
collaborators, most notably on research relating to heavy water and 
the deuteron, which went too rapidly down a path that proved to be 
erroneous.108, 109 
Lawrence’s cyclotrons, with their very large magnets, high voltage 
requirements, and needs for skilled and capable staffing were 
expensive. It is therefore instructive to examine how Lawrence got his 
money in the 1930s, which was before the era of big support of science 
by the US government. His entrepreneurial methods utilized a wide 
variety of sources, most of which were private foundations.110 The 
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staffing for the cyclotron project grew from ten people to fifty-six 
between 1932–33 and 1939–40. 111  In line with the purposes of 
Leuschner’s Board of Research, Lawrence’s first funding came from 
that board.112 Lawrence also made effective use of coworkers funded 
by a variety of extramural means. For example, in 1937 there were 
seventeen postdoctoral fellows in physics on his staff, but he paid the 
salaries of only two of them from his own funds. The others were 
sustained on stipends from external entities such as the National 
Research Council and the Rockefeller Foundation. 113  Lawrence’s 
laboratory was innovative in another way, by bringing together teams 
of researchers from several different disciplines to address complicated 
issues. In this way he was a pioneer of University of California efforts to 
foster multidisciplinary research (chapter 14). 
Frederick Cottrell, the former Berkeley faculty member in 
chemistry who had invented the electrostatic precipitator, became 
both a supporter and an ambassador for Lawrence. Starting early on, 
Cottrell’s Research Corporation supported Lawrence’s research, and in 
return Lawrence (in the absence of any University of California patent 
policies) assigned the patents to the Research Corporation in the same 
way that Cottrell himself had done for the electrostatic precipitator. 
Cottrell was also the path to funding of Lawrence’s research by the 
Chemical Foundation, which had been set up in 1918 by the US 
government to administer five thousand German patents that had 
been appropriated at the end of World War I. 
Still later (1935–36) Lawrence obtained funding from the Josiah 
Macy, Jr. Foundation to initiate work relating to the use of radiation in 
medicine. Over his career, Lawrence recognized the value of research 
on medical applications of the cyclotron as an effective lure to obtain 
financial support from foundations with medical interests. That goal 
meshed well with the fact that Lawrence’s younger brother, John 
Lawrence, was a medical researcher with interest in using high-energy 
beams for treatment of conditions such as cancers. John Lawrence 
joined Ernest Lawrence’s team in 1937, spearheaded the Donner 
Laboratory which opened in 1942 on the Berkeley campus, was a 
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founder of the Medical Physics Program at Berkeley in 1947, had a 
significant research career of his own, and eventually was one of the 
few faculty members of the university ever to move on to become a 
regent of the University of California, 1970–83.114 
Then, in 1937, as Ernest Lawrence moved toward his ultimate 
184–inch cyclotron, he obtained support in the amount of $1.15 million 
from the Rockefeller Foundation, an amount far greater than any of his 
other grants and extremely large by the standards of the time.115 In 
1939, Lawrence also began a very productive relationship with Albert L. 
Loomis (figure 13-1), a wealthy investment banker who was also 
trained in mathematics and became a scientist through interest, 
collaboration, and an apprenticeship of sorts with the distinguished 
physicist Robert W. Wood of Johns Hopkins University. That connection 
led to large direct funding from Loomis for Lawrence’s work. It also led 
to the launching of the radar-development laboratory at MIT, which 
was spurred by Lawrence and Loomis and deceptively given the name 
Radiation Laboratory, the same name as that of Lawrence’s laboratory 
at Berkeley, for purposes of wartime secrecy. The career of Loomis and 
the interactions between Lawrence and Loomis are engagingly 
described by Conant.116 Lawrence’s relationship with Loomis is further 
described by Hiltzik.117 Lawrence also obtained some funding for staff 
support from the Works Progress Administration of the US government 
and other Depression-relief agencies that were active as the Great 
Depression proceeded during the 1930s. 
As the cyclotrons became larger and staff for the laboratory grew, 
space, location, and the status of Lawrence’s laboratory were ever-
present issues. As his space needs outgrew those in LeConte Hall, 
where physics was housed, Lawrence was assigned the Civil 
Engineering Test Laboratory, a wooden building nearby located just 
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north of chemistry’s Gilman Hall. This building received the name 
“Radiation Laboratory” from the regents in 1932.118 The much larger 
Crocker Radiation Laboratory was built nearby for medical physics, 
1936–39, through a gift from William Crocker, a regent of the 
university.119  
With the new Rockefeller Foundation grant for the 184-inch 
cyclotron, the sheer physical size of the operation required space off 
the main campus, and with that the laboratory and its new cyclotron 
moved to Charter Hill behind the Berkeley campus, where it remains 
today. The World War II activities of the laboratory, its conversion to a 
national laboratory, its development of other fields of scientific and 
engineering activities, and its relationship and synergies with the 
Berkeley campus are taken up in chapter 13. 
 As the success and fame of Lawrence and his activities grew, other 
universities, of course, tried to recruit him away from Berkeley. The 
first such attempt came early on from Northwestern University in 1930. 
With advice and urging from G. N. Lewis,120 Leuschner and then-
president Robert Sproul shepherded the process by which Lawrence 
was retained, in large part through promotion to full professor at the 
tender age of twenty-nine and with a substantial increase in salary. So 
as to assure a favorable outcome in the promotion review process, 
Sproul appointed a group composed entirely of very distinguished 
science faculty members, including G. N. Lewis as chair, to be the 
faculty ad hoc committee that would review the case. Because of the 
prestige of those on the committee, more traditional faculty members 
who would object to such a promotion and salary for such a young 
individual were, in effect, silenced.121 
The most serious threat came from Harvard in 1936, with 
Lawrence still at the comparatively young age of thirty-five. Harvard, 
whose president at that time was chemist James B. Conant, boldly 
struck out to hire Lawrence as dean of engineering and applied science, 
and along with him, Edward McMillan122 and Robert Oppenheimer. 
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122 Lawrence’s physics colleague and successor as director of the laboratory (see chapter 13), as 
well as a future Nobelist. Lawrence and McMillan married sisters from New Haven, CT. 
Creating Research Excellence: Physical Sciences at Berkeley 
279 
 
Despite the fact the university’s budget was under severe stress as the 
Depression continued, Sproul pulled out the stops and responded by 
offering independent identity for the Radiation Laboratory, substantial 
monies for the operating budget of the laboratory, and a promise to 
work with Lawrence in obtaining the funds and facilities (which became 
the Crocker Laboratory) for Lawrence’s nascent program in medical 
physics. 123 , 124  Birge 125  noted that he and Oppenheimer worked 
continually to convince Lawrence to stay and concluded that the 
ultimate deciding factor was the fact that it would have taken several 
years of construction and acquisitions to duplicate at Harvard the 
facilities that Lawrence had already at Berkeley and that the pace of 
Lawrence’s research could not afford that delay. Lawrence stayed at 
Berkeley.126 
Finally, in 1939 the University of Texas made a strong play for 
Lawrence to become a vice president of the university and lead a 
movement of that university, backed by its oil money, into the first 
ranks of academic science. Sproul again moved energetically and 
promptly. From this retention came matching monies and work by 
Sproul himself in synergy with Lawrence toward the large grant from 
the Rockefeller Foundation and the designation of Charter Hill as the 




After Lawrence, the Berkeley Department of Physics made a 
number of outstanding hires, probably the best known of which was 
Robert Oppenheimer. 127, 128, 129 Oppenheimer came in 1929, splitting 
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his time between Berkeley and Caltech. He was the department’s first 
exclusively theoretical physicist, developed a strong reputation, and 
became close to Lawrence. Lawrence had a major role in the selection 
of Oppenheimer to lead the scientific aspects of the Manhattan 
Project, as described in chapter 13. Birge130 recounts many interesting 
aspects of Oppenheimer’s academic life. Herken131 explores the lives of 




Figure 9-7. Oppenheimer (left), Seaborg (center), and Lawrence  




Lawrence received the Nobel Prize in Physics for 1939, the first 
Berkeley faculty member to do so. The list of Nobelists associated with 
Berkeley physics is comparably impressive to the above list of those 
                                                                                                                     
129 Jennet Conant, 109 East Palace: Robert Oppenheimer and the Secret City of Los Alamos (New 
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from Berkeley Chemistry.133 All prizes are in physics, except that for 
McMillan, which is in chemistry. The list through the Lawrence era 
includes the following persons: 
 1939: Ernest Lawrence (Berkeley faculty member), “for the 
invention and development of the cyclotron and for results 
obtained with it, especially with regard to artificial radioactive 
elements”; work done at Berkeley and Radiation Laboratory 
 1951: Edwin McMillan (Berkeley faculty member), “for discoveries 
(with Seaborg) in the chemistry of the trans-uranium elements”; 
work done at Berkeley and Radiation Laboratory 
 1959: Emilio Segré and Owen Chamberlain (Berkeley faculty 
members), “for their discovery of the antiproton”; work done at 
Radiation Laboratory in Berkeley 
 1960: Donald Glaser (Radiation Laboratory and later Berkeley 
faculty member), “for the invention of the bubble chamber”; work 
largely done earlier at University of Michigan 
 1964: Charles Townes (Berkeley faculty member), “for 
fundamental work in the field of quantum electronics, which has 
led to the construction of oscillators and amplifiers based on the 
maser-laser principle”; work done earlier at Bell Labs and Columbia 
 1968: Luis Alvarez (Berkeley faculty member), “for his decisive 
contributions to elementary particle physics, in particular the 
discovery of a large number of resonance states, made possible 
through his development of the technique of using hydrogen 
bubble chamber and data analysis”; work done at Radiation 
Laboratory and Berkeley 
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Figure 9-8. A 1960 photo of seven Berkeley/LBL Nobelists in front of the thirty-
seven-inch cyclotron magnet in front of the new Lawrence Hall of Science. 
Left to right: Chamberlain, McMillan, Segré, Calvin, Glaser, Alvarez, Seaborg.134 
 
 
MATHEMATICS AND GRIFFITH EVANS 
 
Major, uprooting actions were taken to upgrade the Department 
of Mathematics on two occasions. The situations and the steps taken 
are described by Calvin Moore in his history of the Berkeley 
Mathematics Department.135 
The original professor of mathematics for the university had been 
William Welcker, a graduate of the US Military Academy at West Point, 
who instituted basic courses in mathematics, but without advanced 
mathematics or research. After the departure of Daniel Coit Gilman as 
                                                     
134 https://perma.cc/8G3U-SHZT (Courtesy of Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, 
© 2010 The Regents of the University of California, through the Lawrence Berkeley National 
Laboratory.) 
135 Calvin C. Moore, Mathematics at Berkeley: A History (Wellesley, MA: AK Peters, 2007). 
Creating Research Excellence: Physical Sciences at Berkeley 
283 
 
president in 1875, the UC Regents sensed that the university was 
drifting academically and in 1880–81 created a Committee on 
Instruction and Visitation composed of regents chartered to dig into 
the leadership, management, academic structure, and curriculum of 
the university, and to recommend needed steps. The report, 
reproduced in its entirety by Moore136 was far-reaching, quite critical, 
and highly specific. It included a recommendation for the removal of 
the president (John LeConte) and the separation of the Office of the 
President from professorial functions. This committee targeted 
mathematics as well and recommended the dismissal of Welcker, 
apparently linking that step with a finding that “in some of the 
departments outgrown methods are still adhered to.” After substantial 
discussion the regents voted 11–6 to dismiss Welcker. 
Paralleling what had been done earlier by Erza Carr (chapter 2), in 
the year (1882) following his dismissal, Welcker ran for the office of 
superintendent of public instruction in California. After winning that 
election, he became a regent ex officio, and through that post 
eventually succeeded in having the regents eliminate the Committee 
on Instruction and Visitation that had initiated his dismissal.137 
The report, the dismissals, and the entire process are prime 
examples of the very strong role of the regents in the early years and 
the lack of organized faculty roles. As well, they may also reflect at 
least some intrusion of politics. The regents who had created the 
Committee on Instruction and Visitation were mostly Republicans, and 
LeConte and Welcker were Democrats. 
The Committee on Instruction and Visitation conducted the search 
for a replacement for Welcker. (This again underscores the lack of 
established roles at the time for faculty in academic appointments.) 
Irving Stringham was strongly recommended by former UC president 
Daniel Coit Gilman, who was by then the founding president of Johns 
Hopkins University, where Stringham had obtained his PhD. Stringham 
was also endorsed by President Charles Eliot and Professor Benjamin 
Pierce of Harvard, where he had done his undergraduate work in 
mathematics under Pierce. Stringham had just completed two years of 
                                                     
136 Moore, 2007, op. cit., appendix 2, pp. 316–319. 




postdoctoral work at Leipzig, as well. He was hired. Stringham 
effectively modernized the curriculum and created advanced studies, 
but, while remaining highly respected within the field, did not do much 
research himself. Instead, he moved to academic administration. 
Stringham held decanal positions of several kinds, starting in 1886. 
As noted above, he was dean of both the College of Letters and the 
Colleges of Science for many years and then Dean of the Faculties 
under President Wheeler. This was a position with functions similar to 
those of a provost today and a precursor to the Dean of the Graduate 
Division position held later by Leuschner. It was Stringham who 
recognized and hired Leuschner as an instructor in Mathematics.138 
Fifty years after the crisis of 1881, it was again concluded that 
mathematics at Berkeley was much in need of reinvigoration and new 
leadership. But the way in which it happened and what was done about 
it stand in marked contrast to the regents-dominated process of 1881, 
reflecting the 1919 Berkeley Revolution which established the roles of 
the Academic Senate, as well as the arrival of figures such as 
Leuschner, Lewis, Hildebrand, and Birge. The process is again described 
by Moore.139 In 1927 a consensus grew among the faculty, primarily in 
physical sciences, that the mathematics department was insufficiently 
distinguished and did not effectively serve the needs of the physical 
sciences, which were then developing much more of a mathematical 
basis. The mathematics department had stagnated in part as a result of 
inbreeding (i.e., hiring its own graduates as faculty members).140 The 
conclusion was that an outstanding new professor of mathematics was 
needed to lead the renaissance of the program.  
The Committee on Budget and Interdepartmental Relations of the 
Academic Senate created an ad hoc Committee on a Professorship of 
Mathematics. Two members were drawn from the mathematics 
department and three, including G. N. Lewis and Armin Leuschner, 
from outside that department. This committee settled upon Griffith 
Evans, who had joined Rice Institute (now Rice University) in 1912 as its 
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first faculty member, declining offers from Yale, MIT, and the University 
of California. Evans declined the Berkeley offer because of his 
continuing strong feelings for Rice. He had also declined a 1925 offer 
from Harvard following the same rationale. 
As the stock market crash (1929) and Depression came along, 
nothing further was done about mathematics at Berkeley until 1932, 
when the existing department chair reached retirement age. The new 
Berkeley provost, Monroe Deutsch, doubtless relying upon input from 
senior physical sciences faculty members, convinced the new 
president, Robert Sproul, that something must be done to invigorate 
the Department of Mathematics. Sproul concurred, and Deutsch asked 
the Academic Senate Committee on Budget and Interdepartmental 
Relations to propose a committee for an intensive study of the 
department and its needs. Members named by the Budget Committee 
were once again Gilbert Lewis as chair, along with Birge, Leuschner, 
Hildebrand, and two members of the engineering faculty, Charles 
Derleth and Baldwin Woods.141 The committee’s recommendations 
were drastic, including terminations of existing nontenured faculty 
members, a search for a new chair from outside, and a proposal that 
Hildebrand be tasked with visiting leading institutions elsewhere in the 
United States to search for both the new chair and new faculty 
members. The recommendations were accepted by the administration. 
Hildebrand, who describes his role in his oral history,142 returned from 
his extensive tour of other universities with the renewed 
recommendation that Griffith Evans (who was now much less 
enamored of Rice and therefore more interested) be appointed 
professor and chair, and with a list of other persons who should be 
considered for appointment. 
Evans was pursued, and, after communication back and forth on 
salary,143  which could be vulnerable during the Depression years, 
accepted and came to Berkeley in July 1934. Hildebrand’s very positive 
evaluation of him was verified when Evans was elected to the National 
Academy of Sciences in 1933, as the negotiations with Berkeley were 
proceeding. There was an interim year before the actual arrival of 
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Evans, and for that time Hildebrand was formally designated by the 
administration as advisor to the acting chairman—that is, to stay in 
contact with Evans so that Hildebrand would know Evans’ desires and 





Figure 9-9. Evans Hall, named for Griffith Evans, frames the Berkeley campus 
campanile in this photograph144 
 
 
Griffith Evans chaired Mathematics at Berkeley from 1934 through 
1949. Brief biographies of him are available as a National Academy of 
Sciences biographical memoir145 and a short memorial piece written by 
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Berkeley colleagues.146 He systematically built the department into its 
present preeminent status.147 Working with the list that Hildebrand 
brought back from his travels on behalf of the committee and other 
contacts, Evans oversaw twenty-one appointments to the mathematics 
faculty during his fifteen years as department chair. Among his most 
notable hires was Jerzy Neyman, who built statistics, which eventually 
(and against Evans’s desires) became a separate department. It too is 
one of Berkeley’s outstanding fields. 
 
 
GEOLOGY AND GEOPHYSICS 
 
 In the case of the geological sciences, the richness of the geology 
of California itself was a large stimulating force, and the field grew up 
at Berkeley essentially independently from the other physical sciences. 
Geologic interests in California had been set in motion by the needs 
generated by the gold rush of 1849 and the associated great surges of 
settlement, population, and interest in natural resources. These 
concerns set in motion the California Geological Survey of 1860 to 1864 
(figure 9-10), known more familiarly as the Whitney survey after its 
leader, Josiah D. Whitney, who had been appointed state geologist. The 
field leader of that survey was William H. Brewer, who recorded many 
of the events in a well-read book still available today.148 Some of the 
other members of the survey were Clarence King,149 a future head of 
the US Geological Survey; William Gabb,150 who became a noted 
paleontologist and member of the National Academy of Sciences; and 
William Ashburner, who was subsequently associated with the  
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Press, 2003). 
149 Robert Wilson, The Explorer King: Adventure, Science, and the Great Diamond Hoax—Clarence 
King in the Old West, Scribner, New York, 2006). 
150 William H. Dahl, “William More Gabb, 1839–1878,” Biographical Memoirs, National Academy of 




University of California as of 1874 as professor of mining engineering, 
then honorary professor, and then regent (1880–87),151 another of the 
few faculty members who have become regents. Extensive fossils and 
other geological material were collected by the survey and, through 
Gabb, became the founding collection for what is now the Museum of 





Figure 9-10. The California Geological Survey, December 1863: from left, 
Chester Averill, assistant; William M. Gabb, paleontologist; William Ashburner, 
field assistant; Josiah D. Whitney, State Geologist; Charles F. Hoffmann, 
topographer; Clarence King, geologist; and William H. Brewer, botanist. 
 
As noted in chapter 2, one of the founding faculty members of the 
University of California was geologist Joseph LeConte153, 154 (figure 9- 
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11), a charismatic and learned individual who was a well-known 
proponent of evolution, made early trips to Yosemite Valley, and was a 
cofounder and early director of the Sierra Club. He did much to raise 
interest in the scientific method, geology, evolution, and fieldwork. 
 
   
 
 
Figure 9-11. Joseph LeConte, 1875155 
 
 
Andrew Lawson,156 a native of Scotland, was appointed to the 
Berkeley faculty in 1890 at the invitation of Joseph LeConte as an 
assistant professor of mineralogy and geology. He was the first to 
identify the San Andreas Fault and wrote in 1908 what was at the time 
the definitive analytical report on the 1906 San Francisco earthquake. 
Seismology quite naturally became a major emphasis within Berkeley 
geology and geophysics, given California’s location astride several 
major faults. Lawson was also floor manager and strategist for the 
faculty in the Berkeley Revolution of 1919 (chapter 7). 
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Research and teaching at the highest level in paleontology were 
set in motion by the arrival on the faculty in 1894 of John C. Meriam,157 
who had been drawn to Berkeley as an undergraduate by LeConte’s 
textbook on geology and then had taken his PhD in Munich with noted 
paleontologist Karl Zittel. With the financial sponsorship of his patron, 
Annie Alexander,158 Meriam carried out landmark research including 
studies of the fossils from the La Brea Tar Pits in Los Angeles. 
Another prominent faculty member arriving shortly thereafter was 
George Louderback, geologist, mineralogist, and seismologist, who 
became an assistant professor in 1906.159 In addition to his teaching 
and scholarship, Louderback was also distinguished through his service 
to the university in important roles. He too was a member of the 
Academic Senate committee that met with the regents in 1919–20 to 
establish the present roles of the Academic Senate. He was Dean of the 
College of Letters and Science for two periods, 1920–22 and 1930–39. 
He was active in many leadership roles with the Academic Senate, 
including being chair of the Budget Committee for eight years (1923–
31), and a member of two of the initial advisory committees (1943 and 
1945) for the Santa Barbara campus when it was first brought into the 





 Several key factors can be identified from this survey of how the 
University of California was initially able to build research excellence 
and stature in physical sciences. 
 First of all, the process had to start with bringing in people who 
were known nationally or internationally to be strong or very promising 
researchers. These intellectual founders had to be located, identified, 
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and selected by people who could judge research well and they had to 
be hired with very attractive packages (Lewis, Lawrence, and Evans) or 
arrive serendipitously and be recognized and fully supported for their 
talents (Leuschner, Birge, and Meriam). They had to obtain and retain 
the trust and confidence of the university administration and other 
faculty members, so that they could define recruitment plans and carry 
out searches, evaluations, and recruitments (Lewis, Hildebrand, and 
Birge). These approaches follow the principle that top-flight 
researchers are best equipped to identify outstanding research and to 
recognize, evaluate, and identify the people who can best do it. 
 Notice also the involvement of relatively few people in the process 
of developing research excellence as it flowed through chemistry to 
physics to mathematics. Note also Pitzer’s description (which also 
applies to Lewis, Hildebrand, Birge, and others) of how he relied on his 
own judgment and the judgments of a certain few people upon whom 
he depended heavily to assess quality. That was clearly a very 
successful approach in developing the research stature of Berkeley, but 
it does not fit well with today’s concepts of broad searches and 
inclusiveness. The approach today at any major research university is 
for academic departments to propose definitions of positions for 
recruitment of faculty.  Then, if the recruitment is authorized, the 
department creates a search committee, advertises and solicits 
nominations widely, invites multiple candidates in for visits and 
seminars, compares among candidates, and then by a collective 
process picks the actual person to recruit. 
 It was also important that many of the principal actors had 
institution-wide interests at heart and were willing to give time and 
effort to building quality across the institution, recognizing that the 
success of any one discipline depends as well on the success of other 
disciplines. One can see a network of quality recognition and 
university-wide concern stemming from Leuschner to and through 
Lewis, Birge, Hildebrand, Evans, and even Lawrence. 
 The development of research excellence was very much driven 
and fostered by intellectual interactions themselves. Lewis’s weekly 
research conference is a prime example, as is the involvement of Lewis 




controversy, and even disagreement (as for the Bohr atom) actually 
generated intellectual cohesion and cross-disciplinary interests. 
 The Lick Observatory, as the most capable telescope in the world 
when built, provided a lure for leading astronomers, one of whom 
(Leuschner) was a leader in the building of research in general at 
Berkeley, another of whom (Holden) was both observatory director and 
president of the university, and a third of whom (Campbell) became 
observatory director, then president of the university, and then 
president of the National Academy of Sciences. 
 It was important that salaries could ignore seniority and that 
special arrangements could be made for recruitments (Lewis) or 
retentions (Lawrence), even though these usual steps could generate 
resentment and disapproval among the rank-and-file faculty. 
 Finally, it is worth noting that many of the principals in the 
development of Berkeley toward research excellence had studied in 
Germany (Stringham, Lewis, Hildebrand, Evans, and Leuschner in his 
early education). It was Germany that had developed the modern 
concept of a research university, and by being there, one could soak up 






Developing New Campuses 
 
 
The eye-catching additions to the Research I ranks in our classification 
of research universities, however, are the UC campuses at Santa 
Barbara, Riverside, and Santa Cruz. The speed with which these 
institutions rose from modest beginnings is astonishing. 
 —Hugh Graham and Nancy Diamond1 
 
During the seven years from 1955 and 1961 I experienced the fierce joys 
of helping to found a new university. As with most things one does for 
the first time—making love, becoming a father, getting a Ph.D.—this 
task was approached with more enthusiasm than knowledge…We 
decided…to build our first “little university” from the top down, or, if 
you like, to lay the roof first. We started to build a series of graduate 
research and teaching departments, one at a time, first in physics and 
chemistry, then in the earth sciences and biology, mathematics and 
engineering, and in linguistics, philosophy, comparative literature, and 
economics. In each department we aimed for a critical mass of faculty 
who would be able to give a doctoral program right from the start. 
 —Roger Revelle2 
 
I…conceived of myself as someone who really had to project the image 
of UCLA—in the community, within the regents—and to carry the UCLA 
message right directly head on to the Berkeley administration. I also 
conceived of myself as a person…who somehow had to convince the 
UCLA community that they were as good as I knew they were. They had 
so long been Berkeley’s little brother. And, you know, sure, Berkeley has 
nine Nobel Prize winners, and we’ll never have any sort of thing; and  
 
                                                     
1 Hugh D. Graham and Nancy Diamond, The Rise of American Research Universities (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997). 
2 Roger Revelle, “On Starting a University,” unpublished paper, circa 1983, Scripps Institution of 




when you talk about the University of California in London or New York 
or something, they say, “Oh, yes, you mean Berkeley.” So I conceived 
early on that this image had to be changed. 
 —Franklin Murphy3 
 
We would always end up after our discussions and disputes saying, 
“Would it not be nice someday to combine the advantages of the big 
campus providing the library, the research facilities, the cultural 
programs, and the small campus intimacy among students and among 
faculty members?” 
 —Clark Kerr4 
 
 
 As described in chapter 2, decisions were made by degrees over 
the years that resulted in the University of California becoming one 
university with multiple campuses with equal opportunity to develop, 
something that was unique at the time within the United States. UC is 
still the research university with by far the most campuses with the 
same, single mission. The quality and norms that had developed at 
Berkeley spread very effectively to the newer campuses as they were 
developed. The purpose of this chapter is to outline how that 
happened, what the key steps were, and how the different campuses 
undertook initiatives for academic development. 
 
 
UC LOS ANGELES (UCLA) 
 
 During most of the latter half of the nineteenth century, the 
population of California was largely in the northern part of the state, 
with the greater San Francisco area being the largest settlement. It was 
                                                     
3 Franklin D. Murphy, interview by James V. Mink, “My UCLA Chancellorship: An Utterly Candid 
View,” tape 1, side 2, October 18, 1973, Oral History Program, University of California, Los 
Angeles, 1976, https://archive.org/details/myuclachancellor00murp;  
http://oralhistory.library.ucla.edu/viewFile.do?itemId=29627&fileSeq=3&xsl=http://oralhistory.lib
rary.ucla.edu/xslt/local/tei/xml/tei/stylesheet/xhtml2/tei.xsl.  
4 Clark Kerr, quoted by Kay Mills, “Changes at ‘Oxford on the Pacific’: UC Santa Cruz Turns to 
Engineering and Technology” National CrossTalk, Spring 2001, https://perma.cc/6ACP-4UVW. 
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logical, therefore, that when the University of California was initially 
established, it was situated in the San Francisco Bay area. However, the 
shift of population toward the southern part of the state with the 
arrival of the twentieth century created a demand for university-level 
public education in the south. Faced with the alternatives of 
acquiescing to there being a second, independent public university in 
the Los Angeles area or spreading the University of California itself to 
the south, the university leadership took the latter path. The Los 
Angeles Normal School was brought into the University of California in 
1919 as the Southern Branch, offered a full four-year undergraduate 
education, and then in 1927 became the University of California at Los 




Figure 10-1.  Aerial View of the UCLA Westwood Campus Site, shortly before 
the opening of the campus, 19295 
 
 
 The Los Angeles campus moved from the Vermont Street location 
of the normal school to essentially bare land (Figure 10-1) at the  
 
                                                     




present Westwood site in 1929. Governance of the campus at that time 
stemmed from Berkeley and was for the most part located at Berkeley. 
As of 1931 there were two provost positions within the university: one 
held by Monroe Deutsch as “provost of the university” at Berkeley, and 
the other held by Ernest Moore as “provost of the University of 
California at Los Angeles,” the highest position resident in Los Angeles. 
Moore had been the last president of the normal school.6 Over time, 
the Los Angeles campus developed a modest graduate program. It was 
first authorized in 1936 to give the PhD7 and awarded its first PhD 
degree in 19388 to one of Vern Knudsen’s PhD students in acoustics 
(see below). However, there were continued feelings in the south, 
backed up by fact, that UCLA was being held back from moving toward 
the status that Berkeley had in terms of faculty and programmatic 
distinction and budget. For example, Taylor describes the spartan 
situation for a research-oriented assistant professor of mathematics.9 
 During his presidency Robert Gordon Sproul kept tight 
administrative control over the Los Angeles campus, frustrating later 
UCLA provosts, such as Clarence Dykstra (provost, 1945–50), who had 
been president of the University of Wisconsin before coming into the 
UCLA position. However, there were also a growing number of long-
term and strong regents from the south. The first of these had been 
journalist (Los Angeles Express) Edward Dickson, who was a twice-
reappointed regent for forty-three years, from 1913 until his death in 
1956, and was chair of the UC Regents from 1948 until 1956. Other 
later and similarly influential, long-term southern regents were oil-
magnate Edwin Pauley (1940–72) and Edward Carter of Carter Hawley 
Hale stores (1952–88). 10  This situation brought about a complex 
                                                     
6 Verne A. Stadtman, The University of California, 1868–1968 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970), p. 
272. 
7 Angus E. Taylor, Speaking Freely: A Scholar’s Memoir of Experience in the University of California, 
1938–1967 (Berkeley: Institute for Governmental Studies Press, University of California, 2000), p. 
23. 
8 Clark Kerr, The Gold and the Blue: A Personal Memoir of the University of California, 1949–1967, 
vol., 1, Academic Triumphs (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), p. 18. 
9 Taylor, 2000, op. cit., pp. 9–16. 
10 These remarkably long terms of service—forty-three, thirty-two, and thirty-six years, 
respectively—were the result of what were at the time appointment terms of sixteen years, 
followed by reappointments. The very long cumulative terms were hallmarks of an era now past. 
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triangle of influence and governance wherein the UCLA administration 
reported to the president and the president to the regents, but Dickson 
and other southern regents engaged key deans socially and worked 
with them to accomplish desired ends.11, 12 
 Research and graduate work began to take form at UCLA around 
1930. Vern Knudsen13 joined the institution in 1922, developed his own 
interests and research in acoustics within physics, and became UCLA’s 
first graduate dean (1934–58). He describes how Armin Leuschner, 
then graduate dean for the university, came to UCLA from Berkeley 
starting in 1929 in his capacity as chair of the Board of Research to 
meet with a local committee to determine awards of research grants 
for the Los Angeles campus. Knudsen attributes the initial 
establishment of high standards at UCLA to Leuschner and Charles 
Lipman, who was Leuschner’s successor as graduate dean for the 
university. 14  The start of UCLA’s research prominence came with 
Knudsen and a few other faculty members of that era. In the case of 
Knudsen, graduate students in physics at Berkeley who were interested 
in acoustics came to Los Angeles to work with him. These included 
Norman Watson, the initial UCLA PhD recipient and subsequently a 
UCLA faculty member, and Richard Bolt,15 later cofounder of Bolt, 
Beranek and Newman, Inc.16 Kerr17 stresses that Deans Gordon Watkins 
(1936–45) and Paul Dodd (1946–60) from letters and science also had 
                                                                                                                     
There have been some regents reappointed recently, but now with twelve-year terms, full service 
upon reappointment amounts to at most twenty-four years. 
11 Roger L. Geiger, Research and Relevant Knowledge: American Research Universities since World 
War II (Transaction Publishers, 2004), pp. 135–146. 
12 Kerr, 2001, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 328–329. 
13 Vern O. Knudsen, interview by James V. Mink, “Teacher, Researcher, and Administrator: Vern O. 
Knudsen,” Oral History Program, University of California, Los Angeles, 1974, 
http://oralhistory.library.ucla.edu/permissionPop.jsp?forward=viewTextFile.do?itemId=29607&fil
eSeq=1. 
14 Knudsen, 1974, op. cit., pp. 856–858 
15 Leo J. Beranek, “Gold Medal Award, 1979: Richard Henry Bolt,” Acoustical Society of America, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20170621000819/http://acousticalsociety.org/about/awards/gold/
12_10_10_bolt. 
16 Knudsen, 1974, op. cit., pp. 852–863. 




much to do with stimulating high-quality research at UCLA. Neil 
Jacoby18 and Franklin Murphy19 also note the contributions of Dodd. 
 After World War II, the interests of the southern regents and 
community leaders in the Los Angeles area centered on vigorous 
development of professional schools.20 The initial push came with the 
medical school, for which Stafford Warren21 was recruited from the 
University of Rochester as dean when the school was founded in 1947. 
Warren, who brought a team of researchers with him, had been a 
medical advisor to the Atomic Energy Commission on the Bikini Atoll 
atomic bomb tests and thereby had contacts that could and did lead to 
substantial research funding from the federal government.22 Warren 
used this federal funding to leverage money for facilities from the 
university administration and the state government. In order to do this, 
he had to overcome substantial resistance from James Corley, UC vice 
president for business affairs and government relations, who, as 
already noted in chapter 3, had a large degree of independence in 
Sacramento and did not want to see an expensive research-based 
medical operation in the south. Warren also developed a support base 
of his own in Sacramento and elsewhere, using the entrée that he had 
been appointed by Governor Earl Warren to establish a state 
commission on radiological defense. That gave him opportunities to 
tour the state, linking awareness of civil defense with the UCLA medical 
school.23 The UCLA School of Medicine has become a prominent and 
thriving operation in patient care and forefront research and is a world 
leader in, among other areas, joint replacement.24 
 Also impressive was the development of a research-based School 
of Management, which underwent large changes from its initial form as 
                                                     
18 Neil H. Jacoby, interview by James V. Mink, “The Graduate School of Management at UCLA: 
1948–1968,” p. 35, Oral History Program, UCLA, 1974, 
http://digital2.library.ucla.edu/viewFile.do?contentFileId=2289890.  
19 Murphy,1973, op. cit., tape 1, side 2. 
20 Geiger, 1993, op. cit., p. 140. 
21 W. P. Longmire Jr., J. F. Ross, and Robert Vosper, “Stafford L. Warren, Biophysics: Los Angeles,” 
In Memoriam, University of California, 1985, https://perma.cc/24BY-9DSE. 
22 The year 1947 was still a very early point in government support of university research in 
general. Government support became widely available only with the establishment of the 
National Science Foundation in 1950. 
23 Geiger, 1993, op. cit., pp. 138–139. 
24 Jonathan R. Cole, The Great American University (New York: Public Affairs, 2009), p. 224. 
Spreading Excellence: Developing New Campuses 
299 
 
the College of Commerce25 when it was founded in 1935. Neil Jacoby26 
was hired as dean in 1948 from the University of Chicago, where he 
had been secretary, vice president, and professor of finance. Jacoby’s 
stated reasons for the move were to gain a favorable climate for his 
son’s health and the opportunity to build a major school of 
management.27 During a visit to Los Angeles ten years earlier in 1938, 
he and his wife had decided, “This is where we want to live.”28 Jacoby 
was available by virtue of a loss in his rapport with Chicago president 
Robert Hutchins and his own feelings of a decline in the physical 
environment at the University of Chicago and its surroundings.29 
 During Jacoby’s first four years as dean, the faculty grew by a 
factor of four from eleven to forty-four, with Jacoby doing the 
recruitment, negotiations, and preparation of appointment cases for 
senate review and then ultimate approval by Sproul in Berkeley.30 The 
more pedestrian programs within the school were discontinued, and 
the associated faculty members were replaced by others highly capable 
in research and research-based instruction. Much of that recruiting was 
done from the University of Chicago itself, akin to what Roger Revelle 
at UC San Diego would do subsequently. The recruitment process made 
heavy use of the salubrious Southern California climate.  
 Jacoby built the present School of Management and enjoyed 
considerable support from the Los Angeles professional community in 
doing so. A key step was gaining a large grant in the late 1950s from 
IBM Corporation, creating the Western Data Processing Center, and 
thereby using the capabilities of then-new digital computers for 
business research. That in turn led to a major grant from the Ford 
Foundation, establishing the Western Management Science Institute. 
Undergraduate education in business was then phased out in the mid-
1960s, leaving a well-respected, research-based graduate program,31 
                                                     
25 The same name, “College of Commerce,” had originally been used for the program at Berkeley. 
26 J. F. Weston et al., “Neil H. Jacoby, Management: Los Angeles,” In Memoriam, University of 
California, 1980, https://perma.cc/Y52B-ZVRG. 
27 N. H. Jacoby, interview by James V. Mink, “The Graduate School of Management at UCLA, 1948–
1968,” Oral History Program, p. 11, University of California, Los Angeles, CA, 1974, 
http://digital2.library.ucla.edu/viewFile.do?contentFileId=2289890. 
28 Jacoby, 1974, op. cit., 1973, p. 29. 
29 Jacoby, 1974, op. cit., pp. 36–37. 
30 Jacoby, 1974, op. cit., p. 54. 




which today as the Anderson School of Management (Figure 10-2) is 





Figure 10-2. Anderson School of Management, UCLA32 
 
  
The Law School and College of Engineering had rockier roads at 
the start, for reasons that differed greatly between the two cases. The 
founding dean of the Law School was Dale Coffman, who came from 
Vanderbilt in 1946. Politically conservative and thereby in tune with the 
conservative southern regents, he was a strong anticommunist and was 
also accused of being anti-Semitic. 33  He was a strong and vocal 
proponent of the loyalty oath (chapter 2), which fact put him politically 
at odds with many of his faculty; he referred to the Law School as “an 
island in a red sea.” 34  As well, he was a relatively ineffective 
administrator and resisted the roles of the Academic Senate in shared 
governance. His removal in 1956 was, because of his connection with 
regents, a sensitive matter that was carried out through a review by 
                                                     
32 Photograph © 2003 by Alan Nyiri, courtesy of the Atkinson Photographic Archive, 
http://www.lib.berkeley.edu/uchistory/archives_exhibits/campus_planning/atkinson_archive/ucl
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33 Geiger, 1993, op. cit., p. 137. 
34 Kerr, 2001, op. cit., p. 141. 
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three other deans.35 , 36 , 37  The climb of the UCLA Law School to 
prominence was thereby delayed. 
 The College of Engineering was started in 1944 with the 
recruitment of L. M. K. Boelter38 as the founding dean. Boelter’s career 
until then had been at Berkeley, where he had become prominent in 
the field of heat transfer through the development of the widely used 
Dittus-Boelter equation and other accomplishments. His decanal 
appointment at UCLA became his opportunity to put into practice his 
ideas on engineering education, which called for a unified engineering 
curriculum, built around the science of engineering without division 
into the classical engineering disciplines (electrical, civil, mechanical, 
and so on). He also favored having graduate students in engineering 
who were at the same time working at full-time or nearly full-time 
engineering jobs in industry. 39  A thorough analysis of Boelter’s 
approach and activities in launching engineering at UCLA is given by 
Akera,40 who also points out that Boelter’s different approach to 
engineering education was in part driven by the desire that he and his 
former superior, Berkeley dean Morrough P. (Mike) O’Brien, had to 
differentiate the UCLA and Berkeley programs so that they would not 
directly compete. 
 Boelter was dean for twenty years until his death in 1965, and 
during that time the College of Engineering at UCLA had a single 
Department of Engineering with Boelter as both dean and department 
chair. This structure41 matched some of the needs of the aerospace 
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37 Taylor, 2000, op. cit., p. 35. 
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industry but substantially held back appreciation of UCLA engineering 
within the classical engineering disciplines, which are the loci of 
academic recognition for both United States and world engineering. 
The unified structure has now been abandoned, with a return to 
conventional disciplines. As one example of this history, the tortured 
path for chemical engineering went from the undifferentiated 
Department of Engineering (1944), to a Chemical, Nuclear, and Thermal 
Division within that department in the early 1960s, to an Energy and 
Kinetics Department within the College (1968–69), to a Chemical, 
Nuclear, and Thermal Engineering Department (1976–77), and finally to 
a Chemical Engineering Department (1983). 42 
 Given the unusual administrative structure for UCLA within the 
University of California before the era when Clark Kerr was president, it 
was the deans and the academic-personnel review functions of the 
Academic Senate that did most of the building of high-quality academic 
research.43 The deans drove selective faculty recruitment, as we have 
seen for Warren (medicine) and Jacoby (business/management). 
Effective senate review of appointment and advancement cases drove 
quality, as did the overall participation of the Academic Senate in 
governance. As at Berkeley, outstanding UCLA faculty scholars 
participated conscientiously in senate work. There were also two 
important periods (1943–45 and 1950–52) before and after Dykstra’s 
provostship when the on-site administration of UCLA was carried out 
by committees of deans.44 Enrollment grew tremendously, from ten 
thousand before World War II to fifteen thousand in the early 1950s 
after the end of the surge from the GI Bill and then to twenty thousand 




                                                     
42 See timeline table, pp. 22–23 of Ken Nobe, “Douglas Bennion’s Contributions to 
Electrochemistry at UCLA,” in J. S. Newman and R. E. White, eds., Proceedings of the Douglas N. 
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from 220 in 1940 to over 900 in 1960. Graduate students were one of 
every eight students in 1940 and had become one in three by 1960.45 
 Perhaps the strongest rise of an academic department at UCLA 
during the period between World War II and 1960 was that for 
chemistry. Here too the building was done by an energetic department 
chair who was well able to gauge talent. William G. Young became 
chair in 1940, shortly before the PhD program was established in 
chemistry at UCLA. He was himself a distinguished physical organic 
chemist, and he assembled outstanding faculty colleagues such as Saul 
Winstein and Donald Cram (Nobel Prize in Chemistry, 1987) in that area 
and built other subfields of chemistry. Young’s abilities were 
recognized and utilized at UCLA as he went on to become dean of 
physical sciences in 1948 and then vice chancellor for planning, 1957–
70. In the latter position, he was influential in establishing the Center 
for Health Sciences, now a badge of distinction at UCLA.46, 47 
 Chemistry at UCLA was largely built by promotion of assistant 
professors from within, rather than recruitment of senior faculty from 
outside. Hires would be made at the assistant professor level, with high 
standards and considerable selectivity being exercised in tenure 
decisions.48 The large exception was Willard Libby, former faculty 
member at Berkeley (1933–45) and Chicago (1945–59), coworker with 
Harold Urey on gaseous diffusion for separation of uranium isotopes at 
Columbia during World War II, and commissioner of the Atomic Energy 
Commission (1955–59). 49  Libby selected UCLA from among five 
academic offers as he left the AEC in 1959, declining a return to the 
University of Chicago, a department-chair position at Stanford, and 
what would have been one of Roger Revelle’s initial faculty positions in 
La Jolla (see UC San Diego, below). He had also been approached for 
the presidency of Rice University. In his oral history,50 he indicates that 
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he came to UCLA because his then-wife wanted to live in Los Angeles. 
He accepted the UCLA offer even though at the time in his view 
Chicago was “four orders of magnitude better than UCLA…[At UCLA] 
there were some chemists who were pretty good, and the chemistry 
department was the best in the university. But it was nothing like what 
it is now.”51 Libby received the Nobel Prize in Chemistry in 1960—the 
year after his arrival at UCLA—for his earlier work on dating with 
carbon-14. During his twenty-year career at UCLA, he was highly active 
in research and directed the university-wide Institute of Geophysics 
and Planetary Physics, corresponding to his interests at that time in 
aspects of chemistry bearing on space.52 
 During Sproul’s last year as president (1957–58), intense 
negotiations between longtime Southern California regent Edward 
Carter and Sproul, amplified by an Academic Senate planning study, 
had resulted in a plan to provide “equal opportunity” to UCLA. The 
substance of the proposal was embedded in a statement from the 
senate Committee on Educational Policy: “Plans for the future and 
budget allocations for the Berkeley and Los Angeles campuses should 
be comparable in size and have equal opportunities for developing 
programs which, although not identical but rather complementary, are 
of equal quality.”53 This confirmation of equal opportunity, adopted by 
the Board of Regents in Kerr’s first year (1958) upon Kerr’s 
recommendation, was vital for continued academic development at 
UCLA. 
 As was noted in chapter 2, chancellorships had been established in 
1952 at Berkeley and UCLA under the overall supervision of the 
president, who at the time was Sproul. The initial Berkeley chancellor 
was Kerr. After an earlier effort from Southern California regents 
seeking the appointment of World War II General Mark Clark54 (a 
person with no academic background but seen as someone who could 
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and would stand up to Sproul), the first chancellor selected for UCLA 
was Raymond Allen, who had been president of the University of 
Washington. After gaining experience with him, Kerr and many regents 
and UCLA faculty members thought that Allen was insufficiently 
dynamic, and so, following a search, Kerr and the regents replaced 
Allen with Franklin Murphy, who had until then been president of the 
University of Kansas.  
Murphy, who served from 1960 to 1968, energetically and capably 
established the separate identity of UCLA. He also built relationships 
with the Los Angeles community; the fine arts, both academically and 
through the cultural life of Los Angeles; and rapport with the students 
in what could have been a difficult time for student relations given the 
Free Speech Movement and its aftermaths at Berkeley.55 Murphy has 
left an oral history56 that is quite critical of Kerr on matters relating to 
the independent identity of UCLA and the relative roles and visibility 
(what Kerr calls “regal matters” or “symbolic functions”) of the 
chancellor vis-à-vis the president. Kerr gives his own, more moderate 
views of the same matters.57 Related to this controversy, it should be 
noted that Sproul as UC president had kept a firm and near-total grip 
on the reins. Kerr decentralized governance in function and form 
considerably, but the transition to the present high degree of 
autonomy of the individual campuses was not yet complete. 
 The contributions of Murphy during his eight years and of Charles 
(“Chuck”) Young during a remarkable twenty-nine years (1968–97) as 
UCLA chancellor were heavily directed to building UCLA in all the 
various ways that are needed, placing it on a firm and diverse base of 
financial, community, and regional support, thereby assuring its future. 
The leadership and stability provided by those two leaders were vital. 
 As the other side of the coin, Kerr cites the statements of Vern 
Knudsen in his oral history: “I would say if there’s any shortcoming with 
the Murphy administration it was the failure to press sufficiently for 
the recruitment of top scholars…I believe that if you look at the 
number of distinguished professors that we have here [1973], you will 
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find that we haven’t been as ardent in pressing that very important 
requirement as took place in the earlier years.”58  
The rise of UCLA in academic rankings from 1936, when it had no 
PhD programs, to 1957 is impressive. The Keniston survey of 1957, 
cited by Kerr 59  and Geiger, 60  placed UCLA fourteenth among US 
research universities. Subsequent surveys have placed UCLA in about 
the same position. This does not at all reflect the campus having stood 
still academically, since the general tide of quality within US research 
universities also rose during the more recent period. Even during the 
Murphy years, most faculty hiring was at the assistant professor level. 
Under Young, the campus made greater ventures into the national 
hiring market for senior faculty. 
 As of 2015 UCLA had six faculty Nobelists, fifty-two members of 
the National Academy of Sciences, twenty-six members of the National 
Academy of Engineering, and thirty-nine members of the National 
Academy of Medicine.61, 62 The Nobelists are/were: 
 1960, Chemistry: Willard Libby, “for his method to use carbon-14 
for age determination in archaeology, geology, geophysics, and 
other branches of science”; work done earlier at the University of 
Chicago 
 1965, Physics: Julian Schwinger, “for fundamental work in 
quantum electrodynamics, with deep-ploughing consequences for 
the physics of elementary particles”; work done largely at Harvard 
 1987, Chemistry: Donald Cram, for “development and use of 
molecules with structure-specific interactions of high selectivity”; 
work done at UCLA 
 1997, Chemistry: Paul Boyer, “for elucidation of the enzymatic 
mechanism underlying the synthesis of adenosine triphosphate 
(ATP)”; work done at UCLA 
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 1998, Physiology or Medicine: Louis Ignarro, “for discoveries 
concerning nitric oxide as a signaling molecule in the cardiovascular 
system”; work done at Tulane and UCLA 
 2012, Economic Sciences: Lloyd Shapley, “for the theory of stable 
allocations and the practice of market design”; work done largely 
at RAND Corporation. 
 
 In summary, given the handicap of initial second-class status that 
UCLA had to overcome in order to become an academically 
distinguished institution, how did the university do it? A first answer is 
the instillation of the standards and structure of the University of 
California during the 1930s and during the decade following the end of 
World War II in 1945. The standards were manifest in the attention 
given by Berkeley graduate deans Leuschner and Lipman to the 
development of graduate studies at UCLA, by the existence of the 
Academic Senate structure and the active participation of the best 
scholars in the senate’s work, and by the standards and quality-seeking 
values of deans such as Dodd, Knudsen, Warren, and Jacoby. 
 Another vital ingredient was the general political muscle of Los 
Angeles, which resulted in the selection of long-term and effective 
Southern California regents such as Dickson, Pauley, and Carter; their 
drive for equal opportunity for UCLA; and their synergy with the deans. 
 Also very important were the general attributes of the Los Angeles 
and Southern California area. The very attractive climate brought 
faculty members such as Libby and Jacoby to UCLA and served as a 
general incentive for faculty recruitment. The cohesion and synergy 
established by Chancellors Murphy and Young with the community 
brought cultural events, large community support, and the strongest 





 As we have seen in chapter 2, two large issues in the 1870s at the 
start of the University of California were the degree of emphasis on 
agriculture and mechanics as opposed to higher education in general 




a more classical and comprehensive university eventually won out, the 
university retained substantial interest in agriculture and particularly 
science-based agriculture. The UC pioneers in agricultural research 
were Eugene W. Hilgard and Edward J. Wickson, who arrived in 1875 
and 1878, respectively. Hilgard, in particular, was a leader in 
scientifically based agriculture. 
 Agricultural research required land, which became less and less 
available around the Berkeley campus. After some continued 
controversy in Sacramento as to whether practical agriculture would be 
better situated in a separate public university, a bill was passed in 1905 
through the advocacy of Judge Peter Shields to seek and create the 
University Farm (figure 10-3) as part of the University of California.63 A 
year later in 1906, a site was selected and acquired in Davisville in Yolo 
County, about seveny-five miles northwest of Berkeley and fifteen 
miles west of Sacramento. Soon thereafter courses of instruction were 
offered along with the research operations.  
Thomas F. Hunt, who became dean of agriculture in 1912, the year 
that G. N. Lewis arrived at Berkeley, launched an effort to make the 
University of California agriculture program the best in the country. In 
doing so he had the strong support of President Wheeler and the 
California legislature. During the decade preceding 1915, agriculture 
enrollments grew from 4.2 percent of the Berkeley student population 
to 11.7 percent.64 
 The location of the University Farm in Davis, so near the state 
capital in Sacramento, was important. As was pointed out by California 
historian Kevin Starr,65 the University Farm, en route to becoming the 
University of California at Davis, would never lose that vital political 
connection. For the first half of the twentieth century, in fact, rural 
California held a disproportionate authority at the capitol, especially in 
the state Senate; and two generations of rancher-legislators 
understood as a matter of lifetime recognition the importance of the 
Davis enterprise to the development of rural California. 
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Figure 10-3. The University Farm in Davis66 
 
 
 The link between the agricultural interests in the legislature and 
those in the University of California has been vital for both California 
agriculture and the University of California over the years. The 
university has performed research and Cooperative Extension services 
(see chapter 16) that have enabled modern agriculture to thrive in the 
state, including the establishment of major subindustries such as wine 
making and viticulture. Agricultural interests in the legislature have, in 
turn, been a steady source of support for the University of California in 
all respects, not just agriculture. 
 In 1921, soon after the arrival of the Southern Branch in Los 
Angeles in 1919, agriculture was reorganized so that there were two 
branches, Northern and Southern, under the College of Agriculture 
which was still headquartered at Berkeley. The University Farm at Davis 
became the Northern Branch and now had a resident director of the 
branch, Claude Hutchison, who was later (1955-63) mayor of Berkeley. 
                                                     





The Southern Branch included the Riverside Citrus Experiment Station 
as well as activities that could be developed in Los Angeles. At this 
point a four-year agriculture degree program was started at Davis. 
Science and humanities programs were started during the 1920s to 
support the four-year degree, and several more specific agriculture 
fields were started in the 1930s and 1940s. The Davis enrollment 
exceeded one thousand for the first time in 1937. 
 For World War II (1943–45), the campus at Davis was converted to 
a Signal Corps training camp for the US Army. With the surge from 
returning war veterans, the Davis campus grew considerably following 
the war. In the late 1940s and the 1950s, several steps were taken that 
served to move the balance of emphasis on agricultural matters from 
Berkeley to Davis. Four departments that had been split between 
Berkeley and Davis were moved to Davis—Poultry Husbandry and Food 
Technology in 1951, and Home Economics and Soils and Plant Nutrition 
in 1955. Home Economics was later disbanded in the early 1960s, with 
remnants becoming part of Nutritional Sciences and Agricultural 
Economics.67 
 The School of Veterinary Medicine had formally been established 
at Davis in 1948, building on and pulling together elements of 
veterinary medicine that were already there. It became and has 
remained an outstanding school, being consistently named top in the 
country in various surveys.68 
 The first UC Davis PhD was awarded in 1950 in botany, and, as 
described in chapters 2 and 3, in 1959 the Board of Regents designated 
Davis to become a general campus.69 
 Stanley Freeborn had been made provost for the Davis campus 
when that position was established for the smaller campuses in 1952. 
Freeborn served one year as chancellor after that position was 
established in 1958, but for all intents and purposes, the founding 
chancellor was Emil Mrak, who served from 1959 through 1969. Mrak 
had been chair of the Department of Food Technology and had moved 
from Berkeley to Davis with that department in 1951. Mrak was 
approachable, gregarious, an excellent politician, and a builder, with an 
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ability to recognize quality. He was an excellent fit for a campus 
embarking on the ambitious path toward being a full general campus of 
the University of California. He has also left us a substantial oral 
history.70 
 One important undertaking early in Mrak’s term was restructuring 
and further building the College of Agriculture, linking to advances in 
biology and bringing in environmental issues, particularly those that 
interface with agriculture. Over the years, ongoing efforts of this sort 
have kept UC Davis at the forefront of agriculture research and 
education. That has been important for sustaining the very high 
reputation that the campus has in fields relating to agriculture. 
 The agricultural heritage of Davis made it receptive to professional 
schools, a situation different from what prevailed at Riverside, Santa 
Barbara, and Santa Cruz, where there was appreciable resistance 
among core academic faculty against the establishment of professional 
schools.71 This fact coupled with the considerable interest of political 
figures in Sacramento in having core professional schools established 
near Sacramento at Davis, or even within Sacramento itself. As a 
consequence, Davis has the greatest density of professional schools 
among the campuses other than Berkeley and UCLA—Medicine, Law, 
Management, Veterinary Medicine, Education, and Nursing, as well as 
the College of Engineering and the College of Agriculture and 
Environmental Sciences, both of which also have undergraduate 
programs. 
 The School of Law was secured through the help of both a 
university-wide planning process for legal education72 and legislative 
ties and interest.73, 74 Approved by the regents in May, 1963, the school 
admitted its first class in 1966, just as student activism was burgeoning 
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within the university. Despite a somewhat rocky start resulting from 
the activism, the school is now being placed in the top twenty-five 
nationally in rankings by lawyers, judges, deans, and professors.75 
 The UC Regents also approved a medical school for Davis in 1963. 
Again, this was encouraged by Sacramento-area legislators and was 
acceded to by Kerr, vice president of the university Harry Wellman, and 
Mrak, despite the young age of the general campus, recognizing the 
good that the political partnership could do for university needs in 
general.76 Pending construction of a hospital on the Davis campus, the 
school affiliated with the Sacramento County Hospital in southeast 
Sacramento for its clinical element.77 The first class of medical students 
was admitted in 1968.  
The school encountered several difficulties upon start-up. The 
failure of a statewide bond issue in 1970 made funding for both a 
hospital ($56 million) and a veterinary hospital ($22 million) 
unavailable. The veterinary hospital was eventually built on the 
campus, and it is both regionally recognized and a vital component of 
the School of Veterinary Medicine. But for hospital facilities, the 
campus eventually had to go the route of taking ownership of the 
Sacramento County Hospital in 1972, thus leaving the UC Davis Medical 
School with on-campus medical-science facilities and a hospital half an 
hour away by automobile. That situation was eventually remedied by 
constructing additional facilities at the Sacramento hospital site in the 
early 2000s and moving the entire medical school to that location. 
 Other difficulties in the early years of the UC Davis Medical School 
had to do with the school being the focus of what became the 1977 
Bakke decision of the US Supreme Court on affirmative action (see 
chapter 15) and in 1980 public attention to an in-house controversy 
between faculty cardiologists and UC Davis Medical Center heart 
surgeons who were accused of having high rates of mortality and 
complications.78 Despite its difficult beginning, the UC Davis Medical 
School and Medical Center have developed well over the years. 
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 In the early days of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 
Edward Teller (see chapter 13), who was then a professor of physics at 
Berkeley, strongly urged creation of a joint graduate program between 
Berkeley and the Livermore Laboratory relating to applied sciences. 
Teller’s well-known strident manner and in particular his aggressively 
negative testimony against Berkeley/Caltech physicist Robert 
Oppenheimer in the 1954 hearings that resulted in the nonrenewal of 
Oppenheimer’s security clearance led many Berkeley scientists to 
oppose this relationship vigorously. Teller then turned to the Davis 
campus. Again, many chemists and physicists at Davis opposed a 
relationship with Teller and Livermore. However, a new College of 
Engineering had been formed at Davis in 1961 to branch out into other 
areas of engineering from agricultural engineering, which had already 
existed at Davis. The Dean of Engineering, Roy Bainer, with the 
encouragement of Kerr and Mrak, agreed to form such a program, 
which opened in 1963 as the Graduate Program in Applied Science. The 
Applied Science emphasis fit with the trends of the time to bring more 
science base into engineering. More informally known as “Teller Tech,” 
this program continued with facilities at both Livermore and Davis until 
2011, when it was discontinued in a time of budgetary stringency. Mrak 
describes the controversies at the start of the program.79 
 A more recent addition to the Davis campus is the magnificent 
Robert and Margrit Mondavi Center for the Performing Arts (figure 10-
4), which forms an entry to the campus and is a legacy of Larry 
Vanderhoef, who served as chancellor from 1994 to 2009. The Mondavi 
Center serves to make the Davis campus a prime cultural center for the 
Sacramento state capital area. 
 As of 2103 the Davis campus had twenty members of the National 
Academy of Sciences, eleven members of the National Academy of 
Engineering, and thirteen members of the National Academy of 
Medicine. It is top ranked in most fields relating to agriculture, 
including the School of Veterinary Medicine and the Department of 
Viticulture and Oenology, which has had an enormous influence on the 
success of the California wine industry (see chapter 18). 
 
                                                     







Figure 10-4. The Robert and Margrit Mondavi Center for the Performing Arts, 
University of California, Davis80 
 
 
UC SANTA BARBARA 
 
The Santa Barbara and Los Angeles campuses are the two cases in 
which a state college or normal school campus was transformed into a 
University of California campus. Santa Barbara State College had 
started in 1909 as the Santa Barbara State Normal School of Manual 
Arts and Home Economics and had added the typical normal school 
function of teacher education.81 Now renamed Santa Barbara State 
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College and with a pre–World War II enrollment of about nineteen 
hundred students, it was brought in the University of California in 1944 
as a result of a series of political actions and responses that are 
described by Douglass,82, 83 Kelley,84 and Stadtman.85 This episode and 
similar unsuccessful efforts by legislators elsewhere in California are 
among the factors that led to recognition of the need to develop what 
became the 1960 Master Plan for Higher Education in California 
(chapter 5). 
 As the University of California came out of World War II, the 
enrollment at the still-unchanged Santa Barbara campus grew to 
almost 2,700 students.86 The nature and status of this very different 
campus within the University of California were then evaluated 
seriously by the university. As a new site at a former US Marines air 
base in nearby Goleta became available, attention turned to the 
concept of a small liberal arts college on the model of Reed, Bowdoin, 
or Williams, and a plan to that end was adopted by the UC Regents in 
1953 promising “instruction and activities worthy of a liberal arts 
college of the highest quality enabling it to become a distinguished unit 
of the university.”87 In a sense this Santa Barbara plan paralleled that 
for Watkins College at UC Riverside (see below) and was a precursor of 
the eventual model for the Santa Cruz campus when it was founded 
later. 
 There was considerable tension between the faculty members of 
the old state college and those who favored the transition to a liberal 
arts college. Probably as a result of that tension, the industrial arts 
program stayed at the original site in Santa Barbara itself, but it could 
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not sustain itself in isolation and withered away.88 The remaining 
faculty members from that program were placed in other positions 
within the university, through the guidance of the vice president of the 
university, Henry Wellman.89 The buildings released by the demise of 
the industrial arts program eventually formed the core for the present-
day Santa Barbara City College, which is one of the more active and 
effective sites for transfer of community college students to UC. 
Placement of what remained of the industrial arts program within the 
community college system was also in accord with the Master Plan 
when it was formulated soon thereafter. Contention remained within 
the university as a whole over whether or not the Santa Barbara faculty 
should be admitted to the Southern Branch of the Academic Senate,90 
which did not happen until 1956.91, 92 
 Some individuals who were associated with the state college were 
very positive forces in the subsequent transitions through the liberal-
arts-college model to full research-university status. Both Clark Kerr93 
and Robert Kelley94 praise the contributions of Elmer Noble, who was 
dean of liberal arts and then acting provost in the days before general-
campus status, and Russell Buchanan, who became dean of letters and 
science and then vice chancellor for academic affairs as Vernon 
Cheadle became chancellor. Enlightened and willing individuals of that 
sort are extremely helpful for difficult transitions. 
 As described in chapter 2, when Clark Kerr became UC president in 
1958, he recognized the need for large forthcoming growth of the 
university to meet the coming “baby boom” enrollment, the children of 
returned World War II veterans. The short-lived plan for a small liberal 
arts college was abandoned in favor of Kerr’s proposal that UC Santa 
Barbara, along with Davis and Riverside, should become general 
campuses of the university (i.e., undertake the research mission with a 
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full panoply of programs and both undergraduate and graduate 
education). That plan was adopted by the regents in 1958.  
 With the determination that Santa Barbara should be a general 
campus came the need for it to have a chancellor. (It had had only a 
provost theretofore.) The first chancellor (1959–62) was Samuel Gould, 
former president of Antioch College, who involved himself personally 
and energetically in the process of building toward a general campus. 
In 1961 Gould secured the formation of the College of Letters and 
Science and the School (later College) of Engineering and placed 
teacher education in the School of Education, all approved in 1961. 
Gould’s major coup was to attract as the first dean of engineering 
Albert G. Conrad, a distinguished electrical engineer who could well 
have been the next dean of engineering at Yale University. However, in 
1961 Yale had eliminated its School of Engineering, converting it into a 
single department within Yale College. 95 , 96  Gould recognized the 
unhappiness created at Yale by this action and moved to recruit 
Conrad, who came to UCSB together with Philip Ordnung, another 
distinguished Yale engineering professor, who became the initial chair 
of the Department of Electrical Engineering.97 
 Another innovation was the Education Abroad Program (EAP),98 
implemented in 1962 by William Allaway, who then led the program 
for twenty-seven years.99 A pioneer program of its sort at the time, EAP 
operates on a university-wide basis, establishing study centers at many 
universities overseas, some with resident UC faculty directors. UC 
students go to the study centers and can take courses at the host 
university. There is a system for establishing credit for these courses at 
the home campus. Allaway was succeeded in 1989 by John Marcum, a 
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distinguished scholar and former academic vice chancellor from the 
Santa Cruz campus, who led EAP for another eighteen years until 2007. 
 Gould tended to be self-driven and nonconsultative. He came into 
conflict with the Academic Senate in many ways, the most difficult of 
which concerned the initial appointments in engineering, where Gould 
operated on his own, seemingly ignoring the senate roles in review of 
new faculty members.100, 101 Those faculty appointees were very strong; 
hence preventing the senate from carrying out its role was an 
unnecessary red flag. The break with the senate became so severe that 
Kerr asked Vice President Harry Wellman to ease the situation through 
personal intervention. Shortly thereafter, Gould left to become head of 
the Educational Broadcasting System in New York, and then president 
of the State University of New York. 
 As the next chancellor, Kerr chose Vernon Cheadle, a distinguished 
botanist who at the time was academic vice chancellor of the Davis 
campus. Cheadle had been in many Academic Senate positions during 
his career and was regarded as a fully consultative administrator, 
factors that were clearly important in his selection. Cheadle served as 
chancellor for fifteen years, 1962–77. On the basis of a number of 
interviews, Diamond 102  reports that Cheadle remained highly 
consultative and liked by the faculty in his role as chancellor. Kelley 
observes, “Vernon Cheadle was not an eloquent man, nor a charismatic 
one. His strength lay rather in his integrity, his firm scholarly values, 
and in his readiness to speak and act for his principles. His personal 
capacity for extraordinary endurance, for bearing the continuing 
burden of indignity and frustration all administrators must face—
especially was this true in the 1960s—without losing his civility, were 
remarkable gifts to a campus going through wrenching changes and, in 
crisis years, violent and debilitating controversies.”103 
 Kerr indicates that as UCSB became a general campus in 1958, 
“One urgent issue, or at least policy action, was to expand [UCSB] as 
fast as possible so that the new ‘university’ faculty would overwhelm 
                                                     
100 Kelley, 1981, op. cit., p. 18. 
101 Diamond, 2000, op. cit., p. 189. 
102 Diamond, 2000, op. cit., p. 199. 
103 Kelley, 1981, op. cit., p. 101. 
Spreading Excellence: Developing New Campuses 
319 
 
the old ‘college’ faculty.” 104  During Gould’s era (1959–62), fall 
enrollment grew from 2,380 to 4,780, 5 percent of whom were 
graduate students. During Cheadle’s period there was extremely rapid 
growth to a fall enrollment of 10,833 in fall 1966 and then a percent-
wise lesser rate of growth to 14,588 in fall 1977, 13 percent of whom 
were graduate students.105  The period of extremely rapid growth 
coincided with the onset of the surge in demand from children of 
returning World War II veterans (the baby boom) and migration to 
California. To obtain this rate of growth Cheadle aggressively recruited 
students including “redirects”—UC-eligible students whose first choice 
had been another UC campus to which they had not been admitted.106 
 There was a continuing and pressing need for growth and building 
academic quality. In addition to increasing enrollment so as to provide 
the wherewithal for adding faculty, challenges included building 
research quality, securing extramural grants, creating support systems, 
and enhancing the library, which in 1958 had included only 150,000 
volumes.107 
 Cheadle personally involved himself in faculty promotion and 
tenure processes, working collaboratively with the Academic Senate to 
raise the bar in reviews and actually participating in some faculty 
searches as well. 108 , 109  Academic quality was the criterion for 
allocations of budget and faculty-recruitment authorizations. He 
emphasized disciplines such as physics and religious studies in which 
quality had already taken hold. The National Defense Education Act of 
1958 provided national government support in the form of fellowships 
and other academic resources that could be used effectively to build. 
The number of graduate students grew from 123 in 1960 to 624 in 
1964 and over 2000 in 1969. The first two doctorate programs, history 
and biological sciences, had been approved in 1961, and the UCSB’s 
first two PhD degrees were awarded at end of Cheadle’s first year 
(1963) to students who had been admitted with advanced standing.110 
                                                     
104 Kerr, 2001, op. cit., p. 309. 
105 Kelley, 1981, op. cit., pp. 135–142. 
106 Diamond, 2000, op. cit., p. 190. 
107 Diamond, 2000, op. cit., p. 189. 
108 Kelley, 1981, op. cit., p. 26. 
109 Diamond, 2000, op. cit., p. 193. 




Academic Senate review of the proposed programs was carried out 
through the Southern Division of the Academic Senate, the structure 
that existed until 1963, when it was changed to individual campus 
divisions within a university-wide Academic Senate (see chapter 7). 
That senate review system included faculty members from UCLA and 
Riverside as well as Santa Barbara. Advice on the actual setup of new 
programs would typically be provided by faculty members drawn from 
existing UC campuses.111 
 In 1966 the regents approved growth to a target goal of twenty-
five thousand students, a full-sized UC campus. Cheadle, working 
closely with the Academic Senate, developed proposals for new schools 
of Law, Administration, Preclinical Medicine, Architecture and Regional 
Planning, Library and Information Science, and Creative Studies.112 
However, as of 1968, state budgets for the university—and hence, the 
rate of growth of the campus—sagged, and only three of these 
proposed schools (Law, Administration, and Creative Studies) were 
approved by the university-wide administration and the regents, and 
only one of those (Creative Studies) was actually funded and came into 
being. Even today, UC Santa Barbara has only one professional 
school—the Bren School of Environmental Science and Management, 
established in 1993. The College of Creative Studies has remained a 
small but viable program over the years. It is designed to serve the 
needs of unusual students who are highly gifted and well along in 
particular fields of endeavor, who engage in small seminar settings 
with advanced faculty—a sort of personally adapted graduate school 
for undergraduates.113 
 In the period 1969–72, the Santa Barbara campus underwent 
intense and almost continual student unrest, built around protesting 
the Vietnam War and other student issues of the time. These protest 
activities brought in many nonstudents. They were follow-up waves to 
the activism at Berkeley that had begun with the Free Speech 
Movement in 1964 (chapter 2). The base for the activism was the 
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community of Isla Vista, adjoining the campus and housing many 
students outside any oversight from the university. A culmination of 
the activism that received major national media coverage was the 
burning and total destruction of the Bank of America branch building in 
Isla Vista on February 25, 1970. 
 The student unrest had several negative effects—diversion of the 
campus from academic building, diversion of the attention and 
energies of Chancellor Cheadle, and a reputation for the campus that 
was discouraging to many students and families. As of 1973 Cheadle 
promoted economist Alec Alexander from dean of the College of 
Letters and Science to vice chancellor for academic affairs. His intent 
was that Alexander would continue to pay close attention to academic 
development as Cheadle had done but no longer could do because of 
these other needs.114 It turned out to be an inspired choice. Alexander 
worked synergistically with the Academic Senate in academic planning 
and allocation of faculty recruitments, including launching a program of 
senior appointments for distinguished individuals who could spark their 
disciplines to greater academic heights.115, 116 Faculty positions were 
reallocated to areas with research potential, strong job markets, or 
both, the aim being to sustain and build academic enrollment despite 
the image issues that had come with the Isla Vista problems. Tenure 
decisions became more selective. During the period from 1968 to 1971, 
there was a 60 percent concurrence between favorable 
recommendations of departments and recommendations of senate 
review committees. For 1971–4 this figure fell to 48 percent. As of 
1978, one in five tenure-track faculty members had been hired in the 
previous three years, and 35 percent of these 128 new appointments 
were at the rank of professor.117 
 Still, with this boost in size and faculty quality, UCSB’s extramural 
support in 1978 was less than 25 percent of the volume on the other 
UC general campuses, excluding Santa Cruz and Riverside. 118  The 
campus still had a substantial way to go in building to the stature of 
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most other UC campuses. However, major strides were made in the 
next fifteen years, despite campus leadership that was troubled in 
several ways. 
 With the age-related mandatory retirement of Vernon Cheadle in 
1977, Robert Huttenback, a historian of science from Caltech, was 
chosen as the next chancellor and served until his resignation in 1986. 
His time with the campus was turbulent. There were some strong 
accomplishments, but his manner and style occasioned the resignation 
of several top campus officials, including Alexander, another vice 
chancellor for academic affairs, and a dean of letters and science.119, 120 
Huttenback was also viewed by the Academic Senate as dismissive of 
faculty consultation. In addition, he got into legal and ethical 
difficulties121, 122 that resulted in his becoming the first faculty member 
to be formally dismissed by the Regents of the University of California. 
 In 1979 the investment of the campus in building academic 
strength in physics paid off as the campus won a competition held by 
the National Science Foundation to establish an Institute of Theoretical 
Physics. The request for proposals had drawn fifteen proposals from 
major universities.123, 124 The founding director of that institute was 
Walter Kohn, a theoretical physicist who subsequently won the Nobel 
Prize in Chemistry in 1998. The award of the institute also drew to 
UCSB Robert Schrieffer of the University of Pennsylvania, who had 
already received the Nobel Prize in 1972 for the development of the 
theory of superconductivity. The Institute of Theoretical Physics served 
as an effective catalyst for further academic development of the 
campus in related areas. Schrieffer became the second director. The 
institute is now the Kavli Institute for Theoretical Physics (figure 10-5), 
supported by the Kavli Foundation,125 and continues to be a highly 
visible pillar of strength for the campus. 
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The continued academic-building strategy was to invest selectively 
in those areas that matched Santa Barbara’s attributes with federal 
research funding sources and the availability of outstanding faculty. 
This approach paid off during the 1980s as multiple areas grew in 
distinction, including marine sciences (a strength continuing from early 
days, figure 10-6), materials science, chemical and nuclear engineering, 
remote sensing and other areas within geography, and 
multidisciplinary humanities activities., including award of the 
Interdisciplinary Humanities Center in 1987, where Santa Barbara was 
chosen over other UC competitors.127 
 Another important development during Huttenback’s time was 
the hiring of Robert Mehrabian from the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology as dean of engineering in 1983, coupled 
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with a big push for building engineering. During the 1980s, through 
Mehrabian’s efforts, the engineering faculty increased from fifty-four 
to ninety-five, and there was a major push toward multidisciplinary 
research activities and a consequent large increase in government-
funded organized research activities. In addition, a poll of engineering 
deans nationally recognized the program as being the number-one up-
and-coming engineering program. Engineering accounted for 21 
percent of UCSB’s extramural funding in the late 1980s.128 Mehrabian 
subsequently became president of Carnegie Mellon University and then 





Figure 10-6. Marine Biotechnology Laboratory, opened 1964, UCSB.129 
 
 
 After the resignation of Huttenback in 1986, UC president David 
Gardner took a healing step by appointing as interim chancellor Daniel 
Aldrich, the founding chancellor at Irvine (see below) and a person 
respected throughout the university. The search for a permanent 
chancellor then led to Barbara Uehling, chancellor at the University of 
Missouri, Columbia, who served as UCSB chancellor from 1987 until 
1994, when she was succeeded by Henry Yang, who now (2017) has  
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been chancellor for over twenty years. Uehling encountered difficulties 
of her own: being arrested the evening before her inauguration for 
driving while intoxicated, being viewed as having insulated herself from 
both faculty consultation and criticism as she focused upon external 
fund-raising, and facing but staving off a vote of no confidence from 
the faculty in 1993.130 
 Despite these administrative issues, the rises across the board in 
academic quality and recognition during the 1980s placed the 
University of California at Santa Barbara in a prominent and highly 
respected position. It was elected to the American Association of 
Universities (AAU) in 1995, the fourth UC campus to be so recognized 
after Berkeley, Los Angeles, and San Diego. (The Davis and Irvine 
campuses were elected a year later, in 1996.) In a ranking of research 
quality carried out by Graham and Diamond looking at data from the 
late 1980s, UC Santa Barbara and the Stony Brook campus of the State 
University of New York tied for second place behind UC Berkeley 
among Carnegie classification Research 1 public universities.131  
UC Santa Barbara now has the following impressive array of Nobel 
Laureates, some of whom did their prize-winning work while at UCSB 
and others of whom came subsequently to UCSB: 
 1972 Physics: J. Robert Schrieffer with John Bardeen and Leon 
Cooper, “for their jointly developed theory of super-
conductivity, usually called the BCS-theory”; work done at the 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 
 1988 Chemistry: Walter Kohn, “for his development of the 
density-functional theory”; work done at Carnegie Mellon, UC 
San Diego, and UC Santa Barbara 
 2000 Chemistry: Alan J. Heeger, “for the discovery and 
development of conductive polymers”; work done at University 
of Pennsylvania and UC Santa Barbara 
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 2000 Physics: Herbert Kroemer, “for developing semiconductor 
heterostructures used in high-speed and opto-electronics”; 
work done at several institutions in Germany and the United 
States 
 2004 Physics: David J. Gross, “for the discovery of asymptotic 
freedom in the theory of the strong interaction”; work done 
largely at Princeton 
 2004 Economic Sciences: Finn E. Kydland, “for contributions to 
dynamic macroeconomics: the time consistency of economic 
policy and the driving forces behind business cycles”; work 
done in Norway and the United States 
 2014 Physics: Shuji Nakamura, “for the invention of efficient 
blue light-emitting diodes, which has enabled bright and 
energy-saving white light sources”; work done in Japan 
Four of these prizes are in physics, and a fifth winner (Kohn) was a 
physicist. Three of them (Kohn, Schrieffer, and Gross) were directors of 
the Kavli Institute, thereby reflecting the importance of UCSB’s early 
emphasis on physics and the 1979 award of the Institute of Theoretical 
Physics in the National Science Foundation competition. 
 As of 2014, UC Santa Barbara had thirty-nine members of the 
National Academy of Science and twenty-four members of the National 
Academy of Engineering. 
 UC Santa Barbara has succeeded despite some major obstacles, 
overcoming the handicaps associated with beginning as a very different 
sort of institution, difficulties in style and other factors associated with 
three chancellors, and the negative images associated with the student 
unrest of the late 1960s and early 1970s. The success can be attributed 
to several factors, among them being the inherent strength of the 
University of California system and its methods and culture, some 
excellent strategic choices, an outstanding location and environment, 
and the steady and effective leadership at critical early times by 
persons such as Vernon Cheadle and Alec Alexander. 
 At the conclusion of her examination of UCSB, Nancy Diamond132 
concludes that these factors were crucial for the rise of UCSB: 
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1. The successful exploitation of the natural advantage of a 
unique California location (through emphasis on marine 
sciences, geography, and engineering) 
2. An inherited UC research-doctorate mission 
3. An ability to absorb a tidal wave of enrollments during the 
1960s, thus assuring the size necessary to support a significant 
program of research 
4. Effective leadership from UC president Clark Kerr, campus 
chancellor Vernon Cheadle, vice chancellor Alec Alexander, and 
the Academic Senate 
5. The development of unique research niches in marine sciences, 
theoretical physics, and engineering that matched federal 
funding priorities; and establishment of the NSF-sponsored 
Institute for Theoretical Physics (ITP) and subsequent national 
research centers 
6. Campus adaptability and nimbleness 
 
With regard to factor two, one should really cite the entire structure, 
culture, and traditions of the University of California. Factor three gave 
the ability, through numbers of faculty hires, for a rapid transition from 
the original state college to a research culture. Although size per se is 
certainly helpful, it is not a sine qua non, a fact witnessed by the 
success of Caltech, which has remained a very small institution. Factor 





 The Riverside campus had two precursors, an agricultural research 
facility and a small, liberal arts college. The Citrus Experiment Station133 
(figure 10-7), founded in 1907, was recognized throughout the world 
for its research on citrus fruit trees. That research evolved into other 
agricultural products as well. The liberal arts college, a College of 
Letters and Science known colloquially as “Watkins College” after its 
                                                     





founder, Gordon Watkins, a former UCLA dean of Letters and Sciences, 
was authorized by the Board of Regents of the University of California 
in 1949 and opened in 1954. Future vice president of the university 
Harry Wellman, 134  who was on the university committee that 
recommended the college, describes the intent as “to create a 
“Swarthmore of the West” where undergraduate instruction of the 





Figure 10-7. Citrus Experiment Station. ca. 1916. 136   This building, 




In the years immediately after its founding, the UC Riverside 
liberal arts college functioned impressively. It drew a capable faculty 
committed to undergraduate teaching in the spirit of the college. The 
high school grade point averages of students upon entry exceeded 
even those for Berkeley, and the college was the only public college 
ranked in the top ten of US liberal arts colleges in a national survey. 
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legendary figure, serving twenty-nine years as chancellor at UCLA 
(Chapter 10) and then as the president of the University of Florida.137 
 As of the mid-1950s, demographic projections, which later turned 
out to be overestimated (see chapter 3), led to the decisions to create 
three new campuses and to convert Santa Barbara, Davis, and Riverside 
to general campuses. Thus, in April 1959 upon Clark Kerr’s 
recommendation, the UC Regents approved the conversion of the 
Riverside campus into a general campus. The goal then became to 
convert it to a research university with both undergraduate and 
graduate study and with a much larger ultimate enrollment.138 
 On the surface it might appear than the combination of the well-
recognized agricultural research station and the liberal arts college 
might be a good starting point for evolution to a general campus, but 
that was not the case. First of all, the faculty of the liberal arts college 
had not been hired on the basis of being suitable for a research 
university; in fact, the college had drawn faculty members who wanted 
to focus solely upon undergraduate teaching and took pride in that 
fact. Secondly, the staff members of the Citrus Experiment Station 
were not the same sorts of researchers and were less suited to the 
needs of a general campus than were the Scripps researchers in the 
case of the founding of UC San Diego (see below). In the classical mode 
of agriculture research, they were much closer to the farmers and 
ranchers who made use of their work, and they were on full-year 
salaries, whereas the college faculty members were paid for only their 
academic-year instructional work. The college faculty members had 
nothing in common with the Experiment Station faculty and were even 
of a different age group, since nearly all the college faculty members 
had been hired at the entry level. The two groups looked down upon 
one another. 
 The difficulties became manifest in 1956, when Gordon Watkins, 
who had been given the provost title as on-site head of the campus, 
retired, and it was necessary to find a successor. As the only Academic 
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Senate members, the college faculty populated the faculty search 
committee and steadfastly provided only one name, in violation of a 
university policy that required search committees to forward more 
than one name. That one person was the dean of the College of Letters 
and Science of the college, who was vigorously opposed by the 
scientists of the Citrus Experiment Station, who would of course also 
come under the provost. Sproul resolved this impasse by naming as 
provost the dean of biological sciences within the college, Herman 
Spieth. 139  Spieth and most other biologists in the college were 
interested in research, as were many of the physical scientists. Also 
biology, albeit a fundamental science, was as close to the interests of 
the Experiment Station scientists as one could get within the college. 
Spieth had seven difficult years as chancellor as moves to graduate 
education and expanded enrollment were made. The Graduate Division 
at Riverside was established in 1960. 
 In hindsight, one can question the original decision to create the 
small, liberal arts college. The experiment was appealing as a way of 
emphasizing undergraduate education and individualized attention to 
undergraduate students. A similar short-lived experiment was being 
made at Santa Barbara at the same time from a different starting point, 
and a much grander experiment of a similar sort would be made at 
Santa Cruz a few years later. But why endeavor to maintain a small 
fifteen-hundred-student liberal arts college as part of the public 
research university, which would have to do its part in educating the 
children of the postwar baby boom and the surge of immigration to 
California? Why do it in a location so close to the successful private 
Claremont Colleges complex in Pomona? And why do it on a campus 
with such an unnatural coinhabitant as the Citrus Experiment Station? 
 In 1964 Chancellor Spieth resigned and transferred to the Davis 
campus so as to continue his teaching and research. Without a search, 
President Kerr recruited as replacement Ivan Hinderaker, who as 
academic vice chancellor had for two years been planning and 
recruiting the initial leaders for the new Irvine campus (see below). In 
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his oral history,140 Hinderaker describes the invitation and his decision 
as follows: 
The Irvine dedication [took] place on June 20, 1964. At eight 
o’clock the next morning in my office, Harry Wellman came in 
without any preliminaries or anything and said, “Clark and I 
want you to go to Riverside as Chancellor.” It was a complete 
surprise…Why I did go? Ok, it was a part of the University of 
California. I just kept the great seal of the university polished 
and clutched it tightly to my breast at all times. (chuckle) And 
I was being asked by the President and the Board of Regents, 
and I hadn’t applied for the job. OK. Getting UCR well 
established on a track consistent with the Master Plan was 
one of the critically important things for the university to do. 
That was a feeling expressed by the President, but rather 
generally throughout all of the campuses of the university. 
And, I just found it difficult to resist that challenge. My 
experiences as administrator, as chairman of the department 
at UCLA and Vice Chancellor here led me to feel that I might 
be able to handle what was then regarded as a very difficult 
problem. I liked administration, so I had to give it a try. And 
furthermore, my leaving was not creating a problem, because 
Peltason had been recruited as a Dean. 
Although Kerr does not state it explicitly, one can presume that 
Hinderaker was chosen in substantial measure because of his abilities 
to calm troubled waters. 
 In addition to the college-versus-experiment-station issue and the 
needs to initiate a graduate program and convert both preexisting 
entities into a single research university, Hinderaker inherited another 
problem and had yet another major one soon to arrive. The other 
inherited problem had to do with the fact that the founding college 
faculty members had all been hired at the entry level. Arthur Turner, 
who was somewhat more senior than the other college faculty and was 
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hired as associate professor and chairman (later dean) of social 
sciences, described some of the difficulties: 
 Not only in the Division of Social Sciences, but all the 
divisions on the whole campus, the level of initial 
appointment was extraordinarily low, and I think it was 
technically a mistake because we had extremely few people 
at a senior level. Hardly any people except the division 
chairmen, in fact, had tenure…This was an astonishingly low 
level of appointment and gave a certain kindergarten air to 
not only the students but the faculty. And of course it was a 
great consequence later on that people moved upwards into 
the various stages of promotion in step with each other. So 
instead of having almost everybody assistant professors, you 
had some years down the line everybody being associate 
professors and everybody being full professors and eventually 
everybody retiring at once, which was not good from any 
point of view. It would have been much better to do, as in 
fact the early chancellors at San Diego did, to have a decent 
distribution of positions over the various levels and ranks and 
to enable, therefore, the campus to get older in a more 
orderly and distributed manner among the various levels.141 
 Hinderaker carefully pursued a path of consolidation to get the 
college and the experiment station working together. In an approach 
that is seen again in the reorganization of biosciences at Berkeley 
fifteen years later (see chapter 12), Hinderaker started by appointing a 
special committee of six respected senior faculty members, three from 
the Citrus Experiment Station and three from the College of Letters and 
Science. After examining the issues involved, this committee 
recommended that the Division of Biological Sciences be removed from 
the College of Letters and Science and merged with what were then the 
nine departments in agriculture to form a new College of Biological and 
Agricultural Sciences.  
This recommendation was substantially opposed within the 
College of Letters and Science, which would be broken up, and by many 
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of the senior scientists in the Citrus Experiment Station, who now had 
senate membership by virtue of partial faculty appointments for their 
teaching. The recommendation was nonetheless endorsed by the two 
pertinent Academic Senate committees, Education Policy and Budget, 
which were both chaired by distinguished faculty members who could 
see the issues on a broader scale. The proposal went to a formal vote 
of the Letters and Science senate faculty, where it was opposed by a 
vote of 62 to 16 with 10 abstentions. From there it went to a full 
Senate vote, where it was opposed 101 to 31. However, in shared 
governance such Senate votes are advisory, and Hinderaker was able to 
trade upon the considerable respect and liking for him across the 
campus as well as the cover afforded to him by the special committee 
of senior faculty members and the two senate Committees. By “sailing 
tight to the wind,” as he described it, he was able to accept the 
proposal and institute the change in 1968, with the chair of the Division 
of Biological Sciences being named dean and the director of the Citrus 
Experiment Station being associate dean for research.142 In 1974 the 
physical sciences were brought into this college too, with the name 
then being changed to College of Natural and Agricultural Sciences.143 
 The major problem that arrived while Hinderaker was chancellor 
related to smog, publicity for it, and the resultant effects on student 
enrollment. Riverside is located such that the terrain and the generally 
west-to-east flow of air off the Pacific Ocean funnel the air from both 
the Los Angeles Basin and the Orange County area into Riverside. 
Following the morning-commute traffic, the resultant photochemical 
smog would flow to, and intensify in, Riverside in the early afternoon. 
Thus, although Riverside was not the primary generator, it was the 
recipient of the smog. The public relations problem for the campus was 
so severe that Hinderaker kept a collection of newspaper headlines 
from 1972 and 1973,144 which convey the picture: 
 
Toronto Star, “City Being Strangled by Smog” 
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Washington Post, “Smog Peril Spreads to Riverside California” (with 
photo of jogger wearing gas mask) 
 
New York Times, “Smog Alerts Blight Life in Riverside California. Angry 
Citizens Urge Drastic Action on Befouled Air” 
 
Los Angeles Times, “Riverside, A Black Eye for Fighting Smog” 
 
Honolulu Star Bulletin, “The Smog Capital of the World” 
 
San Francisco Chronicle, “Riverside’s War on Its Smog Image” 
(The lead paragraphs of each of the last three stories were about a senior 
professor who decided not to come to Riverside after reading the New 
York Times headline.) 
 
New York Times, “‘The Town That’s Choking to Death, Riverside 
California” [“The air is so bad that kids can’t play outdoors. The sun is 
rarely seen and they are beginning to grow oranges in oxygen tents. 
Riverside smog has become the object of national attention…”] 
 
Riverside Press-Enterprise, “Millions of Ill Persons in the U.S. Are Made 
Sicker by Smog” 
 
Oxnard Press Courier, “Prediction: The World’s Next Great Smog Disaster 
May Strike Riverside. Experts Believe Riverside Will Fall Victim of Smog” 
 
Torrance South Daily Breeze, “You Need To Feel Your Way To Class in 
Riverside” 
 
Los Angeles Times, “Regents Ponder UC Riverside’s Future as Enrollment 
Dips” 
 
San Francisco Chronicle, “UC Regents Try to Revive Riverside Campus” 
 
Los Angeles Herald Express, “Smog Location Blamed for UC Riverside 
Decline” 
 
Oakland Tribune, “Enrollment Drop Alarms Regents” 
 
Pasadena Star News, “Students Decline Mystery. UC Riverside Rolls 
Drop” 




Anaheim Bulletin, “UC Riverside Budget Cut” 
 
The last six of these headlines refer to the natural result of the 
earlier headlines and stories. The enrollments at the Riverside campus 
actually dropped from 6,200 in 1971 to 4,600 in 1978 and then stayed 
essentially flat at 4,600–4,800 for another six years.145 Since funding 
was based on enrollment, budget dropped too. This situation led to 
widespread rumors that the Riverside campus would be closed. 
 There were some other facts besides smog that contributed to the 
enrollment issue. Kerr notes that “the city of Riverside, with its 
Victorian ambience, proved to be something of a cultural desert from a 
1960s student’s point of view.”146 Further, Hinderaker,147 Turner,148 and 
Kerr149 all note the effects of competition from the nearby Irvine 
campus, less than an hour away by automobile. 
 The Riverside campus itself actually contributed to the ultimate 
solution to this problem.  Control of photochemical smog was a major 
scientific and technological accomplishment. The sources and 
mechanisms of formation of photochemical smog were worked out by 
Arie Haagen-Smit and associates of Caltech during the 1950s and 
1960s.150 At UC Riverside the Statewide Air Pollution Research Center 
had been founded in 1961 by James N. Pitts, an original faculty 
member. Upon his death in 2014, the chair of the California Air 
Resources Board said, “Jim Pitts was probably the single person most 
responsible for the understanding of what strategies we need to clean 
up Southern California’s air. He was able to explain all of this in English 
to policymakers so that they would be able to accept that it was going 
to take extensive and difficult actions to control emissions.” 151 
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Ultimately, positive crankcase ventilation (1961), the requirement of 
catalytic converters for automobiles (1975), and the elimination of lead 
in gasoline (1976) led to near elimination of the smog problem for Los 
Angeles and Orange Counties and thereby Riverside. The 
understanding of the mechanism of photochemical smog and the 
ensuing work with government and industry to develop methods to 
control it are prime examples of the contributions of academic 
research to improving modern life. 
 The Statewide Air Pollution Research Center later became part of 
CE-CERT, the Bourns College of Engineering Center for Environmental 
Research Technology (figure 10-8). In 2016 UC Riverside was chosen by 
the State of California Air Resources Board for a $366 million 
investment as the new home of its motor vehicle and engine emissions 
testing and research facility.152 This is a striking case of making a silk 
purse (outstanding research accomplishments that serve the state) out 





Figure 10-8. Center for Environmental Research and Technology (CE-CERT),  
University of California, Riverside, courtesy of CE-CERT153 
 
 
 The first PhD program at Riverside began in chemistry in 1960. By 
the end of Hinderaker’s fifteen years as chancellor in 1979, there were 
twenty-nine PhD programs and thirty master’s programs. Over a 
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thousand PhDs and twenty-five hundred master’s degrees had been 
awarded, and the student body had become 25 percent graduate 
students.154 But perhaps Hinderaker’s main contribution, noted by 
many, was simply to keep the campus going and improving during the 
difficult period in which he was chancellor. 
 Hinderaker’s chancellorship was followed by a rather tortured 
thirteen years, during which there was frequent turnover due to deaths 
and other reasons. Tomás Rivera, a noted Mexican American author 
and poet who had been executive vice president of the University of 
Texas at El Paso (UTEP) succeeded Hinderaker in 1979 but died 
unexpectedly in 1984. He was succeeded by Theodore Hullar, a 
biochemist who had come to UCR that same year as executive vice 
chancellor after being director of the Agricultural Experiment Station at 
Cornell. In 1987, President Gardner moved Hullar from Riverside to the 
chancellorship of the Davis campus. At the same time he appointed as 
Riverside Chancellor Rosemary Schraer, a biochemist who had come 
from Pennsylvania State University in 1985 to be executive vice 
chancellor under Hullar. Schraer died unexpectedly in 1992, a few 
months before her term was to end, at a time when Raymond Orbach, 
a physicist who had been provost for letters and science at UCLA, had 
already been selected as the next UCR chancellor. 
 The image that Hullar was apparently being upgraded in his move 
from Riverside to Davis and the appointment of Schraer without a 
search were both seen as degrading to the campus by many faculty 
members at Riverside; see, for example, reflections by Carney155 and 
Turner.156 
 Orbach served a stabilizing ten-year period as chancellor, from 
1992 until 2002, during which time the campus advanced in both 
distinction and enrollment. When Orbach left in 2002 to become 
director and then under secretary for science in the US Department of 
Energy, Executive Vice Chancellor David Warren was acting chancellor 
until a search yielded the appointment of France Córdova, a physicist 
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who had been chief scientist at NASA and then vice chancellor for 
research at UC Santa Barbara. Córdova served from 2002 to 2007, 
when she became president of Purdue University and then later 
director of the National Science Foundation. Robert Grey, former 
executive vice chancellor at UC Davis, then served as interim chancellor 
for somewhat over a year while a search was done to recruit Timothy 
White, president of the University of Idaho and former Berkeley faculty 
member. White served, again in an effective and stabilizing capacity, 
for four and a half years through December 2012, when he became 
president of the California State University system. He was then 
followed by an eight-month interim chancellor, Jane Close Conoley, 
who had been dean of the Graduate School of Education at UC Santa 
Barbara. The current chancellor (2017), who started in January 2014, is 
Kim Wilcox, who had been provost of Michigan State University. 
 From this synopsis, one can see that the leadership of the 
Riverside campus over the past thirty-six years has been an up-and-
down affair, with some very effective longer-term chancellors, most 
notably Hinderaker and Orbach, interspersed with shorter-term 
chancellors, some of whom have been lured to other major 
universities. 
 Nonetheless, the Riverside campus is now fully established and 
secure and is steadily making inroads. There are now six members of 
the National Academy of Sciences and two of the National Academy of 
Engineering157 on the faculty. The enrollment for fall 2015 was 21,539, 
a notable recovery from the depressed-enrollment situation with which 
Ivan Hinderaker had to cope in the 1970s. In fact, the campus has 
become selective, in the sense that more UC-eligible students now 
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UC SAN FRANCISCO 
 
The San Francisco campus of the University of California underwent 
extremely rapid development of research stature, going from a 
situation as late as 1964, when it was a relatively conventional but 
undistinguished medical school and a minor player in research, to 
worldwide recognition achieved during the 1970s and multiple Nobel 
Prize winners on the faculty. (Two of its faculty members received the 
Nobel Prize in 1989, and other Nobel Prizes were awarded in 1997, 
2009 and 2012.) How did this happen? 
 As described in chapter 2, a number of professional schools of 
various sorts were established in San Francisco in the last part of the 
nineteenth century and were affiliated with the University of California. 
Several of these—the Tolman Medical College (later known as the 
Medical Department), the California College of Pharmacy, and the 
Department of Dentistry—became the basis for what is now the San 
Francisco campus of the University of California.158, 159 The original 
affiliations were on a self-sustaining basis financially, meaning that the 
Board of Regents of UC appropriated no funding to them. From the 
standpoints of these school and departments, the stature achieved by 
affiliation was enough of a gain. 
 When a tract of thirteen acres of land on Parnassus Heights south 
of Golden Gate Park was donated to the University of California in 1895 
by San Francisco mayor Adolph Sutro for the purpose, the three 
colleges moved to that location and became known as the Affiliated 
Colleges.160 A building was also created there for the Hastings College 
of Law, but Hastings never moved to it from its downtown San 
Francisco site. That building was then used to hold the extensive 
worldwide archeological collections that had been acquired and 
donated to the university by Phoebe Apperson Hearst (see chapter 2). 
 The Affiliated Colleges lost building space in downtown San 
Francisco in the great fire that stemmed from the earthquake of 1906. 
This loss required more space for clinical operations at Parnassus 
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Heights, which was generated by the move of the basic science 
departments (pathology, anatomy, physiology) of the medical school to 
the Berkeley campus. The first two years of medical education were 
then being taken at Berkeley.161 This arrangement served to strengthen 
academic ties for the clinically oriented Medical Department. However, 
over time it weakened the appreciation for science and engagement in 
research by the medical faculty in San Francisco. 
 The establishment of the UC Training School for Nurses in 1907 
added a fourth professional school to the Affiliated Colleges. During his 
time as UC president, Benjamin Ide Wheeler persuaded the Board of 
Regents to accept full financial responsibility for the Medical and 
Dental Departments, including meeting the payroll. Thus, affiliation 
ended for these units and subsequently pharmacy and nursing, and 
they became integral parts of the university.162 In 1949 the regents 
renamed the Parnassus Heights campus the UC Medical Center in San 
Francisco. Until 1954 the deans of what had been the Affiliated 
Colleges had all reported independently and directly to the UC 
president, but in that year they became the Executive Committee with 
the dean of medicine as chair of that committee and chief executive 
officer of the Medical Center.163 As Clark Kerr became University of 
California president in 1958, he gave the dean of medicine the title 
provost, and in 1965 the provost title was changed to chancellor.164 
 Also in 1958, Kerr ended the arrangement whereby the basic 
sciences supporting medical education and hence the first two years of 
medical school had been at Berkeley. Physiology, biochemistry, and 
anatomy were moved back to the Parnassus Heights site in San 
Francisco.165 Pathology had moved back earlier, and pharmacology and 
bacteriology were already at Parnassus Heights.166 The space enabling 
the remaining basic science departments to move back was freed by a 
decision of Stanford University to consolidate its medical education in 
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Palo Alto. Stanford had until 1958 been using clinical facilities at 
Parnassus Heights in San Francisco. However, Bourne167 notes that 
many of the most distinguished researchers in those scientific 
disciplines that were moved back from Berkeley to UCSF chose to stay 
at Berkeley, which they saw as providing a richer intellectual climate. 
Bourne also observes that the research of those who did move to San 
Francisco “proved more sleepy than exciting.” 
 Thirteen years later, in 1971, a joint medical program was created 
between UC San Francisco and UC Berkeley, whereby about 10 percent 
of the students in the incoming class in medicine for USCF take the first 
three years of a five-year program at Berkeley, obtaining a master’s 
degree (originally in any of various disciplinary areas but now in the 
Health and Medical Sciences at UC Berkeley's School of Public Health) 
on their way to the MD degree. 
 Kerr’s structural changes in 1958 set the stage for the subsequent 
rise of UCSF in research stature, but changes in leadership, outlook, 
and hiring practices were also needed before the ascent could start in 
earnest. The culture and leadership at UCSF were still heavily clinically 
oriented and generally did not recognize the value of research 
supporting and being integrated with clinical practice. This outlook was 
particularly true for the initial chancellor, John Saunders. There were, 
however, pockets of research activity and belief in its value. A “coup” 
of sorts occurred in 1964 when a group of research-valuing leaders 
from the campus sought a meeting with Kerr to push for the removal of 
Saunders. This group was led by the director of the Cardiovascular 
Research Institute, Julius Comroe, and included both Dean of Medicine 
William Reinhardt and chair of the Department of Medicine L. H. (Holly) 
Smith. Kerr arranged for the vice president of the university, Harry 
Wellman, to meet with the group and upon finding that there was 
much substance to the complaints, consulted widely and made the 
difficult decision to remove Saunders. So as to calm the troubled 
waters as much as possible and minimize perceptions of winners and 
losers, Kerr also arranged the resignation of Reinhardt as dean of 
medicine, and for a new Chancellor he took the unusual step of 
                                                     




selecting the dean of dentistry, Willard Fleming, who was a respected 
and a capable healer.168, 169 
 Henry Bourne170 has explored the specific careers of four of the 
most important individuals in the rise of UCSF to preeminent research 
distinction during the 1970s—three Nobel Prize winners (J. Michael 
Bishop,171 Harold Varmus, and Stanley Prusiner) and the co-inventor of 
recombinant DNA and cofounder of Genetech Corporation,172 Herbert 
Boyer.173 Bourne has sought to identify the ways in which particular 
structures, policies, and leadership at UCSF affected their selection and 
growth as faculty members and the development of their careers and 
accomplishments. He cites a “Great Man Theory of History” that 
pervades UCSF, involving as heroes “a pioneering scientist with a 
brilliant mind and fiery temperament” (Comroe) and “a shrewd, 
charismatic physician, skilled in the magic of persuading others” 
(Smith). There is a “dastardly villain” (Saunders). These heroes, plus 
others, constitute the “aces, kings, queens, and jacks (‘face cards’) that 
always appear to dominate history’s otherwise anonymous deck.” 
Finally there are the four scientists about whom he writes, who 
“arrived on the USCF scene unheralded and obscure, but quietly 
became wild cards with unexpected transformative qualities.”174 He 
then explores the question of what the face cards (leaders) had to do 
with the discoveries made by the particular wild cards (scientists) and 
finds the answer to be surprisingly little. The scientists arrived upon 
their own volitions, researched in remarkably confined and unequipped 
space, and largely on their own hit upon great ideas and discoveries. 
 But there is indeed a strong connection between the leadership, 
structure, and culture of UCSF and its rise toward outstanding science. 
In a penultimate chapter entitled, “Something in the Water: Can We 
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Bottle It?,” Bourne concludes that UCSF supplied three essentials 
toward the careers of these outstanding researchers: “(1) the 
opportunity for adventures at a new frontier; (2) freedom to apply skill 
and passionate effort to asking questions, without unnecessary 
constraints from funding sources, supervisors, and pressures for quick 
results or conformity to prevailing views; and (3) material resources 
adequate to the task.”175 The first factor relates to the excitement of 
someone from the eastern United States coming to California to find a 
new and more open society, encouragement of experimentation, and 
the lure of a glorious outdoors capped by the Sierra Nevada mountain 
range.176 With regard to the second factor, he notes the importance of 
a benevolent mentor, Leon Levintow, whom Bishop had followed from 
the National Institutes of Health to UCSF, as Varmus followed Bishop.177 
Bourne notes that the same enabling factor applied strongly to the 
accomplishments of James Watson and Francis Crick as they unraveled 
the double-helix structure of DNA178 and cites a quote attributed to 
Watson, “It is necessary to be slightly underemployed if you are to do 
something significant.” Boyer, on the other hand, found himself stifled, 
especially by space limitations, in the Department of Microbiology, 
which he did not find to provide a welcoming atmosphere. At his own 
instigation, he transferred to the Department of Biochemistry and 
Biophysics in 1975, as he recognized the very different environment 
provided by the approaches of William Rutter and Gordon Tompkins in 
that department,179 now to described. 
 The actual building of the science enterprise to excellence was 
launched with the 1968 recruitment of William Rutter as chair of the 
Department of Biochemistry and Biophysics. Securing Rutter was the 
result of a long and arduous search that was led by Holly Smith, Bert 
Dunphy (head of surgery), and William Reinhardt, who was now in the 
position of associate dean of medicine. After a search in which 
“probably every good scientist in the United States had been asked to 
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take that job,”180 Rutter, who at the time was professor in both 
genetics and biochemistry at the University of Washington, was 
persuaded to accept. In doing so, he indicated that he was moved in 
large measure by the strong interests of the clinical leaders in 
developing research of the highest quality in the science departments 
and the availability of what became twenty open faculty positions to 
fill.181 Also important was a dinner set up to include Rutter and Gordon 
Tompkins, a capable and inspiring biochemist at the National Institutes 
of Health who had previously been approached for the UCSF position. 
Rutter and Tompkins effectively recruited one another (i.e., each was 
attracted by the opportunity to work with the other as a team). 
 A striking feature of UCSF in comparison with other medical and 
health science institutions became the close cooperation and valuing of 
one another by the research and clinical enterprises, forming “a 
genuine partnership that made each partner stronger.”182 There are 
several striking manifestations of the partnership. One was an unusual 
use of a “dean’s tax” on clinical income that was used to support basic 
science.183 Another was the involvement of three top clinicians (Smith, 
Dunphy, and Reinhardt) in leading the UCSF search that obtained 
Rutter to fill the biochemistry post, a very important position in 
fundamental science. A third was the prominent involvement of 
clinicians (Reinhardt, Smith, and others) in the effort to convince Kerr 
and Wellman to replace Saunders as chancellor. Rutter explains that at 
the time “it was unpopular to do basic science in a medical school. The 
best science was really being practiced outside medical schools. The 
relationship between the clinical sciences and the basic sciences in 
medical schools generally was strained, perhaps because of 
consistently diverging interests. There was no easy way to address 
mechanistically and from a molecular point of view the most important 
problems of clinical medicine. Science had not progressed far enough 
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to be able to ask sophisticated questions about complex physiology and 
clinical phenomena.”184 
 Bourne,185 building upon earlier observations by Smith,186 notes 
that the creation of the synergistic partnership between the clinical and 
scientific research sides of the house required a major shift in 
institutional culture at UCSF that began with the transfer of the science 
departments back across San Francisco Bay from Berkeley to Parnassus 
Heights, followed by eight key developments that helped to bond the 
partners. Those developments were 
1. Construction of both hospital and research facilities at the 
Parnassus site 
2. Medicare, which reimbursed cost of care for many more 
patients and allowed recruitment of first-rate clinicians 
3. Early replacement of the old guard (Saunders and others) 
by new leaders who valued both research and patient care 
4. Early models of research excellence provided by Comroe’s 
CVRI and William Rutter’s rejuvenation of the Department 
of Biochemistry (see below) 
5. Increasing cooperation and synergy between clinical and 
basic science departments 
6. The fundamental discoveries of Boyer, Bishop, Varmus, 
Prusiner, and others, which opened avenues to 
understanding disease mechanisms and developing 
effective new therapies 
7. The birth of Genentech and the biotech industry 
8. Continually increasing National Institutes of Health 
funding. 
In his introduction to Rutter’s oral history, Holly Smith writes: 
Leadership is difficult to define but easy to recognize in 
action. There is no single style that makes effective 
academic leadership, which has been defined as the 
singular ability of an individual to stand up and pull the 
rest of us over the horizon. Suffice it to say that the 
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arrival of the Rutter-Tomkins team almost immediately 
began to transform the climate of the whole basic 
science community at UCSF. New standards of 
performance were both exhibited and demanded. Bill 
had then, and still retains, an innate and uncanny ability 
to judge people. It has been said that horse sense is the 
good sense horses have not to bet on people. But 
academic leadership depends, in considerable measure, 
in betting on people, especially during the ascending 
curves of their respective careers. The appointments in 
Bill’s department were astutely made and many of these 
individuals remain today as leaders of our campus. 
Fortunately, Bill Rutter fostered lateral dendrites as well, 
such that UCSF’s whole basic science community 
synaptically improved in parallel with the 
transformations that were so evident in the Department 
of Biochemistry and Biophysics. 
Several aspects of Rutter’s approach and leadership at UCSF are 
evident in those remarks and can be summarized as follows. 
 The intellectual atmosphere that Rutter and Tomkins created and 
sustained. Working with and through Tompkins, Rutter built a 
culture of free and open intellectual exchange where scientists 
would discuss problems and needs together.187 To quote Rutter,188 
“We began developing an intensively interactive culture. We got 
together as a group to talk science. We developed an active 
seminar program.” There are strong shades here of the intellectual 
atmosphere that arrived at Berkeley with Gilbert Lewis in 1912. 
Tomkins died in 1975 as a result of a tragic illness, but his style and 
contributions to science at UCSF survived him. 
 Building the faculty through a complementary, multidisciplinary 
approach. While recognizing that faculty would need to build 
strong research programs of their own, Rutter and Tomkins sought 
and fostered collaboration and multidisciplinary approaches and 
focused the activities of the department broadly upon the 
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structural-functional aspects of fundamental genetic 
macromolecules, nucleic acids, and proteins relating to human 
genetics. As Rutter noted, “One didn’t know from which branch of 
science the solutions would come. The issues were 
multidimensional; there wasn’t just one simple solution. There had 
to be chemical solutions, genetic solutions, structure solutions, 
biological solutions. If you didn’t have all these approaches working 
collectively, the risk would be higher.”189 This emphasis fit in a very 
timely fashion with the explosion of fundamental knowledge and 
capabilities in molecular biology that was occurring at the time and 
placed UCSF in a prime position for discovery and accomplishment. 
Rutter’s approach here is again reminiscent of Lewis’s approach of 
focusing Berkeley chemistry on broad and current issues of the 
rapidly developing field of physical chemistry, where faculty 
members could reinforce one another while still having 
independent programs and not being so different in interests and 
expertise that interactions and mutual reinforcement would not be 
possible. 
In moving toward these capabilities, Rutter generated still 
more open positions by encouraging those faculty members who 
did not fit the plan or who were unproductive or problematic in 
other ways to leave. He even expended considerable effort in 
working to get them good positions elsewhere. 190  Building a 
multidisciplinary team working on molecular issues of human 
genetics from a variety of directions was enabled by the unusually 
large number of faculty recruitments that could be made over a 
relatively short time. Rutter’s personal style generated a wide 
spread of reactions among the faculty, particularly the younger 
ones,191 but the value of his approaches and goals was so widely 
appreciated that he stayed on as chair of biochemistry and 
biophysics until 1982, a tenure of fourteen years. Joint 
appointments were used more sparingly, but Michael Bishop, Leon 
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Leventow, and Herbert Boyer of Microbiology were all brought into 
biochemistry and biophysics through joint appointments.192 
 Astute judgment and assessment of the research potential of 
scientists. Echoing Holly Smith’s comments above, Julius Krevans, 
who was dean of medicine from 1971 to 1982, and chancellor from 
1982 to 1993, noted that Rutter “was blessed with a sommelier’s 
taste in judging scientific promise.”193 Rutter and Tompkins worked 
as a team in aggressively going out and finding and recruiting 
outstanding new, usually early-career, faculty members.194 This too 
evokes the practices of Lewis, and later Pitzer, at Berkeley. 
 Enabling and facilitating the spread of the biochemistry and 
biophysics approaches to other departments. Julius Krevans 
indicated that, in his role as dean of medicine, he would not release 
a faculty position for recruitment to other science departments 
unless they had someone from biochemistry and biophysics on 
their recruitment team. This, of course, was an effort to spread the 
values and judgments of Rutter, Tompkins, and their colleagues 
beyond their own department. That insistence initially caused 
resentments; for example, pharmacology simply decided not to 
recruit. 195  Recognition of that issue and perceptions that 
biochemistry/biophysics was being greatly favored budgetarily led 
Rutter to work to transform “ourselves from a position of being 
somewhat antagonistic towards the other groups to a position of 
helping others to develop their programs in order to develop a 
more distinguished scientific community.” Asked if that meant that 
he and the department became, in effect, a catalyst, Rutter replied 
that was true.196 
Another perspective on Rutter and his influence comes from Edward 
Penhoet, who followed Rutter as a student and coworker from the 
University of Illinois to the University of Washington, was close to him 
in the UCSF years, and then cofounded Chiron Corporation with him. 
Penhoet observes that Rutter has always had an intense work ethic. 
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Speaking of the Rutter lab at UCSF, he says, “I’ve never known a place 
in which people worked so hard, and I think it’s the main reason it’s 
been successful. I don’t think the raw talent of that group of people at 
UCSF in the seventies was any greater than any other place. I respect 
them all tremendously; that’s not the point. They were a somewhat 
above-average group of scientists who were way above average in 
terms of productivity, in large part because everybody in the place 
worked seven days a week, eighteen hours a day. And that still exists 
today to some degree.”197, 198 
 It is interesting to contrast Rutter’s opportunity to build a 
cohesive, interactive, and multidimensional molecular approach to 
modern biology with the situation in which the Berkeley campus found 
itself in the late 1970s, when aspects of biology were spread out over 
many different departments that were divided by types of organism. 
Although elements of modern biology had entered many of those 
departments, those faculty members did not have such facile ways to 
interact across department lines. Berkeley’s massive reorganization of 
biology in the early 1980s (chapter 12) was carried out so as to achieve 
the kind of organizational structure that Rutter and Tompkins had 
already been able to create, bottom up, at San Francisco. Thus the 
northern University of California story begins with the sciences 
underlying medicine being at Berkeley since shortly after the 1906 
earthquake and fire and then continues with the strongest aspects of 
those sciences remaining at Berkeley as the science departments 
themselves were moved back to San Francisco in 1958. This was 
followed by UCSF, through Rutter and Tomkins, building a highly 
synergistic, multidisciplinary enterprise at UCSF, which in turn provided 
both the need and a key model for Berkeley to undergo its large 
reorganization in 1980 and subsequent years to reach the sorts of 
capabilities that then already existed at UCSF. 
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 The nature of the Rutter-Tompkins design for biochemistry and 
biophysics at UCSF positioned it well for UCSF people to take a lead 
role in the nascent biotechnology industry, which had and still has its 
major hubs of activity in California in the areas of San Francisco and San 
Diego (see chapter 18). Penhoet199 summarized his views on why that 
was as follows: 
I think the move to the University of Washington was a 
crucial move for Bill in the sense that it started this whole era 
of the integration of biochemistry and medicine, which was 
[later] fully developed at UCSF. The other reason that UCSF 
was so powerfully involved in the early days of biotechnology 
was because it was pregnant with people who were really 
interested in gene structure and gene function. So once Herb 
[Boyer] and Stan [Cohen] had done the cloning experiments, 
their application to medicine went whoosht, just like that, like 
wildfire through UCSF. Because the place was ready to do it. 
 The key experiments establishing recombinant DNA technology 
were carried out in 1973 by Boyer and his collaborator, Stanley Cohen 
of Stanford, and were published in 1974. Later in 1974 Niels Reimers, 
heading the patent office at Stanford, filed the application for what 
would become the most fundamental patent for the new 
biotechnology industry. Following an initial meeting initiated by 
twenty-eight-year-old venture-capital entrepreneur Robert Swanson 
with Boyer in January 1976, the two of them cofounded Genentech 
Corporation in that same year to exploit the technology 
commercially.200 In March, 2009, Genetech became part of the Roche 
Group for an acquisition price of $46.8 billion201 for the outstanding 
shares (Roche already held shares) and has been number one in US 
sales of oncology products since 2006. Five years later, in 1981, Rutter, 
Penhoet, and Pablo Valenzuela (also a faculty member in biochemistry 
and biophysics at UCSF) founded Chiron Corporation, which also 
succeeded handsomely and is now part of Novartis. 
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Throughout the development of research stature in the 1970s and 
on into the 1980s and 1990s, the Parnassus Heights UCSF campus had 
very limited space, particularly prime research space, even though the 
campus did build upward there (figure 10-9). The campus acquired 
additional sites elsewhere in San Francisco at a former Fireman’s Fund 
office building at Laurel Heights (1985)202 and a complex around the 





Figure 10-9. Aerial view of UCSF Parnassus Heights campus, the cluster 
of higher buildings below Mount Sutro203 
 
 
Finally, in 2003, an additional campus in the Mission Bay area 
south of downtown San Francisco was opened (figure 10-10). The site is 
much larger than the Parnassus Heights campus and the other sites and  
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has been developed by UCSF working in concert with a private 
developer (Catellus Corporation) and the city of San Francisco. The 
overall site design has been to have a central campus core of molecular 
biology research surrounded by hospitals and clinical services as well as 
by corporate laboratories and other biotechnology facilities that value 
proximity to UCSF Mission Bay research. There are also living 





Figure 10-10. The initial UCSF building at Mission Bay (Genentech Hall)  
under construction, 2002205 
 
 
As of 2014, UCSF had forty-nine members of the National Academy 
of Sciences and ninety-two members of the National Academy of 
Medicine. There have been five Nobel Prize winners, all in physiology 
or medicine: 
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 1989: J. Michael Bishop and Harold Varmus, “for their discovery of 
the cellular origin of retroviral oncogenes”; work done at UCSF 
 1997: Stanley Prusiner, “for his discovery of Prions—a new 
biological principle of infection”; work done at UCSF 
 2009: Elizabeth Blackburn, “for the discovery of how chromosomes 
are protected by telomeres and the enzyme telomerase”; work 
done at Yale, UC Berkeley, and UCSF 
 2012: Shinya Yamanaka, “for the discovery that mature cells can 
be reprogrammed to become pluripotent”; work done at the UCSF-
affiliated Gladstone Institute and in Japan 
 
 Beyond its medical services to the community, UCSF has had very 
large beneficial effects on the economies of San Francisco, the Bay 
Area, and California (chapter 14). Those benefits have been achieved 
through catalytic leadership that capitalized on the wave of advances in 
molecular biological sciences that led to the biotechnology industry, as 




UC SAN DIEGO 
 
 The presence of the University of California in the San Diego area 
began with studies of marine biology and then oceanography. William 
Ritter, professor and department chair of zoology at Berkeley in 1903, 
developed a research tie with the Marine Biological Research 
Association of San Diego. Together they gained funding from the 
Scripps newspaper publishing family and with it in 1905 built a 
laboratory by the ocean shore in La Jolla, north of San Diego. The 
University of California took over responsibility for that laboratory in 
1912, and in 1925 changed the name from Scripps Institution for 
Biological Research to Scripps Institution for Oceanography (SIO) to 
recognize the evolving mission. Over the years, the institution attracted 
outstanding scientists and leaders, including the following, who served 
as directors: oceanographers Harald Sverdrup (1936–48) and Roger 
Revelle (1951–61), Berkeley physicist William Nierenberg (1961–86), 




robust starting point by being a preexisting, first-class component, with 
strong scientists and leaders who could join in on designing and 
developing UCSD. 
Roger Revelle (figure 10-11) was the major figure in the academic 
design and initial recruitment for UC’s San Diego campus. An 
outstanding scientist, he was one of the first to recognize that carbon 
dioxide released to the atmosphere through the use of fossil fuels 
would bring about global warming.206 He realized the value of bringing 
the science and engineering disciplines together as needed to address 
complex issues and did so very effectively. In the words of Clark Kerr,207 
“his great strengths were in identifying talent and recruiting it.” For 
those interested in learning more about him, a four-volume oral history 
of Revelle exists208 but unfortunately does not cover his roles in the 





Figure 10-11.  Roger Revelle at the Scripps Institute of Oceanography Pier209 
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As SIO director during the 1950s, Revelle urged that a full-fledged 
University of California degree-granting program come to San Diego in 
the form of an ultra-select graduate program in science and 
engineering at La Jolla. In this he gained the support of many leaders of 
the San Diego community, who saw it as a path to economic 
development and diversification of an economy that had been focused 
heavily upon military needs during World War II and thereafter. 
 The plan proposed by Revelle as his “Cathedral on a Bluff” had 
several unusual components.210, 211, 212, 213 One was that the campus 
should be relatively small and directed toward multidisciplinary science 
and engineering, on the model of a graduate-level-only Caltech. The 
campus should be built from the top down, in the sense that 
outstanding established stars would be hired as the initial faculty. 
These faculty members would be hired without regard to any specific 
design as to which fields should be built initially; the flexibility to hire 
outstanding, accomplished, well-regarded people was more important. 
The campus would also be built from the outside in, meaning that 
there would be no effort to provide comprehensive coverage among 
disciplines or even within a discipline. The campus would be built one 
academic field, or a small number of fields, at a time in order to create 
a stimulating critical mass of scholars in each. The fields in which the 
initial hires were made would drive the academic direction of the 
campus. Academic instruction would be through multidisciplinary 
“divisions of instruction,” and research would be carried out through 
three multidisciplinary institutes—the Benjamin Franklin Institute 
directed toward societal problems; the Alfred North Whitehead 
Institute which would address pure reason; and the Charles Darwin 
Institute devoted to the study and description of the physical world. 
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 In 1956 the Revelle plan was reviewed by two University of 
California committees. In addition to review by the Academic Senate 
Education Policy Committee, which would occur anyhow, President 
Sproul appointed a university-wide committee, possibly to help offset 
an anticipated negative review from the senate committee. The special 
committee was chaired by Berkeley chemist Glenn Seaborg. It also 
contained Vice President James Corley, Ernest Lawrence, Joel 
Hildebrand, and engineering dean “Mike” O’Brien from Berkeley, as 
well as engineering dean L. M. K. Boelter, physicist Joseph Kaplan, and 
Institute of Geophysics director Louis Schlichter from UCLA. All these 
members were distinguished scientists or engineers except for 
Corley),214 The select committee endorsed the plan, with the important 
exception that the members believed that the organization of the 
campus should be with along conventional departments rather than 
the institutes.215 Despite what did turn out to be objections from the 
Education Policy Committee of the Academic Senate after their 
deliberations, described by Taylor,216 Sproul transmitted the modified 
plan to the regents, who approved it in August 1956 as “a graduate 
program in science and technology, with such undergraduate 
instruction as is essential to support the graduate program.”217 With 
this endorsement, General Dynamics, a large employer in the area, 
pledged $1 million to support recruitment of faculty, and the city of 
San Diego voted to transfer a large tract of land near the SIO site to the 
university for the project.218, 219 
 The approach taken by Sproul here can be seen as another form of 
the strategy undertaken by Hinderaker at UC Riverside to consolidate 
biological sciences and agriculture into a single college (see above), and 
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that taken by Heyman and Park to restructure biological sciences at 
Berkeley (see chapter 12). The use of a select committee of 
intellectually highly respected faculty served to offset anticipated 
negative reactions from the Academic Senate, thereby enabling a 
controversial decision to be made. 
 The new campus opened in 1957 as the Institute of Science and 
Engineering, later called School of Science and Engineering at La 
Jolla.220 Because of growing undergraduate enrollment pressure for UC 
as a whole, the Board of Regents almost immediately augmented the 
mission to evolve over time to “a large campus…fulfilling the functions 
of a major university including both undergraduate and graduate 
instruction…”221 Revelle was made director of the new campus as well 
as of SIO, and dean of the new school. 
 Equipped with the plan, the regents’ authorizations, and the $1 
million from General Dynamics, Revelle went energetically about hiring 
faculty. Atkinson222 observes that Revelle would sometimes recruit 
faculty before he had actual authority to do so, paying them with 
federal research funds and promising that when the school was 
officially established, they would receive their appropriate academic 
appointments. Several prominent Scripps Institution of Oceanography 
researchers became founding faculty members and were effective 
lieutenants to Revelle in identification of prospects and recruitment. 
Among them were Carl Eckart, Walter Munk, Leonard Liebermann, Ed 
Goldberg, Harmon Craig, and Hans Suess.223 Among the criteria for 
identifying the first faculty members were a top-notch established 
reputation or equivalent promise and effectiveness as faculty recruiters 
themselves. 
 Revelle’s first hire was indeed eye-catching—Harold Urey, the G. 
N. Lewis Berkeley chemistry graduate who had won the Nobel Prize in 
1932 for his work on deuterium and had been at Columbia and then  
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Chicago.224 During World War II, Urey had led the scientific portion of 
the Manhattan Project for creation of the gaseous-diffusion process for 
enrichment of uranium-235. The fact that at Chicago Urey would have 
had to retire at age sixty-five provided the opportunity for Revelle. 
 Also in 1958 came James Arnold, a noted chemist who had worked 
on the Manhattan Project and with Willard Libby at Chicago. He had 
joined the Princeton faculty in 1955. Urey and Arnold were both very 
active in further recruiting. Keith Brueckner, a young physicist, so 
impressed Revelle at their first meeting that he was hired on the spot 
to build the physics program, which he did energetically and very 
effectively, as he describes in a 1994 memoir.225 In 1960 came David 
Bonner from Yale, who with similar energy built the biological sciences, 
with emphasis on the budding and then burgeoning field of molecular 
biology. Arnold recruited physical chemist Joe Mayer from Chicago, 
who arrived in 1960 as part of a husband-wife team with physicist 
Maria Goeppert-Mayer, who soon thereafter received the 1963 Nobel 
Prize in Physics for her work on proposing the nuclear-shell model of 
the atomic nucleus. Indicative of the provinciality of San Diego at the 
time, the San Diego Union-Tribune ran a headline banner, “La Jolla 
Housewife Wins Nobel Prize.” Maria Mayer had not had a faculty 
position while the Mayers were at Chicago because of an antinepotism 
policy.226 
The University of Chicago and Bell Laboratories were particular 
targets for UCSD faculty recruitment. Revelle’s recruitment techniques, 
described by Anderson,227  made full use of the beautiful natural 
setting, climate, and ambience of La Jolla, as well as the excitement of 
his plans for the university. UC procedures required submission of 
appointment cases for review to the Committee on Academic 
Personnel of what was then the Southern Division of the Academic  
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Senate, but the appointments were so strong that the faculty review 
was almost an afterthought. 228  Fifty percent of initial faculty 
appointments at San Diego were made at the full professor level, as 
opposed to 15 percent for the University of California as a whole. Many 
of those appointments were made at very high step levels or above 
scale (see chapter 11). As of 1960–61, 57 percent of the ladder (tenure-
eligible) faculty members at San Diego were full professors, and 67 
percent of those full professors were above scale. The 50 and 67 
percent figures compared at the time with 43 and 29 percent at 
Berkeley and 40 and 32 percent at UCLA.229 
 This unusual and highly disproportionate emphasis on the new 
campus in San Diego caused much concern among leaders and faculty 
members at the other campuses. Although Revelle stressed that such 
outstanding senior faculty members would bring their own graduate 
students and postdoctoral scholars and be able to support their 
research through substantial extramural grants, it was apparent that 
resources were being selectively diverted to San Diego. Clark Kerr 
chose to resist those pressures and sustain the Revelle plan. 
 In 1958–60 the land of the La Jolla site was transferred to the 
Board of Regents. This included Camp Mathews, a US Marine Corps 
rifle-range base from World War II, which became the main-campus 
site. As the first graduate students were admitted to the campus in fall 
of 1960, the name was changed from School of Science and 
Engineering at La Jolla to University of California, San Diego. 
 A chancellor was then appointed later in 1960, to begin July, 1961. 
To the surprise of many, especially the founding faculty, that chancellor 
was not Roger Revelle. Instead it was thirty-nine-year-old Herbert York, 
who had obtained his PhD with Emilio Segre at Berkeley and had then 
become a Berkeley physics professor. Already with a meteoric career, 
he had been at age thirty the founding director of the Lawrence 
Livermore Laboratory (1952–58) and then had held major government 
posts, including chief scientist of the Advanced Research Projects 
Agency and director of Defense Research and Engineering within the 
Department of Defense, being the first occupant of both those posts. 
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 The faculty role in the selection process for chancellor is described 
by Taylor.230 He notes that the faculty advisory committee—of which 
he was a member along with Glenn Seaborg, Harold Urey, and others—
put forward six names, with Kenneth Pitzer, Revelle, and York among 
them. Kerr231 indicates that an appointment of Revelle would have had 
to contend with several problems. First, Revelle had gotten into a 
major public dispute with Edwin Pauley, a long-time regent and a 
powerful force within both the state and the nation, over the matter of 
a site for the campus. As is described by Revelle,232 Kerr,233 Anderson,234 
and others, Pauley favored Balboa Park in downtown San Diego and 
was very negative on the La Jolla site. (Atkinson indicates that in 
addition, or possibly instead, Pauley favored taking over San Diego 
State University,235 a possibility that may also have been favored by 
President Malcolm Love of SDSU. 236 ) Second, there were strong 
opinions from civic leaders in both San Diego and La Jolla that Revelle 
was out of step politically with the relatively conservative community, 
that he was too outspoken and too radical. He had taken a vocal and 
public-leadership role against the loyalty oath in the late 1950s (see 
chapter 2), and he had worked to eliminate a La Jolla Real Estate 
Brokers Association ban on deeds to anyone “whose blood is not 
entirely that of the Caucasian race.”237 Finally, there was opposition 
from other chancellors because Revelle stood for something different 
and highly resource-intensive in La Jolla. 
While none of these factors, in themselves, would have been an 
absolute reason for bypassing Revelle, Kerr perceived that the main 
overall difficulty was that Revelle could come across as contemptuous 
of his opponents and unable to show “any empathy toward the other’s 
feelings.” He was not a diplomat. Kerr238 concluded, “Roger Revelle was 
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the creator of the San Diego campus; Herb York was its builder as a 
fully operational campus. The university needed both of them.” 
 Herb York was chancellor for three years, from July 1961 through 
June 1964. He succinctly labeled his initial chancellorship as “not my 
cup of tea.”239 He indicates that he accepted Revelle’s plans virtually in 
their entirety. In his previous administrative posts, he had been 
accustomed to what was to him a straightforward authoritarian style of 
leadership, and thus the roles of the Academic Senate, particularly in 
faculty hiring and review and in curriculum development, were new to 
him, and he saw them as limiting his authority. There was an initial 
tendency for the faculty to be antagonistic, given York’s background in 
nuclear-weapons work at Livermore and in the government. 240 
Anderson assesses the situation as York “working with a collection of 
faculty members described in scholarly circles as a gifted group of 
outlaws who saw in San Diego the chance to shed the constraints of 
ordinary university life.”241 Although respect was gained on both sides 
over time, York in late 1963 asked Kerr to initiate a search for a 
successor. York then went on to become vice chair of the US 
President’s Scientific Advisory Council (PSAC) and then returned to UC 
San Diego as professor and director of the Institute on Global Conflict 
and Cooperation for the remainder of his career. He was acting 
chancellor at UCSD from 1970 to 1972 (see below), as the campus 
recovered from a period of intense student agitation over the Vietnam 
War and related issues, and he served as US ambassador to the 
Comprehensive Test Ban negotiations in Geneva from 1979 to 1981. 
 Plans for undergraduate education and the organizational 
structure surrounding it were developed by a committee spearheaded 
by Jim Arnold. This committee produced the concept that UCSD would 
be composed of a series of separate colleges containing two thousand 
to twenty-five hundred students each. There would be both 
undergraduate and graduate students in the colleges, and faculty 
members would be associated with individual colleges as well. Each 
college would be headed by a provost and would provide the 
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atmosphere of a smaller institution, including social life and sports. 
Much, then later some, of the instruction that students would take 
would be provided within the college, and the colleges would have 
different academic emphases reflected in their general-education 
requirements. 242 , 243  That approach is, in effect, the Oxford and 
Cambridge model that was earlier implemented in the United States at 
Harvard, Yale, and Princeton through houses, residential colleges, and 
eating clubs, respectively. It would be instituted at the Santa Cruz 
campus of UC in a different form (see below). 
 The first college, ultimately named for Revelle, was formed from 
the preexisting School of Science and Engineering and opened in 1964 
with an entering class of 180 students. All were freshmen, since 
transfer students would not have met the Revelle College 
requirements.244 The college system continues in existence to this day, 
now with twenty-five thousand undergraduate students distributed 
among six colleges. The current individual emphases and requirements 
of the different colleges (Revelle, John Muir, Thurgood Marshall, Earl 
Warren, Eleanor Roosevelt, and Sixth) are described on the UCSD 
website.245 The histories of each are reviewed by Anderson.246 
 Kerr247 observes that the colleges “became successful residential 
and social communities for students and centers for organized 
activities by students, but they did not become as successful as centers 
for faculty-student intellectual life as had first been hoped. Faculty 
members, by and large, did not enter into college activities.” The same 
can be said for the equivalent structures at Harvard, Yale, and 
Princeton. 
 There were three relatively public disputes between the campus 
leadership and the university-wide administration during the early 
years, all described by Kerr 248  and Wellman 249  from their own 
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viewpoints. One concerned the medical school, both its size and the 
desire of David Bonner and others to emphasize research, particularly 
in molecular biology.250 In this sense, UC San Diego was ahead of both 
UC San Francisco and Berkeley in recognizing the importance of 
molecular and structural biology to medicine and as an extremely 
rapidly developing field. The medical school did come into being and 
both had and still retains a strong, molecular research base, with 
multidisciplinary approaches and close integration between research 
and clinical operations. In this and other ways UCSD has had strong and 
supportive intellectual ties over the years with its two neighbors on the 
Torrey Pines mesa that emphasize medical biology—the Salk Institute 
for Biological Studies251  and the Scripps Research Institute.252  The 
second dispute concerned whether there would be a third great library 
within UC, in addition to those at Berkeley and UCLA.253 John Galbraith, 
the second chancellor, played his demands out in the media and even 
delayed his inauguration in an effort to get Kerr to supply the desired 
large acquisitions budget. The third confrontation concerned moving 
along construction of the library building itself and led to a Galbraith’s 
resignation, which he subsequently reversed at Kerr’s request.254 
 UC San Diego had relatively rapid turnover of chancellors in early 
years, attributable to personal characteristics, the fact that managing 
such a distinguished assemblage of academic stars was no easy thing, 
and student unrest. As already noted, York asked to be replaced after 
only two years. John Galbraith, who followed York, lasted three years 
and publically squabbled with the university-wide administration, using 
the threats noted above in efforts to get what he wanted. He was, in 
effect, negotiated out of office by Kerr. Following Galbraith, an effort 
was made to get Berkeley chemist Kenneth Pitzer as chancellor, but 
Pitzer, who had been president of Rice University from 1961 to 1968, 
was already in negotiations with Stanford University for its presidency 
and declined the UCSD opportunity.255 That search then turned to 
William McGill, who was at the time chair-designate of the San Diego 
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Division of the Academic Senate. McGill’s tenure from 1968 to 1970 
was marked by the arrival of massive student unrest and protest about 
the Vietnam War and related issues, which clashed strongly with the 
largely conservative values of the San Diego community.256 The story of 
that period has been engagingly recorded by McGill.257 McGill was then 
recruited away to become president of his alma mater, Columbia 
University, where he also had to deal with student protest.  
Herb York was brought back as acting chancellor from 1970 to 
1972, during which period the university waited for the campus to 
regroup following the protests before seeking a permanent chancellor. 
The person eventually recruited was biologist William McElroy, who 
had been director of the National Science Foundation. McElroy was 
chancellor from 1972 through 1980. However, toward the end of his 
time as chancellor, while McElroy also dealt with personal problems, 
there had been a major squabble within the administration, a 
perceived lack of consultation with the Academic Senate, and an 
informal vote of no confidence at an Academic Senate meeting. 
McElroy’s private indications to faculty leaders that he would resign 
shortly did not forestall the faculty senate seeking a mail-ballot vote. 
Equipped with the negative formal vote, faculty leaders went to then-
president Saxon seeking McElroy’s removal.258, 259 
 To replace McElroy, Saxon and the regents chose Richard 
Atkinson, who, like McElroy, had also been director of the National 
Science Foundation. Atkinson was a strong stabilizing force. He was 
well liked and had a very successful chancellorship from 1980 to 1995, 
when he became president of the University of California. His approach 
to dealing with the situation that he found at UCSD is told by Pelfrey260 
and at greater length in his own memoir.261 First and foremost, he gave 
attention to the faculty and the culture of excellence. He took a direct 
interest in faculty recruitments, mentioning an approach that he had 
learned from Fred Terman, long-time Stanford provost. The idea was to 
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pay careful attention, as a member of the National Academy of 
Sciences, to the names that had just missed election to the academy in 
a given year. Recruitment of those faculty members would lead to 
excellent faculty members as well as a strong likelihood that they 
would be elected to the academy soon after their arrival at UCSD. 
Secondly, Atkinson moved promptly and with respect for people in 
making the changes in senior administrative positions that were 
needed following the very public squabbles at the end of McElroy’s 
time. Third, to enhance relations with the faculty, he established a full-
time position of associate to the chancellor, filled for one- to three-year 
periods by senior faculty members who participated in all Chancellor’s 
Office activities, giving a direct faculty viewpoint. He met regularly with 
the chair of the San Diego Division of the Academic Senate, included 
that person in the Monday morning meetings of the chancellor’s 
council, and made efforts to respect and utilize shared governance. 
 With regard to his position vis-à-vis the faculty, Atkinson cites262 in 
translation a passage on leadership from the Tao Te Ching of Lao Tzu, a 
sixth-century BC Chinese philosopher: 
 
He does not make a show of himself 
Hence he shines 
Does not justify himself 
Hence he is glorified 
Does not boast of his ability 
Hence he gets his credit 
Does not brandish his success 
Hence he endures 
Does not compete with anyone 
Hence no one can compete with him. 
 
This is good counsel for any university administrator. Related to that 
advice, the San Diego campus maintains an extremely unpretentious 
Chancellor’s Office complex consisting of a group of small and low 
Californian buildings among much larger and architecturally imposing 
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buildings used for other purposes. These buildings are left over from 





Figure 10-12. Jacobs School of Engineering, UC San Diego263 
 
 
 Although engineering had existed at UC San Diego as of the hiring 
of Sol Penner in 1964,264 it had not been placed into a school or college. 
After Atkinson’s arrival as chancellor, it became first the Division of 
Engineering and then the School of Engineering.265 An interesting 
family tree266 shows the evolution of engineering at UCSD through 
2005. By design, academic coverage has not been comprehensive, 
concentrating instead, à la Revelle, on applied science, areas of 
opportunity, and interdisciplinary activity. For example, there is 
currently a Department of NanoEngineering. As is the case for the rest 
of UCSD, the engineering school (figure 10-12), now named after 
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Qualcomm founder Irwin Jacobs (chapter 18), is highly ranked 
nationally and internationally. 
 Through Atkinson, Mary Walshok, and others, UCSD has had a 
particularly catalytic and synergistic relationship with the San Diego 
business community in support of technological innovation and new 
business enterprises. This too is described in chapter 18. 
 
Achievements and Summation 
 Clark Kerr267 observed, “San Diego was an instant success. It came 
to be one of the four American research universities that started out in 
the front ranks. The three others were Johns Hopkins in the 1870s, and 
Stanford and Chicago in the 1890s.” This is a remarkable 
accomplishment for a public university. The other three universities 
that Kerr identified are all private and were well endowed from the 
start. This result testifies directly to the strength of the Revelle plan. 
 Anderson notes that by the late 1980s, not yet thirty years after 
the first graduate students entered, UCSD had sixty-four members of 
the National Academy of Sciences and eight Nobel laureates. Winners 
of six National Medals of Science, two Pulitzer Prizes, two Fields Medals 
in mathematics, and six MacArthur Foundation fellowships had taught 
at UCSD, and the faculty had collectively received over one hundred 
Guggenheim Fellowships.268 As of 2014–15 there have been sixteen 
Nobel Prizes associated with the UCSD faculty, and there are eighty-five 
UCSD members of the National Academy of Sciences,269 twenty-three 
members of the National Academy of Engineering, and thirty-eight 
members of the Institute of Medicine. There are five current (2016) 
members of the UCSD faculty who are winners of Nobel Prizes:270 
 1990 Economic Sciences: Harry M. Markowitz with Merton H. 
Miller and William F. Sharpe, “for their pioneering work in the 
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theory of financial economics”; work done at University of 
Chicago and RAND Corporation 
 1995 Chemistry: Paul Crutzen and Mario Molina, Scripps 
Institution of Oceanography, joint with F. Sherwood Rowland, 
“for their work in atmospheric chemistry, particularly 
concerning the formation and decomposition of ozone”; work 
done at Stockholm University by Crutzen and at UC Irvine by 
Molina 
 2003 Economic Sciences: Robert Engle with Clive W. J. Granger, 
“for methods of analyzing economic time series with time-
varying volatility (ARCH)”; work done at UC San Diego 
 2008 Chemistry: Roger Tsien with Osamu Shimomura and 
Martin Chalfie, “for the discovery and development of the 
green fluorescent protein, GFP”; work done at UC San Diego 
In addition to these active faculty members, other Nobelists with UCSD 
connections 271  are Harold Urey and Maria Goeppert-Mayer (both 
already mentioned), Hannes Alfven (Physics, 1970), Walter Kohn 
(Chemistry, 1998), William Moerner (Chemistry, 2014), Francis Crick 
(Chemistry, 1962), George Palade (Physiology or Medicine, 1974), 
Renato Dulbecco (Physiology or Medicine, 1975); Robert W. Holley 
(Physiology or Medicine, 1968); Roger Guillemin (Physiology or 
Medicine, 1977); Sydney Brenner (Physiology or Medicine, 2002), and 
Clive Granger (Economic Sciences, 1990). 
 UC San Diego was admitted to the Association of American 
Universities (AAU) in 1982, the shortest time since founding for any 
AAU member university. Atkinson describes the strategy and process 
for achieving that membership.272 
 Kerr273 states the reasons for the success of UCSD as follows:  
It had the reputation of the University of California; the 
resources of a then-prosperous state of California; access to 
the federal funds that followed Sputnik; and an original 
building block in the world-famous Scripps Institution of 
Oceanography; the charismatic leadership of Revelle, who 
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had a gift for identifying and recruiting academic talent, as 
well as clear preference in the assignment of new resources 
(for faculty appointments and book acquisition funds) from 
the regents and from the president of the university—
preference over the two other new campuses [Irvine and 
Santa Cruz], over the metamorphosing campuses of Davis, 
Santa Barbara, and Riverside, and even over Berkeley and 
UCLA. No vote had established this preference. It was the 
result of an unspoken agreement. 
 Unquestionably, the start from the highly respected Scripps 
Institution of Oceanography was important, if for no reasons other 
than establishing values and a culture of excellence. The exquisite 
Revelle plan was critically important too, emphasizing as it did hiring 
target-of-opportunity faculty stars of the first magnitude who would in 
turn attract other faculty members with strong accomplishments or 
high potential. The start with the graduate program was effective for 
establishing the importance of research and enabling a start in selected 
fields (those corresponding to the faculty targets of opportunity) 
without necessitating the broad coverage needed for the subsequent 
undergraduate program. 
 The Revelle plan had to be enabled through funding, which was 
available from California’s thriving economy, strong state support of 
the university, and presidential decisions that gave San Diego high 
priority. Other key enabling factors were the dynamic enthusiasm of 
Revelle and his initial senior hires and the magnificent La Jolla Torrey 
Pines setting above the Pacific. Another vital factor was a vibrant and 
supportive community that included leaders who saw the values of 
both an outstanding research university and valuable companion 
institutions such as the Salk Institute and the Scripps Research 
Institute. 
 The undergraduate colleges have worked out well at UCSD, 
providing more cohesive social, sports, and living activities for students, 
even though they have not been able to hold as much independent 
intellectual life as originally planned. 
 The faculty has been a constant and stabilizing strength, offsetting 
what was a relatively volatile turnover of chancellors in the early years. 




unrest of the late 1960s, when there was a large need to retain the 
bond with, and the support of, the politically conservative San Diego 
community. Chancellors McGill, York (during his second, acting, term), 





 Irvine was another of the three new campuses of the 1950s. Like 
Merced and Santa Cruz, it started from nothing—no preexisting 
program or even physical structures. It was part of the general 
development of the huge Irvine Ranch, 480 square kilometers (185 
square miles) of what is now Irvine, California, and vicinity. The city of 
Irvine is also a planned community that started de novo from land of 
the Irvine Ranch. 
 Clark Kerr picked Daniel Aldrich to be the founding UC Irvine 
chancellor. Aldrich had started with UC as a soil chemist at the UC 
Citrus Experiment Station and subsequently became professor and 
then chairman of the combined Berkeley/Davis Soils Department. 
Following that, he was university-wide dean for agriculture, having 
succeeded Harry Wellman when Wellman was moved to the position of 
vice president of the university by Kerr. 274  Aldrich’s disciplinary 
background was not a match to the new general campus, but his 
manner and effectiveness both as a leader and in dealing with people 
were strong matches. 
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Figure 10-13. (a) Original 1962 plan for the Irvine campus of the University of 
California (above)275; (b) aerial view of Irvine campus, circa 2006 (below)276 
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Starting from undeveloped, bare land presented an opportunity 
for an innovative physical plan for the campus. The striking plan that 
came into being (concentric circles with paths and roadways as radial 
spokes) was suggested by Kerr himself, drawing from his memory of 
the plan for a model city from Johann Heinrich von Thünen’s Der 
isolierte Staat, 1863.277 The original plan278 for the layout of the campus 
is shown in figure 10-13a, paired with an aerial view of the nearly fully 
built-out campus in figure 10-13b. One goal of the design is to make 
pedestrian circulation throughout the campus more efficient. Another 
is to maximize opportunities for interaction among the disciplines. 
The principal architect for the campus was William Pereira, who 
had also worked on the San Diego campus and elsewhere within UC. 
Pereira’s design of the Irvine campus is regarded as one of his principal 
works, along with the Transamerica Tower in San Francisco, the Geisel 
Library at UC San Diego, and the Dickson Art Center at UCLA. The 
design remains striking and effective now that the campus is essentially 
built out. The innermost circular core is a tranquil park of twenty-one 
acres, denoted as Aldrich Park, where campus events such as 
inaugurations of chancellors are held. Additional description and 
photographs of the initial construction are given by Masters.279  The 
campus was dedicated in June, 1964 (Figure 10-14). 
 Among the three new UC campuses of the 1960s, UC Irvine 
deviated the least from the standard academic model of a research 
university. San Diego had followed the Revelle plan, and Santa Cruz was 
a bold experiment of a different sort, as described below. Aldrich’s 
initial plan was that the campus should open as a full university, 
enabled by both physical and academic design to grow to the then-
contemplated maximum UC campus enrollment of 27,500 students. 
Aldrich wanted to start with some professional schools as well, for 
balance and in recognition that the political dynamics, both inside the 
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Figure 10-14. President Lyndon B. Johnson (center) at the site dedication280 for 
the Irvine campus, June 20, 1964. Others (left to right) are  
Vice Chancellor Ivan Hinderaker, Chancellor Dan Aldrich, UC president Clark 
Kerr, and California governor Edmund G. (“Pat”) Brown.281 
 
  
Fleshing out and implementing this general plan was left to the 
initial vice chancellors for academic affairs, Ivan Hinderaker (1962–64) 
and then Jack Peltason (1964–67), who was selected for the position 
when Hinderaker became chancellor of the Riverside campus on short 
notice in 1964 to deal with the difficult situation there. Early in his 
career, Hinderaker had been in the Minnesota State Legislature.282 He 
had then been professor and chairman for a few years of the Political  
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Science Department at UCLA. He was recommended by Dean McHenry 
at UCLA through Kerr to Aldrich, who met with Hinderaker and 
appointed him.283  Peltason had been dean of liberal arts at the 
University of Illinois. Despite an original decision to separate the 
traditional College of Arts and Sciences into physical sciences, 
humanities, and so on, a super-dean position, dean of arts, letters, and 
science, was created for Peltason so as to draw him to the campus.284 
When he actually arrived a year later in 1964, that position was 
abolished, and he became vice chancellor for academic affairs, 
succeeding Hinderaker.  
A distinguished political scientist, Peltason was the author of a 
widely used textbook, Government by the People, which went through 
many editions. He returned to Illinois as the first chancellor of the 
Urbana campus in 1967, when the University of Illinois became a 
multicampus university, staying until 1977, when he became president 
of the American Council on Education (ACE) in Washington, DC. In 1984 
he returned to Irvine as chancellor and occupied that position until 
1992, when he became president of the University of California, 1992–
95. With regard to why he came to Irvine, Peltason noted that he and 
his wife had always wanted to live in California and that he had said to 
his good friend Austin Ranney, later a Berkeley political science 
professor, while they sat together on the beach there, “If you ever start 
a university in Newport Beach, California, count me in.”285, 286 Newport 
Beach directly adjoins Irvine. 
 Several innovations were attempted as Aldrich, Hinderaker, and 
Peltason drew up plans for academic development. Aldrich wanted to 
stress activities on campus that would be relevant to needs of society. 
This led to early development of cultural programs for the community 
and university extension for continuing education. Emphasis on  
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environmental concerns was sought in program design. The builders 
also wanted to become leaders in the use of information technology 
for instruction, but they were too far ahead of the time when much 
could be done. There were also several innovations in academic 
organizational structure. One already noted was the use of divisions 
with deans for physical sciences, biological sciences, social sciences, 
humanities, and fine arts, without an overall college of Letters and 
science structure. Another was the division of biological sciences into 
departments by the level of organism, as was also done at UC San 
Diego and would come much later at Berkeley through a difficult 
reorganization (chapter 12). Psychology was divided into social 
psychology and neuropsychology. The former later became the 
innovative School of Social Ecology. This feature was placed into 
Hinderaker’s own initial draft for the academic plan based upon 
comments that he had heard at UCLA.287 Instead of a classical school of 
business or management, the School of Administration was created, 
covering administration of all sorts, including the public arena, as has 
also been tried at Yale. Over time, however, that school has morphed 
into a more conventional business-management school.288 A single 
Department of Comparative Literature was created, as opposed to 
individual departments covering literature on a language-by-language 
basis.289 This latter aspect of the plan did not work out well and was 
later abandoned.290 
 The academic recruitment plan adopted and pursued by 
Hinderaker and Peltason was to hire deans first, then chairs, and then 
faculty, taking advantage of the more specific knowledge and contacts 
of the deans and chairs to locate and select faculty members.291 This 
approach was used in all cases but one. The founding department 
chairs in physical sciences—Sherwood Rowland, chemistry 
(recommended by Willard Libby of UCLA); Kenneth Ford, physics 
(recommended by Herb York); and Bernard Gelbaum, mathematics, 
from the University of Minnesota—were hired before the founding 
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physical sciences dean, Frederick Reines, and took part in the search 
that led to Reines.292 For the other dean recruitments, Hinderaker and 
Peltason looked within UC, used contacts around the country, and 
followed up on leads from Kerr and others. The other founding deans 
were 
 Biological Sciences: Edward Steinhaus, chair of the Division of 
Invertebrate Pathology at UC Berkeley, 
 Director of Special Studies and then also dean of the Graduate 
Division: Ralph Gerard, international authority on brain function, 
 Humanities: Samuel McCulloch, dean of the college at San 
Francisco State College (later University), 
 Social Sciences: James March, professor of psychology at Carnegie 
Institute of Technology, 
 Fine Arts: Clayton Garrison, chair of drama at UC Riverside, 
 Graduate School of Administration: Richard Snyder, chair of 
political science at Northwestern University, and 
 School of Engineering: Robert Saunders, chair of electrical 
engineering at Berkeley.293 
Others whom Hinderaker294 mentions unsuccessfully trying to recruit 
are George Pimentel of the Berkeley chemistry department, for dean of 
physical sciences;295 William Bowen of Princeton and Richard Lyman of 
Stanford, each subsequently president of those respective institutions; 
and Charles Hitch, the assistant secretary of defense, who became 
Kerr’s successor as UC president. 
 Peltason observed that when he arrived in 1964, there were seven 
academics, and then there were 157 faculty members appointed as of 
a year later when the campus opened,296 119 of whom were on hand 
on opening day. These faculty members had an average rank at the 
mid-associate-professor level and an average age of thirty-six.297 
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 The UC Irvine approach of hiring deans first, then chairs, and then 
faculty contrasts sharply with the Revelle plan for UC San Diego. At UC 
San Diego, superstar faculty were sought and hired first, thereby letting 
initial fields and emphases be defined by who those faculty members 
turned out to be. Irvine covered fields broadly and by design, having 
both undergraduate and graduate education at the start. San Diego 
made no attempt for comprehensive coverage at the start and enabled 
that choice by starting graduate education before undergraduate 
education. The San Diego plan was pitched almost exclusively toward 
outstanding research, while the Irvine plan sought both teaching 
coverage and excellent research at the start. San Diego sought research 
stardom from the start and counted on those stars to attract high-
quality faculty and graduate students, while Irvine counted on its ability 
to select promising initial faculty members who were earlier in their 
careers but held the potential for growth toward star status. 
 Both campuses succeeded in their very different ways. San Diego 
made the larger initial splash and has continued to ride the momentum 
of it with great success. But the Irvine strategy has clearly led to a 
reputational success too, although longer in coming. Two 
manifestations of the worth of the Irvine strategy were Sherwood 
Rowland298 and James McGaugh, who were hired at ages thirty-seven 
and thirty-two, respectively, both arriving in 1964 as founding faculty 
members. Rowland won the Nobel Prize in Chemistry in 1995 for his 
work at Irvine identifying chlorofluorocarbons as the major cause of 
destruction of ozone in the stratosphere, while McGaugh won many 
national and international honors, became a member of the US 
National Academy of Sciences (1989) and the equivalents in Mexico 
and Brazil, succeeded Steinhaus in 1967 as dean of the School of 
Biological Sciences, and then went on to become vice chancellor and 
executive vice chancellor. He also founded and for many years directed 
the Center for the Neurobiology of Learning and Memory. Frederick 
Reines, who came in 1966 as the initial dean of physical sciences, also 
won the Nobel Prize in Physics (1995) for his lifelong work on the 
neutrino. He came from Case Institute of Technology, where he was 
                                                     





chair of the Physics Department, and had spent World War II at Los 
Alamos.299 
 Peltason himself,300 upon reflection years later, observed, “That’s 
one of the best recruiting jobs I know of…I’m very proud of the 
recruiting job we did: one of the largest numbers of people recruited in 
the shortest period of time who turned out subsequently to be 
distinguished academics. The only other [such successful] recruiting 
task I know of was Woodrow Wilson’s famous recruitment of fifty 
preceptors to Princeton301 at the turn of the century.” 
 All three of the campuses that were new in the 1960s were 
equipped with Advisory Committees, composed of faculty members 
from other campuses.302 This approach and its utility are explored by 
Douglass. 303  The membership was determined by Kerr 304  in 
consultation with the Academic Senate, and the committees acted in a 
number of senate roles, interfacing with the rest of the UC Academic 
Senate structure. The committee would be consulted on initial 
appointments to both administrative and faculty positions, serving as 
the Budget Committee (Berkeley) or Committee on Academic 
Personnel (other campuses) would function on an established campus. 
At times the committee members would also assist with recruitments 
themselves. The importance and help of this committee for the initial 
development of the Irvine campus are stressed by both Peltason and 
Hinderaker.305 The approach did much to instill the culture, value 
systems, and respect for excellence of the university as a whole into 
these new campuses. 
 Another person who helped greatly in recruitment was the 
architect Willam Pereira. Peltason306  notes, “Bill Pereira and Dan 
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[Aldrich] had the physical plan, and when you’re recruiting people you 
can’t show them anything, and there aren’t any students, and there are 
no alums; you’re selling them a dream. Bill Pereira was a very 
persuasive salesperson, as was Dan…We’d bring in the recruits, and 
this very sophisticated, world-famous planner spent a lot of time 
helping us recruit faculty. Although he built the Transamerica building 
and a lot of famous buildings, I think building the Irvine campus was 
one of the things of which he was proudest.” 
 Academic recruitment continued under subsequent vice 
chancellors James McGaugh and William Lillyman, filling out the 
faculty. One important joint recruitment was that in 1989 of Ralph and 
Carol Cicerone, a distinguished atmospheric chemist from the National 
Center for Atmospheric Research and a distinguished psychologist from 
the University of Colorado, respectively. Ralph Cicerone became UCI 
chancellor (1998–2005) and then president of the National Academy of 
Sciences (2005 until his death in 2016). 
 One important aspect of the academic development of the Irvine 
campus did not come by design, but instead by serendipity and politics. 
The California College of Medicine, a private institution in Los Angeles, 
had until recently been focused on osteopathic medicine. It was in a 
failing financial position but was supported strongly by the one 
physician in the state senate, who was also in a very strong position as 
chair of Senate Committee on Finance. Adequate state funding for the 
development of UC’s other medical schools thereby became linked 
with UC taking over the California College of Medicine, staff and all. 
Such an agreement was made in 1963, and the transfer was made at 
the request of the university through action of the state legislature. 
There were then protracted negotiations both inside and outside the 
university over the affiliation and then a relocated site for the newly 
acquired college of medicine. Finally, it was determined that it would 
be best to move the college administratively to UC Irvine, and in 1966 
Chancellor Aldrich agreed with some reluctance.  
Acceptance by the Irvine campus had been debated intensely 
within the Irvine Academic Senate, which had, however, neither 
supported nor opposed the addition to the campus. The acquisition 
was also disturbing to the initial fundamental-biology faculty, and it 




to UC San Diego. In hindsight, this was probably the only way in which 
Irvine would have gotten a medical school, since four others (San 
Francisco, Los Angeles, Davis, San Diego) were already in existence 
within UC. But the campus received a relatively undistinguished 
organization with no hospital and a bundle of problems along with a 
need to provide facilities for the existing school at the Irvine campus.307 
 Years later and following much controversy, the issue of a hospital 
for the Irvine campus was finally resolved in a semisatisfactory way 
that also had large political overtones: the university acquired a county 
hospital in Anaheim, twelve miles away from the campus.308 
The following Nobel Prize recipients were or are with UC Irvine: 
 F. Sherwood Rowland, Chemistry, 1995, jointly with his UCI 
postdoctoral associate, Mario Molina, “for their work in 
atmospheric chemistry, particularly concerning the formation and 
decomposition of ozone” 
 Frederick Reines, Physics, 1995, “for the detection of the neutrino” 
 Irwin Rose, Chemistry, 2004, “for the discovery of ubiquitin-
mediated protein degradation” 
As of 2015, UC Irvine had twenty-five members of the National 
Academy of Sciences,309 eight members of the National Academy of 
Engineering, and six members of the National Academy of Medicine.310 
 In his comments looking back on the academic building of UC 
Irvine, Peltason reflected: 
It’s a miracle that major campuses were built in such a short 
time. It was the genius of the University of California and the 
wealth and the strength of the state of California that you 
could do so. There was the excitement of one of the world’s 
greatest universities giving you a fresh start to go out there 
and start over…We received [positive support] both from the 
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faculty senate and from the Office of the President…They had 
been supportive without trying to be controlling. I think that’s 
very important in the development of new campuses. It helps 
explain why the University of California has been so 
successful in permitting new campuses to develop and in 
maintaining quality…The Office of the President was very 
helpful. Clark was always available…The Office of the 
President has to champion the new campus. I now know that 
from my own experiences three decades later. Existing 
campuses don’t understand the need for new campuses. 311 
 
 
UC SANTA CRUZ 
 
The third new campus opening in the 1960s was innovative and 
experimental in several ways. The driving idea pushed by Clark Kerr and 
Dean McHenry, the founding chancellor (1961–74), was to create a 
campus that could sustain the approach and benefits of small-college 
education as the campus grew to what was to be the 27,500-student 
enrollment then contemplated for all campuses. As such, it was much 
more designed and sustained than were the short-lived attempts at 
Santa Barbara and Riverside in the 1953–58 period. Emphasis was to be 
on undergraduate instruction and the student experience.  
 
The Approach 
The initial guiding concepts for the campus are described by 
McHenry312 and Kerr.313 McHenry also describes the process by which 
these guidelines were formulated, including examination of Oxford, 
Cambridge, Harvard, Yale, Princeton, the Claremont Colleges, and the 
newer British universities built on the residential college model. The 
essential concept was to have an assemblage of small colleges, each 
overseen by a provost and with student populations averaging seven 
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hundred, which together would compose a full-size University of 
California campus. Given the target of ultimately enrolling 27,500 
students, of which perhaps 70 percent would be undergraduates in the 
arts and sciences and 50% of those would be housed on campus, there 
would then be about fourteen such colleges eventually.314 Initially, they 
would be built, staffed, and opened at a rate of one per year. Each 
college would have its own particular emphases and would have a 
multidisciplinary collection of faculty associated with it according to the 
academic design and emphases of the college. 
Among the complex realities to be dealt with for any model of this 
sort are 
 the division of functions, both academic and nonacademic, 
between the levels of the individual colleges and the overall 
campus; 
 the means of gaining the additional revenue needed for the greater 
costs associated with repetitive functions within the colleges and 
for a lower student-to-faculty ratio to promote high-quality 
undergraduate education; and 
 the ways in which a greater emphasis on, and quality of, 
undergraduate education can be achieved within the context of 
what is still a research university, in recognition of the natures of 
the entire university system and the Master Plan. 
 
The site chosen for the campus provided both opportunities and 
limitations. It was land of the Cowell Ranch above the beachside city of 
Santa Cruz on the north side of Monterey Bay in central California. The 
other site under serious consideration had been the Almaden Valley 
area, just south of San Jose in Santa Clara County. However, for the 
latter site, many different properties would have had to be acquired 
from different owners, and the known interest of the regents in the 
area had caused property values to increase considerably. Interest 
therefore shifted to the Cowell Ranch site, which was a magnificent 
setting of a redwood forest surrounding grassland with sweeping views 
down to Monterey Bay. That site was purchased from the S. H. Cowell 
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Foundation, which also provided a grant of over $900,000 toward 
ongoing support of the first college, to be known as Cowell College. The 
university thereby gained a handsome site but lost an opportunity to 
have a campus directly adjoining what was to become Silicon Valley in 
the fast-growing South Bay.315, 316 The less urban character of the site 
that was chosen bolstered the part of the plan that called for 
accommodating 50 percent of undergraduate students on campus 
residentially in the colleges, as opposed to the 20 percent figure typical 
for other UC campuses. 
 The academic case for the Santa Cruz college approach is 
presented by Kerr,317 McHenry,318 and Noreña,319 among others. The 
realities and difficulties associated with the plan and encountered in 
practice are outlined starkly by Robert Sinsheimer,320, 321 who was the 
fourth Chancellor (1977–87). 
 
What Happened over Time 
 Clark Kerr classifies four successive eras in the development of the 
Santa Cruz campus—the neoclassical, the countercultural, backlashes, 
and stabilization.322  The reasons for those names should become 
apparent from this narrative. 
 Originally the plan was that all academic functions would belong 
to the colleges as they were built. However, in its review of the original 
academic plan, the Committee on Education Policy of the university-
wide senate noted, “A college transmits knowledge; a university 
creates it” and then urged “more formal organization of faculty by 
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departments.”323 During the first year of operation of the campus 
(1965–66) the Academic Senate put forth a plan where there would, in 
addition to the colleges, be boards of study in each disciplinary area 
that would set requirements for the major, provide for a 
comprehensive examination, and propose graduate degrees.324 Faculty 
members would have joint appointments—50 percent associated with 
the college and 50 percent associated with a board, and thereby the 
discipline. A position for recruitment was then determined by a college 
and a board getting together and agreeing to combine their respective 
half positions. Given the nature of the faculty positions, academic 
reviews and requests for advancement or promotion were done by 
both the college and the board. About twenty-three boards were 
established, all thinly and unevenly staffed with faculty.325 
 Another innovation from early on was the use of a narrative 
evaluation system (NES) for grading of courses. This was introduced by 
Page Smith, the initial provost of Cowell College and was adopted the 
next year by the Santa Cruz Division of the Academic Senate.326 Instead 
of receiving a letter grade, a student would receive either a pass or a 
fail (later changed to no report), together with a narrative evaluation of 
performance. This approach was believed to be more nuanced and 
useful than a simple letter grade. Students in science courses could 
receive a letter grade if they petitioned for it, but petitions were 
rare.327 The NES was controversial, to say the least, with concerns that 
it would handicap students who would seek graduate work elsewhere, 
especially in professional schools. Also, in practice the narratives were 
inconsistent in quality and conscientiousness. Through the Academic 
Senate, the faculty reviewed this policy and tweaked it in various ways 
over the years, moving generally toward letter grades. In 2001 the use 
of letter grades for all courses became mandatory.328 
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Figure 10-15. Aerial view of Crown (left, upper) and Merrill (right, lower) 
Colleges, the third and fourth of the UC Santa Cruz colleges, 
showing the typical setting among the redwood trees329 
 
 
The colleges, years of opening, and initial emphases have been 
Cowell, 1965, world civilization; 
Stevenson, 1966, self and society; 
Crown, 1967 (figure 10-15), science, culture, and man; 
Merrill, 1968, (figure 10-15) poverty at home and abroad; 
Porter, 1969, visual and performing arts; 
Kresge, 1970, educational innovation; 
Oakes, 1972, skills and community service; 
Eight, 1972 (figure 10-16), the environment; 
Nine, 2000; and Ten, 2002 – no emphases yet 
Among the first four colleges, Cowell College received over 
$900,000 from the S. H. Cowell Foundation, Crown College received an 
 
                                                     





 endowment of $500,000 from the Crown-Zellerbach Foundation, and 
Merrill College $650,000 from the Charles Merrill Trust. The Stevenson 
name was sought by the initial provost, in honor of two-time 
presidential candidate Adlai E. Stevenson, without a corresponding 
endowment. In hindsight, these endowments were much too low to 





Figure 10-16.  College Eight, UC Santa Cruz.330 
 
 
The designs and emphases of the colleges were left to the initial 
provosts to formulate, with quite varied results, as is evident from the 
list above. Kerr331 and Sinsheimer332 both describe the problematic 
situation that involved Kresge College and a provost who established 
sensitivity training, as well as courses where students took the lead 
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with faculty in the role of facilitators, an approach known now as a 
form of the flipped classroom. 
 The original plan for the Santa Cruz campus entailed engineering, 
and early steps were taken in that direction, including the recruitment 
of Francis Clauser, a distinguished aeronautical engineer at Johns 
Hopkins University, as dean. However, the California Coordinating 
Council for Higher Education (the forerunner of the Postsecondary 
Education Commission—chapter 5) chartered Frederick Terman, then 
ex-provost of Stanford, to carry out a major study of engineering 
education within California. 333  Terman’s report, 334  released in the 
spring of 1968, maintained that small engineering programs were 
economically inefficient and specifically recommended that the 
nascent programs on two UC campuses (Riverside and Santa Cruz) 
should not be pursued. 335  In accord with this recommendation, 
President Hitch decided that both programs should be abandoned. This 
episode, with unfortunate timing and result, cost the Santa Cruz 
campus its one professional school, a solid tie with the community, and 
what would have been an early, crucial link with Silicon Valley as it 
developed over the hills to the north. Santa Cruz was not able to 
initiate engineering until thirty years later in 1997. In 2003 UCSC 
opened a University-Affiliated Research Center (UARC) jointly with the 
Ames Research Center of the National Aeronautics and Space Agency 
at Moffitt Field at the northern edge of Silicon Valley.336 The UARC has 
served to enhance engineering education and foster ties with Silicon 
Valley companies. 
 Several other problem areas developed as the number of colleges 
multiplied and the population of Santa Cruz evolved. The most 
fundamental academic problem stemmed from the roles of the 
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colleges and the boards and the duality of the faculty appointments 
between the two. Simsheimer337 described the situation succinctly: 
Conceptually, the boards of study were to be merely 
coordinating bodies. But, inevitably, the demands of 
disciplinary education and the need for provision of an 
appropriate range and depth of courses within each field 
began to be felt. Although a faculty member nominally held a 
50 percent appointment in a board and a 50 percent 
appointment in a college, educational control gradually but 
inexorably shifted to the boards. Disciplinary pressures 
increased within the boards and courses given by faculty 
within the colleges became for the most part increasingly 
peripheral and “Mickey Mouse,” and their requirement 
increasingly resented by many faculty members. And, 
inevitably, since the boards and colleges competed for the 
same always inadequate pool of funds, the tension between 
these two organizational sets, with their nearly orthogonal 
missions, increased…The college-board structure was 
supposed to produce “creative tension”; instead it produced 
deadlock. This became particularly manifest in the 
recruitment and promotion of faculty. 
 With their “themes,” the colleges had their own 
recruitment agendas. But each faculty appointment had to be 
in a board as well, which had its recruitment agenda. 
Frequently, these requirements were in conflict, for which 
there were three possible solutions. In times of rapid growth, 
two appointments could be made available, one to satisfy 
each agenda. As growth slowed, this option became 
unavailable. Or sometimes the board’s first choice and the 
college’s first choice could be bypassed in favor of a second-
choice candidate, probably inferior to either first choice but 
more broadly acceptable. Peace was preserved, but at a 
price. Or, finally, the issue could be passed up to the central 
campus administration for resolution, which left one side 
happy and the other bitter. Faculty promotions and 
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particularly tenure reviews brought these conflicts to a head. 
The boards and the colleges simply had different missions 
and correspondingly different criteria. The board valued 
scholarship, research, and professional teaching and was 
generally in accord with the system-wide UC standards. The 
college valued service in the college, counseling and working 
with students, teaching in interdisciplinary college courses, 
and participation in “college building” (especially in the early 
years). The college functioned more like a club. Junior faculty, 
who often had been encouraged to devote their energies to 
collegiate affairs at the expense of their research and 
scholarship, now found themselves caught. Tenure decisions 
for a member of the faculty were made in both one’s board 
and one’s college. Understandably, these frequently 
diverged. Indeed, individual senior faculty, members of both 
the board and the particular college, were known to vote 
oppositely in the two circumstances using different criteria. 
The divergent votes would then be reviewed by the Academic 
Senate Committee on Academic Personnel, a six-person body 
and, depending on their inclinations preferentially to value 
board or college service, they would frequently produce a 
split vote. Which left the decision to the central campus 
administration—that is, the chancellor. Most often, the 
chancellor tended to uphold the disciplinary or board 
standard as most consistent with broad UC standards, from 
which Santa Cruz had never been exempted. Then, as such 
negative tenure decisions most often resulted in the 
departure of an often well-liked member of a college, faculty 
and students in the college were outraged. Thus, “creative 
tension” became a constant irritant, a boil on the campus 
ambience.338 
Compounding this problem, as had been the case for the original 
Riverside college, most of the initial Santa Cruz faculty members had 
                                                     




been hired at the entry level, and thus progressed into tenure and 
promotion decisions more or less together.339, 340 
 The primary external issues related to the changing population of 
the city of Santa Cruz during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Originally, 
the university campus had been a major attraction, seen as a way of 
reviving a sagging beach-resort economy. The population trends 
included several very different factors.341 First there was an influx of 
the hippie culture that had developed in the San Francisco Bay Area in 
the 1960s. Second, there was substantial influx of persons whose 
employment was to the north, over the hills in Silicon Valley, and who 
valued the semirural aspect of Santa Cruz and Aptos. The third factor 
was the growth of the university population, most notably the students 
themselves, who along with other college and university students in 
California were enabled by a 1971 California Supreme Court decision to 
vote in the communities where they resided as students. These three 
factors, each in their own way, created a considerable problem of 
town-gown relations—one that still exists. 
 Another pervasive problem was budget, or really the lack of it. 
Simply put, the funding for the campus was in proportion to 
enrollment, as it was for other campuses, and yet the Santa Cruz 
campus had to deal with the added costs associated with distribution 
of academic functions and services to the colleges. As already noted, 
the initial endowments made for colleges were not large enough to 
make much difference. 
 Faced with these problems, in his last year (1973) as chancellor, 
McHenry went to the UC Regents requesting that the growth plan for 
the campus be scaled back to a cap of 7,500 students for at least the 
next decade.342 This request was not approved, given the overall 
enrollment pressure then foreseen for the university. 
 The person chosen as McHenry’s successor as chancellor was 
Mark Christensen (1974–76), who had been academic vice chancellor 
at Berkeley. He was unable to come up with, or steer through, 
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solutions to the problems.343 Sufficient unhappiness prevailed so that 
then-president Saxon asked Angus Taylor, the former vice president for 
academic affairs, to go to Santa Cruz as chancellor for a year to settle 
the waters, start on needed changes, and serve until the time was right 
for a search for a new chancellor to be engaged. Taylor did so 
effectively, although he could not and did not make major changes. He 
describes his time at Santa Cruz in an engaging oral history.344 
 The new chancellor, starting in 1976, was Robert Sinsheimer, a 
Caltech molecular biologist who had headed the Division of Biology at 
Caltech. In both an autobiographical book345 and an oral history,346 
Sinsheimer describes the situation as he saw it and what he decided to 
do about it. 
 First, a new, menacing problem raised its head—declining 
enrollment. For the first few years after opening in 1965, Santa Cruz 
had drawn outstanding students (the highest SAT scores among UC 
campuses) and was oversubscribed. But several factors soon combined 
to start a noticeable decline in applications for admissions as of 1971, 
which became a 22 percent decline in 1975.347 The Berkeley campus, 
which was a direct competitor geographically, recovered from its 
student-unrest problems of the mid-1960s, and a substantial amount 
of the radical student element found its way to Santa Cruz, in part 
because of the general environment and the attractions for radical 
elements on campus such as the nature of Kresge College, described 
above. Sinsheimer348 described what happened as follows: 
This “radical” image combined with the soft “no-grade” 
image to create a vision of Santa Cruz as a far-out, laid-back 
campus where one went to flake out and smoke pot under 
the redwoods, not a serious academic locale. While doubtless 
attractive to some, this image further deterred many more 
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prospective students…And then, in the early 1970s, the Santa 
Cruz community was the scene of several shocking murders, 
two involving a campus employee. Santa Cruz became known 
as the “murder capital,” and enrollment applications 
plummeted. 
Sinsheimer took two main steps to deal with the enrollment 
matter. First, he hired Richard Moll, formerly of Bowdoin College, who 
was an energetic and effective,349 albeit controversial,350 admissions 
director, a forerunner of the enrollment-management directors now 
common in private higher education. Second, he made an arrangement 
with Berkeley whereby Berkeley would refer to Santa Cruz UC-eligible 
freshman applicants whom they had no room to admit, with the 
commitment that with satisfactory performance in the first two years 
they could then transfer to Berkeley as juniors. Sinsheimer351 notes 
that about half of such students who did come to Santa Cruz in that 
way chose to stay rather than transferring to Berkeley as juniors. 
 Still, the largest issues requiring attention were the conflict in 
values between the colleges and the boards, its effect upon faculty 
recruitment and promotion, and how the structure could be adapted to 
a UC budgeting process that did not allow for the extra costs associated 
with the college setup. This then led in 1978 to what became known as 
the Rearrangement, the essential elements of which352 were (1) placing 
faculty recruitment, promotion, and advancement completely with the 
boards rather than split between the boards and the colleges; (2) 
reclustering faculty members among the colleges so as to aggregate 
kindred interests in one or several colleges, thereby creating affinity 
groups that did not exist when the faculty members were fully 
dispersed among colleges; and (3) cutting the courses within the 
colleges back to just a core set so as to improve the budgetary 
situation. The plan was essentially Sinsheimer’s own design. There was 
an elaborate process, including a large multifaceted campus committee 
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that is described by Cowan353 and senate roles, by which the plan was 
assessed and eventually accepted with a 75–80 percent positive faculty 
vote.354 Sinsheimer355 describes his guiding concepts as follows: 
Academic standards are the sine qua non of a major 
university. To maintain and improve the standards of the 
disciplines was a primary step in the recovery of the image of 
Santa Cruz. To accomplish this, the diversion of resources into 
second-rate college courses had to be stopped. The influence 
of the colleges had to be removed from personnel decisions 
so that the faculty had a clear set of academic goals. The 
vitiation of the intellectual life of the disciplines caused by the 
dispersion of faculty among all eight colleges had to be ended 
by establishing intellectually coherent groups of faculty in 
each discipline in at most two or three colleges. 
 At the same time, I wished to maintain the colleges as 
intellectual and cultural centers in the liberal arts tradition, as 
well as residence facilities. There would be several diverse 
groups of faculty in each college and a mix of students with 
varied interests. Each college would be required to provide a 
freshman “core” course on some broad topic of interest to its 
faculty—funds would be provided for this purpose. As 
available, funds might also be provided for other college-
based endeavors that fell outside the scope of any discipline. 
 Robert Stevens, who as chancellor from 1987 to 1991 succeeded 
Sinsheimer, added the fine-tuning of increasing the academic budgets 
for the colleges but to nowhere near their original levels, while 
focusing student services to a greater degree centrally.356 Stevens had 
from 1978 to 1987 been president of Haverford College, a prominent 
private liberal arts college with 1,300 enrollment. He had difficulties 
meshing into the system of shared governance of the University of 
California, and upon his departure, a longtime UC person, Karl Pister, 
who had been dean of engineering at Berkeley, was brought in, first as 
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interim chancellor and then as chancellor following the expressed 
desires of the Santa Cruz faculty. Pister indicates that he endeavored to 
resuscitate some of the originally intended academic aspects of the 
college system further but that faculty sentiment was by then generally 
too much opposed for that to happen.357 
 The structure and academic nature of the campus have remained 
largely unchanged since the rearrangement. The boards are now simply 
called departments. The colleges parallel the Harvard houses and the 
Yale residential colleges, in that the provosts now equate roughly 
comparably in function to the masters358 of those bodies, and the 
college activities are very largely directed to sports, organizations, and 
social functions. Under Chancellor Stevens an agreement was reached 
with the city of Santa Cruz to limit the enrollment to fifteen thousand, 
a figure unusually low for UC campuses. That figure was subsequently 
raised to seventeen thousand, which is the approximate present 
enrollment of the campus. Of this enrollment, only 9 percent in 2014 
was at the graduate level, the lowest percentage for any UC campus 
other than Merced, which in 2014 was at 6.1 percent. Riverside and 
Santa Barbara, the next lowest, were at about 12.5 percent. One of the 
purposes of budgetary “rebenching” within the university (chapter 6) 
was to enable growth in the percentage of graduate students enrolled 
at the Santa Cruz campus. 
 In terms of current academic recognition, UCSC has achieved 
preeminence in astronomy359 through an outstanding collection of 
faculty members and its stewardship of the UC participation in the Keck 
ten-meter telescopes atop Mauna Kea in Hawaii, the Lick Observatory, 
and the current project for a thirty-meter telescope (chapter 2). The 
stature of UCSC in astronomy can be traced back to Clark Kerr’s 
decision360 to place the Lick Observatory above San Jose with the new 
Santa Cruz campus, so as to give it a unique focus for academic 
development. As of 2014, fourteen members of the National Academy 
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of Sciences are associated with UCSC. A recent study361 using data 
compiled by Thomson-Reuters in University Science Indicators 362 
reviewed the average number of times that faculty research papers are 
cited in papers by other researchers and found that, overall, UC Santa 




 Many people have looked back over the history of the Santa Cruz 
campus seeking lessons to be learned. Kerr himself dwells upon the 
balance of factors, recognizing that the initial objective was probably 
too much of a dream and wishing that he had been able to be more 
involved himself in the initial implementation.363 An early comparative 
analysis by Grant and Riesman364 was generally quite favorable toward 
the concept academically, painting a picture of probable success in a 
niche market. The initial UCSC chancellor, Dean McHenry, who worked 
with Kerr on the concepts and was on the ground for the 
implementation, has left us much in the way of retrospectives.365, 366, 367 
Noreña 368  has provided a thorough introspective on the colleges 
approach, arguing that the Sinsheimer Rearrangement went much too 
far. Sinsheimer 369, 370 is the most succinctly critical—for example, in the 
following passages: 
 
                                                     
361 “University of California, Santa Cruz, Accountability Profile,” University of California, 
https://perma.cc/HA7K-YQTF. 
362 See Thomson Reuters, INCITES, https://perma.cc/9537-CVWN. 
363 Kerr, 2001, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 293–301. 
364 Gerald Grant and David Riesman, “To Seem Small as It Grows Large,” in The Perpetual Dream: 
Reform and Experiment in the American College (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), pp. 
263–290. 
365 McHenry, 1977, loc. cit. 
366 McHenry, 1993, loc. cit. 
367 Dean McHenry, interview by Elizabeth Spedding Calciano, Founding Chancellor of the University 
of California, Santa Cruz (3 vol.), oral history, UC Santa Cruz, University Library, Regional History 
Project, vol. 1: 1972; vol. 2: 1974; vol. 3: 1987 (coeditor, Randall Jarrell), 
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/34r6t4d5.  
368 Noreña, 2004, loc. cit. 
369 Sinsheimer, 1996, op. cit., p. 94. 




I feel [UC] Santa Cruz was betrayed in three ways. It was 
betrayed by Kerr and McHenry because…they had this great 
vision and they simply did not think through how they could 
do this within the University of California.…In an 
experimental lab, the E. coli aren’t going to complain if there 
is a fault in the experiment and they are wasted. But people 
are. UCSC was betrayed by the community which invited it 
here and then turned on them…. And third, in a sense it got 
betrayed by the system in that after Kerr left…nobody in the 
system felt any obligation to foster this experiment. 371 
The question is how to implement the original concept 
of having a group of four-year liberal arts colleges—a cluster 
of colleges. Quite aside from the question of how you would 
integrate such a structure internally, how do you do this 
within the UC system and under the Master Plan, which says 
the UC system is a research university, which has quite 
different demands on its faculty than the demands made on 
the faculty at Swarthmore or Haverford. How do you do this 
within a system which is geared to kind of large, mass 
undergraduate education with the economies that that 
provides, again compared to a good first-rate liberal arts 
college, which operates at a much higher cost per student? 
You don’t have the money. So where is that money supposed 
to come from? To illustrate, again, it doesn’t square with the 
Master Plan.372 
 Tapper and Palfreyman373 have examined the UCSC experiment in 
some depth, concluding, among other things, that the difficulties and 
failures result from an inability to couch in the American context the 
values that have driven and supported Oxford and Cambridge in the 
United Kingdom. They conclude that neither a public-funded collegiate 
university independent of UC nor direct public funding of UCSC’s 
college system makes practical sense. Similar viewpoints are offered by 
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Duke.374 Finally, there are many oral histories available,375 most notably 
the insightful reflection by Cowan.376 
 
Concluding Thoughts 
 The University of California, Santa Cruz, has been an experiment in 
public higher education that has been much analyzed and evaluated. 
While conclusions and opinions certainly vary, the most common view 
is that the original design, providing education in small colleges placed 
together within a large university-campus framework, was a goal that 
had large difficulties fitting within a public research university such as 
the University of California. If the goal was to have a high-stature 
research faculty, the structure of joint appointments in colleges and 
disciplinary boards severely hampered the recruitment, nurturing, and 
evaluation of faculty. If the goal was to de-emphasize the research 
roles of the faculty, then, following Sinsheimer, the campus design was 
not consistent with the California Master Plan for Higher Education or 
the natural value system of a research university. 
 However, the fact that the colleges do exist today in the setting of 
a major public university is itself an accomplishment not to be belittled. 
The colleges provide a situation where the students within them know 
one another and socialize together. This goes a long way in overcoming 
the usual, largely nonresident, nature of public research universities 
and is a particular strength of both the Santa Cruz and San Diego 
campuses of the University of California. 
 The Santa Cruz campus was started in an era of abundant public 
funding for public higher education but encountered difficulties in 
accommodating the more intensive college type of instruction within 
the standard state budgetary framework of the University of California. 
Since then we have entered an era of declining public financial support 
and a need for public universities, particularly major research 
universities, to develop additional sources of funding from diverse 
private sources. Would this move to new funding models better enable 
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the success of the original Santa Cruz design? Put another way, could 
the Santa Cruz college model draw endowment and other sustaining 
private funding particularly well? Currently the emphases of major 
foundations run to matters of access and throughput in higher 
education. However, some large private donors might be captivated by 
an opportunity to make the college model work, following the thoughts 
of Rhoades377, Grant and Riesman378 and Tapper and Palfreyman379 that 
a UCSC could effectively serve a niche market. There would still be the 
issue of sustaining the remaining public funding as lawmakers question 
the more expensive type of education. 
 The major design and leadership issues associated with the Santa 
Cruz campus have been compounded by four instances when 
emergency interim or new leadership was needed in connection with 
the turnover of chancellors. Specifically there was the 1976 interim 
chancellorship of Angus Taylor to recover from the difficulties of the 
Christensen era, the 1991 appointment of Karl Pister in the wake of 
severe governance issues that developed during the Stevens era, the 
appointment of Martin Chemers as acting chancellor following the 
departure of M. R. C. Greenwood to become provost and senior vice 
president of academic affairs of the University of California in 2004, 
and the appointment of the current chancellor, George Blumenthal, 






Timing and Securing Land Use 
 As described in chapter 2, the site for Merced campus was chosen 
by the Board of Regents in July 1995 following an extensive site-
selection process. The original 1988 proposal from President Gardner 
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had a new campus opening in 1998. What then occasioned the delay, 
such that the new campus opened seven years later in 2005? The 
answers are the volatility of the state’s economy, a variety of political 
factors, and environmental permitting issues. As is explained in chapter 
2, the California state budget is highly subject to changes in the 
economy. The economy took sharp downturns in both the early 1990s 
and the early 2000s. These downturns fed political positioning with 
respect to the campus. Politicians who were opposed would point 
toward the expense of a new campus. Largely lost in that battle was 
the fact that the capacity was needed to enable the University of 
California to meet its Master Plan enrollment obligations, given the fact 
that, one way or another, all existing campuses were subject to 
enrollment limitations included in long-range development plans that 
had been worked out with their surrounding communities. The legally 
mandated environmental review process provided avenues for groups 
opposed to the project for any reason, environmental or otherwise, to 
slow or stop the development of the campus. A particular 
environmental issue for the Merced project involved vernal pools and 
fairy shrimp. Founding chancellor Carol Tomlinson-Keasey described 
the situation:381 
A year after the site was selected, a tiny fairy shrimp that 
lives in seasonal vernal pools was added to the federal 
endangered species list. A vernal pool…emerges from the 
depressions in the land where there is clay hardpan soil. For a 
brief period during the winter rains, these dips retain water, 
allowing the dormant fairy shrimp and other animal and plant 
species adapted to ephemeral wetlands to go through the 
active phase of their life cycle. As the pools dry up in March 
and April, the fairy shrimp burrows into the mud and resumes 
the dormant phase of its existence. Fairy shrimp can remain 
in this dormant phase for decades if there is a drought. Vernal 
pools exist only where the soil has not been seriously 
disturbed by farming, orchards, vineyards and development, 
which all break up the hardpan, leading to the disappearance 
                                                     
381 Carol Tomlinson-Keasey, “A Delicate Dance,” in Karen Merritt and Jane Fiori Lawrence, eds., 
From Rangeland to Research University: The Birth of University of California, Merced, New 




of vernal pools. For this reason there are only a few areas in 
California where significant vernal pools remain. 
Furthermore, as the federal Clean Water Act has been 
extended over the years, vernal pools have been included 
among the waters of the United States and now come under 






Figure 10-17. A vernal pool in Merced Vernal Pools and Grassland Reserve382 
 
 
Thus, a difficult permitting process with the US Army Corps of 
Engineers came into play. The complications from that process 
eventually led to relocation of the campus site from its original 
intended location within the donated land to adjacent land that had 
already been developed as a municipal golf course. This required 
acquisition of both the golf course and adjoining private property, 
which would be used for development of a neighborhood community 
to support the campus. For that purpose a grant from the Packard 
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Foundation was secured in support of both the campus development 
and the opportunity to lessen impacts on vernal pools.383 
 As the campus was further developed, and in accord with the 
Packard Foundation grant, a Merced Vernal Pools and Grassland 
Reserve was created and added to the University of California Natural 
Reserve System, thereby setting aside a substantial portion of the 
Virginia Smith Trust lands for preservation and scientific study. 
 The permitting, legal, and land-acquisition processes associated 
with the Merced campus and the long time for carrying them out stand 
in marked contrast to the relatively uncomplicated processes involved 
in the start-ups of the San Diego, Irvine, and Santa Cruz campuses in 
the 1960s. The differences also display the changes that occurred in US 
environmental and legal permitting requirements over the intervening 
forty years. As well, they have strong implications for what would be 
required for development of new campuses in the future. 
 
Oversight and Leadership 
 As was the case for the starts of the Irvine and Santa Cruz 
campuses, the Merced project originated in the Office of the President. 
In the case of UC Merced, the foundational work took place from 1989 
until the appointment of the first chancellor, which happened in 1999. 
In 1997 as the site had been selected and development was clearly 
getting underway, a position called vice provost for academic initiatives 
was created within the university-wide provost’s office, with the 
principal initiative in the portfolio for the position being the new 
campus. In 1999 a full search for a chancellor was carried out, and 
Carol-Tomlinson-Keasey, who had been vice provost for academic 
initiatives, was selected. Also, the Academic Council was asked to 
appoint a Faculty Advisory Committee for the new campus, as had 
been done for the new campuses in the 1960s. The first chair of that 
committee was Fred Spiess,384 a longtime distinguished scientist with 
the Scripps Institution of Oceanography at UC San Diego. The Faculty 
Advisory Committee was closely involved in academic planning, the 
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appointment of academic officers, and in the normal Academic 
Personnel Committee role for appointments of faculty. 
 
Academic Planning and Start-Up 
 As it started, the Merced campus was faced with a much more 
stringent funding environment than was the situation for the new 
campuses of the 1960s. 
 Early in the academic planning for the Merced campus, the 
decision was made to have no academic departments, but instead to 
place faculty within one of three colleges: Social Sciences, Humanities, 
and Arts; Natural Sciences; and Engineering. In addition to fitting better 
with funding and overall growth prospects, the aim was to avoid the 
allegiances and limitations of horizons associated with departments 
and to stress interdisciplinary study and multidisciplinary 
interactions.385  Undergraduate majors would grow in number and 
become more field-specific as adequate numbers of faculty members 
became available. As of 2018 there are twenty-three different 
undergraduate majors available.386 
 There are, of course, some difficulties associated with the 
approach that was taken, as is the case for any start-up strategy. There 
were dangers of spreading the faculty too thin and having incomplete 
coverage of material within a major. This concern then led to the 
concept of building affinity clusters of faculty with a variety of 
disciplinary backgrounds. One cluster, early on, was environmental 
sciences. Others that have now (2017) been added include sustaining 
the planet; computational science and data analytics; adaptive and 
functional materials; innovation and entrepreneurship; precision 
agriculture; human health science387 ; inequity, power, and social 
justice; and anthropology and archaeology. 
 It was felt desirable to seek research distinction in some cluster 
areas from the start. Therefore the initial faculty hiring was to be at the 
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senior level,388 although subsequently a large number of junior hires 
have been made (see below). Two research institutes were planned 
from the start—the Sierra Nevada Research Institute and the World 
Cultures Institute. The former389 takes advantage of the unique location 
of the Merced campus near the Sierra Nevada Mountains, along with 
formal partnerships with Sequoia-Kings Canyon and Yosemite National 
Parks, to address specific research issues associated with the mountain 
environment and the parks. It has been an impressive success. The 
World Cultures Institute was to address the multicultural makeup and 
history of the San Joaquin Valley. It did not materialize as such for a 
number of reasons, one of them being the predominance of individual, 
rather than collaborative, research within the social sciences, 
humanities, and arts. 
 One helpful feature toward the start-up of UC Merced was an 
alliance with UC’s Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, which 
enabled research partnerships and the actual location of the research 
of some science faculty members to be at Livermore (one hour away by 
automobile) in the early years. Early on, the campus also obtained use 
of facilities at nearby, recently decommissioned Castle Air Force Base. 
 The initial undergraduate class for UC Merced entered in 2005, 
and the first commencement (figure 10-18) was in 2009. 
 
Current Status 
 The current (2017) tenure-track faculty, on a headcount basis, 
numbers 221 individuals, of whom 15 are in the lecturer (potential 
security of employment) series, 57 are full professors, 69 are associate 
professors, and 95 are assistant professors.390 The large proportions of 
assistant and associate professors correspond to the fact that recent 
hiring preferences have been at the entry level. That trend can lead to 
a version of the past Riverside and Santa Cruz situations in which large 
cohorts of faculty members moved through the ranks more or less 
together. The Merced campus also has an unusually high proportion of 
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non-tenure-track faculty, 194 headcount, almost as great as the 
number of tenure-track faculty members. 391  The lecturers enable 






Figure 10-18. First Lady Michelle Obama speaks at the first commencement 
 of the Merced campus, May 16, 2009, courtesy of UC Merced392 
 
 
 As of 2017, UC Merced had 7,336 students, of whom 7.1 percent 
were graduate students.393 It is the one University of California campus 
that is available to fulfill the Master Plan promise of a place for every 
eligible California-resident applicant to the University of California 
(chapters 5 and 15). The student body at Merced is remarkably diverse 
ethnically. As of 2017, 51 percent of undergraduate students were 
Hispanic, 22 percent Asian or Pacific Islander, 11 percent Caucasian, 5 
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percent African American, and 7 percent nonresidents of California.394 
Among the undergraduates, 71 percent are first-generation students in 
the sense that neither parent holds a four-year degree.395 Thus, the 
new campus more than does its part to maintaining access to UC-
quality higher education throughout the diverse population of 
California. 
 Less than a decade after the first graduating class, it is still too 
early to judge the academic and research success of the campus, 
although there are promising signs. The two largest winners of the 
2015 university-wide Multicampus Research Initiatives competition 
were the UC Advanced Solar Technologies Institute,396 Roland Winston 
of UC Merced, lead investigator, and the UC Water Security and 




 Growth and academic development of the Merced campus are 
vital for the University of California to meet its access obligations under 
the California Master Plan. However, in a stringent budget climate, that 
is much more difficult than it was for campuses before 1990. The 
regents have approved an innovative project, dubbed Merced 2020, 
that will enable the campus “to attain self-sufficiency and function 
effectively as a world-class, but highly focused, research university.”398 
The project enables academic development, a doubling of physical 
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year 2020.399, 400 The project funds both academic buildings and student 
housing.  
In recognition of the fact that the state no longer finances facilities 
projects other than for some seismic purposes and no longer issues 
construction bonds for the university, the financial and organizational 
plans for the project are innovative. There is a public-private operation 
known as an availability-payment concession in which a single 
development team designs, builds, and heavily finances the entire 
project and then operates and maintains the resultant buildings 
through a thirty-nine-year, performance-based project agreement.401 
The cost of nearly $1.3 billion is financed by a combination of $600 
million long-term regents’ bonds and $738 million of debt and equity 
financing arranged by the private development team. In addition to 
very beneficial decompression of facilities use, the project increases 
enrollment capacity by twenty-seven hundred students for the campus, 
raising the campus capacity by 36 percent, but only increasing the 
capacity of the University of California as a whole by a bit over 1 
percent. However, the project should really be viewed as setting the 
necessary stage for the campus to develop over time to a capacity 
similar to those of the other campuses. 
 
 
SUMMARY COMPARATIVE ANALYSES 
 
Differences in Starting Points 
 The eight newer general campuses reflect three different ways of 
adding campuses to an existing university or university system: (1) 
building upon an existing specialized operation to form a general 
campus (Davis, Riverside, San Diego), (2) acquiring an existing 
university or college (Los Angeles, Santa Barbara), and (3) a de novo 
start from no existing base (Irvine, Santa Cruz, Merced). Each of these 
has its own features, opportunities, and problems. 
 A start from an existing specialized base is beneficial if the culture 
and values of that base effectively establish and readily transition to 
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the standards and goals for a more general campus. Starting from the 
Scripps Institution of Oceanography clearly did this for the San Diego 
campus, given the strong emphasis of SIO on science of the highest 
quality. The preexistence of the University Farm did this in a different 
way for the Davis campus, setting traditions of service to the state and 
valuing professional education. However, given the unique situation 
surrounding agricultural research (year-round appointments, 
guaranteed research support), it was more difficult to transition to a 
more general standard of the highest quality as other disciplines were 
built. In the case of the Riverside campus, the start was an unlikely 
combination of a very specialized agricultural research station on the 
one hand, and a college focused upon high-quality, liberal 
undergraduate education without much attention to research on the 
other hand. Both of these preexisting structures were rather far 
removed from the ultimate goal of establishing a research-university 
general campus, and the start was therefore difficult. With the 
development of mass higher education and research universities 
around the world, conversions of previously specialized academic 
institutions have been happening on a large scale, notably in China 
(e.g., Beijing Forestry University, Nanjing University of Posts and 
Telecommunications, and Shaanxi Normal University). The nature of 
the starting point has been or becomes a major factor in each case. 
 A start from an existing university or college of a different sort is 
generally a substantial handicap, because of the need for transitions in 
culture and probably also replacement of faculty. Only very rarely do 
nonresearchers transition to become strong researchers. The approach 
that was used and ultimately worked for converting the state college 
campuses at Los Angeles and Santa Barbara to general research-
university campuses in the University of California was essentially one 
of dilution through rapid growth. Program elimination (e.g., industrial 
arts at Santa Barbara) was also used. But the need to deal with 
inherited faculty and traditions did make the starts of these two 
campuses more difficult, and resources were needed for the 
conversion. The difficulties would be even greater and would require at 
least thirty or forty years for turnover of faculty through attrition if 




The same sort of institutional transformation took place in a 
different way for the San Francisco campus. There it was necessary to 
infuse research values into a medical school that had been built upon 
traditional medical education and clinical practice and where the value 
of research had not been appreciated except in a few isolated areas. 
The change was accomplished by faculty leaders who recognized the 
need for strong research and persuaded the university-wide 
administration to go in that direction through a change in campus 
administrative leadership, with consequent changes in the value 
system and faculty reward structure. For UC San Francisco, serendipity 
and the general attractiveness of the location then served to bring in 
highly capable young researchers. 
A “grassroots” or bare-land start from no preexisting university 
operation provides the least encumbrance and the most opportunity 
for innovation through an unconstrained fresh start. It may also be the 
most expensive route because of the lack of inherited academic 
buildings and the need to build all support services. The Irvine, Santa 
Cruz, and Merced campuses of the University of California are all 
examples of that sort. The Santa Cruz project enabled the campus to 
try a system of small-college education within a large campus. The 
Merced project has allowed that campus to try structures without 
actual academic departments, as was also done in a different way at 
Santa Cruz. The value of a fresh start rather than an inherited 
institution is a rare opportunity. That fact was also recognized by the 
Olin Foundation when it chose to foster innovation in engineering 
education by starting an entirely new institution (Franklin W. Olin 
College402), rather than trying to influence or cause evolution of 
engineering education in an existing university.403 
 
Transitions in Responsibility and Leadership 
The new campuses in the 1960s (San Diego, Irvine, Santa Cruz) and 
the new Merced campus forty years later all “belonged” to the Office 
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of the President and its staff for the first six or seven years after the 
projects were chartered until a chancellor was be named to fill out 
resident staff.404 This was necessary in order to give proper attention 
to, and have proponents for, the new campuses from the start. The 
chancellors then oversaw their own buildups, 1961–68 and 1999–2006. 
Similarly, Academic Senate committees were formed by the university-
wide Academic Council with the approval of the president for each of 
the new campuses from the start and took the Academic Senate 
shared-governance roles. These committees were composed of 
respected and capable faculty members from existing campuses.405  
 
Building from Within 
All University of California campuses have been developed largely 
by building from within the existing university rather than through 
incorporation of already well-developed other universities or college 
campuses into the UC system. This is true even for UCLA and Santa 
Barbara, because of the large dilution effects when they were built. 
There are several significant advantages to creating new campuses 
from within a university or university system. Most notably, the 
university or university system can generate its own design and impose 
its own values, standards, and approaches from the start, especially by 
using wisdom and personnel from existing campuses. For example, for 
a new campus, all faculty members can be hired with review and 
recommendations from a Committee on Academic Personnel that is 
initially composed of faculty members from preexisting campuses. 
There is no inherited different culture, value system, or work ethic to 
overcome. 
 
Strategies for Academic Building 
A new campus by definition opens with a small contingent of 
faculty. Who should those faculty members be? Should a campus build 
initially across the entire range of disciplines or area by area? Should a 
campus start with primarily senior faculty members, primarily junior 
faculty members, or a spread across ranks? Should the start be with 
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undergraduate education or with graduate education or both? Should 
extensive use be made of lecturers or other temporary faculty to 
provide coverage before ladder-rank faculty can be hired? There were 
different answers to these questions among the new campuses. 
The conventional approach is to start undergraduate education 
first, while having enough graduate education to draw research-
oriented faculty. This is what was done at Santa Cruz, Santa Barbara, 
and Merced, and to a significant extent at Irvine. For a public 
university, undergraduate education visibly satisfies the political 
supporters of the campus. However, starting with undergraduate 
education also calls for a sufficient distribution among disciplines and 
potential majors at the start to accommodate the varied interests of 
undergraduates. It thereby spreads the faculty thin. In the affluent time 
of the 1960s, the Irvine campus was able to ameliorate this challenge 
with a large burst of initial faculty hiring—the addition of 150 faculty 
members in the single year 1964, described by Peltason, above. In 
order to effectively nurture the academic quality of a campus, such a 
large amount of hiring cannot be allowed to exceed the supply of 
highly promising potential faculty members. The Merced campus, 
opening later at in a time of severe budgetary constraints, has been 
fiscally limited in its ability to hire tenure-track faculty members. As 
noted, it is providing adequate initial coverage of fields through the use 
of a large number of non-tenure-track faculty members. 
The San Diego approach was to start by hiring faculty stars of the 
first magnitude and offer study in such fields as they turned out to 
represent, with only graduate education initially. As Revelle predicated, 
this was indeed a path to early and rapid academic distinction. 
However, the San Diego approach entails a serendipitous arrival of 
research fields and a delayed inception of undergraduate education. 
Typically, a public university has more political support for 
undergraduate education than it does for research, despite the 
ultimate contributions of research to the economy and human 
betterment. More constituents are visibly and directly affected by 
undergraduate education. What was different in San Diego was that 
the community saw the university campus as a key and necessary 
factor in economic redevelopment following the military-related 
economy of World War II. 
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The two efforts to start largely with entry-level faculty did not 
work well. The Riverside “college” faculty were hired very largely at the 
entry level and progressed through the ranks together, as was also the 
case for the start of UC Santa Cruz. This approach had several 
problems, as youth and then various degrees of age and experience 
prevailed at various points in time, lessening the breadth of experience 
of the faculty and concentrating periods of faculty renewal rather than 
spreading them evenly over time. At San Diego, star-quality senior 
faculty prevailed at the beginning, and at Irvine and UCLA the spectrum 
of experience of faculty was, by design, widespread from the start. The 
current distribution of faculty ranks at Merced is closer to the Riverside 
and Santa Cruz situations, given the unusually high proportions of 
associate and assistant professors (33 and 46 percent, respectively).  
 
Stars as Magnets 
The Revelle plan for building the research stature of the San Diego 
campus worked admirably. Revelle himself and the initial star-quality 
faculty such as Urey, Arnold, Bonner, and Goeppert-Mayer did indeed 
draw other distinguished senior faculty members, junior faculty 
members, and graduate students who wanted to work with and near 
these people. San Diego could build in this way, deferring attention to 
an undergraduate program, because of the strong interest of the San 
Diego community in the research base, the strong intellectual 
leadership of Revelle himself, the relatively affluent state of the 
California treasury, and the fact that the regents were developing 
several other new campuses, such that San Diego’s different path 
would not draw as much attention at the state level. Strikingly, the 
faculty members that Revelle and York assembled provided a strong 
base for generating the undergraduate program when it did come. 
 
A Sommelier’s Taste 
Above all else, examination of the developments of the various UC 
campuses reveals the extreme importance of the faculty being built not 
by top administrators and not by sitting back and waiting for 
applications from prospective faculty members. Instead, it is most 
effective for unique intellectual leaders, probably distinguished 




brightest. What is needed, as was described by Julius Krevans for 
William Rutter in the case of UCSF, is the rare people who have ”a 
sommelier’s taste” in recognizing quality research and talent and 
promise for it. In addition to Rutter at UCSF, we have seen this for 
Lewis, Birge, Hildebrand, Pitzer, and Evans at Berkeley; for Revelle and 
Brueckner at San Diego; for Young and Jacoby at UCLA; and for the 




Two significant categories of organizational innovation have been 
devised and tested in the development of University of California 
campuses. They are ways of securing a small-college experience within 
a large research university and ways of overcoming the constraints 
associated with academic departments. Toward the first goal, 
residential colleges were created from the start at San Diego and Santa 
Cruz, among the first efforts to do so within public universities. In line 
with what has happened at Harvard, Yale, and elsewhere, these have 
proven to be successes in terms of focusing the social lives, 
recreational sports, and other events for students. The Santa Cruz 
effort to center intellectual life and instructional courses within the 
colleges was less successful and has been largely abandoned. With 
regard to the second objective, the original design for Santa Cruz called 
for no academic departments. Boards of study were introduced as 
weaker forms of departments to coordinate curricula, and now UCSC 
has actual departments. The newer Merced campus also was started 
without departments, having just the three academic schools. 
Organization without formal departments may indeed be a good way 
to start a new campus with a small faculty size. However, as the 
campus grows, as faculty multiply in number, and in view of 
recognition and academic stature occuring within the disciplines, 
department structures become increasingly compelling. 
 
Initial Research Signature 
We have seen a number of instances where distinction in a 
focused area of research early on has been a very positive factor. One 
example, of course, is the start that the Scripps Institution of 
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Oceanography gave to the distinction of the San Diego campus. The 
same can be said of the strong standing of the Davis campus in 
agricultural research before it became a general campus. Landing the 
National Science Foundation’s Institute of Theoretical Physics was a 
plum for Santa Barbara and has led to considerable distinction for UCSB 
in physics. The creation of the Air Pollution Research Center at 
Riverside was important, both intellectually and in creating a positive 
image to counter the negative publicity from the smog problem. The 
Sierra Nevada Research Institute has been a very positive early 
accomplishment for the Merced campus. 
 
Campus Site 
The geographical siting of a campus has a very important effect. 
This is true in terms of the appeal of the surroundings, such as access 
to recreational opportunities, cultural events, and delightful living in 
general, and it can be important in terms of what linkages there are for 
the campus with the community or other nearby institutions. Seven of 
the UC campuses (all except Riverside, Davis, and Merced) are in 
coastal regions near the Pacific Ocean and therefore have a pleasant 
and moderate Mediterranean climate. The major metropolitan areas 
surrounding Los Angeles and San Francisco have many cultural 
activities. San Francisco has extremely progressive (some would say 
left-wing radical) politics, which appeal to some potential faculty 
members. The state of California has an extremely beautiful and 
accessible mountain range, the Sierra Nevada, and attractive desert 
locales. As Bourne reported, the San Francisco climate and range of 
activities and interests figured prominently in attracting the four 
research luminaries-to-be (Boyer, Bishop, Varmus, Prusiner) who came 
to UCSF early in its development of research. 
Nearby and allied institutions that have been important for 
drawing faculty members include the Scripps Research Institute and 
the Salk Institute in La Jolla (San Diego); marine research facilities in 
San Diego, Santa Barbara, and Santa Cruz; Silicon Valley for Berkeley 
and Santa Cruz; the biotechnology industry for UCSF and Berkeley in 
the San Francisco Bay Area and for San Diego; and the proximity of the 





The Radicalism of the 1960s 
Campus unrest in the 1960s caught different campuses in different 
stages of development and was of different natures and intensities on 
the various campuses because of different political environments. The 
initial Free Speech Movement started at Berkeley and caused a major 
crisis that led to the removal of a chancellor, much negative publicity, 
and eventually the dismissal of Clark Kerr as president by the Board of 
Regents. Clark Kerr devotes the second volume of his memoirs406 
largely to these matters. These events brought Berkeley a radicalized 
political image and had a negative effect upon applications to the 
campus, since overcome many times over. 
A counterpart countercultural movement some years later in San 
Diego, largely in resistance to the Vietnam War, is described by then-
chancellor William McGill407 and was particularly stark because of the 
contrast with the politically quite conservative San Diego and La Jolla 
communities. At this still early stage in the development of the campus, 
the campus leaders—McGill and interim successor Herb York—were 
almost fully diverted for two years to repairing relationships with the 
community and regaining equilibrium on campus. 
A similarly highly disruptive series of events was generated by the 
protest activities in Isla Vista, the student residence area adjoining UC 
Santa Barbara, culminating in the burning of the Bank of America 
building in Isla Vista in February 1970. These events created genuine 
concern about the safety of students attending UCSB and surely had 
their impacts on enrollments. As well, they consumed much of the time 
of Chancellor Vernon Cheadle. Unfortunately, such concerns were 
stoked again by a rapid sequence of six murders perpetrated by a 
demented nonstudent in Isla Vista in May 2014. 
There were also instances in which faculty members prompted 
political concerns and headlines. Herbert Marcuse, a philosopher of the 
far left, was a San Diego faculty member who drew national attention 
during the period of student activism and was in various ways a thorn 
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in the side of William McGill during the 1968–69 year.408 Angela Davis, 
a radical activist, was an acting assistant professor at UCLA in 1969–70 
and drew so much attention that the regents chose to dismiss her, over 
the protests and challenge of then-new-chancellor Charles Young. 
Davis was reinstated by court action. Subsequently, Davis became a 
professor at UC Santa Cruz from 1991 until her retirement in 2008. 
Student unrest and the images associated with it were factors in 
the enrollment problems at UC Santa Cruz in the early 1970s. 
 
Learning and Adjusting to the University of California 
The University of California has its own ways of governance and 
operation. These are often markedly different from the experiences of 
a campus or university leader coming from outside the university. Most 
new leaders from outside can adjust to the ways of UC, but some do 
not, and there can also be difficulties encountered during a period of 
learning and adjustment. There were a number of instances during the 
formative years of campuses when setbacks came because of crises of 
governance associated with the lack of attunement of leaders to the 
systems and traditions of the university. 
 
Times to AAU Membership 
Membership in the Association of American Universities is by 
invitation only and is highly sought. As of 2017 there are sixty-two 
member universities, of which thirty-four are public, twenty-six are 
private, and two are in Canada. University of California campuses make 
up 10 percent of the US membership and 18 percent of the US public-
university membership. 
Repeating the statistics from chapter 1, it is interesting that it has 
taken about the same lengths of time after embarking on the general-
campus research-university mission for the various University of 
California member campuses to achieve AAU membership. This speaks 
to the general strength of the structural and operational principles of 
the university as a whole. Davis, which awarded its first PhD (botany) in 
1950, was established as a general campus in 1959 and achieved AAU 
membership in 1996, thirty-seven years later. Irvine, which opened in 
                                                     




1965, also became a member of the AAU in 1996, thirty-one years 
later. Santa Barbara, which was chartered as a general campus in 1958 
and conferred its first PhD in 1963, became a member in 1995, thirty-
seven years later. San Diego was on yet a faster track in its rise, 
achieving AAU membership in 1982, only twenty-two years after 
admitting its first graduate students in 1960. The shortness of that 
period further attests to the worth of the Revelle approach as a way of 
moving an institution as fast as possible to distinction. UCLA was 
admitted to the AAU in 1974, thirty-six years after giving its first PhD in 
1938, and only sixteen years after being accorded “equal opportunity” 
by the UC Regents and Clark Kerr in 1958. That too is impressive. 
The other AAU member is Berkeley, which, as the University of 
California, was a founding member of the AAU in 1900. That is only 
thirty-two years after the founding of the university as a very small 
institution in 1868. But the interval cannot be compared, since 
research distinction was not as large a criterion for the AAU in 1900 as 
it is at present. 
The three potentially eligible UC campuses that are not yet 
members of the AAU are Santa Cruz, Riverside, and Merced. Santa Cruz 
was held back in research growth until the Sinsheimer Rearrangement 
of 1978. As of 2017, thirty-nine years have elapsed since that time, and 
Santa Cruz is now regarded as a strong contender for AAU 
membership. (Whether or not the AAU will choose to allocate over 10 
percent of its US membership to University of California campuses is 
another matter, however.) Riverside was held back in development by 
the conflicts that existed in the early years and by the smog infamy of 
the early 1970s but has developed well in recent decades. Merced 






Faculty Appointments and Advancement 
 
 
The quality of the faculty of the University of California is maintained 
primarily through objective and thorough appraisal, by competent 
faculty members, of each candidate for appointment or promotion. 
Responsibility for this appraisal falls largely upon the review 
committees nominated by the Committee on Academic Personnel or 
equivalent Committee and appointed by the Chancellor or a designated 
representative. It is the duty of these committees to ascertain the 
present fitness of each candidate and the likelihood of the candidate’s 
pursuing a productive career…Superior intellectual attainment, as 
evidenced both in teaching and in research or other creative 
achievement, is an indispensable qualification for appointment or 
promotion to tenure positions. 
 —Academic Personnel Manual, University of California1 
 
The Committee on Budget and Interdepartmental Relations (Budget 
Committee)…is the most potent expression of the egalitarian 
philosophy of “faculty governance,” which has fostered and 
safeguarded the academic distinction of our institution for almost a 
century. 
—Committee on Budget and Interdepartmental Relations2 
 
[At the University of California3] academic quality is elevated to a 
priority and even a collective obsession that pursues every academic all 
 
                                                     
1 Academic Personnel Manual, University of California, Section 210-1(a), https://perma.cc/N6JD-
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2 Committee on Budget and Interdepartmental Relations, “Introduction to the Budget 
Committee,” Academic Senate, University of California, updated August 2017, 
https://perma.cc/63UW-N958. 
3 These authors studied Berkeley, but their conclusions can be extended to the other UC campuses 
as well by virtue of the spread of common practices and a common academic culture throughout 
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along his/her academic career…Evaluation is on-going throughout an 
academic’s lifetime. It never seems to come to an end. Faculty members 
are submitted to reporting requirements all along their career, from 
recruitment to retirement, whether as junior or senior professor. 
—Jean-Claude Thoenig and Catherine Paradeise4 
 
 
 At the heart of a distinguished research university is a culture of 
faculty excellence in research, teaching, and service. The concept of 
academic excellence should underlie everything that is done, ranging 
from the evaluation of faculty for promotion and advancement 
throughout their careers, to the choice and piloting of research by the 
faculty, to initiatives and priorities within the administration, to the 
coverage and emphases within teaching, and to attitudes and habits 
transmitted to students. Given a culture of excellence and practices 
that stem from it, all else will follow.5 
 
 
MAINTAINING THE CULTURE 
 
 Chapters 9 and 10 have explored ways in which academic 
excellence was initially built at the various campuses of the University 
of California. We now turn to how that excellence has been, and can 
be, effectively nurtured and sustained over time. 
 Excellence is embedded in faculty values and capabilities. 
Sustaining excellence requires serious involvement of the most 
accomplished and most capable faculty members of the institution in 
program review, planning for evolution of program areas, and 
evaluation of fellow faculty members for appointment and throughout 
their careers. Key roles for the university administration are to identify 
                                                     
4 Jean-Claude Thoenig and Catherine Paradeise, “Organizational Governance and the Production 
of Academic Quality: Lessons from Two Top U. S. Research Universities,” Minerva 52, no. 4 (2014): 
pp. 381–417. 
5 Through extensive interviews Thoenig and Paradeise, 2014, loc. cit., have examined both the 
Berkeley campus of the University of California and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
(MIT) from this standpoint and have stressed how a strong devotion to principles of academic 
quality influences all that is done. 
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and place excellence as the highest priority; to foster methodologies 
that enable identifying, recruiting, and sustaining the best and 
brightest faculty; and to enable the faculty to define and pursue 
outstanding research and teaching with as few institutional constraints 
and diversions as possible. 
 If the quest for excellence does not yet pervade the faculty culture 
of a mature university, it will be nearly impossible for the university 
administration to create it. If the university is small in comparison with 
its intended ultimate size, then the approach of dilution with waves of 
new faculty members who are strongly oriented toward quality can be 
used, as was done by UC in the development of both the Los Angeles 
and Santa Barbara campuses (chapter 10). But without the opportunity 
for growth and a dilution approach, it may well make better sense to 
create an entirely new university as the approach for creating academic 
quality and stature, rather than trying to upgrade the concern for 
academic quality in an existing university. 
 This chapter concerns the unique University of California system 
of reviewing faculty members for appointment and advancement 
throughout their careers with emphasis on the ways in which the 
process stresses and secures academic quality. This established 
mechanism is probably the single most identifiable and important 
reason for the standing that has been achieved by the university. 
Program reviews and changes and evolution of program have also been 
important and are a subject of the following chapter. 
 
 
PRINCIPLES USED IN THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 
 
Reviews 
 All initial appointments and increases in rank and/or salary6 come 
as the result of reviews of the recent performance and 
accomplishments of individual faculty members. These reviews are 
carried out at the time of initial hire and then typically every two to 
four years, continuing throughout the entire career of a faculty 
member. The intervals between reviews become longer, the criteria 
                                                     
6 Except for cost-of-living increases. See the next section. 




applied become greater, and the bar to be cleared for advancement 
becomes higher as a faculty member moves further along in her or his 
career. The reviews are conducted by a thorough and structured 
process involving first faculty members in the candidate’s own 
department and then faculty members campus-wide. At key points in 
the career of a faculty member, written, confidential evaluations are 
solicited from national and international peers who are closely familiar 
with the accomplishments of the candidate. The process is designed to 
involve a large number of reviewers with no one or even a few 
particular reviewers dominating the process, thereby helping to assure 
fairness and increase objectivity. The ultimate decisions are made by 
the administration, typically the provost or a vice provost, but the 
recommendations of reviewers are highly influential in these decisions 
and are almost always controlling. 
 
Salaries 
 The University of California establishes salary scales7 for academic 
titles, corresponding to advancement through the ranks by means of 
steps within rank. Currently these scales entail six steps for assistant 
professor, two of which overlap in salary with the first two of the five 
steps for associate professor. The top two steps for associate professor 
overlap in salary with the first two of the ten steps for professor. The 
overlapping steps offer some latitude to provide continual 
advancement before the next promotion in rank. When a faculty 
member is promoted, the overlapping steps are generally not repeated 
so that the professor does receive continual salary increases upon 
advancement. For the most distinguished faculty members, there are 
above-scale appointments, which allow continual recognition of 
accomplishments beyond the top of the established salary scale. In 
years of sufficient state budget, cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs) are 
applied to all the steps and are automatically received by all faculty 
members. 
 
                                                     
7 “Academic Salary Scales, Effective July 1, 2017,” Office of the President, University of California, 
https://perma.cc/H2T2-KZKS. See the indicated subpages for the scales for different types of 
appointment. The scales are updated whenever cost-of-living increases are applied. 
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 Under California law, salaries of all University of California 
employees are publicly available within a database maintained by the 
university8 as well as a database maintained by the Sacramento Bee 
newspaper9 covering all California public employees. 
 Historically, the set scales served a valuable purpose of 
maintaining equity in salaries among disciplines; however, market 
forces have grown substantially over the past half century and do differ 
considerably among disciplines and also professions. Two additional 
approaches have been taken to recognize that fact. One of these is the 
establishment of special higher scales for certain disciplines—one for 
law and another for business, economics, and engineering10. There iis 
also a different approach to salaries within the health sciences, where 
compensation for practice occurs through the university as well. The 
second change is more frequent use of higher, off-scale salaries, which 
are still determined through the standard review process. 
 Up through professor, step 4, the academic salary scales specify 
“normal” intervals for advancement: two years through associate 
professor, step 3, and three years beyond that level. Depending upon 
performance, a faculty member may receive accelerated advancement 
at periods shorter than the stated normal period, be advanced at the 
normal interval, be advanced at a slower rate than normal, or not be 
advanced at all. In any event the interval between reviews cannot be 
more than five years.11 Above professor, step 4, there is no normal 
period, connoting that some faculty members will not advance further 
and that typical periods within step will be longer. 
 
Major Reviews 
 Reviews are in-depth at all levels of advancement, but for certain 
advancements they are more thorough. These special advancements 
include the award of tenure, which equates to promotion from 
assistant professor to associate professor; promotion from associate 
                                                     
8 “Compensation at the University of California: University of California Employee Pay”, 
https://perma.cc/X8KM-ASLP. 
9 “State Worker Salary Database,” Sacbee, https://perma.cc/T9GH-D47C. 
10 The latter special scale was established in 1981. 
11 Section 200-0, “Policy,” Academic Personnel Manual, University of California, 
https://perma.cc/X2AZ-E8U8.. 




professor to professor; advancement to step 6 professor; and 
advancement above scale (i.e., beyond step 10). 
 The tenure review is of course particularly important. That review 
is preceded by a midcareer appraisal,12 which at Berkeley occurs in the 
seventh semester of employment. The purpose of the midcareer 
appraisal is to provide information that can help an assistant professor 
gauge the likelihood of achieving tenure and make any desirable 
adjustments in his or her approach. Following that, the tenure review is 
typically started in the eleventh semester (the start of the sixth year) of 
employment as an assistant professor. The University of California 
extends to eight years the recommendation 13  of the American 
Association of University Professors that employment in a pretenure 
position should be limited to seven years. The review in the sixth year 
enables a year for re-review if that is needed for procedural reasons 




BUDGET COMMITTEE/COMMITTEE ON ACADEMIC PERSONNEL 
 
As of the Berkeley Revolution of 1919 (chapter 7) and the consequent 
increase in the roles and formal structure of the Academic Senate, the 
Board of Regents established a policy that the Academic Senate should 
be consulted by the president on all “appointments, promotions, 
demotions, and dismissals” of faculty members in professorial 
positions.14, 15 The Academic Senate then established the Committee on 
Budget and Interdepartmental Relations, known familiarly as the 
Budget Committee, to advise the president on those matters. Berkeley 
 
                                                     
12 “Procedure for the Formal Appraisal of an Assistant Professor,” Academic Personnel Manual, 
Section 220-83, University of California, https://perma.cc/6Z7A-B7UL.. 
13 “1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure: AAUP,” 
https://perma.cc/6P3F-3SN5. 
14 Standing Orders of the Regents, no. 105.2, “Duties, Powers, and Privileges of the Academic 
Senate,” University of California, https://perma.cc/T9SP-8FRM.. 
15 Angus E. Taylor, “The Academic Senate of the University of California: Its Role in Shared 
Governance and Operation of the University of California,” p. 3, Institute of Governmental Studies, 
University of California, Berkeley, CA, 1998, 
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Sustaining Excellence: Faculty Appointments and Advancement 
423 
 
chemist Joel Hildebrand, who was often a member of that committee 
in its early years, indicated that among the first things that the 
committee did was to “set up criteria for the ranks in the academic 
ladder” and “what the criteria and length of periods of [service as] 
instructor, assistant professor, [and] associate professor are.” He 
further indicated that there had previously (i.e., during the Wheeler era 
and before) been no regular plan or approach and that promotion and 
salary increases had simply been presidential decisions without clearly 
identified criteria.16 
 As campuses came into being beyond Berkeley and then UCLA, the 
Academic Senate divided into Northern and Southern Divisions, and 
each of the divisions had a Committee on Budget and 
Interdepartmental Relations with the same functions. Subsequently the 
structure changed to there being divisions of the Academic Senate on 
each campus, and the names of the campus committees were changed 
to Committee on Academic Personnel (CAP) on all campuses except 
Berkeley, where the committee retains the original name. Operations 
and membership of the CAP or Budget Committee and its interactions 
with the administration vary among campuses, but for all campuses the 
CAP or Budget Committee is the focal point of the process for faculty 
review and advancement. At some campuses (e.g., UCLA) CAP does not 
review advancements at normal rates within ranks and/or initial 
appointments, leaving these to deans. At some campuses, CAP audits 
reviews of routine advancements after the fact.17 At UCLA, CAP reviews 
and recommends the appropriate step and then the salary, if off scale, 
is determined by the administration. At Berkeley, on the other hand, 
the Budget Committee reviews and recommends both step and salary 
for all cases. 
For Berkeley, the Budget Committee is composed of nine faculty 
members, appointed by the Committee on Committees of the Berkeley 
Division for three-year overlapping terms, so that there are three new 
appointments per year. The faculty members are drawn from 
                                                     
16 Joel H. Hildebrand, interview by Edna Tartaul Daniel, “Chemistry, Education, and the University 
of California,” oral history, p. 155, Regional Oral History Office, University of California, Berkeley, 
1962, https://perma.cc/PW5V-4QUC.   
17 Ellen S. Switkes, personal communication, June 2016. 




disciplines throughout the campus, including the professional schools. 
The chair is one of the third-year members. 
 So as to even out the work of the Budget Committee over time, 
there is a published schedule18 giving due dates for various categories 
of advancement requests. It is also possible to submit a request off 
cycle at any other time of year if that is needed because of the timing 





The sequence of events by which an advancement review occurs has 
been described by Switkes19 and by the Berkeley Budget Committee20 
for the Berkeley campus and is summarized here. 
 At the end of each academic year, faculty members complete a 
statement of activities and accomplishments known as the Annual 
Supplement to the Bio-bibliography.21 Equipped with this information, 
and if there is a possibility that an advancement request could be 
appropriate, the department chair meets with faculty members 
individually to discuss objectives and accomplishments and to 
determine whether or not an advancement request is indeed in 
order.22 An advancement review begins with the candidate assembling 
a full dossier covering research (accomplishments, extramural grants, 
publications, and presentations since the last review, as well as 
research plans for the future); teaching (creation of courses, syllabi, 
online material, and textbooks); and service activities to the 
department, the university, professional societies, government, and 
 
 
                                                     
18 “APO Deadlines for Deans: Cases with July 1, 2019 effective date,” Academic Personnel Office, 
University of California, Berkeley, https://perma.cc/Y36F-YZ5H.  These are updated annually. 
19 Ellen Switkes, “University of California Peer Review System and Post-Tenure Evaluation,” 
Innovative Higher Education 24, no. 1 (September 1999): pp. 39–48, https://perma.cc/2YJY-G4FY.. 
20 “Introduction to the Budget Committee,” Academic Senate, University of California, Berkeley, 
updated August 2017, https://perma.cc/CA88-8J73. 
21 Annual Supplement to the Bio-bibliography, University of California, Berkeley, 
https://perma.cc/Y7BP-JBX6. 
22 An advancement request and review may also be initiated by the faculty member, even if the 
department chair concludes that such a request would not be timely. 
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community. Student evaluations of teaching from each course are 
collected directly in the department office, and those for the candidate 
are added to the dossier. The emphasis is on activities since the last 
review, except for the major reviews described above, where 
everything since the last major review is considered. 
 For initial appointment, for promotion to associate professor and 
professor, for advancement above scale, and optionally for 
advancement to professor step 6 or advancement above scale, letters 
of evaluation are solicited and are included with the case for review. 
These letters are sought from respected scholars and other leaders 
who are familiar with the specific field(s) in which the candidate in 
engaged and who should therefore be able to assess the work and its 
impact upon, and standing within, the field. The letters are solicited on 
a confidential basis, with the understanding that it may ultimately 
become necessary to release the language, without identifiers of the 
letter writers. That fact is pointed out to those from whom letters are 
requested, with a request that they put any information identifying 
their relationship with the candidate in a protected passage below the 
signature line. The Berkeley campus furnishes extensive guidelines23 for 
the solicitation of these letters. Candidates may make their own 
suggestions regarding persons to be consulted for letters and are 
encouraged to do so. However, there should be a department list of 
potential reviewers prepared in advance of receipt of the candidate’s 
list, and Berkeley campus policy is that at least half of the letters should 
be requested from persons on that department list. Candidates may 
also submit a list of names of persons they believe should not be 
contacted, along with the rationales for those requests. 
 For key advancements and optionally for other advancements, 
there should be consultation with departmental faculty at the rank or 
step proposed and above as well as a report by the department chair of 
the vote and views expressed. There may also be reports of 
departmental evaluation committees, which are required for 
promotions and for advancement to professor step 6. Members of 
                                                     
23 Academic Personnel Office, “External Letters,” University of California, Berkeley, December 9, 
2009, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20170731221254/http://apo.berkeley.edu/external_letters_guideli
nes_12.09.pdf.   




these committees must be faculty members of the rank proposed or 
higher. Berkeley campus checklists show the content requirements for 
submitted faculty advancement requests at various levels. 24  The 
candidate has the right to review the personnel file, with external 
letters redacted of the below-the-signature information that could 
identify the reviewer. The candidate may provide a written response to 
the departmental analysis and recommendation. That response, if 
made, is included with the case as it proceeds to further review. 
 The case assembled by the department chair, together with the 
chair’s analysis and recommendation and any response to letters or 
other evaluations from the candidate, is forwarded to the dean,25 who 
reviews and adds her or his own analysis and recommendation. The full 
case then goes to the central-campus Academic Personnel Office, 
which refers it to the CAP or Budget Committee. For Berkeley, if the 
case involves promotion from assistant professor to associate professor 
(tenure) or promotion from associate professor to professor, the 
Budget Committee submits nominees for a special ad hoc committee of 
reviewers to the vice provost, who selects from among these and may 
add others to form the committee. The ad hoc committee has three or 
five members, with two of three, or three of five, members including 
the committee chair being from outside the candidate’s department(s). 
Five-member committees are typically used for situations where the 
recommendation from the department is substantially mixed, and then 
the two departmental members would reflect differing viewpoints. The 
ad hoc committee produces a report and a recommendation, which 
become part of the case reviewed by the Budget Committee and the 
administrative decision-maker. The membership, the deliberations, and 
the report of the ad hoc committee are all confidential. 
 The Budget Committee or CAP now examines the full case, 
typically making use of a lead reviewer from its own ranks. The full 
committee then deliberates and recommends an action, which, for 
Berkeley, is embedded in a two- or three-page “minute” that is 
transmitted to the vice provost for the faculty. For tenure decisions, 
                                                     
24 Academic Personnel Office, “Checksheet for Preparation of Academic Personnel Actions,” 
University of California, Berkeley, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20180611185158/https://apo.berkeley.edu/check-sheets.  
25 For single-department schools, the dean fulfills the role of the department chair. 
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promotions, and some other appropriate cases, the vice provost for the 
faculty will consult with and gain the agreement of the provost and 
chancellor to make the ultimate determination. The chancellor’s 
decision on promotion and tenure is final. Although the regents had to 
approve tenure decisions during the early history of the university, 





 The criteria that are sought for performance and for various 
appointments are delineated in the Academic Personnel Manual 
(APM),26 which is maintained at the university-wide level, and which is 
continually updated and modified as needed by extensive and 
formalized procedures involving university-wide Academic Senate 
committees in consultation with both campus and university-wide 
administrations and Academic Senate divisions on the campuses. 
Specifically, Section 210-1(d)27 of the APM gives the evaluation criteria 
for use by personnel review committees. Key passages include the 
following: 
The review committee shall judge the candidate with respect 
to the proposed rank and duties, considering the record of 
the candidate’s performance in (1) teaching, (2) research and 
other creative work, (3) professional activity, and (4) 
University and public service. In evaluating the candidate’s 
qualifications within these areas, the review committee shall 
exercise reasonable flexibility, balancing when the case 
requires, heavier commitments and responsibilities in one 
area against lighter commitments and responsibilities in 
another. The review committee must judge whether the 
candidate is engaging in a program of work that is both sound 
and productive. As the University enters new fields of 
                                                     
26 “Academic Personnel and Programs,” Division of Academic Affairs, Office of the President, 
University of California, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20170606030317/https://www.ucop.edu/academic-personnel-
programs/academic-personnel-policy/index.html.  
27 “Review and Appraisal Committees,” Section 210-1(d), Academic Personnel Manual, University 
of California, https://perma.cc/7RND-K9HK. 




endeavor and refocuses its ongoing activities, cases will arise 
in which the proper work of faculty members departs 
markedly from established academic patterns. In such cases, 
the review committees must take exceptional care to apply 
the criteria with sufficient flexibility. However, flexibility does 
not entail a relaxation of high standards. Superior intellectual 
attainment, as evidenced both in teaching and in research or 
other creative achievement, is an indispensable qualification 
for appointment or promotion to tenure positions. Insistence 
upon these standards for holders of the professorship is 
necessary for maintenance of the quality of the University as 
an institution dedicated to the discovery and transmission of 
knowledge. Consideration should be given to changes in 
emphasis and interest that may occur in an academic career. 
The candidate may submit for the review file a presentation 
of his or her activity in all four areas. 
 The University of California is committed to excellence 
and equity in every facet of its mission. Contributions in all 
areas of faculty achievement that promote equal opportunity 
and diversity should be given due recognition in the academic 
personnel process, and they should be evaluated and 
credited in the same way as other faculty achievements. 
These contributions to diversity and equal opportunity can 
take a variety of forms including efforts to advance equitable 
access to education, public service that addresses the needs 
of California’s diverse population, or research in a scholar’s 
area of expertise that highlights inequalities. Mentoring and 
advising of students and faculty members, particularly from 
underrepresented and underserved populations, should be 
given due recognition in the teaching or service categories of 
the academic personnel process. 
 The criteria set forth in the following passages from the Academic 
Personnel Manual are intended to serve as guides for minimum 
standards in judging the candidate, not to set boundaries to exclude 
other elements of performance that may be considered: 
Teaching — Clearly demonstrated evidence of high quality in 
teaching is an essential criterion for appointment, 
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advancement, or promotion. Under no circumstances will a 
tenure commitment be made unless there is clear 
documentation of ability and diligence in the teaching role. In 
judging the effectiveness of a candidate’s teaching, the 
committee should consider such points as the following: the 
candidate’s command of the subject; continuous growth in 
the subject field; ability to organize material and to present it 
with force and logic; capacity to awaken in students an 
awareness of the relationship of the subject to other fields of 
knowledge; fostering of student independence and capability 
to reason; spirit and enthusiasm which vitalize the 
candidate’s learning and teaching; ability to arouse curiosity 
in beginning students, to encourage high standards, and to 
stimulate advanced students to creative work; personal 
attributes as they affect teaching and students; extent and 
skill of the candidate’s participation in the general guidance, 
mentoring, and advising of students; effectiveness in creating 
an academic environment that is open and encouraging to all 
students, including development of particularly effective 
strategies for the educational advancement of students in 
various underrepresented groups… 
 Research and Creative Work — Evidence of a productive 
and creative mind should be sought in the candidate’s 
published research or recognized artistic production in 
original architectural or engineering designs, or the like. 
Publications in research and other creative accomplishment 
should be evaluated, not merely enumerated. There should 
be evidence that the candidate is continuously and effectively 
engaged in creative activity of high quality and significance. 
Work in progress should be assessed whenever possible. 
When published work in joint authorship (or other product of 
joint effort) is presented as evidence, it is the responsibility of 
the department chair to establish as clearly as possible the 
role of the candidate in the joint effort… 
 Professional Competence and Activity — In certain 
positions in the professional schools and colleges, such as 
architecture, business administration, dentistry, engineering, 




law, medicine, etc., a demonstrated distinction in the special 
competencies appropriate to the field and its characteristic 
activities should be recognized as a criterion for appointment 
or promotion. The candidate’s professional activities should 
be scrutinized for evidence of achievement and leadership in 
the field and of demonstrated progressiveness in the 
development or utilization of new approaches and 
techniques for the solution of professional problems, 
including those that specifically address the professional 
advancement of individuals in underrepresented groups in 
the candidate’s field… 
 University and Public Service - The faculty plays an 
important role in the administration of the University and in 
the formulation of its policies. Recognition should therefore 
be given to scholars who prove themselves to be able 
administrators and who participate effectively and 
imaginatively in faculty government and the formulation of 
departmental, college, and University policies. Services by 
members of the faculty to the community, State, and nation, 
both in their special capacities as scholars and in areas 
beyond those special capacities when the work done is at a 
sufficiently high level and of sufficiently high quality, should 
likewise be recognized as evidence for promotion. 
Performance in teaching, research and creative work, and university 
and public service are evaluated for all faculty members. Professional 
competence and activity is also evaluated for faculty where indicated, 
but does not replace or lessen evaluation in the other categories. 
 Recommended methods for assessing teaching include 
evaluations by current students (required for all courses and collected 
independently), former students, faculty colleagues through methods 
such as co-teaching or course visitations, and alumni evaluation.28 
 As is noted in the quoted APM passages, the evaluation of 
research and creative activity (as opposed to professional competence) 
can have different dimensions for professional schools. For twenty-two 
                                                     
28 “Policy for Evaluating Teaching (for Advancement and Promotion),” University of California, 
Berkeley, April 1987, accessed May 28, 2016, https://perma.cc/VZQ2-94H4. 
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years, 1972–94, the Berkeley campus had an unusual administrative 
structure that involved two provosts. One had responsibility for the 
Letters and Science departments and had the additional title, Dean of 
the College of Letters and Sciences. The other provost had 
responsibility for the other four colleges 29  and nine professional 
schools,30 carrying the title Provost—Professional Schools and Colleges. 
In that the shared-governance functions of the campus involve 
academic disciplines and professions working together, the provost—
professional schools and colleges (of which the author was the last of 
three) had the role of representing the unique attributes of the 
professions, including reflecting the unique and different aspects of 
creativity in the professions, in reviews and actions on faculty 
advancement and promotion cases.31 
 
 
QUALITY VERSUS QUANTITY 
 
 In both the statement and the application of the standards, quality 
is stressed above quantity. Originality and innovation are sought and 
rewarded. There is no quantitative measure or even an estimate of the 
number of papers or books required for various levels of advancement. 
Rather, the questions focus on how much impact the research has had, 
whether the candidate leads the field intellectually, and what the 
candidate has done that is truly original. 
 Innovation and being at the forefront of one’s field are valued 
sufficiently highly so that the advancement system is designed and 
implemented to enable and provide encouragement for faculty 
members who wish to switch fields within a discipline as that discipline 
evolves. As but one example, such was the case for Charles Wilke, 
mentioned in chapter 9 as a founder of the chemical engineering 
program at Berkeley. At age fifty, midcareer, he was at the top of his 
field of mass transfer but recognized the potential of the incipient field 
                                                     
29 The Colleges of Engineering, Chemistry, Environmental Design, and Natural Resources. 
30 The Schools of Law, Business, Public Health, Education, Optometry, Social Welfare, Information 
(formerly Library and Information Studies), Public Policy, and Journalism. 
31 C. Judson King, “A Provost for Professional Schools and Colleges,” Research and Occasional 
Papers Series, no. 3-13, February 2013, https://perma.cc/FD3Q-5KLH. . 




of biochemical engineering. He took the time to learn the associated 
concepts of biology and bacteriology, invited visitors to Berkeley who 
were already active in the field, and thereby opened both a second 
research career and a new field in which the Chemical (now Chemical 
and Biomolecular) Engineering Department has excelled. 32  This 
transition and its importance were taken into account in the 
advancement system. 
 Similarly, as is also noted by Thoenig and Paradeise,33 the criterion 
for hiring entry-level assistant professors to the faculty is promise for a 
productive, creative, and innovative career, rather than the amount of 
accomplishment already, or number of publications, or even the quality 
of previous mentors, although the recommendations of others with 
high standing in the field do carry considerable weight. At Berkeley, if a 
candidate of the quality and promise sought cannot be found in a given 
year’s search, the recruitment authorization is automatically carried 
over for another year. That policy removes any incentive to fill a 





 Again using the Berkeley campus as an example, if the vice provost 
upon reviewing the “minute” of the Budget Committee concludes that 
the recommendation does not reflect the evaluation or that additional 
factors when brought into the evaluation may lead to a different 
conclusion, the vice provost writes back to the Budget Committee 
expressing these concerns and offering any pertinent additional 
thoughts. The Budget Committee then reevaluates the case and 
submits a new minute, which may, but usually does not, contain a 
different recommendation. If upon reviewing this second minute, the 
vice provost leans toward a decision that differs from the action 
recommended by the Budget Committee, the vice provost requests a 
meeting in person with the Budget Committee. In the case of a tenure 
                                                     
32 John Prausnitz and Harvey Blanch, “Charles R. Wilke, Professor of Chemical Engineering, 
Emeritus, Berkeley, 1917–2003,” In Memoriam, University of California, https://perma.cc/49X4-
LTK6. 
33 Thoenig and Paradeise, 2014, loc. cit. 
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decision or if the Budget Committee so requests, the chancellor and/or 
provost join that meeting. If the higher officers are to join, the provost 
or vice provost of course first makes sure that the administrators are in 
essential agreement. Following the in-person meeting, the Budget 
Committee furnishes yet another minute, conveying their current 
recommendation. The administration then makes its decision. 
 Tradition has it that ultimate disagreements will be few and far 
between. The number of ultimate disagreements for the year is 
reported by the Budget Committee in its annual report and is typically 
quite small, having averaged over the period from 2004 to 2013 about 
three out of a total on the order of about nine hundred cases per year 
(circa 0.3 percent).34 
 The decision is relayed in a memo from the provost or vice provost 
to the dean, with that memo typically containing much of the language 
in the Budget Committee minute. The action memo, redacted if 
necessary to protect confidentiality of reviewers, is relayed to the 
department chair and the candidate, thereby providing explicit 
feedback to the candidate. If the candidate, department chair, or both 
believe that the rationale or process is somehow flawed, there are 
avenues for appeal. 
 
 
COMPARISON WITH OTHER UNIVERSITIES 
 
 The faculty advancement system of the University of California 
differs from those of all, or very nearly all, other US universities. The 
more common approach in the United States is for intense reviews to 
be attached only to promotions—associate professor, professor, and 
tenure, if that is a separate review. Salary increases in between 
promotions from rank to rank are more commonly determined 
annually by the department chair or possibly a dean, sometimes with 
the assistance of an internal departmental or college committee, but 
without the depth of review that occurs within the University of 
                                                     
34 Annual Reports, Committee on Budget and Interdepartmental Relations, Academic Senate, 
University of California, Berkeley, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20160510183333/http://academic-
senate.berkeley.edu/committees/BIR.   




California and usually without any systematic post-tenure peer review. 
By contrast the University of California carries out in-depth reviews not 
only for promotions but also for all salary increases other than cost-of-
living adjustments, before and after tenure is granted. 
 
 
WHAT IS GAINED BY THE UC METHODOLOGY? 
 
 The nature, intensity, and thoroughness of the University of 
California reviews accomplish a number of desirable objectives, both 
directly and indirectly, as follows. 
 
Rigorous, Objective, and Even Application of High Standards 
 Standards are kept high by virtue of the culture of excellence that 
pervades the university, the system of multiple levels of review, and 
participation in those reviews by many faculty members and faculty 
administrators. Any introduction of lower standards, bias, prejudice, or 
campus politics would be exposed to others on review committees or 
at other levels of review. That fact provides a strong deterrent against 
any lowering of standards. The campus-wide aspects of the Budget 
Committee or CAP, the multidisciplinary composition of ad hoc 
committees when they are used, and the final decision-maker(s) 
ensure that the same high standards are applied evenly to all academic 
areas of the university. Members of the faculty tend to support these 
standards strongly, since they appreciate the value of being associated 
with an institution of the highest standing. 
 
All Disciplines and Professions Are Reflected in the Review Process 
 The way that the University of California has fully integrated 
professional schools into the review and advancement processes and 
all essential academic functions of the campus stands in contrast to the 
situations of the professional schools at many other leading 
universities, such as Harvard and Yale, where the professional schools 
stand alone, making their own determinations internally.  
 The variety in disciplinary backgrounds of members of the campus 
committees means that the differences among the academic natures of 
the disciplines must be recognized and taken into account, albeit by 
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what can be difficult discussions in individual cases. Faculty members 
from academic disciplines must think together about what constitutes 
creativity and original accomplishment in the professions and vice 
versa. 
 
Incentives for Faculty Members throughout Their Careers 
 The system of continual reviews and the fact that rank and salary 
are directly tied to the reviews provide strong incentives for continual 
strong performance throughout a faculty member’s career. For most 
universities elsewhere in the United States and many others 
throughout the world, the lack of, or weakness of, post-tenure review 
is a major issue.35 There is a perception that faculty members can coast 
once they have tenure, and that does indeed happen for what is 
hopefully a small fraction of faculty members. The issue carries across 
to the general public, where there can be perceptions and even 
political stances that tenure for faculty in universities, as well as for 
teachers in schools, leads to suboptimal performance. 
 The University of California review system provides incentives that 
discourage coasting. In addition to continued strong performance being 
the route to higher salary, it is embarrassing for a faculty member to 
have subpar performance revealed to colleagues within the 
department and throughout the campus. Most faculty members would 
not want to be exposed in that way. That fact is probably also the 
reason why the relatively very few nonperforming faculty members 
have retired or left the University of California rather than suffering the 
embarrassment associated with the many-step process for dismissal for 
incompetent performance (see below). 
 
Equal Opportunities for All Faculty Members 
 The University of California makes it clear that every faculty 
member, regardless of discipline or other factors, has the same 
opportunities. The same review systems and campus-wide standards 
apply to all. Faculty appointments are made with the understanding 
that tenured positions are available to assistant professors if they meet 
                                                     
35 See, e.g., Gabriela Montell, “The Fallout from Post-Tenure Review,” Chronicle of Higher 
Education, October 17, 2002. 




the absolute standard. There is no quota on the overall number of 
tenured faculty positions nor is there any need to wait until a tenured 
position becomes available. 
 
An Understandable and Generally Accepted Salary System 
 The clarity, objectivity, and relative openness of the system mean 
that faculty members generally understand their circumstances with 
regard to advancement. Any faculty member interested in the salaries 
of other faculty members can gain that information from the public 
posting of salaries, mentioned earlier. These factors serve to minimize 
suspicions of unfair or partisan treatment. 
 
Nurturing the Culture of Excellence 
 The involvement of faculty members from many disciplines on 
CAP or the Budget Committee, the involvement of faculty members 
from other disciplines on ad hoc committees, and indeed the 
involvement of so many faculty members throughout the continual 
advancement and promotion processes all make the process widely 
owned and valued by the faculty. The continual discussions and 
assessment of quality among faculty at the departmental level also 
maintain a continual awareness of the issue of academic quality among 
the faculty.36 
 
The Quality Standards of Any One Department Are Seen by Others 
 Higher-level reviewers continually see the ways in which faculty 
members in different departments interpret and exercise quality 
standards. Positive recommendations from a department for tenure or 
other advancement can fail under higher-level review. When this 
happens, it reflects negatively on the initiating department. Repeated 
situations of that sort can be negative factors when the CAP or Budget 
Committee comments in programmatic reviews of departments. 
 
Many Academic Administrators Maintain Research and Even Teaching 
 Nearly all department chairs, many deans, some provosts and 
chancellors, and even one recent president of the University of 
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California have maintained some research and/or teaching while in 
their administrative positions. In addition to reflecting a love for those 
activities, keeping active in academic matters affords a way to 
experience firsthand the factors affecting the faculty. As well, all 
administrators drawn from the faculty retain a shadow professorial 
salary to which they will return when they complete their 
administrative service. That shadow salary continues to receive reviews 
and advancements while the faculty member is an administrator. 
 
Faculty Members Find One Another 
 As a side benefit, as faculty members from different disciplines 
work together in carrying out academic reviews, they may find aspects 
of the work of other faculty members that are interesting and useful to 
them. Multidisciplinary research and teaching teams have come 
together as a result of participation in the review process. It is also 
beneficial for faculty members simply to gain some understanding and 






 The multiple layers of review and the various safeguards mean 
that the process can be slow and is a burden on a number of people: 
departmental colleagues, department chairs, internal reviewers, 
external referees, and decision-makers. Faculty members do generally 
value the process and are accepting of the impositions on their time. 
From an administrative standpoint, the faculty time consumed, 
although substantial, is a vital component of building and maintaining 
the high quality and stature of the university. 
 An obvious question is how well the system can respond to the 
need for a quick review that could lead to a salary increase to counter a 
recruitment offer from another institution. In practice, the answer has 
been that this can be done surprisingly well. It is a matter of giving top 
priority for such cases in the queue for review and actions. 
 
 




Lack of Administrative Discretion 
 In meetings of UC chancellors and provosts, one does hear 
complaints that the nature of the review system prevents 
administrative leaders from making appointments, advancements, or 
promotions that they would otherwise want to do. That is a natural 
result of the multiple participants and tensions associated with the 
process. Academic Senate review does serve as a brake or a checking 
mechanism. If one believes in administrative checks and balances and 
that the involvement of multiple minds makes for better decisions, this 
factor can be viewed as a strong advantage rather than a disadvantage. 
 
Differences in Applications of Standards on Different Campuses 
 Reviews are carried out and decisions are made on the individual 
campuses, with no coordination other than the multifaceted review 
process for additions and changes to the university-wide Academic 
Personnel Manual (APM). Despite the detailed wording of the criteria 
and procedures in the APM, the fact that the campuses function 
separately holds the potential that standards and their application may 
drift apart among the campuses. Several factors serve to counteract 
that possibility. There is a university-wide Committee on Academic 
Personnel reporting to the Academic Council, and the chairs of the 
campus CAPs and the Berkeley Budget Committee are members of it. 
That committee considers policy matters, standards, and applications 
of standards. The existence of multiple reviewers at various levels of 
review serves to even out extremes on a campus. 
 During my service as university-wide provost and senior vice 
president—academic affairs, I noticed that campuses differed as to 
whether the CAP/Budget Committee or the administration tended to 
be stricter in cases of disagreement. That factor too serves to even 
things out among the campuses. Finally, the fact that new campuses 
initially have Committees on Academic Personnel composed of faculty 
from existing campuses means that the standards and approaches of 
the existing campuses are imbued into new campuses from the start. 
 
Departures from the Salary Scale 
As already noted, in recent years market forces have brought 
about more and more upward departures from the set salary scale. 
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Off-scale or “decoupled” salaries have become much more common. In 
part this phenomenon reflects market forces that vary considerably 
from one discipline to another, and that factor was initially addressed 
by the creation of the higher salary scales for law and for business, 
economics, and engineering. Since these scales were created, the 
marketplace has intensified further, and there has been reluctance, 
especially on the part of the Academic Senate, to make further across-
the-board adjustments applying to all faculty members in a discipline 
or subdiscipline. The result has been a continual increase in the use of 
off-scale salaries. However, the step system continues to serve as a 





 In any academic advancement system, there is a balance to be 
made between intensity and frequency of review, on the one hand, 
and the burden of work that is placed upon extramural evaluators, 
internal reviewers, and administrative decision-makers, on the other 
hand. The University of California is clearly on the extreme high side 
with regard to the burden, but through all the opinions that I have 
heard expressed during what is now a career of fifty-five years in many 
different positions within the university, I know that the strong belief of 
those who have been involved with the system is that, in general, the 
results warrant the burden. Specific arguments can be made and are 
made continually as to whether various individual facets of the system 
might be streamlined, but the general conclusion regarding the worth 






 A number of policies and procedures have been invoked so as to 
make the academic promotion and advancement system 
accommodating for childbearing, child-rearing, and family issues. These 




are outlined in the Academic Personnel Manual37 and include stopping 
the tenure clock for one year for childbirth or a total of two years for 
multiple children, childbearing leave with or without pay, active service 
with modified duties, and reduction in time to accommodate family 
needs. These policies are not gender dependent. 
 
Mentoring 
 Formal mentoring of pretenure faculty members by senior faculty 
is encouraged and often set up formally within departments. An aim is 
to keep the junior faculty member aware of what is sought in 
advancement considerations, how proposals to funders of research can 
best be made, how the various services at the university function and 
can best be used, and other matters of importance to the career of the 
junior faculty member. 
 
Dismissal 
 Coupled with the requirement for reviews at least every five years, 
there is are criteria for determining incompetence and an established 
procedure that can ultimately lead to dismissal of a tenured faculty 
member for incompetent performance.38 This procedure involves a 
departmental recommendation, responses by the professor, multiple 
reviews, specifications of what improvement is needed, opportunities 
between reviews to make that improvement, provision for an 
evidentiary hearing before the Committee on Privilege and Tenure of 
the Academic Senate, an ultimate recommendation by the chancellor 
of the campus, and then transmission via the president to the regents 
for action. In practice the existence of the process has been valuable 
for convincing poorly performing faculty members to retire or 
otherwise voluntarily depart from the university. Only a very unusual 
faculty member would be willing to go through the exposure and 
intense review that the policy involves. 
                                                     
37 “Benefits and Privileges: Family Accommodations for Childbearing and Childrearing,” Section 
760, Academic Personnel Manual, University of California, https://perma.cc/23DX-26JA.  
38 “Termination for Incompetent Performance,” Section 075, Academic Personnel Manual, 
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 Sanctions up to and including dismissals of faculty members can 
also occur for willful misconduct. The Faculty Code of Conduct39 gives 
criteria to be used, and the Academic Personnel Manual 40  gives 
procedures and types of sanctions that may be applied. In practice 
there have been dismissals for reasons such as unethical actions in 





 Many faculty members and leaders of the University of California 
believe that the system of faculty review for appointment, promotion, 
and advancement is the single most identifiable factor underlying the 
success and stature of the university. Throughout their careers, faculty 
members are reviewed in depth by their peers on research and other 
creative activities, teaching, professional competence (if applicable), 
and service. The intervals for these reviews are typically two to four 
years. Salaries and rank advancements are tied to the reviews. 
 Teaching abilities and accomplishments are evaluated in a variety 
of ways. Research is evaluated for quality more than quantity, with 
well-recognized external reviewers asked for evaluations at several 
points along a career. Service activities that are considered include 
contributions to the university, the discipline or profession, national 
and state bodies, and the community. 
 The intensity and frequency of reviews give a faculty member 
continual valuable feedback and serve as prime performance incentives 
because of the reluctance of faculty members to appear less than first 
class to their reviewing peers. It has been noted by many observers 
that a culture of quality pervades the University of California. In 
addition to the reviews themselves, the participation of so many 
faculty members and faculty administrators in the reviews serves to 
reinforce the importance of academic quality continually. 
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 Faculty members from professional schools and academic 
disciplines participate together on review committees. The many 
review committees also provide a useful mechanism for faculty 
members from different parts of a campus to come to know one 
another. These contacts have occasionally led to collaboration in 







Program Review, Planning, and Change 
 
About eighty-five institutions in the Western world established by 1520 
still exist in recognizable forms, with similar functions and with 
unbroken histories, including the Catholic church, the Parliaments of the 
Isle of Man, of Iceland, and of Great Britain, several Swiss cantons, and 
seventy universities. Kings that rule, feudal lords with vassals, and 
guilds with monopolies are all gone. The seventy universities, however, 
are still in the same locations with some of the same buildings, with 
professors and students doing much the same things, and with 
governance carried on in much the same ways. There have been many 
intervening variations on ancient themes, it is true, but the eternal 
themes of teaching, scholarship, and service, in one combination or 
another, continue. Looked at from within, universities have changed 
enormously in the emphases on their several functions and in their 
guiding spirits, but looked at from without and comparatively, they are 
among the least changed of institutions. 
—Clark Kerr1 
 
In universities, sunset is an hour that almost never arrives. 
—Donald Kennedy2 
 
The glacial pace of university decision making and academic change 
simply may not be sufficiently responsive to allow the university to 
control its own destiny. 
—James J. Duderstadt3 
 
                                                     
1 Clark Kerr, The Uses of the University, 5th ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 
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Change,” in W. Z. Hirsch and L. E. Weber, eds., Governance in Higher Education: The University in a 
State of Flux (London: Economica, 2001), p. 41. 




No man should tamper with a university who does not know and love it 
well. 
—Lord Chesterfield, cited by Frank T. Rhodes4 
 
 
 The preceding chapter dealt with the ways in which the University 
of California evaluates, advances, and incentivizes faculty members so 
as to assure that they have creative and productive careers at the tops 
of their fields. It is, of course, also vital to assure that entire academic 
programs of teaching and research are similarly distinguished and are 
current with respect to the needs of students, society, and 
opportunities for research and teaching. That topic, too, fits in with a 
general culture of academic excellence and is one of the key ways in 
which that culture is both exercised and maintained. This chapter 
explores that topic both for the University of California and in a more 





 Accomplishment of change at universities, and particularly 
research universities, is a subject that is much discussed and often 
maligned. The review and decision-making processes that would lead 
to change are usually complex and involve multiple layers, 
consultation, and checks and balances. The inherent conservatism of 
the faculty—that is, their usual preference to keep doing what they 
have been doing—is frequently cited as a limitation. The facts that 
consensus-building processes can be drawn out and tend toward the 
status quo are often cited as other factors inhibiting change. Anything 
that is threatened will have its supporters, and those supporters will 
generally have ways to influence the decision process. Administrators 
from department chairs on up may choose to abate conflicts by finding 
avenues that cause the least collective unhappiness. 
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 As a consequence of these factors, change in universities tends to 
be unidirectional, in that change that adds functions is much easier 
than change that deletes functions. Smelser5 examined this situation at 
length and gave the phenomenon the name accretion. It works well in 
times of expansion and growing budgets. It is not well attuned to times 
of budget stringency and contraction. 
 Following his well-known observation that leads off this chapter, 
Clark Kerr elaborates on the durability of “the eternal themes of 
teaching, scholarship, and service,” and then observes that research 
universities are the least fundamentally changed portion of higher 
education over what is now almost 150 years since Daniel Coit Gilman 
built Johns Hopkins on the German model. Kerr’s statements and his 
surrounding analysis6 can be cited as a manifestation of the difficulty of 
accomplishing change in universities. But his words can just as readily 
be read to indicate that universities have been sufficiently resilient and 
successful in evolving over the years and centuries so that they have 
survived over such long times without having been replaced by entirely 
new or different institutions. They have been adaptable. 
 There are those who postulate that universities are now subject to 
disruptive innovation,7 whereby if they do not change to a large enough 
degree and sufficiently rapidly, they will be put out of the market. The 
quote from James Duderstadt at the start of this chapter reflects that 
viewpoint. 
 Are research universities in a period of such disruptive innovation? 
What are the extents and rates at which research universities can 
change by evolution? Do particular types of change occur more readily 
than other types? Do certain approaches toward accomplishing change 
work better than others? In addressing these and similar questions, it is 
useful to drill down into the specifics of actual case studies, which can 
reveal what has actually enabled and restricted substantial changes in 
the research university setting. I first outline the program-review and 
academic-planning processes of the University of California and then 
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examine four cases of actual and potential significant change for the 
Berkeley campus. None of the changes in these cases are as dramatic 
as the more draconian predictions of disruptive innovation, but they do 
provide insights into adaptability, governance, and what will and will 
not work. I then draw some generalizations from them. I then return to 
the question of the abilities of universities in general and the University 





 The main mechanism by which the University of California 
assesses the quality, issues, and needs of existing academic programs is 
regular program review. The results of these reviews feed into 
academic planning processes that can lead to change. University-wide 
policy calls for regular reviews of both academic departments and 
organized research units.8 
 The Berkeley campus carries out program reviews at intervals of 
eight9 years for its roughly sixty-five academic departments. Reviews of 
organized research units have been suspended since the early 2000s 
for budgetary reasons; it is both desirable and intended that they be 
started again at some point. The current Berkeley review procedure is 
laid out in detail in the Academic Program Review Guide10 and is 
summarized here. 
 The review process at Berkeley is overseen by the Program Review 
Oversight Committee, a joint committee of the administration and the 
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out on a fixed cycle.12 As of 2016 the process begins with preparation 
of a packet of data by the campus Office of Planning and Analysis, 
including information on peer comparison departments at other 
institutions. The department being reviewed uses this information to 
prepare an extensive self-study report. The department also provides 
nominations for members of the External Review Committee, an 
academic senate liaison, and appropriate comparison departments on 
the Berkeley campus. From these nominations the External Review 
Committee of three to five members is created. One senate liaison is 
selected with the participation of the Committee on Committees of the 
Berkeley Division Senate. The senate liaison is a source of consultation 
for the External Review Committee with regard to Berkeley campus 
and University of California matters, serves as the senate’s general 
overseer of the review, and evaluates the general environment of the 
department. The External Review Committee receives the data and the 
self-study, comes to the campus for a multiday visit, and prepares a 
report. The department then comments on the reports of the External 
Review Committee and the senate liaison. These materials are then 
passed to five different Berkeley Division Senate committees13 for 
consideration. Analyses and recommendations from these committees 
feed to the Division Council of the Academic Senate, which adds 
comments. There is then a wrap-up meeting of the Program Review 
Oversight Committee, senate liaison, and dean, followed by 
transmission of a formal feedback document to the department. The 
department then supplies a response to that document indicating what 
steps it intends to take.  
 As for the evaluations of individual faculty members described in 
chapter 11, the fact that faculty members from many different 
departments are involved in these reviews serves to bring the different 
disciplines together and create a shared sense of pride and collective 
ownership of the academic quality of the campus. Again, the 
professional schools and colleges are involved proportionately, bringing 
the professions and the academic disciplines together. 
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 Historically, academic program reviews started in 1971 and have 
taken various forms over the years.14 At the times of the reviews 
considered in the cases analyzed below, there were campus review 
committees composed of faculty members from other departments, 
chosen by the administration on the basis of nominations from the 
Academic Senate. An external review committee could also be chosen 
and utilized. The review process began with the unit assembling 
information, followed by visits by the external review committee (if 
used) and the campus review committee, then a report from the 
external committee that would be input to the campus committee, 
then a report from the campus committee, then reviews of that report 
by committees of the Academic Senate, and then advice from the 
senate committees to the administration, who would determine the 
path of action. 
 Follow-ups on reviews are ad hoc to the issues uncovered and can 
feed into the planning processes described below. Examples are given 
in the case studies. 
 For comparison with the Berkeley process, the program review 
processes of the Los Angeles, 15  Davis, 16  Santa Cruz, 17  and other 
campuses are available. 
 
 
ACADEMIC PLANNING PROCESSES 
 
 Since the time of Clark Kerr as president, it has been University of 
California policy for campuses to select and define their own academic 
programs, with review university-wide including the Academic Council 
of the Academic Senate and its committees, and then approval by the 
regents for proposals of new schools and colleges, and for new  
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programs with major budgetary impact. The university does not assign 
particular new programs to individual campuses, although the 
politically driven negotiation processes in the 1960s that paired 
medical schools with the Davis and Irvine campuses and a law school 
with the Davis campus (chapter 10) were exceptions to a degree. 
Campus enrollment targets have historically been determined through 
a process of university-wide coordination by the Office of the 
President, with proposals from individual campuses adjusted when 
needed by working with the campuses interactively to meet the overall 
Master Plan enrollment requirements. During the administrations of 
UC presidents Hitch and Saxon (1968–83), there was an Academic 
Planning and Program Review Board (APPRB) university-wide, as 
described in chapter 6 and by Pelfrey.18 
 Campuses typically prepare strategic academic plans at intervals 
of about ten years. Links to current campus plans are provided on the 
website of the UC Office of Enterprise Risk Management.19 These 
strategic academic plans are quite broad. Among their purposes is to 
feed into the campus long-range development plans (LRDPs), which are 
legally required environmental-review documents for physical planning 
purposes. The LRDPs are subject to formal public review and input. In 
between strategic academic plans, identification of planning and 
programs needs stems continually from the ongoing program-review 
process. 
 Other than establishing and disestablishing academic colleges, 
schools, and departments, which are treated in the cases below, the 
primary mechanisms for implementing planning recommendations and 
for adjusting from year to year at Berkeley are the annual allocations of 
faculty recruitment authorizations,20 All vacated faculty positions revert 
to the Chancellor’s Office for evaluation and reassignment to units in  
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an annual planning exercise that includes formal faculty-recruitment 
requests from departments. An exception is made for positions vacated 
by an assistant professor; these stay with the department so as to 
remove any concerns that the department could have during the 
tenure-evaluation process about the retention of the position if tenure 
were not to be granted. In addition to advising and usually determining 
the ultimate decision on faculty promotions and advancement, the 
Berkeley Committee on Budget and Interdepartmental Relations 
advises the provost on the allocations of faculty positions for 
recruitment. The specific information sought for the process of 
allocating faculty positions on the Berkeley campus is available.21 That 
information is extensive and consists of analysis of departmental 
strengths and needs, the relationship of the request(s) to the academic 
plan developed in connection with the last departmental review, and 
justifications of the request(s). 
 Historically, the Berkeley campus and most of the other campuses 
have emphasized recruitment of entry-level faculty. Thus, in the annual 
Berkeley process for faculty recruitment allocations, most 
authorizations are for recruitment at the assistant professor level, and 
strong justification is required when a more senior recruitment is to be 
considered. The university has been very successful in selecting and 
nurturing entry-level faculty members who become stars in their fields. 
There is also a more subtle process at play whereby entry-level faculty 
members naturally attune to the culture of an academic department, 
while senior additions from elsewhere can be more disruptive to that 
culture. On the other hand, at the start of a new campus, a more even 
distribution of hires among grades of the professorship is important, as 
is attested by the issues described in chapter 10 for the early years of 
the Riverside, Santa Cruz, and Merced campuses, when large blocks of 
entry-level faculty members moved through the ranks more or less 
simultaneously. 
The reason that the annual allocation of authorizations for 
recruitment of faculty is such an important component of academic 
planning is that it is the mechanism by which the collective expertise of  
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the faculty changes and is thereby a prime method by which the 
university continually modernizes its programmatic coverage. The 
career span for an entry-level faculty member who is successful in 
making tenure is typically of the order of thirty-five to forty years; so 
the search and selection processes for every faculty recruitment are 
critically important and require a long-range viewpoint. 
The more formal academic planning processes are supplemented 
by a number of less formal consultative mechanisms, notably the 
university-wide Academic Planning Council and the regular meetings of 
chancellors, various sorts of vice chancellors, campus librarians, 
etcetera (chapter 8). 
 
 
FOUR CASES OF CHANGE IN ACADEMIC PROGRAMS AT BERKELEY22 
 
The purpose of the analyses presented in this section is to 
examine the roles of governance in four instances of change at the 
Berkeley campus23 of the University of California. In all of these cases, 
the ongoing program-review process was a critical element in initiating 
the consideration of change. The outcomes differ among the four 
cases. One (the third) led to a large reorganization of structures and  
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affiliations. For another (the first), a professional school was closed. In 
yet another case (the fourth), a professional school was discontinued 
and another was started with a much wider and more modern scope. 
In the other case (the second), a professional school was assessed at 
length and a decision was ultimately made to retain it, while seeking a 
much more professional bent. 
A common denominator for three of these examples (the Schools 
of Criminology, Education, and Library and Information Studies) is the 
tension that exists in professional schools between educating 
practitioners, on the one hand, and engaging in research and other 
creative activities of a sort that will carry intellectual weight in a 
distinguished university, on the other hand. I have addressed that 
subject elsewhere24 in more depth; it is a fundamental challenge to 
many professional schools in major research universities. 
 
Closure of the School of Criminology at Berkeley (1972–76) 
Berkeley and the University of California had lead roles in 
launching criminology as an academic field. That history is told by 
Morn.25 August Vollmer26 was police chief for the city of Berkeley and a 
leader in developing education for law enforcement, corrections, and 
forensics. He defined needs and worked closely with the University of 
California to launch criminology instruction in 1916 in the form of 
summer-session courses. Vollmer led and developed a school of 
thought on criminology education that spread throughout the country 
through so-called “V-Men,” who had been trained by Vollmer and/or 
believed strongly in college-level education for police and related 
professions. With Vollmer’s active participation, the University of 
California program at Berkeley developed into a full curriculum and 
degree program over the years, and became a separate professional  
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school in 1950. The program served to train law enforcement 
professionals in law enforcement, corrections, and criminalistics. 
Throughout its existence, the program and school were subject to 
a tension between needs for instruction for practicing professionals, on 
the one hand, and desires for pertinent research of an intellectually 
high caliber on the other. Initially, the school stressed training of 
professionals and did so through the deanship of O. W. Wilson (1950–
60).27 However, the relative absence of research was continually noted 
by both the administration and the Academic Senate and was out of 
step with trends throughout the rest of the university, particularly after 
World War II. In 1961, in a deliberate move to increase the research 
roles of the school, the Berkeley campus appointed as dean Joseph D. 
Lohman, who was highly respected as both a professional and an 
academic. Lohman introduced a program of research in the school, but 
of a sort that was viewed by many within the campus and elsewhere as 
being more in the “job shop” vein rather than addressing fundamental 
intellectual questions.28 Unfortunately, Lohman died unexpectedly in 
1968. 
There were two trends that affected the School of Criminology 
contemporaneously with the student unrest (chapter 2) of the mid- to 
late 1960s and early 1970s. One was the growth, particularly within the 
Berkeley school, of a field that came to be known as radical 
criminology. The field was and is much more concerned with social 
justice than with the classical elements of law enforcement, forensic 
science, and corrections. The growth of this field within the school 
created tensions between the school and its various supporters and 
potential supporters, substantially lessening the interests that the law 
enforcement and corrections communities had in the school. Matters 
came to a head with the unsuccessful 1969 tenure case of Anthony  
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Platt, a Marxist radical criminologist.29, 30, 31 The denial of tenure to Platt 
and a subsequent denial to another radical-criminology scholar, 
Herman Schwendinger in 1973, became celebrated causes. 
A second major trend during the same period was a large shift in 
enrollment in the school from the graduate (professional) level to the 
undergraduate level. Would-be professional students saw the school as 
not meeting their needs well as a stepping-stone toward professional 
jobs, while undergraduates saw the school as being in line with social 
concerns of the times and a path toward one of the easier degrees on 
campus. Enrollment in the school became 68 percent undergraduate in 
1969–70 and 82 percent in 1971–72.32 
Shifts in deans for the school and the growth of related but 
competing interests on campus also became important. For three years 
after the death of Lohman, there were acting deans, the first of whom 
resigned during the 1968–69 year in sympathy with campus student 
strikers. Finally Sheldon Messinger was appointed dean in 1971. 
Messinger was a respected sociologist with scholarly interests in 
aspects of social justice. He had been among those involved in the 1961 
formation of the Center for Law and Society, an organized research unit 
affiliated with the School of Law at Berkeley that took a more research- 
and discipline-based approach to social issues and the law.33 
In the mid-1960s, the Berkeley campus, through the dean of the 
Graduate Division working with the Academic Senate, devised and 
launched34 what became the regular program of reviews of academic 
departments and schools. This program had been developing for 
several years when the School of Criminology was selected, along with  
 
 
                                                     
29 Richard Schauffler, “Criminology at Berkeley: Resisting Academic Repression,” Crime and Social 
Justice 1, no. 1 (1974). 
30 Albert H. Bowker, oral history, pp. 16–17, Regional Oral History Office, University of California, 
1995, https://oac.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/hb1p3001qq/?brand=oac. 
31 George J. Maslach, oral history, pp. 429–430, Regional Oral History Office, University of 
California, Berkeley, CA, 2000, https://archive.org/details/aeronoticaleng00maslrich.. 
32 Morn, 1995, op. cit., p. 112. 
33 Jerome H. Skolnick et al., “Tribute: Retirement of Sheldon L. Messinger,” California Law Review 
80, no. 2 (1992): pp. 307–316. 
34 Sanford S. Elberg, oral history, pp. 202–211, Regional Oral History Office, University of 
California, Berkeley, 1990, https://archive.org/details/graduateeducation00elberich. 




other units, for review in 1972. The review committee was formed in 
December 1972 and reported in June 1973. The committee 
recommended disestablishment of the school, with a primary reason 
being that it was “a professional school without a professional 
commitment or program, or without effective links to its professional 
constituencies.” 35  The recommendation of the committee was 
reviewed and supported by the relevant Academic Senate committees, 
and passed on to the administration, who made the decision to close 
the school. The administrative decision process is described by Albert 
Bowker, 36  Sanford Elberg, 37  and George Maslach, 38  who were 
chancellor, dean of the Graduate Division, and provost—professional 
schools and colleges, respectively, at the time. The school would admit 
no new students and would close when the last students graduated in 
1976. Substantial demonstrations and a building occupancy by 
supporters of the school ensued, but the decision held. 
No tenured faculty members were dismissed as a result of the 
closure. Several of them went to a new Jurisprudence and Social Policy 
Program within the School of Law, which was formed around them and 
which also gives an undergraduate degree within the College of Letters 
and Science. The Law School has proven to be a good academic home 
for this program, and the program has provided an effective link from 
the Law School to the scholarly work of the rest of the campus, 
supporting the Berkeley concept that the professional schools and 
academic departments are involved on equal bases in research, the 
Academic Senate, and the academic operation of the campus. Those 
faculty members involved with criminalistics (forensic science) went to 
the School of Public Health and formed a small subprogram there. 
There were no substantial budgetary savings associated with the 
closure other than administrative staff savings. 
Another way of looking at the fate of the school was provided by 
Sheldon Messinger in a memo to his faculty in 1973,39 indicating that 
the former programs of the school had been “displaced by the 
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development of criminal justice programs in other institutions. The 
vocational program of the first years is now offered by police and other 
academies. The vocationally oriented academic program that followed 
is now offered by the community colleges. The agency-oriented but 
more generalized academic program that came later is now the staple 
of the state colleges40—and, if my guess is correct, the state colleges 
will be moving into the area of management education.” In that sense, 
the closure of the Berkeley School of Criminology can also be regarded 
as a logical consequence of the distribution of missions among the 
sectors of public higher education occasioned by the California Master 
Plan for Higher Education of 1960. Criminal justice or related programs 
are now offered at nine California State University campuses.41 
 
Review, Evaluation, and Ultimate Retention and Reorientation of the 
School of Education at Berkeley (1978–82) 
Schools of education often have difficult situations within major 
research universities, for they are probably the academic units most 
torn by the competing forces of accomplishing professional instruction 
and seeking incisive research of the highest intellectual caliber. The 
Berkeley School of Education is no exception. The histories of the 
Berkeley and UCLA Schools of Education are outlined and contrasted by 
Clifford and Guthrie.42 
In 1976 a series of events started that ended up putting the 
Berkeley School of Education under intense scrutiny with closure of the 
school being a distinct and even likely possibility. The process again 
started with a scheduled review, this time by the university-wide 
Academic Planning and Program Review Board (APPRB), which is 
described in chapter 6. The review by the APPRB covered all schools of 
education within the University of California, and the 
recommendations regarding the Berkeley School are reported by  
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Smelser.43 These recommendations were sufficiently critical to spur the 
Berkeley campus to initiate in 1978 one of the now-regular Berkeley 
campus program reviews. The recommendations of the report from 
that campus review, which was both intensive and critical of the School 
in a number of ways, are also given by Smelser.44 The review report 
was then analyzed and commented upon by three committees of the 
Academic Senate.  
By this time the criticism of the School of Education had become 
fundamental in many ways, and among the possibilities brought 
forward were reorganization of the school, integration of the school 
more intimately with the rest of the Berkeley campus, and closure of 
the school with distribution of key functions to the rest of the campus. 
At that point (1980–81), the chancellor decided to request a study by a 
specially formed commission to examine “how the study of Education, 
both as a field of scholarship and an area of professional practice, 
should be pursued on the Berkeley campus.” The commission, chaired 
by Neil Smelser, consisted of three distinguished faculty members and 
one graduate student, all from other areas of the campus but with 
knowledge of the School of Education. 
Compounding the situation was the fact that during the review 
period, the school had no permanent dean. The last dean, Merle 
Borrowman, had left the position in 1977. There was an unsuccessful 
search for a new dean, following by a series of seven(!) acting deans as 
the matter of a permanent dean was put on hold during the review and 
decision periods. A new dean eventually arrived in April 1983. There 
was also an erosion of regular faculty positions during this time, since 
recruitment authorizations were largely held back until the review 
issues were resolved by decisions. 
Multiple problem areas were identified surrounding the school and 
are described by Smelser,45 from the standpoint of a major reviewer, 
and by Clifford and Guthrie,46 from the standpoint of two school faculty 
                                                     
43 Neil J. Smelser, Reflections on the University of California: From the Free Speech Movement to 
the Global University (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010), pp. 268–269. 
44 Smelser, 2010, op. cit., pp. 269–273. 
45 Smelser, 2010, op. cit., pp. 238–251. 
46 Clifford and Guthrie, 1988, op. cit., pp. 305–311. 




members at the time who were also both among the acting deans. The 
issues included the following: 
 Ineffective Internal Governance and Internal Fragmentation by 
Divisions. The school was divided into five divisions, which were 
relatively autonomous and had substantial difficulty working 
together either for the common good or even to identify and fulfill 
a common mission for the school. The divisions did not collectively 
cover the field in a comprehensive way, and the whole was, in 
these senses, less than the sum of the parts. 
 A Bifurcated Faculty. Teacher education was not carried out by the 
professorial faculty members of the school but instead by a 
separate set of supervisors of teacher education. Consequently, the 
professorial faculty members were not concerned with the 
principal professional function, and the opportunity was missed for 
having a teacher education program closely informed by research. 
The situation was also beset by issues typically associated with a 
body of adjunct faculty who see themselves as second-class citizens 
in some respects relative to the tenure-track faculty. 
 Perceptions and Stature of Research. By doing research more in 
the vein of what might be done in the social science disciplines 
rather than on the profession itself, faculty members set 
themselves up for comparison in research with faculty from the 
social science departments, leading to perceptions of lower 
academic quality. 
 Relatively low national ranking. The school was ranked number 
ten in the Ladd-Lipset survey of 1977, a relatively low ranking for a 
Berkeley academic unit.47 
 Role vis-à-vis the California State University. The California State 
University has the largest role in teacher education within the state 
of California. The school had not determined its own best roles in 
view of that fact. 
 Balance of EdD and PhD Degrees. The EdD degree was developed 
and used at an early stage historically at Berkeley. It had been a 
focal point of the educational efforts of the school. However, with 
the removal of the foreign-language requirement for the PhD 
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degree at Berkeley in 1966 and with what Clifford and Guthrie call 
the “prestige gradient” associated with the PhD, the balance of 
degrees awarded by the school swung heavily from the EdD to the 
PhD. As a result, there became only a hazy difference in content 
between the two degrees. 
 Diffusion of Education Research outside the School. The APPRB 
report of 1976 had found that 88 percent of education research on 
the Berkeley campus was done outside the School of Education.48 
Yet there was relatively little interaction of the school with other 
professional schools or academic departments. 
The report of the ultimate Smelser Commission on Education is 
available in its entirety. 49  It offered a number of structural and 
organizational options, with comparative discussion. One theme was to 
find ways to foster intellectual ties pertaining to education throughout 
the campus. Closure of the school with redistribution of its more 
essential elements throughout the campus was presented as a serious 
option. 
The chancellor throughout the period of the earlier reviews was 
Albert Bowker, who later observed50 that he was inclined toward 
abolishment of the school. However, as of July 1980, the chancellor 
became Ira Michel Heyman, who chartered the Smelser commission, 
received its report, submitted it to the Academic Senate for review, 
and appointed an acting dean from outside the school (Steven Weiner), 
who would also work with him to analyze the possibilities presented by 
the commission. Despite the fact that the advice from the pertinent 
Academic Senate committees tended toward elimination of the school, 
Chancellor Heyman made the decision in January 1982 to retain the 
school and to seek changes in its orientation so as to revitalize it 
professionally. Much of the concern about primary and secondary 
education in the United States that was reflected soon thereafter in the 
national report A Nation at Risk51was already in existence at that time. 
Heyman cited as his reasoning that he believed that the Berkeley 
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campus “had an obligation to deal with problems besetting elementary 
and secondary education” and that “progress was more likely in the 
context of a school than in a number of disassociated departments.”52  
In addition to the negative public image that would come from 
closure of the school, Heyman may also have been influenced by the 
stark difficulties associated with dismissal of tenured faculty members 
or placement of them in other departments.53 Heyman also indicated a 
belief in three missions for the School—“training new teachers, 
providing advanced education for those in the profession, and carrying 
on relevant research”—and emphasized two goals—“the provision of 
good teachers by enlarging the certificate program and recruiting 
within the student body at Berkeley” and “reorientation of the faculty 
to treat the school more as a professional school than as a pale mirror 
of departments in the College of Letters and Science.”54 
A widespread search was carried out for a new dean who would 
reflect and implement these goals, with the eventual appointment of 
Bernard Gifford, who started in 1983. A PhD biophysicist, Gifford had 
been deputy chancellor of the New York City school system and at the 
Russell Sage Foundation before becoming vice president and professor 
of public policy at the University of Rochester. During his six years as 
dean, Gifford did move in new directions, building a very well-regarded 
program in STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) 
education and through that and other means increasing the amount of 
extramurally funded research in the school.55 However, in later, long-
term reflection, Heyman was more pessimistic, saying, “Unfortunately, 
my vision was not followed and I am sure that someday in the future 
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Reorganization of the Biological Sciences at Berkeley (1978–90) 
Biological sciences underwent rapid advances and large changes in 
the 1970s, as progress on the molecular scale and in genetics, cloning, 
and recombinant DNA opened new and powerful knowledge and 
avenues for much deeper understanding and radical innovation. The 
intellectual affinities, methodology, and laboratory techniques for 
research at the forefront now related much more to scale (molecular, 
cell, whole organism, ecology or groups of organisms) than to the 
classical divisions by classes of species and by application (e.g., zoology, 
botany, physiology, entomology). At the beginning of this period, 
Berkeley had preeminent ranking in the various fields of biology. These 
activities were divided among about twenty different departments, 
located primarily in the College of Letters and Science and the College 
of Natural Resources, the latter having been formed in 1974 by merger 
of the College of Agriculture and the School of Forestry. These 
departments were delineated in the classical way, by classes of species 
and applications. 
As we have seen in chapter 10, these changes struck the San 
Francisco and San Diego campuses of the University of California at 
early points in the research development of both campuses, and those 
two campuses were able to do their initial academic building effectively 
so as to be well positioned in these new approaches to biology from 
the start. Berkeley, by contrast, was hampered by preexisting structure 
that did not fit the new directions of the field well. 
As the revolution in biological research brought about change, 
Berkeley started slipping in the ratings. An external review in 1981 
observed the slippage and attributed it to “a failure to develop strong 
faculty groups in newer subject areas.”57 As well, laboratory facilities 
had deteriorated, were constrained, and were not well suited to the 
newer areas of biology where the greatest breakthroughs were likely to 
occur. The same 1981 external review observed substantial duplication 
in expertise among the existing departments as each tried in its own  
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way to cover the new dimensions of biological research. The situation 
described by this review and some antecedent studies led to a major 
reexamination of the structure, affinities, and plans for the biological 
sciences at Berkeley, leading eventually to rearrangement and 
consolidation of the twenty departments into four, along with 
modernized laboratory facilities in two new buildings and a thoroughly 
renovated third building. The challenge was then how to bring the 
changes about, given the relatively entrenched interests of the existing 
departments and the possible, even likely, strong effect of those 
departmental concerns on deliberations in the Academic Senate. An 
earlier article 58  by Trow analyzes the origins, development, and 
leadership aspects of these changes up to 1983. This was followed by 
his 1999 analysis.59 Park60 subsequently reflected on the process from 
the standpoint of his own close involvement in it. An oral history 
volume 61  on the subject of the reorganization contains recorded 
interviews with three principal participants—Daniel Koshland, Roderic 
Park, and Louise Taylor, who staffed the process. 
As already noted, Ira Michael Heyman became chancellor of the 
Berkeley campus in 1980, having previously been vice chancellor for 
academic affairs. The Vice Chancellor62 Roderic Park, whom Heyman 
appointed as his replacement, was a botanist, had molecular interests, 
had a full appreciation for the rapid changes in biology, and had until 
then been serving effectively as dean of the College of Letters and 
Science. Park and Heyman engaged the leadership of Dan Koshland,63 
an eminent biochemist who had large stature in research, was well 
respected on the campus, and had a strong sense of intellectual 
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leadership. After an initial inventory of biology faculty and their 
interests and expertise, the administration in spring 1980 appointed a 
special Internal Biological Sciences Review Committee of faculty 
members (Koshland, Alex Glazer, Milton Schroth, and David Wake) to 
evaluate “the programs in the biological sciences on the Berkeley 
campus” and analyze “the space needs of these sciences.” This was an 
administrative committee, not a senate committee (i.e., it was 
appointed by the administration). The committee recommended 
(August 1981) the creation of a Chancellor’s Advisory Council on 
Biology (CACB) to point the way toward reshaping and upgrading 
biology at Berkeley and to develop a comprehensive assessment of 
space needs. 
The chancellor created that council, composed of nine 
distinguished Berkeley biology faculty members with modern research 
interests covering a spectrum of expertise, and with Koshland as the 
initial chair. The council had several roles, which in effect expanded 
upon the funcions of the Review Committee—advising on the nature of 
new faculty appointments and in what areas they were most needed, 
effectively naming the members of the search committees for these 
recruitments, and generating an overall space plan. That space plan 
involved an intensive renovation of the Life Sciences Building (figure 
12-1, the largest university building west of the Mississippi River), 
completed in 1994, and the construction of two new buildings—the 
Life Sciences Addition (1988) and the Plant Biology Building (1990), 
which later became Koshland Hall. The space plan became the basis for 
the first large capital campaign of the Berkeley campus,64 so as to 
obtain private monies to supplement state building funds and assure 
the priority of the three building projects within the overall University 
of California queue for state building funds.  
The role of the Chancellor’s Advisory Council in faculty 
appointments effectively supplanted the usual department roles, since 
the Budget Committee of the Academic Senate and the provosts 
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generally followed the advice of the Chancellor’s Advisory Council on 
Biology in reviewing and granting recruitment authorizations and in 
reviewing and approving appointments. (The Budget Committee was 
less influenced than was the Academic Senate as a whole by the desires 
of faculty in the existing departments and of course has a primary 
adherence to academic quality.) It was important that CACB reported 
directly to the chancellor and vice chancellor, since this gave the 





Figure 12-1. The Valley Life Sciences Building, with Life Sciences Annex 
 in the shadow to its right65 
 
 
The role of the Academic Senate was a concern, and the 
approaches taken with the senate are reported in the aforementioned 
oral history. The process was not carried out in the traditional fashion  
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of posing issues to the senate for review and advice and then garnering 
the senate comments before proceeding. The principals believed that 
these more usual processes with the Academic Senate would impede 
matters to such an extent that the reorganization would not be 
achieved. Instead, the process was led intellectually by the Chancellor’s 
Advisory Council. Documents and plans, as they came into existence, 
were then sent to the Academic Senate and its pertinent committees 
to keep them informed, and it was then incumbent upon the senate to 
take the initiative to question actions or raise issues. As a result, the 
involvement of the Academic Senate was significantly less than it might 
otherwise have been. 
Almost half of the biology-related efforts on campus were in the 
College of Natural Resources (CNR), stemming from previous College of 
Agriculture and School of Forestry functions. For several reasons, 
faculty members and departments in that college were much warier of 
the reorganization effort than were the faculty members in the College 
of Letters and Science. Being on the applied end of things, many of the 
CNR faculty sensed that the ascendancy of molecular biology would 
lessen their roles and positions. Also the faculty members in CNR had 
very different situations from faculty elsewhere on campus, since they 
had year-round appointments, split between regular campus 
instructional and research (I&R) funds, on the one hand, and 
Agricultural Experiment Station (AES) funds, on the other hand.66 They 
also received sustained research support through the AES. The year-
round appointments obviated the need for extramural research grants 
to provide summer salary, and there was little incentive for the CNR 
faculty to seek outside research funding. Since the AES funding was 
limited, this situation led to research programs of modest size relative 
to those of the biology faculty members outside CNR. Because of the 
stronger reluctance of the CNR faculty and their different situation, the 
CACB and administration decided to leave CNR out of the initial round 
of reorganization and out of the new facilities as well. The one 
exception was for the departments dealing with plant biology or 
botany, for which there had been two separate departments in the two 
colleges. In the initial round of changes, those two departments were 
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combined into one, located now in CNR with a new building of its own 
and with conventional faculty appointments. 
The development of the space plan and the definition of the 
building projects preceded decisions on the specifics of departmental 
organization. The rationale was to let the space plan define natural 
affinity groups for colocation in the new facilities, based upon the 
nature of laboratory needs and desirable working adjacencies, and 
then to use the desirability of the new space to mobilize faculty 
interest in the new affinity groups. The new departmental organization 
followed the establishment of affinities and the space plan and 
resulted in the collapse of the biology departments involved into three 
large departments: Molecular and Cell Biology within the College of 
Letters and Science, Integrative Biology within the College of Letters 
and Science, and Plant Biology within the College of Natural Resources. 
Matching faculty members with departments went through four 
iterations from 1984 to 1986. Each iteration consisted of a proposed 
set of assignments devised by the CACB, followed by both a town-hall 
meeting for affected faculty and an opportunity for submission of 
written comments. The initial plan met with much concern and strong 
objections, including feelings on the part of many faculty members in 
the Department of Integrative Biology that the molecular biologists 
were “taking over.” But over the course of the iterations and a few 
adjustments made by the CACB, objections diminished, and there was 
ultimately widespread acceptance of the final plan. The new space 
markedly helped this process. 
It should be noted that the entire reorganization process did have 
strong faculty guidance, but it came from a special faculty council, 
developed by the administration and with concurrence from the 
Academic Senate that was often tacit, in the form of not challenging or 
offering substantial additional input on the various decisions that were 
made. 
Subsequently, the College of Natural Resources reorganized, 
merging a number of smaller departments (Plant Pathology, 
Entomology, Forestry, Soil Science, Conservation, and Resource 
Studies) to form a large Department of Environmental Science, Policy, 
and Management (ESPM) as of 1993, the last step in the overall 
process. This process was also contentious, but was facilitated by the 




visible success of the biology reorganization and now by a greater 
involvement of the Academic Senate, which became a positive force in 
the reorganization. Emulating the new structure of the biological 
sciences, the ESPM department has three divisions based upon scale: 
Ecosystem Sciences, Organisms and Environment, and Society and 
Environment. 
 
From Librarianship to Information Management and Systems at 
Berkeley (1989–1995) 
In 1918 Berkeley established within the College of Letters and 
Science a Department of Library Science, which became the 
professional School of Librarianship in 1926 and then was renamed the 
School of Library and Information Studies in 1976.67 Although the 
“Information Studies” component of the name connoted information 
systems beyond libraries themselves, the school’s main concerns 
remained the education of professional librarians and research related 
to libraries. 
An essay68 accompanying a past Berkeley campus accreditation 
report identifies the steps that led to the closing of the School of 
Library and Information Studies and to the opening of the new 
professional School of Information Management and Systems in 
1994.69 
A regular Academic Senate/administration program review 
occurred for the School of Library and Information Studies in 1989–90. 
The report observed some troubling signs in the school and in the 
profession as a whole. Among the points raised were that there were 
few linkages with the rest of the campus, that the tenure-track faculty 
members were directed mainly toward the doctorate program, leaving 
the professional MLS to the non-tenure-track faculty, that the school 
had relatively low support from extramural grants, and that there was 
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no compelling academic plan or vision of the scope and future of the 
professional field. (Note the similarity of these issues to those for the 
School of Education.) The report recommended the hiring of a 
permanent dean.70 With a new dean, the school should assess the 
future directions of the field and develop a well-reasoned academic 
plan. 
Up to this point, the process was normal for a program review. 
Beyond this point, the process was designed for the situation at hand. 
This design and oversight of the process were done by the provost—
professional schools and colleges (PS&C)71 in consultation with the 
leadership of the Academic Senate. 
Building upon advice from the Graduate Council and the Academic 
Senate from their considerations of the review report, the 
administration asked the school to proceed with the preparation of a 
vision statement before a dean search was considered, the rationale 
being that the vision statement and the review of it would be valuable 
in determining the qualities that would be sought in a dean. 
The faculty of the school produced the vision statement in 
December 1991. It indicated desires to expand the scope of the school 
to information systems beyond those of libraries, increase the research 
base, and enhance interactions with the rest of the campus. Again in 
consultation with the senate with regard to both purpose and 
membership, the provost—PS&C created a Special Evaluation 
Committee to review the vision statement. The April 1992 report of 
that committee affirmed the importance of information studies for 
Berkeley; indicated that the status quo was unacceptable; 
recommended the appointment of a new dean with a clear, well-
focused vision; and recommended that if such leadership were not 
available, “only then should [the school] be reexamined with serious 
consideration being given to its permanent closure.” Senate review 
agreed that the status quo was unacceptable and indicated that “the 
preferred result is to rebuild the school along the lines recommended 
by the Evaluation Committee.” Since rebuilding the school implied a 
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substantial commitment in a time of very constrained resources, the 
matter was referred to the relatively new Academic Planning Board. 
The Academic Planning Board (APB) had been established for the 
Berkeley campus in spring 1992 as a joint senate-administration group 
to enable the two bodies to work together to implement overall 
academic planning in response to the severe state budget crisis in the 
early 1990s.72 The APB was composed of equal numbers of members 
from the Academic Senate leadership and the administration. Upon 
receiving the results of the reviews and the commentary, the APB in 
March 1993 chartered a planning group. This group was charged with 
developing a viable definition of the field to be served, identifying and 
assessing potential leadership, and assessing external resources and 
support to help determine whether the new direction would be 
economically feasible given the budgetary stress. The APB also 
suspended admissions to the existing school and determined that 
financial support to the existing school should be limited to the current 
level. The resultant planning group was chaired by the provost—PS&C 
and had a diverse, knowledgeable membership approved by the 
Academic Planning Board. 
 The December 1993 report73 of the planning group laid out a new 
professional School of Information Management and Systems, which 
would “advance, through teaching and research, the organization, 
management and use of information and information technology, and 
enhance our understanding of the impact of information upon 
individuals, institutions, and society.” It addressed the justification and 
drivers for such a school, the degrees that it would offer (MS and PhD), 
the desirable components of the faculty (highly multidisciplinary), likely 
students and their career opportunities, and the alternatives to this 
path of action along with the reasons that they were not 
recommended. It delineated potential classes of employers, job 
functions, and research opportunities, along with potential federal and 
private funding sources and an economic justification. 
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Figure 12-2. South Hall, one of the two original buildings on the Berkeley 
campus and now the home of the School of Information74 
 
 
The recommendations of the planning group were endorsed by 
the Academic Planning Board and adopted by the administration. The 
necessary actions were embedded in a resolution enacted by the 
Regents of the University of California in May 1995 discontinuing the 
School of Library and Information Studies and forming the new School 
of Information Management and Systems. The first dean for the new 
school, Hal Varian, a distinguished economist of information, was 
found through a comprehensive search and was appointed in July 
1995, with the new school formally being launched as of fall 1995. 
The plan envisioned that the faculty would grow soon to ten FTE 
(full-time equivalent), of whom three would be carried forward from 
the old school. Other ladder faculty members from the old school  
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elected retirement, and one was transferred to another department. 
As of 2014 there were sixteen tenure-track faculty members (fourteen 
FTE) drawn from a diverse range of disciplines. There were joint faculty 
appointments with a wide variety of other departments, including 
Computer Science, History, Industrial Engineering, Law, Education, and 
City and Regional Planning. MS and PhD degrees are given in 
information management and systems, along with a master of science 
in information and data science. 
The venture to create the new school was also a case of 
recognizing the probable development of a new professional field, 
which has now been borne out. The result is that the Berkeley campus 
is well positioned academically to take full advantage of the research 
and educational opportunities afforded by the rapid development of 
capabilities and usages of information technology. To get to that point 
required the new start; a process of evolution in the old school would 
have been much slower and most likely would not have gotten as far. 
Students interested in library fields can still apply and receive a 
pertinent and useful education that equips them well for the still rapid 
advances in information technology that lie ahead. 
Some important components of the process leading to the end 
result were the strong cooperation and positive contributions of Acting 
Dean Nancy Van House of the School of Library and Information 
Studies, the quality of the program review process that flagged the 
issues in the first place, and the close working relationship of the 
Academic Senate and the campus administration. Finally, as the 
process was going on, there was a large letter-writing campaign from 
librarians in the state to government and university officials, protesting 
closure. However, there were a few contacts made by legislators with 
the university, and because of UC’s constitutional autonomy no 
legislation was introduced that would affect the process or the result. 
The knowledge base for information technology and its uses 
continues to grow rapidly. As of 2017 there are strong interests at 
Berkeley in developing and coordinating the growing field of data 
science, but there are also strong differences and contentions as to 
how that should be done. A different approach has been taken to this 
matter, namely creating a dean for a Division of Data Science. The dean 
does not yet have units or a program; instead, that dean is asked to 




work synergistically with others on campus to define what program 
and organization will work best.75 
 
Comparative Analysis of the Four Case Studies 
Accomplishing Programmatic and Structural Change. The four 
cases show that the system for change does work within the University 
of California for situations where programmatic or structural change is 
driven by academic and quality considerations stemming from 
advances in knowledge, perceptions of suboptimal overall 
performance, or new research capabilities. That is, quality control is 
accomplished well. The four cases also show that successful change is a 
deliberative and multifaceted process requiring skilled leadership. 
The role of the Academic Senate in programmatic change at the 
University of California is vital because it is, after all, the faculty who 
best know the program and programmatic needs. Because of the 
inherently conservative natures of most faculty members, the faculty 
role can be viewed as an impediment as well, as is reflected in some of 
the quotes at the start of this chapter. However, in the final analysis, 
the role of the Academic Senate gives a gravitas and imprimatur that 
establish the validity of adopted changes and facilitate acceptance. The 
senate is thereby a steadying and stabilizing force for accomplishing 
change. Shared governance is a valuable tool and should operate and 
be used in the most constructive ways to address needs for change. 
It is instructive to examine the various cases in terms of the roles 
of the Academic Senate and the ways in which the administration 
worked with the Academic Senate. For the Schools of Criminology and 
Library and Information Studies, the process was built heavily around 
program reviews and Academic Senate evaluations of points raised in 
those reviews, and the administration role was more in the design of 
the process and in the ultimate decision and implementation. The 
same can be said for the case of the School of Education, except that 
there was the added dimension of changing from a chancellor who 
would probably have decided to eliminate the school to a new 
chancellor who ultimately decided not to do so. The case of Biological 
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Sciences stands in contrast to these other three cases and shows how 
the process can be guided by the administration in different ways. The 
senate mechanism can be used heavily for change that is generally 
perceived within the senate as being needed. Other forms of 
intellectual leadership can be brought into play when senate views 
would be more divided. 
For cases of programmatic change, displacement of tenured 
faculty can be a dominant issue. It is probably not coincidental that the 
three cases that worked through to actual structural change 
(criminology, library, and biological sciences) did not ultimately require 
dismissals of faculty members or relocations of tenured faculty 
members far outside their disciplines, whereas the one case that did 
not result in structural change (education) would have had large issues 
of that sort if the change had been made. Although it could do so, the 
University of California has not yet chosen to dismiss tenured faculty 
members for programmatic reasons without providing relocation 
opportunities elsewhere on the campus or university-wide. Members 
of terminated departments or schools have been relocated either on 
the affected campus or to other campuses. Both of these approaches 
were taken, for example, when the nascent UC San Diego School of 
Architecture was terminated in the early 1990s. Even the initial faculty 
members for the new Merced campus were assured that they would 
have positions at other campuses if the Merced campus did not 
ultimately materialize. 
The cases of the Schools of Criminology, Library and Information 
Studies, and Education are also instructive with regard to the effects of 
suspending searches for deans and holding back faculty recruitment 
authorizations, both of which often occur with situations of protracted 
and/or difficult review. Both steps are rational as holding actions until 
new directions are defined as a result of the review process, but they 
also serve to weaken the academic unit. Therefore decisions to 
withhold dean searches and/or recruitment allocations should be 
regarded as tantamount to a decision that fundamental changes must 
and will be made in the unit. 
Intellectual Leadership. The value of proven intellectual 
leadership is exhibited by the roles of Daniel Koshland and the 
Chancellor’s Advisory Council in the reorganization of the biological 




sciences. They commanded a level of academic respect that 
strengthened their roles vis-à-vis the affected faculty and those in the 
Academic Senate who would be concerned about the reorganization. In 
any administration-driven effort for change, it is vital that intellectual 
leadership of that sort be identified and take clear and major roles. 
Professional Schools. Professional schools in research universities 
must serve the needs of the profession effectively through both 
education programs and research and other creative endeavors. The 
pressures to do outstanding research are strong and can be difficult to 
reconcile with the needs for professional education. This tension can 
lead to two undesirable situations. First, a bifurcation can occur where 
those teaching for the profession are not ladder faculty who also do 
research. Second, the ladder faculty may pursue research that is more 
in the line of that done by academic departments than being matched 
to research needs of the profession. In the former situation, the 
university loses the opportunity for education for the profession to be 
done by research-informed faculty, which should be a major advantage 
of research universities. The latter easily leads to a situation where the 
research of the faculty in the professional school is regarded as second-
rate by the more classical academic departments. Elements of these 
factors are found in the cases of the Schools of Education, Library and 
Information Studies, and Criminology. Among the other professions, 
engineering, medicine, and law are less affected by these tensions. 
 
 
ADAPTATIONS OF RESEARCH UNIVERSITIES TO MAJOR FORCES OF 
CHANGE 
 
The four cases considered so far are all programmatic in nature 
and can be considered as evolutionary rather than radical upheaval. 
Although three of them also led to structural change that included 
elimination or wholesale transformation of academic units, none of 
them led to substantial downsizing. In that way these changes are 
consistent with Smelser’s aforementioned thesis that change at 
universities tends to go in the direction of structural accretion, rather 




than removal of functions,76 and Donald Kennedy’s comment cited at 
the start of the chapter regarding sunset being “an hour that almost 
never arrives” in universities. 
But what about change that is more disruptive? Can research 
universities adapt sufficiently rapidly to the forces generated by 
advances in information technology and globalization, by new market 
competition, and by financial stresses that include diminished state 
funding for public higher education? Do other types of change, in 
particular those that may require downsizing, have characteristics that 
make the change much more difficult, or even impossible, to achieve? 
As Clark Kerr noted in his quote cited at the start of this chapter, 
universities “have changed enormously in the emphases on their 
several functions and in their guiding spirits.” Frank Rhodes77 observes 
that there have been major changes in universities within the United 
States as results of the following: 
 the Land Grant (Morrill) Act of 1862, which “changed forever the 
role of the nation’s great public institutions” 
 the GI Bill of 1945, which “changed forever the accessibility of 
America’s universities and colleges” 
 the Vannevar Bush report to President Roosevelt in 1945, which 
“changed forever the relationship between science in the academy 
and sponsorship by the federal government” 
 the executive orders from Presidents Kennedy and Johnson in the 
1960s instituting affirmative action requirements and then the 
subsequent actions through regents’ actions, ballot initiatives, 
legislative action, and court decisions in California, Washington, 
Texas, Florida, and Michigan placing limits on affirmative action 
criteria and procedures 
 the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, which gave research universities clear 
roles and incentives in the arena of technology transfer 
The first three and the last of these factors all presented opportunities 
for universities, to which they rose. The fourth factor (affirmative 
action) has presented a world of challenges for universities and must 
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still be regarded as an unsettled issue; however, universities have 
proven to be resilient on the subject. 
 
Reactions to Current Forces of Change 
Drivers that are often cited as potentially disruptive are online 
instruction, massive open online courses (MOOCs), competency-based 
degrees, and reduction of the nominal time for the baccalaureate from 
four years to three. Another issue that could be added to this list is 
career-oriented higher education as opposed to the more classical US 
concept of a broad liberal education. Markets will eventually resolve 
these issues. Vendors will offer, employers will recognize, students and 
families will seek, and universities will create and offer entirely online 
degrees to the extent that they find them to be useful and effective. 
More likely, online instructional mechanisms will become integrated 
into conventional academic degrees, rather that leaving students with 
a stark choice of going all one way or the other. This is already 
happening. 
Competency-based degrees will require respected certifiers. It is 
unlikely that the brand-name positions of Harvard, Yale, Stanford, 
Berkeley, UCLA, Michigan, and the like will be overtaken by start-up or 
less distinguished certifiers. More likely, the possibilities and 
alternatives will continue to grow for degree programs of respected 
existing universities to credit demonstrable mastery of knowledge 
gained elsewhere. As has already become the case, online learning will 
be a large component of continuing education. 
 
The Faculty 
For academic changes, no matter how large, to work, it is essential 
that the faculty enter the picture early and fully, because the faculty 
will have to be the ones to subscribe to a new concept and carry it out 
and because at least some faculty members will have insights that are 
valuable in assessing and defining the initiative. Two recent, 
unsuccessful efforts in California in the area of online instruction 
illustrate this point. Both were cases where the top administration got 
too far out in front of the faculty. There was also an ingredient in both 
cases of trying to please the governor of the state (Jerry Brown), who 




has pressed his belief that online instruction will substantially decrease 
costs of higher education—now. 
The first case was an effort78, 79 at San Jose State University that 
took the form of a large partnership with a Silicon Valley firm (Udacity) 
to provide open-access, online, entry-level courses for both SJSU 
students and enrollees elsewhere. The project was launched with 
considerable fanfare by the president of San Jose State in January 2013 
at a press conference involving Governor Brown. However, there had 
been little faculty involvement in the formulation of the initiative; 
instead it had the appearance of being a personal initiative of the SJSU 
president. The launch of the initiative resulted in substantial faculty 
controversy and objection on many different grounds, most of which 
were academic. Then, results for the first offerings showed very low 
rates of successful completion. Six months after its start, the project 
with Udacity was “paused” and has not been restarted. More 
successful has been the effort at San Jose State to make use of the 
courses put online for open-access usage by edX,80 formed by MIT, 
Harvard, UC Berkeley, and other universities to share course content 
around the world. SJSU uses these courses largely in a hybrid format 
(i.e., as one component of classroom instruction). 
The second example occurred within the University of California 
itself and is described by Wu.81 A July 2009 op-ed piece in the Los 
Angeles Times82 was authored by the dean of the Law School at 
Berkeley who was at the same time also a 50 percent time senior 
advisor to the president of the University of California. This proposal 
urged creation of an entirely “virtual” eleventh University of California  
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campus to expand capacity of the University of California. The prospect 
of such a massive movement into online education for the entire 
content of degrees and the fact that it came from a source so close to 
the UC president triggered a large backlash and much discussion within 
the faculty. It also led to a generally negative reaction from the 
Academic Senate. Even so, the Office of Programs and Planning at the 
UC Office of the President was charged to pursue the initiative.  
As the proponents met with Academic Senate committees, one of 
the suggestions that arose from campuses was to develop a set of 
online versions of “gateway” courses (i.e., courses that are on the 
prescribed paths for large-enrollment majors and are frequently 
oversubscribed). This proposal was incorporated into a presentation of 
the broader promise of online education made at a regents meeting in 
July 2010.83, 84 A pilot project to create such courses was then created 
by the Office of the President, an RFP was issued, and a review process 
was used to pick twenty-nine course proposals. These courses were to 
be funded through a budget totaling $7–8 million, for which extramural 
funding would be garnered. However, the only funding gained was 
$750,000 from an EDUCAUSE initiative that had been funded by the 
Gates and Hewlett Foundations. An internal loan of $7 million was then 
made to complete the funding with the idea that it would be repaid by 
sales of the product outside the university. This too drew substantial 
criticism from faculty members when extramural sources to repay the 
loan did not materialize. Six years later, the initiative was redefined 
again more generally and is broader, more modestly funded, and much 
more faculty driven.85 
While the original intent may have been simply to stir the pot and 
get things going, the initial media splash, the top-down aspect, and the 
unrepayable internal loan were not useful for winning the faculty over 
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California, July 14, 2010, https://perma.cc/C89P-SHZP. 
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to the project. A more suitable approach is to seed the garden, water 
the flowers, and support those that bloom best, which is better 
reflected in the current definitions of the UC Online project. A number 
of different campus approaches flesh out this line of attack. For 
example, the Berkeley campus has created the Resource Center for 
Online Education,86 which provides a variety of support services for 
faculty and for departments that want to create clusters of courses or 
degree programs. 
The importance of approaching change through early and genuine 
consultation with the faculty and through prominent roles for 
intellectual leadership from within the faculty cannot be stressed too 
highly. Getting too far out in front of the faculty and/or seeming not to 
value the views of the faculty are probably the two most common 
causes of involuntary departures from university presidencies. In this 
regard the formal structure provided by the Academic Senate has been 
vital for the University of California. 
 
Efficiencies in Services 
Change in nonacademic aspects of universities can be handled 
through mechanisms that are more typical of corporate management. 
For example, a more managerial approach has been taken in recent 
movements toward shared administrative services (chapter 6) at Yale, 
UC Berkeley, the University of Michigan, the University of Texas at 
Austin, and a number of other universities. However, for services that 
support faculty in their academic work, consultation and faculty 
involvement are still essential. 
 
Reflective Thoughts 
On the matter of disruptive innovation and the threatened plight 
of universities, in the end—and perhaps not surprisingly for a lifelong 
University of California person—I find myself with Clark Kerr. In the 
final preface87 to The Uses of the University, he observed “that new 
knowledge still makes the world go round and that the university is still 
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its main source.” And in a chapter written in 1982,88 he concluded that 
“the research university in America still has a long way to go” (i.e., it 
will endure for a long time). Research universities very synergistically 
combine education with active research, continual critical thinking, and 
creativity. Faculty members are chosen and evaluated on the bases of 
those criteria of creativity and critical thinking. Methods of research 
continually change as faculty members individually and competitively 
determine the best paths ahead. Some recent examples are use of 
online methodologies in research, creation and use of very large 
databases enabled by the growing capabilities of information 
technology, increasing collaboration among researchers worldwide, 
and honing of research results through working papers, preliminary 
communications, and online feedback. There is continual feedback 
from research into teaching. It is no surprise that educational 
innovations such as Coursera and edX have come out of research 
universities.  
In sum, research universities can and do change, and there are 
good reasons why that happens, relating to the inherent creativity of 
the faculty. By contrast, education that is more directly oriented 
toward vocations and careers and is less tied in with research does not 
have these paths toward continual innovation and improvement and 





Much has been written about difficulties of accomplishing change 
in universities, including how it is easier to add functions (accretion) 
than to eliminate them and how faculty members are inherently 
conservative with regard to change. Yet on the other hand, Clark Kerr’s 
observation that universities are primary among the longest-lived 
institutions of the world and that much change has been accomplished 
over the years to enable that longevity is also striking. The five 
examples of relatively recent major changes in research universities 
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cited by Frank Rhodes also clearly show major changes over time 
stemming from opportunities and needs. 
Within the University of California, program-review mechanisms 
have decentralized over time, and now regular program reviews at the 
campus level are the usual mechanism for monitoring program quality 
along with needs and opportunities for program change. Valuable 
adjuncts to these procedures have been the continual reviews of 
faculty members (chapter 11) and the participation of respected 
external reviewers. The Academic Senate has major roles in the 
process. 
Academic planning itself is also carried out on regular bases and 
by a variety of means, such as campus academic plans associated with 
campus long-range development plans; annual faculty recruitment 
plans, reviews of them, and authorization of recruitments; and various 
less formal consultation mechanisms. 
Four instances of programmatic change at Berkeley have been 
described as case studies. These include (1) the elimination of the 
School of Criminology in the 1970s, (2) the intense review of the School 
of Education around 1980, which almost led to the closure of the 
school and did lead to a reemphasis on the profession itself, (3) the 
major rearrangement of the biological sciences and related fields in the 
1980s to recognize the large changes and opportunities within the field 
of biology itself, and (4) the closure of the School of Library and 
Information Studies in the 1990s and the establishment of the School 
of Information Management and Systems (now simply School of 
Information) to replace it. An analysis of these cases shows important 
programmatic change, skilled oversight and management in various 
ways, the importance of intellectual leadership, and some of the 
particular issues associated with professional schools in research 
universities. 
Faculty creativity and faculty competition for innovation are 
particular advantages for research universities in generating change. 
Academic change in research universities works best when faculty 
members are the ones to inspire it and carry it out. It works much less 
well when attempts are made to impose it from above. 













The day when the scientist, no matter how devoted, may make 
significant progress alone and without material help is past. This fact is 
most self-evident in our work. Instead of an attic with a few test tubes, 
bits of wire and odds and ends, the attack on the atomic nucleus has 
required the development and construction of great instruments on an 
engineering scale. 
—Ernest O. Lawrence, Nobel Prize acceptance speech1 
 
There was some very informal discussion after that with Dr. 
Oppenheimer, and it is my understanding that as a preliminary matter 
we were to provide personnel service, traveling expenses and to cover 
charges then being expensed by Princeton University under a similar 
letter of intent. It was some time later before permission was granted 
to inform me as to where this project would be located, my only 
knowledge up to that time being that it would not be in the State of 
California. It very definitely seemed to be that the University, as a 
corporation, was to be almost a straw man in the proceedings, but to 
this the University never agreed. 
—Robert M. Underhill, reflecting upon the Manhattan Project2 
 
If we get rid of bomb-making, plutonium, and New Mexico, I would be 
very happy. 
—Robert Gordon Sproul (1946)3 
 
 
                                                     
1 Ernest O. Lawrence, Nobel Prize Acceptance Speech, February 29, 1940, Berkeley, CA, 
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2Robert M. Underhill, cited by the Manhattan Project Heritage Preservation Association, Inc., 
“Manhattan Project History: You Know What They’re Doing Down in Los Alamos? UC’s First 
Contract to Operate the Laboratory,” 
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3 Peter J. Westwick, The National Labs: Science in an American System, 1947–1974 (Cambridge, 
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An earlier university president [Holden] once complained that the 
university had three presidents: “the president eo nomine, the secretary 
of the regents, and the professor of agriculture”; in 1958, the 
triumvirate was the president, the vice president-business affairs,4 and 




In chapter 9 we left off on the story of the University of California 
Radiation Laboratory with the grant obtained by Ernest Lawrence from 
the Rockefeller Foundation in 1937 for $1.15 million to enable the 
construction of the 184-inch cyclotron. That project was begun but was 
interrupted before completion by the onset of World War II.  
 
 
WORLD WAR II, THE BERKELEY RADIATION LABORATORY, AND NEW 
MEXICO 
 
With the onset of World War II, the university, Ernest Lawrence, 
and Robert Oppenheimer entered into a monumental endeavor leading 
to the development of the most powerful and destructive weapon the 
world had known to that point—the atomic bomb. The story of the 
Manhattan Project has been told in many forms6 and will not be 
repeated here except for those elements relating to the University of 
California and its future roles. 
Discovery and development of understanding of the fissile 
properties of the 235 isotope of uranium stimulated interest in a 
military weapon that would exploit that property. An additional route 
to a fission bomb became available as the unstable transuranium 
                                                     
4 See chapter 6 regarding the relationship between Kerr and James Corley. 
5 Clark Kerr, The Gold and the Blue: A Personal Memoir of the University of California, 1949–1967, 
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6 See, e.g., Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986); 
Gregg Herken, Brotherhood of the Bomb (New York: Holt, 2002); Atomic Heritage Foundation, 
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element plutonium was created at the Radiation Laboratory and 
isolated by Glenn Seaborg and associates in Room 307 of Gilman Hall 
on the Berkeley campus in February 1941. Ernest Lawrence had a lead 
role in national considerations of how best to proceed, because of his 





Figure 13-1. A meeting in Berkeley in March 1940 regarding the 184-inch 
cyclotron project. The same group would very soon be involved in initial 
scientific definition of the Manhattan Project.8 (Left to right: Ernest Lawrence, 
Arthur Compton, Vannevar Bush, James Conant, Karl Compton, and Alfred 
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1970), p. 306; Herken, 2002, op. cit., pp. 35–51. 
8 “Breaking Through: A Century of Physics at Berkeley, 1868–1968,” Bancroft Library, University of 
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The need to isolate uranium-235 from the much more plentiful 
uranium-238 in order to enable a critical explosive mass for the 
uranium bomb called for innovative means of large-scale separation, 
since that separation could not be accomplished on a production scale 
by any method that was already developed. Among the approaches 
explored in depth were ultracentrifugation, gaseous diffusion, thermal 
diffusion, and electromagnetic separation. The latter approach utilized 
principles of the mass spectrometer, related to those of the cyclotron, 
and was pushed intensely by Lawrence in national considerations. The 
project for construction of the 184-inch cyclotron was redirected, and 
the other cyclotrons were adapted as well, so as to investigate the 
principles of electromagnetic separation on a large scale at the 
Berkeley Radiation Laboratory. 
Substantial and ever-growing government funding came for these 
purposes. The Radiation Laboratory on Charter Hill above the Berkeley 
campus grew rapidly in size—buildings, projects and personnel—
commensurate with the increased government funding. Stadtman9 
notes that the university’s income from government contracts grew 
from $1.56 million for the fiscal year 1941–42 to $8.25 million for 
1942–43, to almost $23 million for 1943–44, to $25.95 million for 
1944–45. Nearly all of this federal support focused on the Radiation 
Laboratory. Needs for security grew by leaps and bounds as well, with 
all the issues and needs associated with a classified program within a 
university setting.10 
Eventually, the electromagnetic process for separating uranium 
isotopes was sufficiently developed so that the resultant device, 
dubbed the calutron (California University-tron, see figure 2-4), was 
used for the initial large-scale separation of uranium isotopes at the Y-
12 plant in Oak Ridge, Tennessee.11 An interesting sidelight to this story 
is that the amount of copper needed for the windings of the magnets 
for the many large calutrons at Oak Ridge was so great that, when 
                                                     
9 Stadtman, 1970, op. cit., p. 311. 
10 Westwick, 2003, op. cit., pp. 75–76. 
11 Manhattan Project History: Electromagnetic Separation of U235, Manhattan Project Heritage 
Preservation Assn., accessed June 8, 2016, 
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coupled with the general shortage of copper, it required the “loan” of 
fifteen thousand tons of silver bullion from the US Treasury to serve as 
a substitute for copper in the windings.  
The calutrons had operational difficulties all along, requiring much 
interaction between the Radiation Laboratory in Berkeley and the plant 
in Tennessee with urgent needs to be addressed. 12  As the large 
gaseous-diffusion plants came on line at Oak Ridge in 1945 and 
subsequently in Paducah, Kentucky, and Portsmouth, Ohio, the use of 
calutrons for uranium enrichment was phased out, and the silver was 
returned to the US Treasury. But the calutrons at Y-12 did their job in 
creating the enriched uranium-235 for the first bombs, and residual 
calutrons were used for many years for other isotope production 
needs, such as for medical purposes. 
The fact that calutrons, rather than one of the other methods, 
were used for accomplishing enrichment in the critical few years before 
August 1945 reflects two aspects of Ernest Lawrence. One is his 
forceful and compelling argumentation. The other is his strong 
perseverance through difficult situations. Electromagnetic separation 
was not the most economical and reliable method of separation. As 
soon as they came on line, the gaseous-diffusion plants displaced the 
calutrons. Subsequently ultracentrifugation has become the method of 
choice. Currently uranium enrichment is done by ultracentrifugation or 
atomic-vapor laser isotope separation (AVLIS).13 The laser had not been 
invented, but ultracentrifugation was known at the time of the 
Manhattan Project and was actively investigated and developed by 
Jesse Beams at the University of Virginia. Interestingly, Beams had 
been a colleague of Lawrence at Yale. He was, however, a reserved and 
much less forceful individual.  
 
Los Alamos 
As the Manhattan Project got under way, it became necessary to 
identify leadership, select a team, and choose and develop a site for 
the actual design, testing, and manufacture of the two types of bombs. 
The project now fell under the US Army Engineers and specifically Maj. 
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Gen. Leslie R. Groves and what was code-named the Manhattan 
Engineer District. Initial conceptual work was carried out at the 
Berkeley Radiation Laboratory as well as other locations. It had been 
necessary to utilize theoretical physics heavily in predicting needs and 
capabilities for a uranium-235 bomb since enriched uranium was not 
yet available in quantity for experimentation and measurements until it 
could be obtained by electromagnetic separation in the calutrons. The 
situation for the plutonium bomb was similar. Because of the 
importance of theory, Lawrence had brought in Robert Oppenheimer, 
the preeminent theoretician in the Berkeley physics department 
(chapter 9). As General Groves became familiar with the various 
players, he settled upon Oppenheimer as his choice to be scientific 
project leader. 
The site for the bomb project was a remote mesa in the Jemez 
Mountains of New Mexico, northwest of Santa Fe. That site was 
recommended by Oppenheimer himself, who had been aware of it 
from summer vacations spent at a nearly location.14 The site became 
known as Los Alamos, named after the Los Alamos Ranch School (figure 
13-2) for boys, which had been the one occupant of the site. Both the 
site location itself and the developments there were kept at the highest 
level of secrecy. 
There then came the need for obtaining the services of an 
impressive array of physicists and other scientists and engineers. 
Groves and James Bryant Conant15 (figure 13-1), a prominent chemist 
who was president of Harvard University and chairman of the S-1 
(nuclear weapons) committee of the Office of Scientific Research and 
Development, recognized the likely reluctance of such persons to work 
directly for the military and decided to obtain a civilian contractor. The 
scientists would work under the employment and oversight of the 
contractor, thereby insulated to some degree from the military. This 
approach was also used for the other Manhattan Project laboratories 
being set up at locales such as Oak Ridge and Argonne. The most 
attractive contractor for this purpose would be a university. Given the  
 
                                                     
14 “Oppenheimer’s Better Idea: Ranch School Becomes Arsenal of Democracy,” Los Alamos 
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size and reputation of the University of California and the affiliation 
with it of Lawrence, Oppenheimer, and a number of the other senior 





Figure 13-2. General Leslie Groves (center) presenting the Army-Navy “E” 
Award Flag to Robert Oppenheimer (left) and  
UC president Robert Gordon Sproul (right) in October 1945,  
in front of the Los Alamos Ranch School building17 
 
 
Lawrence arranged and participated in discussions that 
Oppenheimer and Groves had in February 1943 with UC president 
Sproul and the secretary and treasurer of the Board of Regents, Robert 
Underhill. Very little was disclosed to Sproul and Underhill, including at 
first not even the location of the laboratory, other than that it would be 
in “the Rocky Mountains area.”18 Sproul and Underhill nonetheless 
agreed to create a letter of intent for the University of California to  
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manage Los Alamos. Eventually, nine months later in November 1943, 
Lawrence came to Underhill’s office, shut the door, told Underhill that 
the project was for an atomic bomb and what that was, and told him 
that he must not pass that information onward even to UC president 
Sproul or to the regents.19 Thus UC became involved with what has, as 
of 2018, been a seventy-five-year history of managing nuclear weapons 
laboratories. 
The Manhattan Project succeeded in its monumental mission and 
produced the “Little Boy” uranium bomb that was dropped on 
Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, and the “Fat Man” plutonium bomb that 
was tested at the Trinity site in New Mexico on July 16, 1945, and then 
dropped on Nagasaki on August 9, 1945. 
 
 
AFTER WORLD WAR II 
 
By the end of the war, the Radiation Laboratory in Berkeley had 
grown to employ over twelve hundred scientists, technicians, and 
engineers.20 Lawrence had put all his focus on the defense-related 
programs and the calutrons during World War II. As the end of the war 
approached, he directed his attention again to the future of his 
laboratory, anticipating in correspondence with President Sproul a 
decrease in operating budget by as much as 99 percent—from 
$692,000 per month at the height of the wartime activities to $85,000 
per year,21 built around a reversion of the 184-inch cyclotron to its 
original research purposes. But his entrepreneurial spirit was 
irrepressible, and he secured very substantial project funding from 
Groves and the Manhattan Engineer District during the time when the 
formation of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) as a nonmilitary  
 
                                                     
19 Robert M. Underhill, interview by Verne A. Stadtman, University of California: Lands, Finances, 
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successor body to the Manhattan Engineer District was under 
deliberation and before the AEC came into existence at the start of 
1947.22, 23 This funding focused upon Edwin McMillan’s synchrotron, 
Luis Alvarez’s projects for linear accelerators that would be still more 
capable, and the further development of supporting engineering 
capabilities. Thus, when the AEC did take over, it already had very 
substantial ongoing activities at Berkeley. 
The University of California also did its part to keep the wave of 
outstanding research in the laboratory going after the war. For 
example, Glenn Seaborg was brought back to Berkeley’s College of 
Chemistry when Sproul countered a recruitment effort by the 
University of Chicago, where Seaborg had been in the Metallurgical 
Laboratory during much of the war. UC gave Seaborg a full 
professorship at the then relatively young age of thirty-four as well as 
funding for his laboratory assistants, and Lawrence added a promise to 
find outside funding for Seaborg’s laboratory. 24  This then led to 
Seaborg’s work creating and confirming heavy elements (chapter 9). 
Another signal component of the joint efforts of the laboratory and the 
university was the Nobel Prize work of Melvin Calvin on the 
mechanisms of photosynthesis, with support arranged by Lawrence 
through the laboratory. 25  In recognition of the prize and the 
importance of the photosynthesis work, a special building was created 
on the Berkeley campus for the Calvin laboratory.26  
The Atomic Energy Commission faced issues of how best to 
oversee and manage the Manhattan Project laboratories, what 
programs would be appropriate for them now that the war had ended, 
and how large the laboratories should be in terms of staff, facilities, 
and budget. The research policy of the AEC was guided by the General 
Advisory Committee (GAC), which was chaired by Oppenheimer and 
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had Seaborg as a member. The deliberations and decisions of that era 
are chronicled by Seidel27 and Westwick,28 among others. 
The approach of operating the AEC laboratories through 
contractors was continued, using contractors that were universities or 
corporations, depending upon the nature of the laboratory and local 
conditions. Two reasons for the contractor approach were that it was 
more attractive to scientists who would fulfill the missions of the 
laboratories and that it was desirable to use established management 
organizations rather than having to build such capabilities fully and 
rapidly within the AEC. For the Berkeley laboratory, contracting was the 
only option. 
Sustained operation of the Los Alamos facility was a particular 
problem. The University of California was reluctant to continue 
management of Los Alamos, but the AEC recognized the need for 
university management as a way of attracting and retaining excellent 
scientists and engineers.29 UC, with urging by Lawrence, accepted 
continued management upon achieving satisfactory terms. 
It is interesting to compare the approaches in the postwar years of 
the two universities that were most involved in the Manhattan 
Project—the University of California and the University of Chicago.30 
During the war, the University of Chicago held the contract for the 
Clinton Laboratory, which subsequently became the central part of the 
Oak Ridge National Laboratory. In 1945 Chicago left that arrangement, 
and the management was contracted to Monsanto until 1947, when 
the AEC tried to reestablish university management through the 
University of Chicago. This led to a lack of convergence on both terms 
and selection of a laboratory director. Later in the same year (1947), 
the AEC put the contract with Union Carbide Corporation, which also 
operated the Y-12 (calutron) and K-25 (gaseous diffusion) production 
facilities for enriched uranium-235 at Oak Ridge. The University of 
Chicago had started its own in-house laboratory for nuclear physics 
after the war, contemplating an end to its management of the wartime 
                                                     
27 Robert W. Seidel, “A Home for Big Science: The Atomic Energy Commission’s Laboratory 
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Metallurgical Laboratory, which became the Argonne National 
Laboratory nearby in Illinois. However, that competitive arrangement 
did not persist, and Chicago has retained the management of Argonne, 
now in partnership with Jacobs Engineering Group, Inc.31  
By contrast, the Radiation Laboratory at Berkeley after World War 
II was, by virtue of its prewar existence, both an arm of the University 
of California and a laboratory of the Atomic Energy Commission.32 The 
differences in situations for Berkeley and Chicago may also have been 
related to the fact that Berkeley people such as Oppenheimer, Pitzer, 
and Seaborg were at times in official government roles—Oppenheimer 
as chair of the General Advisory Committee of the AEC (1947–54), 
Pitzer as director of research for the AEC (1949–51), and Seaborg as 
chairman of the AEC (1961–71). 
The division of management responsibilities between the 
government and its contractors was a subject of contention in the early 
postwar years, and has remained a source of tension throughout the 
subsequent histories of these laboratories. The early tensions 
concerned determination of program. For Berkeley, through the 
various roles of Lawrence, it was clear that the program was largely to 
be determined by the laboratory itself33; for the other AEC laboratories, 
that was less clear. 34  More recently, the program-determination 
process, while still complex, has become better defined, and the 
tensions surrounding who is responsible for what in management have 
swung more toward matters that are highly charged politically (see, 
e.g., the Wen Ho Lee matter, below). A white paper35 prepared by the 
Special Committee on the National Laboratories of the University of 
California Academic Council (Academic Senate) outlined the division of 
management and programmatic responsibilities as of 2004. 
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The unexpected successful test of an atomic bomb by the Soviet 
Union in August 1949 brought new impetus to the development by the 
United States of the hydrogen bomb or “super,” which had been urged 
by Edward Teller during and since the Manhattan Project. Lawrence 
strongly supported Teller in this quest. The General Advisory 
Committee of the AEC, still chaired by Oppenheimer, resisted the 
initiative. Lawrence and Kenneth Pitzer, on leave from the Berkeley 
College of Chemistry as director of research at the AEC, convinced the 
AEC to commit to development of the hydrogen bomb and to start by 
funding a materials-testing accelerator (MTA), to be built at a former 
naval air station in Livermore, about one hour from Berkeley. Although 
the MTA itself did not last long, the Livermore site persisted as the 
locale for the development of the “super.” Teller, agonized by the 
seemingly slow pace of work on the new bomb at Los Alamos, argued 
for creation of a second weapons laboratory, which could proceed 
apace on the development of the hydrogen bomb. Another part of the 
argument was that having two nuclear-weapons laboratories would 




Figure 13-3. Ernest Lawrence and Edward Teller, founders of the Livermore 
Laboratory, along with Herbert York, the first director, 1952 (courtesy of 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory)36 
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Thus in 1952 the University of California Radiation Laboratory, 
Livermore Branch was created. The first director of the laboratory was 
Herbert York, a Berkeley physics faculty member and one of Lawrence’s 
people at the Radiation Laboratory.37 The Livermore Laboratory has 
persisted to this day as one of two (Los Alamos and Livermore) nuclear-
weapons laboratories.38 The story of the “super” is told by Rhodes.39 
 
 
TRANSFORMATIONS FOR THE LABORATORIES 
 
In what has as of 2018 been seventy-five years since their origins 
in World War II, the former Atomic Energy Commission laboratories 
have undergone many changes in structure, oversight, and program. 
 
Government Reorganization 
With the arrival of the Arab oil embargo in 1974, most of the roles 
of the Atomic Energy Commission were incorporated, along with the 
AEC laboratories, into the Energy Research and Development Agency 
(ERDA), broadening the mission of the agency to all aspects of energy. 
Then in 1977 ERDA was folded into the new Department of Energy 
(DOE), which took responsibility for nuclear weapons as well as other 
aspects of energy generation, transmission, storage, and utilization. 
 
Program Diversification 
As the years went on after World War II, through the formations 
of ERDA and DOE, and eventually through the collapse of the Soviet 
Union in 1991, issues continually surrounded the future and the 
programs of the national laboratories. Both effective new programs 
and local political support for the continuance of the laboratories 
precluded any substantial downsizing. Indeed, the national laboratories 
as a group have grown, despite budgetary ups and downs relating to 
                                                     
37 York was later the first chancellor of the San Diego campus of the University of California, as 
described in chapter 10. 
38 Seidel, 1986, op. cit., pp. 151–153; P. J. Westwick, op. cit., pp. 123–128. An engaging history of 
the Livermore Laboratory is given by C. B. Tarter, The American Lab: An Insider’s History of the 
Lawrence Livermore Notional Laboratory, Johns Hopkins University Press, Naltimore, 2018.   
39 Richard Rhodes, Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb (New York: Simon & Schuster, 
1995). 




such factors as the economy, the onset of nuclear test-ban treaties, 
and the starts and finishes of hot and cold wars. As the years have gone 
on, there has been a continual diversification of the programs of the 
laboratories, with a general theme that the laboratories should 
undertake programs of national importance that are so large or 
expensive that they are not likely to be taken up adequately by the 
private sector. The laboratories have also proven to be effective for 
large-project research that requires combining multiple disciplines. 
The early avenues of diversification at the weapons laboratories 
related closely to their core mission. The original Manhattan Project 
had created early forms of nuclear reactors, starting with Fermi’s 
atomic pile at the University of Chicago. Several of the national 
laboratories had programs relating to power reactors (nuclear energy) 
after the war, an effort that was more at other laboratories than the 
UC laboratories. In 1960–61 the AEC decided to create a new Inorganic 
Materials Research Division at the Berkeley laboratory so as to carry 
out research that would serve materials needs for nuclear reactors and 
space vehicles.40 Materials research spread to the other laboratories as 
well.41 Project Plowshare,42 carried out from 1955 until the early 1970s, 
principally at the Livermore laboratory, investigated potential 
peacetime uses of nuclear explosions, such as for power generation, 
production of tritium and plutonium, excavation, extraction of oil from 
shale (now done by “fracking”), and mining of copper and other 
materials. None of these applications have materialized, because of 
matters of radioactive containment and economics.  
As other nations developed nuclear capabilities and concerns 
developed about “rogue” nuclear weapons being obtained because of 
insufficient security, the Los Alamos and Livermore laboratories 
developed programs dealing with nonproliferation and containment. In 
the 1990s the concept of stockpile stewardship arose, with the 
objective being assurance of continued working capabilities of weapons 
that had been manufactured in the past. These weapons are subject to 
decay in various ways and yet could not be subjected to actual 
performance tests because of test-ban treaties. 
                                                     
40 Seidel, 1986, op. cit., p. 159. 
41 Westwick, 2003, op. cit., pp. 257–266. 
42 Westwick, 2003, op. cit., pp. 231–234. 
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As environmental concerns reached the forefront, ERDA was 
created in 1971, and the Arab oil embargo occurred in 1973. The 
activities of the laboratories grew to incorporate broad issues of energy 
and environment. 43  In the 1990s the Cooperative Research and 
Development Agreement (CRADA) program came into full swing, and 
the laboratories were very active in developing joint programs with 
industrial companies. More recently, the production of energy from 
biological sources became another key component of the mission. 
These activities served to broaden the mission of the Berkeley 
laboratory far beyond accelerators, particle physics, and transuranium 
elements. Over the years, it formed programs in energy, environment, 
earth sciences, biological sciences, genomics, computation, materials 
science, and building technology, as well as construction of a well used 
national Advanced Light Source facility. These developments, in turn, 
widened the scope of involvement of University of California faculty 
members (primarily, but not exclusively, from Berkeley) beyond physics 
and chemistry to various branches of engineering and biological, 
geological, and computing sciences. 
Broadening of mission has affected the Livermore and Los Alamos 
laboratories too. Somewhat more than half of the program of the 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory is now for purposes other 
than nuclear weapons, and a substantial fraction of the Los Alamos 
National Laboratory program is as well. The total operating budgets for 
the three UC laboratories in 2015 were $2.45 billion for Los Alamos, 
$1.5 billion for Livermore, and $785 million for Berkeley. By 
comparison, the total operating budget for the university itself, 
independent of the laboratories, was about $26 billion.44 Employment 
in 2015 was 10,500 at Los Alamos, 6,500 at Lawrence Livermore, and 
3,300 at Lawrence Berkeley. 
 
Structures and Names of the Berkeley and Livermore Laboratories 
From 1931 until 1959, Lawrence’s Charter Hill laboratory at 
Berkeley was known as the University of California Radiation 
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Laboratory (UCRL). Upon the death of Lawrence in 1959, the regents 
renamed it Lawrence Radiation Laboratory (LRL). When the Livermore 
Laboratory was formed in 1952, it was a branch of UCRL and then LRL. 
In 1971 the Livermore laboratory was separated from the Berkeley 
laboratory and given independent status, so that the Regents of the 
University of California now contracted with the federal government 
for the management of three laboratories: Berkeley, Livermore, and 
Los Alamos. The Berkeley laboratory then became the Lawrence 
Berkeley Laboratory (LBL) and then in 1995, the Lawrence Berkeley 
National Laboratory (LBNL). The Livermore laboratory became the 
Lawrence Livermore Laboratory (LLL) and then subsequently the 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). When the Livermore 
laboratory was separated from the Berkeley laboratory, classified work 
then formally ended at LBL.45 
 
Contracts and Controversies with the University 
 Throughout the seventy-five-year management of the nuclear 
weapons laboratories by the University of California, there has been 
continual controversy surrounding that management, both within and 
outside the university and usually swelling toward times of contract 
renewal. The basic concern has been whether it is an appropriate role 
for a major research university to manage nuclear-weapons activities. 
Contract renewals typically have come at five- to eight-year 
intervals. The process has begun with a decision by the Department of 
Energy or one of its forerunner agencies whether to compete or 
extend—that is, whether to open the contract for competition among 
potential managers or to negotiate with the current contract holder for 
an extension of the contract. This decision has been important for the 
university, because competing is much less in line with being asked to 
do a public service than is extension. Also, for an extension the 
university can negotiate specific issues bilaterally with the Department 
of Energy, as opposed to responding competitively to a set of 
predetermined criteria in a request for proposals. The university has 
consistently and appropriately held to the concept of public service as 
                                                     
45 Jeffrey Kahn, “Our History: From Particle Physics to the Full Spectrum of Science,” Lawrence 
Berkeley National Laboratory, January 1989, https://perma.cc/Q4C9-MW2F. 
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the rationale for managing the Los Alamos and Livermore laboratories. 
In fact, former UC president David Gardner observes46 that in 1991, 
when the secretary of energy contacted him to inform him that the 
decision would be to compete rather than renew, he responded that in 
that case the university would not be among those competing. This 
then led to a response from the secretary indicating that because so 
much of the nation’s defense rested on these contracts, he would then 
have to “work” the matter at the Department of Energy and Congress 
so as to extend. Until the 2004–2005 competition, the decision had 
always been to extend rather than compete. 
Various committees have been chartered within the University of 
California over the years to examine and report on the question of 
continuing the contract as contract-renewal time approached. In all but 
one case, the committee was chartered by the Academic Council of the 
Academic Senate. The committee report would then be followed by an 
advisory vote of the faculty, carried out by the Academic Senate. These 
studies included the 1970 report of the Zinner Committee,47 the 1978 
report of the Gerberding Committee48 appointed by President Saxon in 
consultation with the Academic Council, the 1989 report of the 
Jendresen Committee,49 the 1996 report of the University Committee 
on Research Policy (UCORP) of the Academic Council,50 and a 2003 
Interim Report to UCORP. 51  Another evaluation and report were 
supplied in 1996 by the UC President’s Council on the National 
                                                     
46 David P. Gardner, Earning My Degree: Memoirs of an American University President (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2005), pp. 266–267. 
47 Report of the Special Committee on University Research at Livermore and Los Alamos, Academic 
Senate, University of California, 1970, https://perma.cc/N7PD-BWFQ.. 
48 Report of the Committee to Examine the University’s Relationship with the Los Alamos and 
Livermore Laboratories, University of California, February 10, 1978, https://perma.cc/W2GR-
AULX. 
49 M. D. Jendresen et al., “Report of the Special Committee of the Academic Senate on the 
University’s Relations with the Department of Energy (DOE) Laboratories,” University of California 
Academic Senate, November 21, 1989, https://perma.cc/MNS3-HYNA, 
50 University-wide Committee on Research Policy, “Report of the University Committee on 
Research Policy on the University’s Relations with the Department of Energy Laboratories,” 
University of California Academic Senate, January 1996, https://perma.cc/4G75-SCXJ. 
51 Interim Report to the University of California Committee on Research Policy (UCORP), Academic 
Senate, University of California, 2013, https://perma.cc/YB8Y-DTUK. 




Laboratories52, and the Academic Council specifically did not endorse 
the report of the UCORP Committee of that year. Except for the 
President’s Council report of 1996, these reports all recommended 
either discontinuance of UC management of Los Alamos and Livermore 
or continuing the contracts with substantial modifications. In all cases 
the president chose to renew the contracts, but often with some 
modifications along the lines of the senate recommendations. 
 
Public, National, and Political Issues and Controversies 
There are much public concern and political attention directed 
toward the nuclear laboratories, fueled by the strong public interest 
and fear about nuclear weapons, existence of numerous “watchdog” 
operations formed by groups of private citizens, and laws requiring 
openness and public reporting of incidents regarding nuclear and 
classified materials. 
One case in point was the matter of Wen Ho Lee, who in 1999 was 
accused of espionage at the Los Alamos National Laboratory. That story 
broke in a New York Times article.53 The Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) had known for over a year that there had been suspicious activity 
by Lee but had required the laboratory to keep the suspect in place in 
his employment without informing the University of California while an 
investigation took place. The university learned of the matter only 
when the FBI allowed the laboratory director to inform the provost 
(i.e., the author) just two days before the New York Times story ran. 
The accusations brought on quite aggressive political and legal action 
within the Department of Energy and FBI against Lee, in a saga that is 
told in detail by Stober and Hoffman.54 Lee had clearly violated security 
rules by taking classified material outside the classified area and indeed 
outside the laboratory itself. However, it was never proven that he  
 
 
                                                     
52 University of California President’s Council on the National Laboratories, “Recommendation 
regarding Continued University of California Management of the Lawrence Berkeley, Lawrence 
Livermore, and Los Alamos National Laboratories,” February 1996, https://perma.cc/BNP2-3B54. 
53 James Risen and Jeff Gerth, “BREACH AT LOS ALAMOS: A Special Report; China Stole Nuclear 
Secrets for Bombs, U.S. Aides Say,” New York Times, March 6, 1999. 
54 Dan Stober and Ian Hoffman, A Convenient Spy: Wen-ho Lee and the Politics of Nuclear 
Espionage (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002). 
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transmitted sensitive information to a foreign country, and he was 
convicted on no other charge. The Lee incident was followed in June 
1999 by a broad study and report55 from the US president’s Foreign 
Intelligence Advisory Board that was highly critical of security policy 
and practice within the Department of Energy and its national 
laboratories.56 
In May 2000, a large 48,000-acre (190-square-kilometer) wildfire, 
known as the Cerro Grande Fire,57 broke out from what had been a 
controlled burn by the National Park Service in Bandelier National 
Monument adjoining the Los Alamos National Laboratory. The fire 
entered laboratory grounds, causing a two-week closure of the 
laboratory. Shortly after the laboratory was reopened, it was 
discovered that two computer hard drives containing classified 
information were missing from their normal locations within the secure 
classified area.58 This again generated much media coverage, attention, 
and concern. The hard drives were found twelve days later, unscathed 
and apparently not tampered with, behind a copy machine in the 
secure area.59 This incident, the previous Wen Ho Lee matter, and an 
accusation, ultimately proven erroneous, that an LANL employee used 
a laboratory credit card to buy a personal automobile60 were primary 
reasons why the Department of Energy decided to compete the 
management contracts for LANL and LLNL in 2004–05 (see also below). 
 
Oversight and Management of the Laboratories within the University 
of California 
The Regents of the University of California have the ultimate 
authority over the UC management of the national laboratories. The  
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University of California administrative management structure for 
oversight of the laboratories started small and has grown substantially 
over the years. As has already been noted, the original liaison was the 
secretary and treasurer of the regents, a role limited by high secrecy 
and security and acquiesced to by the university because of wartime. 
With the contract renewal of 1972, the first Science Advisory 
Committee was created within the university,61 primarily for the two 
weapons laboratories. In 1978 the position special assistant for 
laboratory affairs was established.62  The senior vice president for 
academic affairs (later with the added title of provost) oversaw the 
special assistant, James S. Kane, a Berkeley PhD chemist who had been 
the founding director of the Basic Energy Sciences Program within 
ERDA and then the Department of Energy. As well, two scientific 
advisory committees (advisory to both the president and the 
laboratory directors) were created—the Scientific and Academic 
Advisory Committee for the two weapons laboratories and the 
Scientific and Educational Advisory Committee 63  for the Berkeley 
laboratory. They would continually review the programs of the 
laboratories for scientific quality, a role that fits appropriately with 
university management. 
In 1989, two UC positions were created to be resident, one at each 
of the two weapons laboratories, providing on-site oversight. Then in 
1991 the Laboratory Administration Office was created to provide 
oversight of business, financial, and administrative management 
matters. This office came under the senior vice president for business 
and finance. The President’s Council on the National Laboratories was 
created at the same time to provide programmatic review, evaluation, 
and scientific oversight. It was chaired by Sidney Drell of Stanford 
University, a prominent physicist and expert on nuclear weapons and 
arms control, and had members who included scientific and industrial 
leaders, a retired four-star general,64 and senior representatives from 
                                                     
61 Jendresen et al., 1989, loc. cit. 
62 Jendresen et al., 1989, loc. cit. 
63 The author was a member of SEAC. 
64 Andrew J. Goodpaster, who had been staff secretary in the administration of President 
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the UC administration and Academic Senate. The full membership is 
given, and the duties of the President’s Council are described in a 
document65 from the Academic Senate written in 2000. There were 
also several committees reporting to the President’s Council with 
responsibilities for reviewing specific aspects of the laboratories. The 
special assistant for laboratory affairs and programmatic matters 
remained with the provost/senior vice president for academic affairs, 
through whom the President’s Council also reported. 
In 2001 the UC administrative structure was changed again, with 
the creation of the position vice president for laboratory management 
(now vice president for national laboratories 66 ), which assumed 
oversight of all aspects of oversight, programmatic and administrative. 
Occupants of that position were John McTague (2001-03) and then 
retired four-star admiral S. Robert Foley,67 former commander-in-chief 
of the US Navy Pacific Fleet (2003-09). This was a major change from 
science and university expertise to military expertise in the 
administrative oversight of the laboratories. 
In 2004–05 the Department of Energy did hold competitions for 
the management contracts for Los Alamos and Livermore National 
Laboratories. At the same time, the Department of Energy switched the 
laboratory-management model to a performance-based model that is 
based upon formal grading, with grade-determined results and a much 
higher management fee that would be put at risk through the 
performance-evaluation process. For this purpose the university 
entered into two limited partnership corporations—Los Alamos 
National Security, LLC,68 and Lawrence Livermore National Security, 
LLC69—with Bechtel Corporation, Babcock & Wilcox Technical Services, 
URS Energy and Construction, and Battelle (for Livermore only). These 
partnerships won both competitions in 2006 and presently (2017) hold 
the prime contracts. 
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The formal oversight of the Berkeley laboratory under the regents 
lay with the president of the University of California until the chancellor 
positions were created in the University of California in 1952, at which 
time the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory was placed under the 
chancellor of the Berkeley campus, at a level equivalent to that of a 
dean.70 However, Clark Kerr in his memoirs71 is quick to say that the 
arrangement was largely nominal since Lawrence functionally reported 
directly to the regents. That reporting line, now more than nominal, 
was changed back from the Berkeley chancellor to the University of 
California president in 1971 at the time of the administrative 
separation of the Berkeley and Livermore Laboratories.72 
 
Management Fee 
Historically and in line with the public-service rationale, UC took 
much smaller management fees than are typically awarded to 
industrial contractors for managing national laboratories of 
comparable size and complexity. The fees were gauged to cover the 
identifiable costs of management and to provide some funds for joint 
research between the laboratories and UC campuses. As already noted, 
the 2004 change in approach by the Department of Energy for what 
became the 2006 contracts involved a major change to a substantially 
higher, but performance-based and therefore variable fee. 
 
 
SYNERGIES BETWEEN THE LAWRENCE BERKELEY NATIONAL 
LABORATORY AND THE BERKELEY CAMPUS 
 
The Berkeley laboratory has undergone remarkable changes over 
time, such that it has been transformed by degrees from an extension 
of the Physics Department of the Berkeley campus into a national 
laboratory with substantial lines of national government funding 
supporting a wide range of research on subjects of national importance 
and with an annual budget now in the range of three-quarters of a 
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billion dollars. There is no main point of time at which this change 
happened,73 but the main causative factors for it were World War II, 
Lawrence’s abilities and zeal for bringing science to bear on wartime 
and postwar needs in useful ways, and the diversification of the 
programs within the laboratory that occurred, particularly in the 1970s. 
The Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory is an invaluable 
adjunct to the Berkeley campus and provides a relationship between a 
government laboratory and a university that is virtually unique among 
American research universities. The Applied Physics Laboratory is a 
comparably large (present annual budget about $500 million 74 ) 
research division of Johns Hopkins University that has origins in World 
War II with the development of the proximity fuse. It is primarily 
devoted to defense, space, and homeland-security purposes but is an 
independent, university-affiliated research center and not a national 
laboratory.75  The Lincoln Laboratory of MIT is a federally funded 
research and development center (FFRDC) of the US Department of 
Defense also working on national security issues and with an annual 
budget approaching $1 billion. The Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), a 
NASA laboratory managed by Caltech, is also an FFDRC and has an 
annual budget around $1.6 million. Both the Lincoln Lab and JPL are 
more removed geographically from the managing campuses and have 
limited, mission-oriented programs. The actual involvements of MIT 
and Caltech faculty with those laboratories are substantially less than 
for Berkeley faculty with LBNL, as is also the case for interactions of 
University of Chicago and University of Tennessee faculty with the 
Argonne and Oak Ridge National Laboratories. The Stanford Linear 
Accelerator Center (SLAC) and FermiLab are single-purpose 
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laboratories of the Department of Energy, managed by Stanford and 
the University of Chicago, respectively, and with budgets of around 
$325 million and $375 million, respectively. The other DOE laboratory 
paired with a university is the much smaller Ames Laboratory at Iowa 
State University, with a budget of about $50 million per year. 
About two hundred Berkeley campus faculty members hold joint 
appointments as LBNL researchers, and about five hundred graduate 
students conduct their dissertation or thesis research through the 
laboratory. The large involvement of Berkeley campus faculty members 
has been enabled by the breadth of program of the laboratory as well 
as its adjacency to the campus. The relationship considerably enriches 
the laboratory’s research and provides an additional avenue toward 
research support for the campus faculty. The laboratory has 
contributed much to the reputation of the campus. For example, ten of 
the Berkeley Nobel Prizes have been won by Berkeley faculty members 
affiliated with the laboratory (Lawrence, Seaborg, McMillan, 
Chamberlain, Segre, Calvin, Glaser, Alvarez, Lee, and Smoot). 
There have been other synergies as well. The nature of the 
laboratory and its program areas are such that they promote and 
enable multidisciplinary research, and thus the laboratory is a catalyst 
for that purpose on the Berkeley campus (see also chapter 14). Finally, 
when the interests of the laboratory and the faculty-recruitment needs 
of the campus coincide, the combination of research with the 




 THE RELATIONSHIPS WITH LOS ALAMOS AND LIVERMORE 
 
The value to UC of the university’s management roles at Los 
Alamos and Livermore has to be judged in the light of public service, 
rather than as a source of revenue or as something that enhances the 
stature of the university. The amount of revenue is both unstable and 
not large in comparison with total UC revenue. The university has 
gained and maintains its stature and distinction through activities that 
do not involve the weapons laboratories. By the very natures of these 
nuclear weapons laboratories, UC is subject to great public scrutiny and 
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political winds that can cause conflict among the Department of 
Energy, Congress, numerous interest groups, and the university and its 
partners with regard to management responsibilities. Because of these 
factors, the university as contractor does not have full control of the 
situation and is often buffeted. 
In the past, the weapons laboratories have been a considerable 
drain on the time of those regents most involved and the top-level 
management of the university. My own estimate is that, before the 
management restructuring of 2001, about 25 percent of the time of the 
senior vice president for business and finance and 15 percent of the 
time of the provost and senior vice president for academic affairs went 
to laboratory matters. 
It would be difficult to make the case that the university itself 
derives enough value from the management of Los Alamos to offset 
the negative publicity that can come from the very sensitive public and 
internal-university aspects of managing the weapons laboratories. One 
test of utility to the university is the amount of university research that 
is collaborative with the laboratories. The Jendresen Committee, in its 
1989 report, 76  estimated that 10 percent and 40 percent of 
collaboration with universities by the Los Alamos National Laboratory 
and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories, respectively, was with 
campuses of the University of California. Those figures are probably still 
much the same. By various measures the University of California is 8 to 
10 percent of the nation’s academic research enterprise, so one could 
conclude that Los Alamos research collaboration is not significantly 
slanted to the University of California, while that at Livermore is. That 
would be a natural result of the different geographical locations of the 
two laboratories. 
The present structure involving the two LLC companies insulates 
the university from the two weapons laboratories more than in the 
past and provides financial, business, and administrative structures 
that are more directly founded in industrial practice. By virtue of the 
formation of partnership LLCs, the employees of the two weapons 
laboratories no longer work for the university itself, which removes 
some of the attractions that historically have brought scientists to the 
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laboratories. Also, with the elimination of the President’s Council and 
many of its activities, there is no longer the same degree of involved 
and knowledgeable programmatic oversight that had been brought by 
the council. 
Unfortunately, there have been two accidents associated with the 
Los Alamos National Laboratory since the change of management to 
Los Alamos National Security LLC.77 In February 2014 an improperly 
packaged container of transuranic waste from LANL shipped to the 
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in Carlsbad, New Mexico, ruptured at 
WIPP, contaminating several workers and causing a shutdown of WIPP. 
In May 2015 an electrical accident at a substation at the LANL Neutron 
Science Center injured nine workers, one of them critically. Factoring 
these instances into the performance-based management grading has 
resulted in a decision by the Department of Energy to recompete the 
Los Alamos contract as of 2018. Operations at Livermore have gone 
much more smoothly, with good performance ratings and continual 
extensions of the contract. The university was thereby faced with dual 
questions. First, should UC enter the new Los Alamos competition (to 
which the answer was yes), and, if so, with the same or different 
partners (to which the answer was different partners – Texas A&M 
System and Batelle)? And second, will current and future management 
structures still provide the degree of programmatic involvement and 






The University of California entered the era of large university-
managed laboratories as Ernest Lawrence built ever-larger cyclotrons 
and eventually had to create a multifaceted but focused research 
laboratory on university property on the hill above the Berkeley 
campus. Lawrence and then his Berkeley physics colleague Robert 
Oppenheimer assumed lead roles in what became the Manhattan 
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March 2016. 
National Laboratories  
509 
 
Project of World War II. The university itself was somewhat reluctantly 
recruited to “manage” the US Army’s Los Alamos Laboratory, which 
produced the first atomic bombs. The university’s institutional role and 
knowledge of the project were small, but the government believed that 
a university was needed to enable recruitment of outstanding scientists 
to the project as well as to provide scientific oversight and 
administrative capacity in various ways. President Sproul undertook the 
role for the university as an act of wartime national service. 
After World War II, the Manhattan Project laboratories (Los 
Alamos, Oak Ridge, Hanford, Argonne, and so forth) were converted to 
a system of national laboratories along with Lawrence’s Berkeley 
laboratory and others. The University of California has managed three 
of these laboratories—the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, the 
Los Alamos National Laboratory, and the Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory. The latter laboratory was formed in 1952, following the 
desire of Edward Teller and others to guide their own program toward 
development of the hydrogen bomb and the recognition that it would 
be desirable to have a second nuclear-weapons laboratory so that one 
could review the research of the other. 
There has been much controversy within the University of 
California about its continued management of the two nuclear-
weapons laboratories. As contract renewals have approached, there 
have been faculty studies and votes within the Academic Senate that 
have recommended against renewal or sought major changes. 
Nonetheless, UC presidents did renew the contracts, viewing them as a 
matter of service to the nation. Not until the mid-1990s were the 
faculty more generally supportive. The change reflected the creation of 
a more diverse array of collaborative research between the 
laboratories and the campuses and probably also the passing of those 
faculty mrmbers who had the most concerns about the laboratories 
arising from the tense years after World War II, when nuclear war 
seemed imminent. 
The initial UC management was modest and was centered upon 
the senior vice presidents for academic affairs and for business and 
finance. With pressures from the US Department of Energy and from 
faculty concerns over the years, much more structure for management 
and oversight was built up. 




The management of the Los Alamos and Livermore Laboratories 
has always been viewed by the university as a public service. The 
distinction and stature of the University of California come from other 
sources than management of these laboratories. The general policy of 
the US government is that there should be competition for 
management of national laboratories, as for other contracted 
government functions. The government’s desire that the contracts be 
competitively bid have been a difficult matter for the university over 
the years since those desires contrast with the concept of an invited 
public service role. Competition never became a reality until 2005, 
when the Department of Energy insisted upon it following very public 
episodes at Los Alamos. The university then joined in partnerships with 
Bechtel Corporation and other specialized companies to compete and 
win the contracts once again. Whether or not there is a sufficiently 
good rationale for the university to participate in the management of 
Los Alamos, and possibly also Livermore, under these circumstances is 
an open question at this point. 
The Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory is a very different 
matter. It has contributed much to the distinction of the University of 
California and continues to do so. It is a major asset to both the 
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[The] new economy is being fueled by exciting scientific developments 
arising out of basic research in nanotechnology, life sciences, 
information technology, and telecommunications. And these 
disciplinary areas are creating a spiral vortex, interpenetrating and 
changing each other as they themselves change. This is where the 
opportunity to stay competitive lies. 
—From the website of Calit21 
 
Calit2…achieved its leadership in taking Internet technologies to the 
next level because 24 academic departments work across disciplines to 
tackle complex problems, many of which lead to the movement of 
intellectual discoveries into the marketplace. 
—Richard Atkinson and Patricia Pelfrey2 
 
[The objectives of education are] to give every citizen the information 
he needs for the transaction of his own business; to enable him to 
calculate for himself, and to express and preserve his ideas, his 
contracts and accounts, in writing; to improve, by reading, his morals 
and faculties; to understand his duties to his neighbors and country, 
and to discharge with competence the functions confided to him by 
either; to know his rights…and, in general, to observe with intelligence 
and faithfulness all the social relations under which he shall be placed. 
—Thomas Jefferson3 
                                                     
An earlier version of much of this chapter appeared as C. Judson King, “The Multidisciplinary 
Imperative in Higher Education,” Research and Occasional Papers Series, no. 11.10, Center for 
Studies in Higher Education, University of California, Berkeley, CA, September 2010, 
https://perma.cc/2ECC-K4KF. It was also an invited paper at the 2010 Beijing Forum in Beijing, 
China, November 2010. 
1 “Calit2 : California Institute for Telecommunications and Information Technology,” accessed 
October 19, 2015, https://perma.cc/E7H5-ZZE9. 
2 Richard C. Atkinson and Patricia A. Pelfrey, “Science and the Entrepreneurial University,” Issues 
in Science and Technology, pp. 39–48, Summer 2010, https://perma.cc/WG8G-5BRL. 





When an issue becomes highly controversial—when it is surrounded by 
uncertainties and conflicting values—then expertness is very hard to 
come by, and it is no longer easy to legitimate the experts. We cannot 
settle such issues by turning them over to particular groups of experts. 
At best, we may convert the controversy into an adversarial proceeding 




You want the inside of your head to be an interesting place to spend the 
rest of your life. 
—Judith Shapiro,5 quoted by Andrew Delbanco6 
 
 
 Knowledge continually grows and forefronts of it become more 
and more specialized.  Yet societal needs and problems become 
continually more multidimensional and complex.  How can research 
universities best adapt themselves to these trends? 
 
 
ROLES OF DISCIPLINES AND ACADEMIC DEPARTMENTS 
 
Over the centuries as knowledge developed at an ever-increasing 




                                                                                                                     
3 Thomas Jefferson, “Report of the Commissioners for the University of Virginia,” August 4, 1818, 
known also as the Rockfish Gap Report, cited by James J. Carpenter, “The Ultimate Defense of 
Liberty,” in M. Andrew Holowchak, ed., Thomas Jefferson and Philosophy: Essays on the 
Philosophical Cast of Jefferson’s Writings (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2013), p. 140. 
4 Herbert A. Simon, Reason in Human Affairs (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1983), p. 87, 
cited by Michael M. Crow and William B. Dabars, Designing the New American University 
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2015), p. 144. 
5 President, Teagle Foundation, former president, Barnard College. 
6 Andrew Delbanco, College: What It Was, Is, and Should Be (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2012), pp. 32–33. 
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and to seek efficient ways of generalizing and extending it. This need 
gave rise to disciplines (chemistry, economics, physics, sociology, and 
so on) and then to subdisciplines within them (physical chemistry, 
organic chemistry, analytical chemistry, and now even physical organic 
chemistry and biophysical chemistry). Disciplines have served us very 
well. They have provided effective and efficient ways of advancing, 
organizing, conveying, and utilizing knowledge. The disciplines have 
also developed their own methodologies and internal cultures. 
In early days, universities sought to provide a general education, 
often under rubrics such as “natural philosophy” and often with a 
strong theological bent. But as knowledge grew and disciplines became 
established, the mode of education became one wherein students 
majored in a particular discipline, preceded by what was commonly 
known as general education. During the twentieth century, for most7 
US universities, the concept of general education gradually changed 
from a collection of particular specified courses to distribution 
requirements. Distribution requirements typically mandate that the 
student take certain numbers of courses from each of several areas, 
but without the particular courses being specified, with many choices 
available, and often without there being available courses that are 
specifically designed for general education.8 At the postgraduate level 
specialization becomes even greater and education thereby narrower. 
Thus we produce graduates who are versed in a specific discipline 
along with general education or distribution requirements that are 
modest at best. For a field such as engineering with its professional 
degree at the bachelor’s level, there is usually very little in the way of 
general-education or distribution requirements. 
The organization of universities has followed the disciplinary 
model, with academic departments corresponding one-to-one with 
                                                     
7 Columbia University still requires a specific set of courses for general education, and the 
University of Chicago, while offering choices for general education, considerably limits that choice. 
8 Appendices A and C of a report on general education in public research universities from a 
commission chaired by Michael Schudson and Neil Smelser of the UC San Diego and Berkeley 
campuses, respectively, summarize the general-education requirements of the different 
undergraduate University of California campuses and general-education reforms of various 
universities. (See “General Education in the 21st Century: A Report of the University of California 
Commission on General Education,” Center for Studies in Higher Education, April 2007, 
https://perma.cc/B46E-UVL2.) 




specific disciplines. Academic life for the faculty has also come to be 
centered on disciplines and departments. Departments are the bases 
for academic appointments, curriculum organization and delivery, 
budgeting, governance, space allocation, and faculty life in general. 
Disciplines are the loci for faculty recognition, national and 
international awards, presentations of research results, and sharing of 
approaches to teaching. Many observers have remarked on the fact 
that, over the years since the 1960s, allegiances of faculty have shifted 
from the university to the department, and from there to the discipline 
or subdiscipline itself (i.e., outside the university rather than within it). 
 
 
MULTIDISCIPLINARY NEEDS AND OPPORTUNITIES 
 
Many of the most exciting challenges, needs, and opportunities 
for  research now deal with areas that are not within a single discipline 
but instead require complementary efforts from several or even many 
different disciplines. Often the needs have come about from world 
population growth. Some examples of the areas that have this highly 
multidisciplinary characteristic and present both needs and major 
opportunities for research are the following.  
 
 Global climate change 
 Energy resources, generation, storage, and transmission 
 Privacy in the era of “big data” and the Internet 
 Water supply and reuse 
 Lessening poverty 
 Food supply and novel food sources 
 Social unrest, arms control, terrorism, and war 
 Heath care 
 Safe uses of biotechnology 
 Medical informatics 
 Acceptance of nuclear energy 
 
The need for involving multiple disciplines in important areas was 
increasingly recognized after World War II, although even earlier the 
concept had been the organizing basis for Bell Laboratories, the 
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research arm of what was then the monopolistic telephone industry in 
the United States. Bell Labs was focused upon bringing together the full 
expertise of different disciplines in complementary ways, through the 
design of the buildings, the organization of project teams, and the 
general culture.9 The Bell Laboratories’ approach led to many striking 
developments, such as the transistor, zone refining for purification and 
controlled doping of semiconductor materials, communications 
satellites, solar cells, radio astronomy, masers and lasers, and much of 
information theory underlying digital computation. 
After World War II, in recognition of the importance of bringing 
disciplines together, there were scholars who intentionally became 
interdisciplinary, having expertise in more than one discipline and in 
areas in which the disciplines would meet or where multiple disciplines 
would be needed. Several programs built around such faculty members 
have been quite successful, including one at Berkeley known as the 
Energy and Resources Group,10 which gives master’s and doctorate 
degrees as well as an undergraduate minor. Still strong, this program 
was formed in 1973 around John Holdren, who later became 
presidential science advisor during the presidency of Barack Obama. 
However, as time has gone on it has become apparent that the full 
power of each of multiple disciplines is needed for progress in many 
areas such as those listed above, and that this knowledge is more than 
can be packed into the brain of a single individual. Thus interests in 
many universities have turned back toward the Bell Labs’ concepts for 
bringing faculty members with different disciplinary backgrounds 
together in ways that enable them to interact well for progress on 
research. To accomplish this does require special structures, 
mechanisms, and incentives, since the natural allegiances of faculty 
members are to their home departments and disciplines, from whence 
come their resources and recognition.  This general need has also been 
recognized in an American Academy of Arts and Sciences study,11 which 
has given the name transdisciplinary to this concept. 
                                                     
9 Jon Gertner, The Idea Factory: Bell Labs and the Great Age of American Innovation (New York: 
Penguin Books, 2012). 
10 Energy & Resources Group, University of California, Berkeley, https://perma.cc/VN84-RFHW. 
11 Venkatesh Narayanamurti, Keith Yamamoto, et al., ARISE II:, Advancing Research In Science and 
Engineering: The Role of Academia, Industry, and Government in the 21st Century, 
 American Academy of Arts  and Sciences, Cambridge MA, 2013, https://perma.cc/24QR-BPWV.. 




It does not work well simply to assign faculty members from 
different disciplines to work together. This is counter to the traditions 
of the great universities, in which faculty members follow their own 
leads and interests and select and define their own research. There are 
good reasons for that tradition. The faculty member knows more about 
her or his field than anyone else in the university and has the most 
intellectual resources for finding and choosing promising leads and 
defining how best to pursue them. The well-honed system that 
assesses and rewards outstanding creativity through reputation and 
salary provides ample incentive for faculty members to excel. 
Outstanding quality and striking innovations come from this tradition. 
It is part of the reason why many large corporations have, starting in 
the 1970s, wound down in-house fundamental research activities that 
often involved assigning research to in-house researchers. Even the Bell 
Laboratories’ approach was based upon individual scientists identifying 
opportunities and working with one another as they saw fit. 
Multidisciplinary needs call for education that enables graduates 
in different disciplines to work together effectively. This is not a simple 
matter, given the different methods, concepts, and vocabularies of the 
different disciplines. Inducing faculty members to work together on 
multidisciplinary or large-problem courses is also difficult because most 
faculty members do not know faculty members outside their 
department well and do not have much understanding of other 
disciplines. Most faculty members are more comfortable teaching in 
their own disciplinary areas.12 
Enabling faculty members from different disciplines who wish to 
do so to get together in research has proven to be an effective way of 
encouraging them to work together in instruction. As collaborating 
researchers discover what others can contribute to multidisciplinary 
research, they come to see the wherewithal of joint preparation and 
delivery of multidisciplinary courses of instruction. 
 
 
                                                     
12 A survey of some of the efforts over the years to bridge the disciplines has been given by 
Michael M. Crow and William B. Dabars, Designing the New American University (Baltimore, MD: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2015), pp. 183–207. 
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Finally, strong multidisciplinary research seems to occur more 
readily in the natural sciences and engineering than it does in the social 
sciences and humanities. In part this is a result of the much greater 
traditions of individual research in humanities and many of the social 
sciences, as opposed to research that is collaborative among faculty 
members, or even between faculty members and their students. It also 
reflects the substantial differences in research working methodologies 
among the different social sciences. 
 
 
FACILITATION OF MULTIDISCIPLINARY RESEARCH 
 
Overall Leadership, Design, and Building 
Motivated and highly effective leaders can build multidisciplinary 
academic enterprises de novo, if given the resources and appropriate 
timing to do so. In addition to Ernest O. Lawrence at Berkeley (chapter 
9), strong examples are William Rutter at UC San Francisco, Roger 
Revelle at the Scripps Institute of Oceanography, and David Bonner at 
the UC San Diego School of Medicine (all chapter 10). 
 
Facilitative Organizational Structures 
One of the best-known methods for facilitating multidisciplinary 
research in research universities is to set up cross-matrix organizational 
structures dealing with specific broad topical areas of research. This 
approach came into being as government support of research 
increased following World War II. The historical development is traced 
by Geiger,13 who notes14 that “Berkeley was the most fertile breeding 
ground of organized research units, and the initiator of the acronym 
ORU” (for organized research units). There were several reasons15 for 
the blossoming of ORUs at Berkeley, among them 
 the boom economy of California after World War II with 
consequent substantial state funding for UC (see chapters 2 and 
17); 
                                                     
13 Roger L. Geiger, Research and Relevant Knowledge: American Research Universities since World 
War II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 48–57, 75–76. 
14 Geiger, 1993, op. cit., p. 75. 
15 Geiger, 1993, op. cit., pp. 74–76. 




 the influx of tuition money for surging enrollments of World War II 
veterans provided by the relatively liberal provisions of the GI Bill; 
 a policy of retaining a set portion of overhead monies from federal 
contracts and grants within the university budget as Regents’ (now 
University) Opportunity Funds even though many of the expenses 
included in overhead calculations had been covered within the 
state budget;16 
 a tacit decision by the university administration, the regents, and 
the state government to stress and build research stature at UC, in 
recognition of the benefits that it would bring to the distinction of 
UC, the economy of California, and society in general; and 
 a desire to match research units within the university better with 
specific federal agencies and other external sources of funding for 
research. 
Although none of these factors, except perhaps the last one, 
specifically addressed multidisciplinary research, encouragement and 
facilitation of multidisciplinary research was the result. As is described 
in chapter 6, there are also multicampus research units (MRUs) and 
related programs to stimulate research involving multiple campuses. 
ORUs and MRUs provide space for research, research interactions, 
and administrative services. In many cases there is some institutional 
budget in addition to what is derived from outside grants. Although a 
few University of California ORUs receive funding through direct line 
items in the state budget,17 many of the early ones were launched 
through the aforementioned Regents’ Opportunity Fund. Many of the 
ORUs formed in more recent years are completely self-funded through 
outside grants, contracts, and services; however, the ORU structure is 
still valuable for identity and for bringing together researchers of varied 
disciplinary backgrounds. 
The ORU movement within UC grew rapidly. Geiger18 points out 
that by the mid-1960s, there were at least 40 ORUs at Berkeley alone 
and 131 in the entire University of California. A 2015 count for the 
Berkeley campus showed that there are forty-four ORUs and fourteen 
                                                     
16 Chapter 17 describes this action in more detail. 
17 Examples are the Institute for Transportation Studies and the Institute for Industrial Relations, 
established in 1947 and 1945, respectively. 
18 Geiger, 1993, op. cit., p. 75. 
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museums and field stations,19 as well as sixty other centers, institutes, 
and the like,20 nearly all of which have the character of ORUs. The 
subject matters of ORUs are extremely varied. 21  Nearly all are 
multidisciplinary, some less so than others. Within the University of 
California, at some campuses (e.g., UCLA) portions of faculty positions 
have been allocated to ORUs, while at other campuses (e.g., Berkeley) 
that is not done. Many ORUs involve faculty members from both 
professional schools and academic disciplines, another way in which 
professional schools and disciplines are brought together academically. 
When multidisciplinary activities or would-be ORUs are started, 
they need a source of support services. Rather than investing in a full 
array of such services for a nascent unit, one useful approach is to 
provide support services at the start from another, established unit or 
parent organization. Several of the newer ORUs at Berkeley were 
started in that way within existing ORUs. Another approach is to 
combine support services for a number of different units. Going much 
further in that direction, the Berkeley campus in 2009 combined 
administrative services (personnel, purchasing, accounting, etcetera) 
for nearly all ORUs and some related units, over eighty in all, into one 
unit known as Research Enterprise Services (RES). A few years later, 
when it seemed that RES had worked well, a number of core 
administrative services (human resources, purchasing, accounting, and 
so forth) for all units on the Berkeley campus, academic and 
nonacademic alike, were combined into the campus-wide Shared 
Services Division, with the goal of substantially saving on administrative 
costs. The results so far are mixed at best (see chapter 6). 
On a grander scale, the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory 
(LBNL) is an effective mechanism for bringing faculty members and 
others together in multidisciplinary projects. The laboratory has grown 
                                                     
19 “Organizational Chart—VC Research,” University of California, Berkeley,  
https://web.archive.org/web/20150929062531/https://vcresearch.berkeley.edu/organizational-
chart “Organization Chart—Executive Vice Chancellor and Provost,” University of California, 
Berkeley, accessed October 14, 2015, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20150905135220/http://www.berkeley.edu/admin/pdf/provost.pdf 
20 “Centers & Institutes by Subject Area,” Office of Research, University of California, Berkeley, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20150929154824/http://vcresearch.berkeley.edu/research-
units/centers-and-institutes-by-subject_area. 
21 See also previous footnote. 




even more multidisciplinary as the mission has diversified from 
cyclotrons and high-energy physics into issues of energy, environment, 
geosciences, and biology. Some of the Berkeley-campus ORUs were 
started within LBNL. The arrival of so many ORUs within the University 
of California after World War II helped to extend the multidisciplinary 
approach of the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory to many other areas, 
including the social sciences, arts, and humanities.   
There is a thorough system of proposals, review, and evaluation 
by Academic Senate committees required for the formation of ORUs.22 
This process is complex and time-consuming, so that in some cases 
faculty members who want to get together for research just simply do 
so, without going through what is required to become an ORU. An 
example from Berkeley illustrates this fact in a very positive way. When 
Berkeley faculty members from several different disciplines 
(engineering, social sciences, medicine, public health, public policy, and 
law) found themselves brought in on the analysis of the damages 
caused by Hurricane Katrina (2005) in New Orleans, they discovered a 
strong common interest in catastrophic risk management and 
recognized that expertise from a number of different disciplines was 
needed in order to approach those issues effectively. What is striking is 
that it took service on the various Hurricane Katrina panels and 
committees in order for these faculty members to find one another; 
they did not intersect naturally on campus. On their own and without 
university budget for initiating it, they created the Center for 
Catastrophic Risk Management,23 which has blossomed. The center has 
been of substantial use with regard to other disasters and potential 
disasters, such as the Deepwater Horizon offshore platform collapse 
and oil release in the Gulf of Mexico (2010) and the risks associated 
with antiquated levees on California’s Sacramento River delta. The 
collaboration has also led to co-teaching of multidisciplinary courses on 
aspects of risk management for potential catastrophes. The referenced 
ORU policy does allow for establishment of non-ORU “centers” upon 
                                                     
22 Administrative Policies and Procedures concerning Organized Research Units, memorandum 
from President Richard C. Atkinson, University of California, December 7, 1999, 
https://perma.cc/L2AH-4MXC. 
23 “UC Berkeley Center for Catastrophic Risk Management: Overview,” University of California, 
Berkeley, https://web.archive.org/web/20150920010245/http://ccrm.berkeley.edu/. 
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campus administrative approval following consultation with the 
campus division of the Academic Senate, a much less elaborate 
process. 
A different Berkeley move toward multidisciplinary academic 
programs was the creation of the School of Information, described in 
chapter 12. However, establishment of a new school as a way to foster 
multidisciplinary activities necessitates a high degree of confidence 
that the subject is appropriately chosen and will stand the test of time. 
Since that is usually difficult to assess at the onset of a program, the 
structures chosen for new multidisciplinary activities should, for the 
most part, be fluid and subject to modification and even elimination 
through subsequent reviews. 
 
Governance, Budgeting, and Empowerment 
Given all the forces that draw faculty members to their home 
academic departments, it is important to devise mechanisms whereby 
multidisciplinary units can deal with academic departments on an 
even-up basis. In management terms, it helps for the structure to be 
brought close to a true cross-matrix model. 
One essential requirement is effective and tested leadership. 
Typically, chairs of academic departments and deans in US universities 
are chosen through processes that have much input and place great 
weight on demonstrated leadership ability. A similar process should be 
followed with respect to directors of multidisciplinary units, so that 
they have the talents to deal with chairs of academic departments and 
other administrators effectively. Interests centering on the 
multidisciplinary field are not enough by themselves. 
Again for reasons of leverage with respect to the academic 
departments, the director of a multidisciplinary unit should have 
continual access to sufficient resources of budget and space. Even if 
the full professorial appointment of a recruited faculty member is to be 
in one or more academic departments, an ORU needs to have the 
resources to participate in start-up packages for recruited faculty 
members so that allegiance of the recruited faculty member to the 
ORU can be developed. As well, the ORU may be able to increase the 
interest of the department in the appointment, or the ability of the 
department to fund the recruitment, by participating in the start-up 




package. The same applies to retentions of faculty members when they 
are recruited by other universities. To the extent that ORUs have 
financial resources and able leadership, they can hold their own in 
dealings with academic departments and gaining allegiance from 
members of the ORU. 
At Berkeley an experiment was carried out in which ten of twenty 
new faculty positions resulting from a state budget increase in the early 
2000s were dedicated to the creation of multidisciplinary research and 
teaching initiatives. A competition was held with a proposal, review, 
and selection process. The five winning initiatives were given new 
faculty positions with which to work, but the faculty appointments had 
to be in academic departments or fractionally divided among multiple 
academic departments. Multidisciplinary, multidepartmental search 
committees were used. The resultant faculty appointments were 
reviewed and approved at the department and central-campus levels in 
the established way (see chapter 11), and the initiative director 
determined the allocation of the faculty FTE among the departments. 
This gave the directors of the new multidisciplinary initiatives 
considerable leverage in negotiations at the time that the new faculty 
members were hired. However, that leverage did not continue once 
the departmental assignments were made, and the allegiances of some 
of the faculty members recruited drifted back over time to the 
departments. It is important that the director of the multidisciplinary 
unit have continual rather than one-time resources, or the ability to 
obtain continual resources, as the multidisciplinary unit and the 
department inherently compete in various ways over time for the 
attention and involvement of the faculty member. 
 
Integration of Disciplines in Governance 
As is described in chapter 7 and elsewhere, the University of 
California has a strong and well-established system of shared 
governance. Faculty members participate in governance through many 
topic-specific committees of the Academic Senate, with committee 
members chosen to represent a wide spectrum of disciplines across the 
campuses, including professional schools. Often, faculty members with 
kindred multidisciplinary interests have found one another through 
these committees.  
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INSTITUTES OF SCIENCE AND INNOVATION 
 
One effective way of incentivizing faculty members to join 
together in well-designed multidisciplinary initiatives is to hold a 
competition with substantial monetary stakes. A prime example was 
the establishment of the California Institutes on Science and 
Innovation. Four major research institutes were launched by the state 
of California in the year 2000 as a gubernatorial initiative to support 
the role of innovation in spurring the California economy. The idea 
originated with Richard Lerner, president of the Scripps Research 
Institute, and John Moores, a successful entrepreneur and a new 
regent of the University of California.24 Both Lerner and Moores were 
close associates of then-governor Gray Davis. With the approval of UC 
president Richard Atkinson, they approached the governor, who was 
enthusiastic. As lieutenant governor Gray Davis had been an active 
regent for four years and was still a regent as governor; hence he knew 
the university well and had high regard for its research activities and 
their effect upon the economy. The basic concept was to create a set of 
research institutes that would be directed toward future economic 
opportunities for California and to base these institutes within the arm 
of the state that is designated for research—the University of 
California. The model most often cited was Bell Laboratories. 
The initiative provided $100 million each for three institutes, 
spread over four years, with a requirement that the institutes raise 
even greater funds from other sources as a two-to-one match. Because 
of the state budgetary situation at that time, the state funding was 
almost totally for capital expenditures. Since the funds were from the 
capital budget, there was a restriction that no more than 5 percent of 
the funding could be used for operating purposes. The matching funds 
could be from any source outside the university and could be either 
operating or capital funds. The institutes were to be on University of 
California campuses and would carry out research in fields believed to 
be promising for the economic growth of the state. They were 
envisioned as catalytic partnerships between the university and private 
                                                     
24 Patricia A. Pelfrey, Entrepreneurial President: Richard Atkinson and the University of California, 
1995–2003 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012), pp. 110–111. 




industry that would “increase the state’s capacity for creating the new 
knowledge and highly skilled people that will drive entrepreneurial 
business growth and expand the California economy into new 
industries and markets—and bring the benefits of innovation more 
quickly into the lives of people everywhere.”25 The institutes were later 
renamed the Governor Gray Davis Institutes for Science and Innovation 
in recognition of Davis’s key role.26 
Through the Office of the President and in consultation with the 
campuses and Academic Senate, the university designed and 
administered an internal competition, encouraging multidisciplinary 
approaches and synergistic involvement of multiple campuses. Topics 
for the institutes were not specified; 27  instead, selection among 
proposed topics was a part of the competition. Two rounds of judging 
were used with both individual and panel peer review.  The first round 
reduced the field to a smaller number of finalists. Final proposals were 
subjected to extensive peer review and were judged by a 
multidimensional, highly distinguished panel whose members came 
from outside the university. The use of competition was key for honing 
the quality of the proposals, since the proposers put great effort into 
making the proposals convincing and attractive in the competition. 
Because of the compelling strengths of four of the ultimate proposals, 
a fourth institute was also funded by the state. 
The four institutes are the following: 
 California Institute for Telecommunications and Information 
Technology [Calit2]—San Diego and Irvine campuses28 
                                                     
25 “California Institutes for Science and Innovation: A Foundation for California’s Future,” Office of 
the President, University of California, Background for Item 304 at July 2006 Regents Meeting, 
https://perma.cc/DHR3-CFPZ.. 
26 “Governor Gray Davis Institutes for Science and Innovation,” University of California, Office of 
the President, https://web.archive.org/web/20170820090333/http://www.ucop.edu/california-
institutes/. 
27 The authorization language was that “the concentration of each institute may include, but shall 
not necessarily be limited to [emphasis added], any of the following—medicine, bioengineering, 
telecommunications and information systems, energy resources, space, and agricultural 
technology.” (California Assembly Bill no. AB 1943, April 3, 2000, accessed June 15, 2016, 
ftp://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/99-00/bill/asm/ab_1901-
1950/ab_1943_bill_20000403_amended_asm.html. 
28 California Institute for Telecommunications and Information Technology, 
https://perma.cc/4ENR-62BP. 
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 California Institute for Quantitative Biomedical Research 
[QB3]—San Francisco, Berkeley, and Santa Cruz campuses29 
 California Nanosystems Institute [CNSI]—Los Angeles and Santa 
Barbara Campuses30 
 Center for Information Technology Research in the Interest of 
Society [CITRIS]—Berkeley, Davis, Merced, and Santa Cruz 
campuses31 
The California Institute for Telecommunications and Information 
Technology is described in more detail in a PowerPoint presentation32 
and two independent case studies33, 34. 
The needed match ($800 million) was a very large sum, yet it was 
raised and exceeded with the ultimate total match being more than $1 
billion. Holding a competition facilitated the acquisition of these 
matching funds, since it was clear for donors that the match would be 
required to bring an institute into existence. The fact that the subject 
matters of the institutes were not specified in the competition 
provided yet another incentive for corporations to provide funding, 
since the institute to which the donation would be made would have to 
be selected in order for there to be an institute matching the interests 
of the corporation. The matching funds were raised primarily from 
industry for three of the institutes and primarily as federal government 
project funds for the fourth (CNSI), reflecting the fact that there was at 
the time no cohesive, substantial nanoscale systems industry, while 
there were existing industries for the other three areas. 
Since the state funding was almost totally for capital expenditures, 
it went primarily into building the campus facilities to bring the 
researchers of an institute together. The researchers must still propose  
 
                                                     
29 QB3, UCB.UCSC.UCSF, https://perma.cc/B3AF-HAEQ. 
30 California NanoSystems Institute, https://perma.cc/2DFJ-GQRD, https://perma.cc/65D9-8ZU5. 
31 CITRIS and the Banatao Institute, https://perma.cc/9SH6-F3QY. 
32 Larry Smarr, “The UC California Institutes for Science and Innovation,” invited talk to seminar on 
Creating a Regional Innovation Cluster: From Discovery to Application, La Jolla, CA, April 25, 2006, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20161207002334/http://lsmarr.calit2.net/presentations?slideshow
=2865477. 
33 Donald Spicer and Bruce Metz, “Calit2: A Case Study in a Next-Generation Research 
Environment,” EDUCAUSE Center for Applied Research, 2006, https://perma.cc/C37J-4LS3.. 
34 Linda A. Hill and Alison B. Wagonfeld, “Calit2: UC San Diego-UC Irvine Partnership,” Harvard 
Business School, 2011, https://perma.cc/G94J-TZMR. 




and obtain extramural funding for individual projects. Obtaining core 
operating funds for administering the institutes was more of a 
problem. Portions of the allowable 5 percent of the state capital funds 
were a start, and then some chancellors devoted a portion of the 
overhead from incremental research grants for the institutes to that 
purpose. Eventually another $20 million of annual operating funds 
divided among the four institutes became part of the state operating 
budget for the University of California. 
The institutes have now been in existence for over fifteen years. It 
has been apparent that on the whole they are large successes. 
Research volume is high, strong multidisciplinary efforts have come 
about in several areas, and there are several measures of substantial 
economic impact, as borne out by an economic impact report35 
produced by CITRIS in 2014–15. Incubators have been key parts of 
QB3,36 with over four hundred start-ups37 as of mid-2017. 
Congress and agencies of the federal government have frequently 
sought to catalyze multidisciplinary research in areas of national 
importance by designating funds for competitions for large institutes, 
but usually with the subject matter specified. As was the case for the 
Governor Gray Davis Institutes for Science and innovation, the lure of 
large funding in those cases has served as an effective catalyst for 





A world of growing multidisciplinary challenges means that 
university graduates must be able to work effectively with persons 
from other disciplines and understand enough of the basic vocabulary 
and methodologies of other disciplines to enable collaboration. 
Furthermore, there is an ever-growing need for an informed and 
thoughtful citizenry who can sift among conflicting arguments on 
                                                     
35 “CITRIS Impact Report, 2014–15,” https://perma.cc/2SWC-2PZD. 
36 “Incubators to Accelerate Innovation,” QB3, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20171020213249/http://qb3.org/incubators. 
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complex situations. 38  The classical American concept of a liberal 
undergraduate education and its strong component of critical thinking 
address those needs. The American Association of Schools and Colleges 
defines a liberal education as follows: 
an approach to learning that empowers individuals and 
prepares them to deal with complexity, diversity, and change. 
It provides students with broad knowledge of the wider world 
(e.g., science, culture, and society) as well as in-depth study 
in a specific area of interest. A liberal education helps 
students develop a sense of social responsibility, as well as 
strong and transferable intellectual and practical skills such as 
communication, analytical and problem-solving skills, and a 
demonstrated ability to apply knowledge and skills in real-
world settings.39 
A liberal undergraduate education should encompass courses 
reflecting different disciplines and combinations of disciplines, 
including the natural sciences and even some engineering. There 
should be specially designed courses giving the gist of a discipline 
rather than providing a foundation for future study in the discipline. 
There should also be courses that are themselves multidisciplinary, 
displaying the ways in which knowledge from different disciplines can 
be brought together to bear upon major issues. Preferably, those 
should be team-taught by faculty from different disciplines. Yes, these 
goals can be difficult to achieve, but they are vitally important. 
Many studies and experiments have been directed toward ways of 
best achieving objectives of these sorts. Many universities, particularly 
private ones, carry out general-education studies with some regularity, 
and many reports from these are available on the Internet. As was 
already mentioned, such a study was carried out for public research 
universities, focused largely on the University of California.40 
The University of California has not been a particular leader in this 
area, but faculty and academic leaders within it have devised and 
                                                     
38 Anne Colby, Thomas Ehrlich, Elizabeth Beaumont, and Jason Stevens, Educating Citizens: 
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39 American Association of Schools and Colleges, “What Is a 21st Century Liberal Education?,” 
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40 Schudson, Smelser et al., Center for Studies in Higher Education, 2007, loc. cit. 




carried out a number of experiments, some of which have lasted. Two, 
of course, are the UC San Diego colleges (chapter 10) and the entire 
history of the UC Santa Cruz campus (also chapter 10), both of which 
involve a number of separate residential colleges, and in the case of 
UCSD have general-education requirements specific to the college. The 
UC Santa Barbara College of Creative Studies, enabling programs of 
study tailor-fitted to individual students, has persisted since its 
founding in 1968. Two experiments at Berkeley in earlier days received 
considerable attention—the Experimental College Program41 (1965), 
headed by Joseph Tussman, and Strawberry Creek College, 42 
spearheaded by Charles Muscatine, 1974–80. 
As of 2018 the College of Letters and Science at UC Berkeley has a 
small program of “big ideas” courses43 for partial fulfillment of the 
breadth requirements of the college. These bring together professors 
from entirely different disciplines to teach courses dealing with a “big 
idea.” An example from 2016 is Energy and Civilization, co-taught by 
faculty members from the Departments of Civil and Environmental 
Engineering, Business Administration, Earth and Planetary Science, and 
South Asian Studies. The big ideas program has its own budget, 
provided through support from two foundations, furnishing 
replacement teaching within the home departments of the faculty 
members involved. 
Another, more common approach toward added breadth can be 
an undergraduate minor—concentrated study in a particular area, but 
to a substantially lesser extent than for the undergraduate major. 
Although most of the minors available at UC are, like the majors, single- 
disciplinary in nature, some are multidisciplinary. As of 2017 the most 
popular minor for undergraduate College of Letters and Science 
students at Berkeley is global poverty and practice,44  carried out  
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through the multidisciplinary Blum Center for Developing Economies, 
which is primarily an ORU. 
Stopping short of the concept of a minor, per se, the previously 
mentioned Schudson-Smelser Commission on General Education in the 
Twenty-First Century recommended developing structured bundles of 
interdisciplinary courses on major issues such as environmental 
sustainability, technology and society, bureaucracy and society, military 
and society, and political and ethical dimensions of biological 
knowledge.45 
Another approach Berkeley takes, primarily to provide small-class 
experience for undergraduates, is to offer the Freshman and 
Sophomore Seminars,46 which focus on specific subjects that are often 
interdisciplinary or multidisciplinary. These provide a small-class, 
discussion experience for freshman and sophomore students. 
Multidisciplinary courses, by definition, usually belong to no 
academic department. Since faculty members’ teaching obligations are 
normally to their home departments, it is important to find ways of 
incentivizing teaching in multidisciplinary courses for both departments 
and individual faculty members within them. Teaching credit for such 
courses can be allocated to the home departments of the faculty 
members concerned, and/or there can be a source of funds that can be 
used by the departments for replacement instructors, such as the 
foundation support for the big ideas courses mentioned above. 
Majors or other disciplinary specialties for students should be built 
upon the foundations of broad liberal undergraduate education. 
Professional degrees are best placed at the postgraduate level, built 
upon a foundational liberal education. Engineering is the one major 
profession in the United States for which the professional degree is at 
the undergraduate level rather than the graduate level. Engineering 
should join the other professions by changing the professional degree 
to the postgraduate level and basing it on a liberal undergraduate 
education.47  
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AVOIDING DEPARTMENTAL STRUCTURES 
 
Another potential route for encouraging multidisciplinary effort is 
to avoid the traditional academic department structure altogether. 
Newly established universities or campuses have no existing interests 
or structures and hence can favor multidisciplinary approaches from 
the start. As described in chapter 10, the academic founders of the 
Merced campus of the University of California chose to encourage 
multidisciplinary interactions of faculty members by having no 
academic departments. The UC Santa Cruz campus (chapter 10) is   
another case, with the initial design placing academics heavily into the 
individual colleges, linked through boards of study for the various 
disciplines. That structure was abandoned through the Sinsheimer 
Rearrangement. Another recent example of a structure without 
departments is the King Abdullah University of Science and Technology 
(KAUST) in Thuwal, Saudi Arabia, an institution opened in 2009 and 
designed to be a graduate-only version of Caltech. KAUST has three 
divisions, each of which combines science and engineering together, 
seeking to promote interactions between the two areas. There is a 
parallel organization by research centers. 
An absence of formal academic disciplinary departments is also 
one way to deal with the small size associated with a start-up 
university. However, the concept becomes much more difficult to 
sustain as growth continues and the size reaches such a level that there 
do have to be knowledgeable evaluation of faculty, effective faculty 
searches and recruitment, design and coordination of instruction, 
provision of discipline-specific services, synergy among faculty 
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It is important for research universities to takes steps to 
encourage and enable multidisciplinary research and teaching. 
Graduates increasingly need to understand multifaceted issues to be 
responsible citizens and to work constructively in their employment 
with people from other disciplinary backgrounds so as to bring the full 
range of necessary knowledge to bear on those issues. 
Present-day structures, both for academic departments within 
universities and for disciplines on national and international scales, 
tend to hamper multidisciplinary efforts. There is therefore a need to 
incentivize multidisciplinary research and take specific steps to 
facilitate it. Multidisciplinary research can naturally lead to 
multidisciplinary teaching. Skilled and creative academic leaders can 
build innovative and effective multidisciplinary research through well-
designed faculty additions when given the opportunity.  
The University of California was the leader in the formation of 
organized research units (ORUs), a movement that started soon after 
World War II as government support of research became more 
plentiful. Most ORUs are multidisciplinary and are directed toward 
specific broad needs or the interests of particular government 
research-supporting agencies. The Lawrence Berkeley National 
Laboratory has also served as a catalyst for multidisciplinary research. 
UC’s Governor Gray Davis Institutes for Science and Innovation were 
formed in the year 2000 through a gubernatorial initiative that 
provided funds for construction of facilities, to be matched at least two 
to one by other sources of funding for any purpose. Most of the 
matching funds were industrial. The four resultant institutes were 
chosen by a peer-review competition, university-wide. 
Skilled and adequately funded leadership is needed for 
multidisciplinary ORUs or other institutes, recognizing the fact that 
institute or ORU directors will need to negotiate on an even-up basis in 
many ways with department chairs and deans. 
University graduates need to be able to work effectively and 
synergistically with people from other disciplinary backgrounds so that 
they, as capable and informed citizens, can address multifaceted issues 
and evaluate complex issues. Therefore undergraduate education 




should be broad, in the vein of the traditional US liberal education. 
Professional degrees should be at the graduate level, as is now the case 
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This is the University of California. It is not the University of Berlin or of 
New Haven which we are to copy; it is not the University of Oakland or 
of San Francisco which we are to create, but it is the university of this 
state…It is “of the people and for the people,” not in any low or 
unworthy sense, but in the highest and noblest relations to their 
intellectual and moral well-being. 
—Daniel Coit Gilman, University of California President, 18721 
 
[It is our] earnest hope and confident expectation that the State of 
California will forthwith organize and put into operation…a University 
of California…with courses of instruction equal to those of the Eastern 
colleges. 
—Trustees of the College of California2 
 
Each segment of California public higher education shall strive to 
approximate…the general ethnic, sexual, and economic composition of 
the recent high school graduates. 
—California Legislature, 19743 
 
The University seeks to enroll, on each of its campuses, a student body 
that, beyond meeting the university’s eligibility requirements, 
demonstrates high academic achievement or exceptional personal 
talent, and that encompasses the broad diversity of cultural, racial,  
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2 Resolution of the trustees of the College of California, offering the College as the basis of the 
University of California. From Verne A. Stadtman, The University of California, 1868–1968 (New 
York: McGraw-Hill, 1970), p. 31. 
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geographic, and socio-economic backgrounds characteristic of 
California. 
—University of California Regents Policy adopted 19884 
 
Effective January 1, 1997, the University of California shall not use 
race, religion, sex, color, ethnicity or national origin as a criterion for 
admission to the university or to any program of study. 
—University of California Regents, 19955 
 
The state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential 
treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, 
ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment, 
public education, or public contracting. 
—California State Constitutional Amendment, adopted November, 
19966 
 
Anyone who thinks that he has the solutions to [matters pertaining 
to affirmative action] doesn’t understand the issues, and anyone who 
understands the problems knows that there are no simple solutions. 
—David P. Gardner, President of the University of California7 
 
 
Because of the success and popularity of the University of 
California, selection among would-be students and provision of access 
across the various elements of society have been sensitive and ever-
growing public issues.  Today they are among the most public and 
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From the start, the University of California and the Californians 
who created it have had three major goals. One, epitomized in the 
above quote from Daniel Coit Gilman, calls for the university to serve 
the particular needs of California. Another, alluded to in the same 
quote, is to be a public university in the highest sense of the word and 
provide access to all who are deserving and capable of partaking from 
it. In that way it should be a prime means for personal improvement 
and upward mobility in the state. A third goal, embodied in the above 
quote from the trustees of the College of California as they offered 
their college as the foundation for the university, is for the university to 
have the same high caliber as the noted [private] universities in the 
eastern United States. The combination of the second and third goals 
was nurtured by the fact that respected private universities did not yet 
exist in California at the time when public higher education became 
encouraged through the Morrill Act, along with a desire to enable 
access at costs much less than for the leading eastern private 
universities. Similar noble language appears in the founding documents 
of other public universities in other states, but California took these 
goals very seriously, and that fact has had much to do with the 
development of the University of California. 
In recent times these three goals have led to considerable tension 
surrounding the matter of who should be able to attend the University 
of California. The first goal, serving the particular situation of California, 
brings at least two needs. The first is to recognize the immense 
demographic shifts that have turned California from a strongly white-
majority state into a minority-majority state with a very diverse 
population, reflecting much immigration from Mexico, other South and 
Central American countries, China, and other Asian and Pacific-Island 
countries. Admissions should pay attention to the needs generated by 
that transition. The second need is to recognize the nature of 
California’s particular economy, which had been dominated by 
agricultural industry but is now heavily reliant on technology, 
entrepreneurism and start-ups. That fact says that admissions should 
seek people who can serve that economy well and accentuates the 




need to sustain the University of California as a preeminent research 
university that can effectively stimulate and serve that economy. 
The second goal, providing access to all who are deserving and 
capable of partaking from it, calls for enabling and encouraging access 
to the university by persons who have the abilities to benefit the most 
from high-level university education, no matter what their economic 
and social background. That means encouraging enrollment by all 
talented people, making that economically feasible for students from 
economically disadvantaged backgrounds, and recognizing that cultural 
backgrounds differ. 
The third goal, having the same high caliber as the noted private 
universities in the eastern United States, calls for providing a top-flight 
education for the most capable people, feeding an elitist concept that 
UC students are the best and the brightest and will be future leaders of 
the state. Since much learning within universities comes from students 
associating with other students, the third goal also calls for providing a 
student body as well as a faculty who can provide a wide variety of 
academic and social experiences for one another. 
These three goals and their associated needs should guide the 
answers to questions such as these: what the size of the university 
should be, what the minimum criteria for entrance should be, how to 
choose among applicants when there are more who meet these criteria 
than can be accommodated, how to manage conditions when demand 
for some campuses considerably exceeds the demand for others, and 
how to mold an incoming class for which the members can best benefit 
one another. Determining the answers plays out in arenas of public 
interest and concern where demand considerably exceeds supply, as 
well as through the politics of race and class, which Peter Schrag8 has 
described well for California. Further, these issues play out in an open-
book fashion in which everything should be available and understood 
by the public, not only because of public-meeting and open-records 
laws, but also because of widespread interest and simply as good 
public policy. The issues are complex and readily incite passions. 
                                                     
8 Peter Schrag, Paradise Lost: California’s Experience, America’s Future (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1998); California: America’s High-Stakes Experiment (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2006). 
Providing Access: Eligibility and Admission  
537 
 
The open-book aspect of University of California admissions 
criteria stands in contrast to those of the selective private universities, 
for which admissions criteria are stated only in general terms. By 
contrast, University of California criteria are known in detail, are 
publicly evaluated and discussed, and are subject to legal contentions. 
Admissions policies for the University of California have been 
developed in a national setting of similar admissions concerns in other 
states. Douglass 9  has reviewed the history of public-university 
admissions in the United States, with the University of California up 





Answers to the questions of the size and degree of selectivity of 
the University of California were not well defined through the end of 
the nineteenth century, but in two significant steps in the 1870s, the 
regents decided that the university would be selective and delegated 
the determination of standards for admission of students to the faculty 
of the university. This delegation was confirmed and strengthened in 
the negotiations of 1919 that defined larger roles for the Academic 
Senate (chapter 7). The decision to be selective was somewhat unusual 
for public universities in the United States at the time. Many other 
public universities were set up to interpret access for all to mean that 
they should admit all applicants who meet a certain low standard of 
eligibility and then sort those incoming students out through grades in 
university-level courses, with many students then leaving. 
The decision to be selective led UC to adopt in 1884 a policy of 
formally accrediting high schools, certifying whether they had content 
standards high enough to prepare students reliably for university 
education. Originally graduates of these high schools would be 
admitted if the principal of the high school so recommended. Later, the 
need for endorsement by the principal was dropped. The accreditation 
process for high schools did much to upgrade secondary education in 
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California. This effect was further strengthened when the university 
initiated the concept that students should have completed a set of 
prescribed high school courses if they were to be admitted to UC. The 
“A-G” courses, now jointly required by UC and CSU for eligibility, still 
serve that purpose.10 Accreditation of high schools by UC lasted until 
1963, when it was discontinued by action of the Academic Senate. On 
behalf of both UC and CSU, the UC Office of the President still reviews 
and approves courses for A-G, based on faculty guidelines.11 
 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF ADMISSIONS POLICIES 
 
Both enrollment pressure and funding for the university began to 
increase during the presidency of Benjamin Ide Wheeler at the start of 
the twentieth century. The Progressive movement that took hold in 
California politics around 1910 also promoted public higher education 
and steered funding to it. During the first decades of the twentieth 
century, the tripartite system of public higher education took form. The 
state colleges started developing curricula beyond teacher education, 
which had been their original base as normal schools. The existence 
and availability of the state colleges and the community colleges (at the 
time called junior colleges), provided additional opportunities in higher 
education and thus enabled the University of California to continue to 
be selective. As of 1905 arrangements were established to provide for 
transfer, wherein a student would take the first two years of college 
education (the lower division) at a normal school or junior college and 
then transfer to UC for the last two years (the upper division). The state 
colleges began sharp increases in enrollment in the 1920s.12 
By the late 1950s, UC required at least a B average in what were 
then the A-F college-going high school courses. Ninety percent of 
admissions occurred via this path. Other routes were admission by 
examination, admission by class rank, admission by exception, and 
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transfer at the upper division level. The large surge of enrollment by 
returning veterans of World War II in the late 1940s was met by 
temporarily increasing admission by exception to as much as 35 
percent of the incoming class. 
 
 
THE EFFECTS OF THE 1960 MASTER PLAN 
 
The effective eligibility rate for graduates of public high schools for 
the University of California in the late 1950s was about 15 percent. As 
the California Master Plan for Higher Education was developed and 
adopted in 1960 (chapter 5), one of the compromises was that UC 
would reduce the eligibility rate for public high school students to 12.5 
percent and that CSU would reduce its eligibility rate from what had 
been about 50 percent to 33 percent, with the displaced demand for 
the bachelor’s degree to be met through junior-level transfer from 
California’s community colleges. The Master Plan also established the 
California Coordinating Council for Higher Education (later the 
California Postsecondary Education Commission, CPEC). Among the 
roles of CPEC was to conduct periodic eligibility studies to ascertain 
whether the eligibility criteria of the Master Plan were being met in 
practice. The criteria for eligibility were to be determined by UC and 
CSU themselves; for UC that was in line with constitutional autonomy. 
Eligibility for UC has come to be defined through a combination of 
high school grade point average in the A-G courses and standardized 
test scores. The SAT came into use for out-of-state students and those 
with relatively low GPAs somewhat belatedly in 1968. In 1979 it was 
incorporated into an eligibility index, which combined GPA in the 
required courses with the SAT as the standardized test for UC 
admissions and the ACT as an allowable alternative. The eligibility index 
would be moved up or down after CPEC eligibility studies so as to 
maintain 12.5 percent eligibility. Over time, first by practice and then 
by state policy, it became understood that the University of California 
would admit all eligible students somewhere within the university, 
although not necessarily at the campus or in the major of first choice 
(chapter 5). 
 




BALANCE OF ENROLLMENT AMONG CAMPUSES 
 
Along with the decision that there would be multiple campuses of 
the University of California came the decision, during Clark Kerr’s era, 
that there would be a cap on the enrollment of any one campus. That 
figure was originally set at 27,500, and has inched up over the years to 
where the Fall 2016 enrollments for the Los Angeles and Berkeley 
campuses were 45,000 and 40,000, respectively.13 As the Berkeley and 
Los Angeles campuses approached what were then their enrollment 
caps, the matter of how to handle backup choices for eligible 
applicants who could not be accommodated at those campuses 
became important. Beginning in the 1970s, the university asked 
students to submit a single application for admission, indicating their 
first, second, and third choices of campus. Eligible applicants not 
admitted to the first-choice campus were then “redirected” to a 
campus that would admit them. Then in 1985 UC switched to having 
independent applications to individual campuses, called multiple filing. 
The campuses each had enrollment targets and chose among eligible 
applicants to admit a number that, when the anticipated acceptance 
ratio was factored in, would meet their target. Eligible students who 
were not admitted to any of the campuses to which they had applied 
constituted the referral pool. The students in that category would be 
offered admission to those campuses (Riverside and Santa Cruz at the 
time) that still had available capacity after the first round of 
admissions. This practice continues in 2018, with the one open campus 
being the newer Merced campus. 
 
 
ATTENTIVENESS TO RACE 
 
The United States has a long and complex history with regard to 
race and ethnicity. It has historically been known to be friendly to, and 
even dependent upon, immigration—the “melting pot” of the world. 
Yet at the same time there is a history of marked differences in the 
                                                     
13 “Fall Enrollment at a Glance,” University of California, 
https://www.universityofcalifornia.edu/infocenter/fall-enrollment-glance. 
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average opportunities and standards of living among people of 
different ethnicities, stemming from lingering effects of poverty, low 
education, and discrimination—and from earlier days even the practice 
of slavery, which existed in the southern states and was eliminated by 
Abraham Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation in 1863, only five years 
before the founding of the University of California. 
During the administrations of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, 
1961–69, the concept of affirmative action arose through several 
executive orders, starting with the requirement that government 
contractors should “take affirmative action to ensure that applicants 
are employed, and that employees are treated during employment, 
without regard to their race, creed, color, or national origin.”14, 15 These 
orders were interpreted at the University of California to mean that 
applications should be actively invited and encouraged from all ethnic 
groups and that processes for selecting among applicants should be 
visibly without discrimination. These actions led to a number of efforts 
to redress past injustices through positive actions, while seeking to 
maintain an overall policy of no racial or ethnic discrimination. 
As California’s minority populations grew, racial balance within the 
University of California grew in importance as an issue. The proportions 
of African Americans, Latinos, 16  and American Indians within the 
university student body were, and still are, substantially lower than in 
the college-age population as a whole. Further, the percentage of 
Latinos within the population of the state grew rapidly. Beginning in 
1964 with the Equal Opportunity Program (EOP) and consistent with 
the executive orders on affirmative action, special outreach efforts 
were made to these minority communities to try to increase the 
interest in and preparedness of students for the University of 
California.17 By 1981 $47 million annually in state funds, fee revenue, 
                                                     
14 Terry H. Anderson, The Pursuit of Fairness: A History of Affirmative Action Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press, 2004), p. 60. 
15 Randall H. Woods, Prisoners of Hope: Lyndon B. Johnson, the Great Society, and the Limits of 
Liberalism (New York: Basic Books, 2016). 
16 For simplicity, the term Latino is used throughout this chapter to denote the combination of 
Chicano, Chicana, Latino, and Latina. 
17 These outreach programs, subsequently called educational partnership programs, grew 
substantially over the ensuing years, with a very large but short-lived burst of growth following 
the regents’ actions in 1995. The programs are described more fully in chapter 16. 




regents’ funds, and some private funding was spent on a collection of 
UC outreach programs.18 The allowable percentage of special-action 
admissions—that is, admissions by exception to normal 
requirements—had been 2 percent since the short-term surge to 35 
percent in the years immediately after World War II. It was increased 
to 4 percent in 1968 and was increased again to 6 percent19 in 1979. 
In 1978 the US Supreme Court decided a legal case wherein Allan 
Bakke, a white applicant to the University of California at Davis School 
of Medicine, claimed that his application for admission had been 
denied on the basis of an explicit consideration of race. In a split (5–4) 
decision, the court held that the use of numerical quota systems20 to 
promote racial balance was unconstitutional but that consideration of 
race as one of many factors in determining admissions was acceptable. 
Following that legal interpretation, the regents adopted the policy 
embodied in the 1988 quotation at the start of this chapter. Guidelines 
for implementation of the policy indicated that 40 to 60 percent of an 
incoming freshman class should be admitted on the basis of academic 
criteria (i.e., grades and test scores) alone, while the remainder could 
be admitted following both academic and supplemental criteria. These 
criteria could include extracurricular achievements, leadership, special 
talents, special circumstances (e.g., low-income, disability, veteran 
status), and “ethnic identity, gender, and location of residence.”21 This 
procedure became known as two-tier admissions. 
The UC campuses then devised means of deciding among eligible 
applicants that brought race in as one factor among many. The process 
at Berkeley involved placing applicants in three groups, effectively 
dividing the second tier into two subgroups. Decisions for one of these 
subgroups brought in EOP status and some other criteria as well as  
 
                                                     
18 Douglass, 2007, op. cit., pp. 108–109. 
19 Currently campuses use only a fraction of the available 6 percent, and then for cases where the 
arguments for an exception are clear and compelling. 
20 The UC Davis School of Medicine did, at the time, have a specific criterion that sixteen of its one 
hundred spots in the entering class of the School of Medicine were set aside for ethnic minority 
students. 
21 Nina Robinson and others, “Undergraduate Access to the University of California after the 
Elimination of Race-Conscious Policies,” Student Academic Services, Office of the President, 
University of California, March 2003, https://perma.cc/AP5K-6Y47. 
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academic factors, and decisions for the second subgroup required only 
UC eligibility as an academic factor to be combined with other criteria, 
including affirmative action. Functionally, three sorts of applicants—
athletes, disabled students, and affirmative-action students—were 
effectively guaranteed admission if they were UC-eligible. UCLA had a 




SURGE OF APPLICATION PRESSURE AND BACKLASH 
 
Up until the early 1970s, Berkeley was able to admit all eligible 
applicants.22 Then, as campuses reached their designated capacities or 
maximum rates of growth from year to year, Berkeley, then Los 
Angeles, and then other campuses became unable to admit all UC-
eligible applicants. As of 2017 all eight undergraduate campuses other 
than Merced are in the situation of not being able to admit all UC-
eligible applicants. Admissions have become highly competitive, 
especially at Los Angeles and Berkeley, but also at San Diego, Davis, 
Irvine, and Santa Barbara. 
One result of these enrollment pressures has been that the 
eligibility and admissions policies of the university have become highly 
contentious. Controversies have played out in public limelight. The 
introduction of multiple filing in 1985 resulted in a much greater 
number of explicit denials of student applications by individual 
campuses, which heightened concerns for families of students who had 
been rejected. For Berkeley, in 1975 there were 5,035 applicants, of 
whom 77 percent were admitted; in 1980 there were 9,115 applicants, 
of whom 54 percent were admitted; and in 1990 there were 19,946 
applicants, of whom 38 percent were admitted.23 For 2015 there were 
73,753 applicants, of whom 18 percent were admitted.24 More denials 
                                                     
22 Committee on Admissions, Enrollment, and Preparatory Education (AEPE), “A Report to the 
Berkeley Faculty on Undergraduate Admission and Comprehensive Review: 1995–2002,” May 
2002, https://perma.cc/VY3K-4CNV. 
23 Douglass, 2007, op. cit., p. 127. 
24 Janet Gilmore, “In a Competitive Year, Berkeley Admits 13,321 Prospective Freshmen,” Berkeley 
News,  




of admission mean more unhappy students and families, who in turn 
are constituents of legislators who pursue redress of their concerns. 
Increased enrollment pressure and heightened concern about 
admissions brought contention against affirmative action policies and 
the “thumb on the scale” for admission of underrepresented minority 
students. One of the first manifestations of that concern was reflected 
in the Asian American Task Force (AATF). Asian Americans had 
originally been identified as an affirmative action group, but in 1984 
they were removed from that status since they were no longer 
enrolling in a proportion lower than their proportion among eighteen-
year-olds. The resultant drop in the percentage of Asian American 
applicants to Berkeley that were admitted (34.4 percent in 1984 as 
opposed to 47.4 percent in 1983) led to the formation of the AATF by 
members of the San Francisco Bay Area Asian American community to 
contend that there had, in fact, been discrimination against eligible 
Asian American applicants at Berkeley. The efforts of that task force led 
to legislative hearings on admissions to the Berkeley campus, 
recognition of the problem by Chancellor Heyman25, and changes in 
elements of the Berkeley admissions process. Criticism of the 
admissions processes of the university was now embedded in conflict 
among races and was coming from both conservatives opposed to 




UC REGENTS’ RESOLUTION SP-1 AND STATEWIDE PROPOSITION 209 
 
On July 20, 1995, the Regents of UC adopted two resolutions26, 27, 28 
barring any use of “race, religion, sex, color, ethnicity, or national 
                                                                                                                     
https://web.archive.org/web/20150919233132/http://news.berkeley.edu/2015/07/02/berkeley-
admits-more-than-13000-prospective-freshmen/.  
25 “UC Berkeley Apologizes for Policy That Limited Asians”, Los Angeles Times, April 7, 1989 
https://perma.cc/8JNR-C9RB. 
26 “Text of UC Regents’ Resolutions,” July 20, 1995, loc. cit. 
27 Patricia A. Pelfrey, Entrepreneurial President: Richard Atkinson and the University of California, 
1995–2002 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012), pp. 173–175. 
28 Brian Pusser, Burning Down the House: Politics, Governance, and Affirmative Action at the 
University of California (Albany: SUNY Press, 2004), pp. 229–232. 
Providing Access: Eligibility and Admission  
545 
 
origin” as criteria for university admissions and employment. Sixteen 
months later, in November 1996, the voters of California adopted 
Proposition 209,29 an initiative constitutional amendment that put 
effectively the same restrictions into the state constitution. The 
regents’ resolutions contained two other features as well. One was a 
change to increase the portion of the freshman class admitted on 
academic criteria (i.e., grades and test scores) alone from what had 
been 40–60 percent to 50–75 percent. The remainder of an incoming 
freshman class could be admitted filling the academic criteria out with 
supplemental criteria, which still should not evidence any preference 
by race or the other stated factors. The second matter was a statement 
that a task force should be formed to define programs of outreach that 
would increase the rates of eligibility of students identified by criteria 
of disadvantage defined in the resolution (see chapter 16). 
The process leading to the regents’ resolutions was highly political, 
occurring, as already noted in chapter 2, at a time when the governor 
of California, Pete Wilson, was seeking the 1996 Republican 
nomination for president of the United States. Wilson and his 
predecessor, also a Republican, had appointed most of the then-
current regents, and Wilson himself was also president of the board, ex 
officio. The events leading to the regents’ resolutions are described by 
Douglass,30, 31 Pelfrey,32 and Pusser.33 The events leading to Proposition 
209 are described and analyzed by Chavez.34 
From the standpoint of university governance, it is important to 
look at the roles of the three main parties—the regents, the 
administration, and the Academic Senate—as the regents’ resolutions 
were developed and presented. The resolutions originated within the 
Board of Regents, specifically from Regent Ward Connerly. The 
president, all chancellors, and all vice presidents openly opposed the 
                                                     
29 California Proposition 209, loc. cit. 
30 John A. Douglass, ”A Brief on Events Leading to SP1,” submitted to the Task Force on Shared 
Governance, Academic Senate, University of California, 1997, https://perma.cc/CW2W-N686. 
31 Douglass, 2007, op. cit., chapter 7. 
32 Pelfrey, 2012, op. cit., chapter 3. 
33 Pusser, 2004, loc. cit. 
34 Lydia Chavez, The Color Bind: California’s Campaign to End Affirmative Action (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1998). 




resolutions. The standing orders of the regents35 state, “The Academic 
Senate, subject to the approval of the Board, shall determine the 
conditions for admission,” but the regents did not ask for senate review 
of the resolution on admissions when it was introduced at the board 
meeting, nor did the Academic Senate ask to do so. President Jack 
Peltason did make such a request ten days before the regents’ meeting 
at which the resolutions were introduced and acted upon, but there 
was no explicit response to his request. 
The regents’ resolutions and Proposition 209 attracted great 
attention and were the cause of heated politics within the California 
Legislature, where many legislators, including the Latino Caucus, urged 
the university somehow to find effective ways to maintain ethnically 
diverse admissions even in view of the limitations that had been 
imposed. Thus the entire follow-up to the resolutions and Proposition 
209 played out in a very public arena with much concern and media 
coverage. For many reasons the resolutions created a major crisis for 
the university: 
 National and state politics in the forms of a presidential 
campaign and the prelude to what became Proposition 209 
had been thrust upon the university. 
 There were intense concerns from both students and faculty. 
Students were by and large both vocal and passionate in 
defense of affirmative action. While faculty members were 
substantially split on the issue, the most vocal elements of the 
faculty were strongly in favor of affirmative action, with many 
advocating open defiance against the regents’ actions. 
 The university was the sole state institution subject to the 
regents’ policy actions and remained in that isolated position 
for sixteen months until Proposition 209 was passed. 
 The Academic Senate had not had its usual role on the matters 
in the two regents’ resolutions. Hence a way had to be found 
to bring the senate promptly in on the issues. 
 Everything that was done would be subject to intense media 
scrutiny. 
                                                     
35 “Standing Order 105, Academic Senate,” Board of Regents, University of California, 
https://perma.cc/62WR-N3FT. 
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 Changes to bring the university into compliance for admissions 
of students entering January 1997 (as stated in the resolution) 
had to be established as of March 1996 because of the lead 
time needed for students, families, and counselors to know the 
requirements that the students would have to meet and the 
criteria by which they would be judged. 
The restrictions applied in Regents’ Resolution SP-1 and 
Proposition 209 did not affect eligibility, because there were no 
preferences used in the criteria for eligibility. But they did affect the 
admissions processes of the selective campuses, which had used 
preferences. Thus the likely immediate consequences were expected to 
be a shift of underrepresented minority (URM) students from the most 
selective campuses to the nonselective campuses, along with some 
decrease in enrollment overall of those URM students who were UC-
eligible because of the appearance of an unwelcoming atmosphere 
resulting from the regents’ resolution and then the state initiative. 
Results over time bore out these predictions.36 
The steps taken by the university in response to these resolutions 
are summarized in a 2003 report from the UC Office of the President.37 
Pelfrey 38  and Douglass 39  have also provided discussions of these 
actions. They are presented here with emphasis on the thinking that 





The two regents’ resolutions, followed by the adoption of 
Proposition 209 by the voters of the state in November 1996, brought 
about a fundamental rethinking within the university regarding what 
admissions criteria should try to accomplish. What factors had specific 
consideration of race been trying to overcome? Were family income, 
geographical location of residence, or other factors surrogates for the 
disadvantages that had been attached to race itself? Who is most 
                                                     
36 Robinson et al., 2003, loc. cit.; see also figure 15-1, below. 
37 Robinson, et al, 2003, loc. cit. 
38 Pelfrey, 2012, op. cit., chapters 5, 6, and 8. 
39 Douglass, 2007, op. cit., chapters 8 and 9. 




deserving of public higher education at an elite research university? 
Changes on two time scales had to be devised. One, immediate for 
admissions as of January 1997 (which later was delayed for 
undergraduates to the spring quarter of 199840), was to make changes 
that would bring the university into compliance with the regents’ 
resolutions and Proposition 209. On the second, longer time scale, 
there could be the more fundamental thinking associated with the 
above questions to devise further changes. 
Even though the determination of the conditions of admissions is 
directly delegated by the regents to the Academic Senate, subject to 
approval by the regents, the university-wide administration and the 
university-wide Academic Senate concluded that it would be best to 
work closely together in devising the immediate response to the new 
limitations. Reasons were the short time scale, the public attention, 
and the fact that an integral part of the issue was also how admissions 
were carried out operationally by the administration. The 
administration and senate therefore promptly created a joint task force 
to review university admissions policies, determine how to place them 
in compliance, develop guidelines for campus admissions policies, and 
recommend avenues for fuller deliberation and improvement in the 
future. Among the avenues proposed for future consideration was “a 
more comprehensive approach to reviewing students’ academic 
accomplishments and personal backgrounds.”41 The individual selective 
campuses were then charged with developing new admissions criteria 
within the guidelines, eliminating consideration of race and ethnicity, 
increasing the portion of those students admitted chosen on the basis 
of academic criteria alone if needed to meet the larger overall target 
set by the regents, and examining and developing supplemental criteria 
to be used for the remainder of admissions. 
UC deferred its development of further major changes until it had 
the results of an eligibility study carried out by the California 
                                                     
40 This delay resulted from recognition of the need to give information to students, families, and 
counselors in a timely fashion but did result in a crisis of understanding between President 
Atkinson and Governor Wilson, which is described by Pelfrey, 2012, op. cit., pp. 42–46. The date of 
the change for graduate and professional school admissions remained January 1997. 
41 Robinson et al., 2003, loc. cit. 
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Postsecondary Education Commission in 1997. That study42 indicated 
an eligibility rate for UC of 11.1 percent. Thus alteration of criteria to 
enable a return to 12.5 percent eligibility could afford eligibility to 
additional students without making any currently eligible students 
ineligible. That fact was a considerable boon. 
 
Eligibility in the Local Context 
Following the enactment of the UC Regents’ 1995 resolutions and 
Proposition 209 in 1996, several elected officials in the state called on 
the University of California to utilize a plan extending admission to the 
top percentage of graduates from all public high schools, following the 
example of the “top 10 percent” plan that had recently been 
implemented for the University of Texas43 following the Hopwood v. 
State of Texas court decision. Staff at the UC Office of the President 
carried out simulations using a database containing the admissions 
qualifications of UC applicants and the academic performance upon 
entering UC by those applicants who were admitted and enrolled. From 
these studies it became apparent that grade point averages (GPAs) in 
the A-G courses were substantially better predictors of university 
performance and persistence than were scores on standardized tests. 
Hence extending eligibility to those performing at top levels in A-G 
courses at all high schools, in addition to those eligible by current 
statewide criteria, should actually enhance the performance at UC of 
those eligible students who would attend. These and various other 
analyses were planned with and made available to the Academic 
Senate’s Board on Admissions and Relations with Schools (BOARS).  
President Richard Atkinson encouraged the idea of extending 
eligibility to those students in the top 4 percent of their high school 
class as ranked by GPA in the A-G courses, which the simulations had 
shown would make an additional 1.4 percent of graduates from public 
high schools eligible, thereby returning overall eligibility from 11.1 to 
12.5 percent. BOARS was receptive, reached the same conclusion, and 
                                                     
42 California Postsecondary Education Commission, “Eligibility of California’s 1996 High School 
Graduates for Admission to the State’s Public Universities,” Commission Report 97-9, December 
1997, https://perma.cc/QUJ2-UD5U,. 
43 “Admission Decisions,” Texas Admissions, University of Texas at Austin, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20160617040323/http://admissions.utexas.edu/apply/decisions.. 




made the recommendation, which was then adopted by the Assembly 
of the Academic Senate for submission to the regents. The regents 
then approved it in March 1999,44 to be implemented as of admissions 
for fall 2001. This program became known as Eligibility in the Local 
Context (ELC). Students to be admitted through ELC were required to 
take the full set of A-G courses and the standardized tests required by 
the university, although the scores on those tests would not be used to 
calculate ELC eligibility. 
Students who appeared to be eligible for ELC after their junior 
year of high school were sent a letter by the UC president indicating 
that they were on the track to ELC and urging them to complete the A-
G courses, take the tests, and apply, which many of them did. The 
results of the first two years implementing ELC were reported to the 
regents in May 2002.45 An interesting and pleasing result was that the 
test scores of nearly all the students who were admitted through ELC 
were high enough to make them eligible by the statewide criteria. Thus 
the existence of ELC and the president’s letter served primarily to 
increase the applications from students who could become eligible by 
statewide criteria in the absence of ELC, but who without the 
president’s letter would not have completed requirements and applied. 
Many of these students were from areas of the state remote from UC 
campuses. ELC had only a modest effect in reversing the slide in ethnic 
diversity among entering students. 
 
Comprehensive Review 
The introduction of ELC served to expand eligibility back from 11.1 
to 12.5 percent, but did not affect the selection among eligible 
students by selective campuses, which was what had been constrained 
by Regents’ Resolution SP-1 and Proposition 209. Several of the 
campuses had developed forms of more comprehensive review, in 
which factors in addition to grades and test scores were considered 
either quantitatively or holistically for the portion of admissions 
                                                     
44 Kenneth R. Weiss, “UC Regents OK Plan to Admit Top 4%,” Los Angeles Times, March 20, 1999, 
https://perma.cc/T367-WJ83. 
45 University of California Eligibility in the Local Context Program Evaluation Report,” prepared for 
May 2002 Regents Meeting, University of California Office of the President, 
https://perma.cc/3S3R-43UT. 
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beyond the 50–75 percent that Regents’ Resolution SP-1 had specified 
must be made on the basis of academic criteria alone. 
As the composition of the Board of Regents started to change with 
new appointments following the election of a Democrat (Gray Davis) as 
governor in 1998, there were prospects for repealing the regents’ 
resolutions. Despite the continued existence of the constitutional 
change made by Proposition 209, a repeal of the regents’ resolutions 
would have symbolic importance and would eliminate the limitation 
that 50–75 percent of admissions should be made on the basis of 
grades and test scores only. President Richard Atkinson proposed 
combining the elimination of SP-1 with the institution of 
comprehensive review for admissions by selective campuses. He 
reached agreement with BOARS on this approach, and BOARS and then 
the full Academic Senate, with ultimate approval by the regents in 
November 2001. 46  These actions established fourteen criteria that can 
be used in comprehensive review. The criteria for freshman admissions 
are given in table 15-1.47 A similar set of criteria developed in the same 
way applies for transfer admissions. 48  Comprehensive review of 
applications is a more complex process because of the greater number 
of factors involved. However, increased use of information technology 
has helped offset that burden. 
 
Testing Policies 
President Atkinson’s own professional expertise was in psychology 
and testing. He became concerned that the SAT-149 was a test that 
emphasized vague notions of academic potential, whereas it should be 
more concerned with actual achievement in learning. He had particular 
concerns about the verbal analogy questions and the absence in the 
SAT of any evaluation of the student’s writing. 
                                                     
46 Pelfrey, 2012, op. cit., pp. 95–96. 
47 “Freshmen: How Applications Are Reviewed,” Office of the President, University of California, 
accessed December 2, 2015,  
https://web.archive.org/web/20151204191124/http://admission.universityofcalifornia.edu/fresh
man/how-applications-reviewed/index.html. 
48 “Transfer: How Applications Are Reviewed,” Office of the President, University of California, 
accessed October 4, 2016, https://perma.cc/5XH2-SZCV.. 
49 SAT-1 denotes the morning part of the SAT tests, once known as the Scholastic Aptitude Test. 




Table 15-1. Comprehensive Review Criteria 
 
1. Academic grade point average in all completed “A-G” courses, including 
additional points for completed UC-certified honors courses 
2. Scores on the following tests: ACT with Writing or the SAT Reasoning Test 
3. Number of, content of, and performance in academic courses beyond the 
minimum “A-G” requirements 
4. Number of and performance in UC-approved honors, Advanced 
Placement, International Baccalaureate Higher Level and transferable 
college courses 
5. Identification by UC as being ranked in the top 9 percent of your high 
school class at the end of your junior year (the current version of Eligible 
in the Local Context) 
6. Quality of your senior-year program as measured by the type and number 
of academic courses in progress or planned 
7. Quality of your academic performance relative to the educational 
opportunities available in your high school 
8. Outstanding performance in one or more specific subject areas 
9. Outstanding work in one or more special projects in any academic field of 
study 
10. Recent, marked improvement in academic performance as demonstrated 
by academic GPA and the quality of coursework completed or in progress 
11. Special talents, achievements, and awards in a particular field, such as 
visual and performing arts, communication, or athletic endeavors; special 
skills, such as demonstrated written and oral proficiency in other 
languages; special interests, such as intensive study and exploration of 
other cultures; experiences that demonstrate unusual promise for 
leadership, such as significant community service or significant 
participation in student government; or other significant experiences or 
achievements that demonstrate the student’s promise for contributing to 
the intellectual vitality of a campus 
12. Completion of special projects undertaken in the context of your high 
school curriculum or in conjunction with special school events, projects, 
or programs 
13. Academic accomplishments in light of your life experiences and special 
circumstances, including but not limited to disabilities, low family income, 
first generation to attend college, need to work, disadvantaged social or 
educational environment, difficult personal and family situations or 
circumstances, refugee status or veteran status 
14. Location of your secondary school and residence. 
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In an invited lecture50 to the American Council on Education in 
2001, Atkinson expressed these ideas. The lecture caught fire 
nationally, and led to considerable public controversy about the SAT 
exams.51 
Atkinson also recommended to BOARS that UC change its testing 
policies and use the SAT Achievement Tests (SAT-2) instead of SAT-1 in 
the criteria for admissions. Studies were carried out to assess whether 
the SAT-1 or the SAT-2 was the better predictor of performance and 
showed a clear advantage to the achievement tests. BOARS then 
recommended a change in requirement from the SAT-1 to the SAT-2, 
noting also that the changed requirement would emphasize curriculum 
and learning in the high schools. This change too was enacted by the 
Assembly of the Academic Senate as a request for what then became 
approval by the regents. Subsequently the College Board made changes 
to the SAT-1 tests, dropping the verbal analogies and adding a writing 
test. UC then kept both the SAT-1 and the SAT-2.52 
 
Reflections 
All three changes made for adaptation to Regents’ Resolution SP-1 
and Proposition 209—Eligibility in the Local Context, comprehensive 
review, and the shift to achievement testing—are cases of presidential 
leadership carried out through logical and scholarly arguments and 
accomplished by working in synergy with the Academic Senate to gain 
enactment. 
The regents’ resolutions and Proposition 209 created a situation in 
which constitutional autonomy was greatly important to the university. 
Without constitutional autonomy, the legislature would surely have 
made strong efforts to prescribe eligibility and admissions policy and 
define the nature of the companion outreach component (chapter 16). 
                                                     
50 Richard C. Atkinson, “Standardized Tests and Access to American Universities,” Robert H. Atwell 
Distinguished Lecture, American Council on Education, Washington, DC, 2001, 
https://perma.cc/PL7Y-2MDV. 
51 See, e.g., “Should SATs Matter?,” Education Special Report, Time, March 12, 2001, pp. 62–76. 
52 BOARS subsequently dropped the SAT-2 requirement in 2009 and returned to the SAT-1, again 
with regents’ approval. The rationale was that the SAT-1 is more commonly taken and that the 
requirement of the SAT-2 was producing a set of students who would have been eligible except 
for the fact that they had not taken the SAT-2 tests. 




To what extent did the admissions policies instituted in the decade 
following the two regents’ resolutions serve to replenish the ethnic 
diversity of the University of California? Figure 15-1 shows the 
percentages of underrepresented minorities (Latino, African American, 
and American Indian) among California public high school graduates 
and among UC freshman and the difference between these two 
percentages over the years from 1989 to 2008. One can see the drop 
occasioned by the race-neutral limitation that was adopted in 1995 and 
went into effect as of 1998 and then the subsequent rise in 
enrollments that primarily reflect the increase in URMs among high 
school graduates. The drop in the difference starting in 2005 probably 






Figure 15-1. Percent of underrepresented minority students in the freshman 
UC class (upper curve) compared to California high school graduates (middle 
curve), fall 1989 to 2008. The lower curve is the difference between the two.53 
 
 
                                                     
53 University of California 2009 Accountability Report, indicator 3.2, https://perma.cc/Z7FD-P2AP. 
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However, the primary effect of the Board of Regents’ resolutions 
and Proposition 209 was on admission to the most selective campuses 
rather than on eligibility. At Berkeley and San Diego, the percentage of 
Latino and African American students is substantially below that at 
other UC campuses54. Geiser55 has shown that much of the negative 
effect upon the underrepresented minorities has been that the top-
ranking students in those groups tend to a greater extent to go to 
private or out-of-state institutions, since many of those institutions do 
offer large financial aid packages on race-attentive bases. 
 
Further Changes and Trends 
 Redefining Eligibility. In 2009, BOARS and the Academic Senate 
recommended, and the UC Regents approved, further changes in the 
determination of freshman eligibility, which became effective for 
freshman students admitted in fall 2012. The standard based upon the 
sliding scale of GPA in the A-G courses and score on the SAT or ACT 
exams would be used to admit the top 9 percent statewide and would 
be supplemented by the admission of those students in the top 9 
percent per high school as measured by GPA in the A-G courses. 
Students in these categories would receive the Master Plan guarantee 
of admission to some campus if they were not admitted to any campus 
to which they had applied. In addition a new category known as eligible 
to review (ETR) was created, composed of all additional students who 
had met or exceeded a GPA of 3.0 in the A-G courses. Students in this 
second category could apply and have their applications reviewed for 
possible admission, but they would not receive the guarantee of 
admission somewhere within UC. The rationales for the changes were 
that the 9 percent/9 percent approach would produce better overall 
student performance and that the broader ETR pool would enable the  
 
 
                                                     
54 Jeremy Askkenas, Haeyoon Park, and Adam Pearce, “Even with Affirmative Action, Blacks and 
Hispanics Are More Underrepresented at Top Colleges Than 35 Years Ago”, New York Times, 
August 24, 2017. 
55 Saul Geiser, “Back to the Future: Freshman Admissions at the University of California, 1994 to 
the Present and Beyond,” Research & Occasional Papers no. 4.14, Center for Studies in Higher 
Education, University of California, Berkeley, April 2014, https://perma.cc/NPU5-MCBD. 




criteria of comprehensive review to be applied to a group that was 
broader in terms of the index of GPA and test scores. 
The analytical methods on which these changes were based 
predicted that the overlap between the two 9 percent groups would be 
so great that it would lead to an overall eligibility rate of only 10.5 
percent and that the ETR category, while being greater than the 
additional 2.0 percent that would meet the Master Plan goal of 12.5 
percent, could amount to about another 2 percent of admissions 
selected from that pool. Put another way, 10.5 percent of students 
would be guaranteed eligibility and admission somewhere at UC, 
whereas about another 4 percent would be reviewed to determine 
another 2 percent that would become eligible and be admitted, but 
without the guarantee. This approach amounted to a decoupling of the 
earlier Master Plan guarantee that there would be single determination 
of eligibility for the top 12.5 percent of students, with a guarantee of 
admission somewhere for the 12.5 percent eligible.  With no statewide 
coordinating body as of 2011, there was no independent assessment of 
whether this decoupling still comported with the Master Plan. 
In practice, the overlap of the two 9 percent pools turned out to 
be substantially less, such that for 2014 admissions56 12.9 percent of 
the public high school graduates in those pools were eligible, and 
another 2.4 percent were ETR admits.57 As of 2016 admissions, the ETR 
category was no longer mentioned explicitly on the university websites, 
pending completion of the eligibility study for the high school class of 
2016 (chapter 5). 
 Increasing Campus Selectivity and Its Effects. A detailed analysis 
of data on UC admissions and enrollments for the period 1994 through 
2012 was carried out by Geiser.58 It shows that all the campuses except 
Merced became increasingly more selective during that period, and the 
trend has surely continued since that time. Increasing campus  
 
 
                                                     
56 “Annual Report on Undergraduate Admissions Requirements and Comprehensive Review,” 
Board of Admissions and Relations with Schools, Academic Senate, University of California, 
January 2015, https://perma.cc/3WWB-F3PP.. 
57 This result may again have reflected applications being drawn from UC-eligible students who, 
without receiving the ELC notice, would not have applied. 
58 Geiser, 2014, loc. cit. 
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selectivity for choosing among eligible applicants has led to continuing 
growth in “cascading” of applicants among campuses, wherein eligible 
applicants rejected by one or more of the most selective campuses 
then accept offers from other campuses, thereby displacing eligible 
applicants from those campuses who take spots at other campuses, 
and so forth.  
All UC-eligible students in the two 9 percent categories, statewide 
and by school, who are not admitted to any of the campuses to which 
they applied are offered admission to the Merced campus if they so 
desire. However, the percentage of such students choosing to enroll at 
a UC campus to which they did not originally apply has been small—2.1 
percent for Merced in 201459 and historically rarely over 3 percent. 
Most of those students choose to attend another institution instead.  
These factors have combined with the increasing selectivity of 
oversubscribed campuses so that the percent of California high school 
graduates actually enrolling at the University of California as freshmen, 
known as the participation rate, declined from 8.8 percent in 2006 to 
7.3 percent in 2012—that is, by 17 percent of the total.  
As the Merced campus continues to mature, it will become more 
attractive, and the interest of students in going to Merced should build 
further.  Without increased capacity, admissions selectivity will rise 
even higher, and it will become impossible to accommodate all eligible 
California residents.  Both the cascading and the decreasing 
participation rate can feed public impressions that the university is not 
serving the educational needs of the state fully enough, and 
unhappiness thereby increases among rejected applicants, their 
families, and their representatives in Sacramento. 
Non-resident Students.  One of the ways in which the university 
adapted to the reduction of state funding in the 2005-15 period was to 
admit more nonresident students—students from other states and 
other countries. Since tuition for nonresident students exceeds the 
average cost of education, enrollments of nonresident students 
actually bring operating funds that can be used for additional resident 
students, provided that the physical capacity exists. Crude estimates 
nationally have been that enrollment of about two full-fee-paying out-
                                                     
59 Board of Admissions and Relations with Schools, January 2015, loc. cit. 




of-state students roughly offsets the cost of attendance of one 
additional in-state student. 
For the University of California as a whole, enrollments of students 
from other states and countries more than doubled over the four-year 
period from 2011 to 2014.60 Fall 2015 freshman enrollments university-
wide, constituting 71 percent of total new undergraduate enrollments, 
were 77 percent from California, 14 percent international, and 9 
percent domestic out-of-state. Individual campus figures for non-
Californian freshman enrollees ranged from just 1 percent for Merced 
and 4 percent for Riverside up to 29 percent at Berkeley and UCLA and 
33 percent at San Diego.61 New transfer students, constituting the 
other 29 percent of entering undergraduate students, were 85 percent 
from California, 15 percent international, and 1 percent out-of-state. 
Individual campus non-Californian new transfer enrollees ranged from 
5 percent at Merced and Santa Cruz up to 11 and 12 percent for San 
Diego and Berkeley.62 International students at Berkeley are about one-
third from China, followed by South Korea, India, and Canada.63  The 
growing percentages of non-resident admissions, especially at the most 
selective campuses, feed an image that those students are displacing 
deserving Californians, a point considered further in Chapter 21.   
 
 
WHITHER THE BUBBLING CAULDRON? 
 
 Some of the many intersecting issues that impinge upon University 
of California admissions are the following 
 The requirements of the Master Plan or any successor to it 
 Enrollment capacity, both physical and financial 
 State financing for the university  
                                                     
60 Board of Admissions and Relations with Schools, Academic Senate, January 2015, loc. cit. 
61 “University of California Statement of Intent to Register (SIR) Counts, Freshmen by Campus and 
Residency, Fall 2013, 2014, and 2015”  https://perma.cc/U9W3-NTT7. 
62 “University of California Statement of Intent to Register (SIR) Counts, Transfer by Campus and 
Residency,Fall 2013, 2014, and 2015” https://perma.cc/4JLQ-SKPN.. 
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 Assuring equivalent access for all elements of society, and the 
distribution of that access among campuses 
 Policies and criteria for university-wide eligiblility and selection 
among eligible applicants by campuses 
 Enrollments of international and other non-resident students, as 
well as the distribution of those students among campuses 
 The differences among campuses in applications pressure64 
These issues play out within the climate of what has been a serious and 
probably irreversible reduction in state funding. 
 
Prospects for Increased Enrollment Capacity 
The capacity of the University of California for enrolling students is 
limited by both physical facilities and finances. Existing and potential 
enrollment capacities reflect land area, availability of operating funds, 
needs for financing construction and modernization of buildings, and 
agreements with communities that occur through long-range 
development plans and environmental impact reports for specific 
projects. Not keeping up with needed capacity will lessen access by 
increasing the selectivity of campuses, increasing numbers of rejections 
of applicants by campuses, and lowering the participation rate. 
Ultimately it will mean that the university cannot keep up with its 
Master Plan commitments for access and enrollment. Unfunded 
increases in enrollment, by themselves, result in decreased quality of 
education because of increased class sizes, fewer course offerings, 
and/or less tutorial instruction. 
As of 2017 there is not much nominal residual capacity in current 
campus LRDPs. The Irvine, Riverside, Santa Barbara, and Santa Cruz 
campuses had combined space left in their LRDPs for about 5 percent 
overall growth in the university-wide enrollment of about 250,000. The 
state no longer provides funding for construction of university facilities 
except for a few projects to address seismic deficiencies, and it no 
longer puts construction bonding referenda up for voter approval. 
                                                     
64 For decades the administration of the University of California has recognized the desirability of 
getting the public to accept that the quality of undergraduate education is comparably high on all 
UC campuses. However, applicants and families often perceive that employers and graduate and 
professional schools do attach prestige and selectivity to Berkeley, UCLA, and UCSD; thus, those 
campuses remain particularly attractive. 




Bonds must now be issued by the Regents and are subject to campus 
caps on incurred debt.  The current UC Merced expansion project 
provides about another 1 percent enrollment capacity increase 
university-wide. Thus, the university is already on the edge of an 
enrollment-versus-capacity cusp without allowing for what will become 
increasing attractiveness of the Merced campus or the need for 
California to increase the percentage of its population that attains four-
year degrees (chapter 5).  Students are being accommodated by 
allowing enrollments on individual campuses to creep upward. 
 
Access  
As state funding has decreased and tuition has increased, it has 
been important for the university to guard against a loss of students 
from families that are less well off financially.  So far, as reflected in 
data on attendance by Pell Grant recipients, the policy of returning 
one-third of tuition increases to need-based financial aid seems to have 
worked for this purpose. 
 
Clarity 
Clarity, simplicity, and openness are vital for criteria and processes 
related to eligibility and admissions.  They help understanding by the 
public and government. They help to prevent suspicions that some sort 
of agenda, hidden or not, is being pursued in eligibility and admissions. 
Simplicity also enables students, parents, and schools to compute 
whether or not a student is UC-eligible, and it provides clear guidance 
as to what schools and students must do in order to enable students to 
achieve UC eligibility. 
 
 
ADMISSIONS TO GRADUATE AND PROFESSIONAL PROGRAMS 
 
The discussion in this chapter so far has been entirely about 
eligibility and admissions of undergraduates, which are handled 
centrally by UC campuses, although there may also be input from 
undergraduate deans or advisors of individual colleges. Admissions to 
graduate and professional schools, on the other hand, are typically 
handled by the individual schools and departments, subject to review 
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or audit by the office of the graduate dean. For highly competitive 
schools associated with the high-income professions (e.g., medicine, 
business, and law) there have been issues similar to those occurring for 
undergraduate admissions. Indeed, it was admissions to the UC Davis 
School of Medicine that led to the Bakke decision, and it was 
admissions to the UC San Diego School of Medicine that were 
challenged and cited by Governor Wilson and Regent Connerly in the 
considerations that led to the regents’ motions in 1995. 
Graduate and professional admissions by departments and 
schools place strong emphasis on an applicant’s record as an 
undergraduate and on letters of recommendation. There are also 
standardized tests, such as the Graduate Records Examination (GRE), 
the Medical College Admission Test (MCAT), and the Law School 





As college going and demand for admission to the University of 
California have grown over the years, the eligibility and selection 
processes for admission of freshman and transfer students have 
become ever more sensitive. UCLA draws the greatest number of 
applications for admission of all university campuses in the United 
States. The situation is further complicated by the growing ethnic 
diversity of California and the great disparities in educational quality 
among high schools around the state. As a public university, the 
university has a responsibility to have criteria and processes for making 
admission decisions that are clear and transparent to the public. 
Both the University of California and the California State University 
utilize the concept of eligibility, whereby students achieve eligibility for 
admission on the basis of grade point average in specified A-G college-
going courses, combined on a sliding scale with standardized test 
scores. The Master Plan and subsequent amending policies specify that 
the upper 12.5 and 33 percent are eligible for UC and CSU, respectively, 
and that all eligible students desiring to come should be 
accommodated somehow by the two universities. The eligibility 
concept has brought clarity to students, their families, and the public, 




as well as guidance to high schools with regard to what college-going 
courses they should offer. 
There have historically been considerable disparities among ethnic 
groups in achieving eligibility for admission to UC. Recent rates have 
spread from about 6 percent for Latino and African American students 
to about 13 percent for Caucasian students, to about 30 percent for 
Asian American students. In recognition that this situation results in 
part from disparities among high schools around the state, starting in 
the 1970s, the university gave attention to race in selections among 
eligible students for admissions to affected campuses. The UC Regents 
in 1995 and then the state by a ballot initiative in 1996 precluded any 
consideration of race, gender, and several other factors in admissions 
decisions. This situation led to extensive rethinking of UC admissions 
criteria and led to three innovations—use of GPA rank within school A-
G courses by itself as a path to eligibility, comprehensive review 
considering fourteen different factors for selection among eligible 
applicants for admission to impacted campuses, and changes in the 
national SAT tests.  
Sharp reductions in state funding have brought additional 
problems. The state no longer funds the Master Plan. Tuitions have 
risen in response, but political pressures have kept tuition increases 
from covering the loss in state funds. Nonetheless, financial aid and 
access without regard to ability to pay have been retained by devoting 
one-third of all tuition increases to need-based financial aid.  
Since about 2005 there has been an increase of campus 
selectivities in choosing among eligible applicants for admission, 
resulting in increased “cascading” of applicants among campuses which 
has led to a reduction in the overall participation rate, the percentage 
of UC-eligible students who actually come to UC.  This is an indirect 






Serving the State of California 
and the Public 
 
The University of California…must be adapted to this people, to their 
public and private schools, to their peculiar geographical position, to 
the requirements of their new society and their undeveloped resources. 
—Daniel Coit Gilman1 
 
Napa Valley’s success is synonymous with Davis’s success. 
—Andy Hoxsey, Napa grape grower and winery owner2 
 
The California Digital Library, by transforming a wealth of resources 
into electronic form, will represent one of the most important doors of 
the Library of California. We are delighted with this newest library and 
with the partnership between UC and the California State Library. The 
people of California will be the beneficiaries of our collaborative efforts. 
—Kevin Starr, California State Librarian3 
 
For the University to achieve its aim of enrolling a student body that 
meets high academic standards and encompasses the broad diversity of 
California, students from all segments of the state’s population must be 
provided the resources needed for good academic preparation. Ideally, 
all students, regardless of where they live, and irrespective of race, 
ethnicity, gender, or family economic circumstance, should have the 
opportunity to develop their full educational potential. 
—New Directions for Outreach4 
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The University of California partners with the state of California in 
many ways, and it is important that it do so. The university should fulfill 
research needs of the state, and its research should be of genuine use 
to the state. Furthermore, by virtue of its extreme geographic 
diversities, its needs for and dependence upon water, and its tendency 
to be the forerunner of trends in United States, the state of California is 
itself a valuable laboratory for academic research. 
The roles are much wider than just research. Public service is 
acknowledged in the Academic Personnel Manual as an expectation for 
faculty members and a factor to be evaluated in their promotion and 
advancement cases. It is, of course, also politically valuable to the 
university to be seen as valuable in many dimensions and appreciated 
by people throughout that state so that the public will value the 
university and their elected representatives will be aware of that fact. 
There are many ways in which University of California is 
meaningful and visible to the citizens of the state other than through 
its educational and degree-giving functions and its research, both of 
which are of course prime benefits themselves. Among these added 
dimensions are 
 the six full-function medical centers at San Francisco, Los Angeles, 
San Diego, Davis, Irvine, and now Riverside, which are prominent 
primary-, secondary-, and especially tertiary-care centers; 
 the Optometry Clinic at Berkeley; 
 spectator sports events; 
 a massive program of continuing education through university 
extension;5 
 music and drama performances; 
 museums; 
 numerous lectures open to the public; 
 the Lawrence Hall of Science6 at Berkeley, which supports science 
education in schools, provides continuing education for teachers, 
and is also open as a participation museum; 
                                                     
5 Among the ten campuses of the University of California, university extension as of 2015 had over 
500,000 enrollees in over 17,000 courses each year. It is the largest such operation in the United 
States and is entirely self-supporting. See “University Extension,” University of California, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20171122213704/http://extension.universityofcalifornia.edu/, and 
links therein. 
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 a charter school 7  and the lab school 8  at UCSD and UCLA, 
respectively, and 
 various programs stemming from “practicum” experiences for 
students in the professional schools, such as free law clinics for the 
underserved,9  field placements in social welfare at UCLA and 
Berkeley, student-run local media in journalism, and summer 
internships in public policy and many other fields. 
The services mentioned so far are common to public research 
universities in many states. The main purpose of this chapter is to 
explore five other disparate aspects of the impact of the University of 
California on the state of California which are distinctive to California: 
 influences upon agriculture, including cooperative extension 
 the California Digital Library 
 education partnerships and outreach 
 the California Council on Science and Technology 





The involvement of the University of California with California 
agriculture is particularly rich and long-standing. California has the 
largest agricultural industry in the United States. In 2014, it had 13 
percent of US cash farm receipts and a 14.3 percent share of total US 
agricultural exports,10 as opposed to 12 percent of the population of 
the United States.11 As of 2012, one-third of California’s $37.5 billion 
                                                                                                                     
6 Lawrence Hall of Science, University of California, Berkeley, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20170830024638/http://www.lawrencehallofscience.org/. 
7 The Preuss School, University of California, San Diego, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20171226220927/http://preuss.ucsd.edu/. 
8 Welcome to UCLA Lab School, University of California, Los Angeles, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20170105120327/http://www.labschool.ucla.edu/about/. 
9 For the Berkeley campus, see “Experiential Education” School of Law, University of California, 
Berkeley, https://perma.cc/4QJB-LLBJ. 
10 California Department of Food and Agriculture, “California Agricultural Production Statistics, 
2014,” https://web.archive.org/web/20160628185149/https://www.cdfa.ca.gov/Statistics/. 
11 Sumit Passary, “US Population Grows to 320.09 Million: California Still Reigns as Most Populous 
US State,” Tech Times, December 30, 2014, https://perma.cc/3HYA-54ZN. 




agricultural output was exported abroad.12 Nationally, the industry 
itself characteristically has little research in the private sector, with 
most research being financed by federal and state governments and 
carried out by universities and government laboratories. From the 
start, the University of California has had the primary agricultural-
research role in California. As was noted in chapter 2, Eugene Hilgard, 
who succeeded Ezra Carr as professor of Agriculture in 1875, greatly 
advanced agriculture at the university in support of the state. A 
pioneering and respected soil scientist himself, Hilgard took many steps 
to base agriculture more on science. His wine-making activities led the 
California legislature to formally authorize and commission the 
university in 1880 to undertake research in support of the development 
of that industry.13 Hilgard also created experiment stations that would 
gauge the suitability of California for various crops and arranged for 
farmers’ institutes for education in agriculture in many of California’s 
counties.14 
Over the years many advances affecting California agriculture have 
come from UC research. A few relatively recent examples from among 
many are current varieties of tomatoes and strawberries; a doubling of 
yields of almonds (a prime export product at $3.9 billion in 201115); 
pest controls of many sorts, including biological (nonchemical) control; 
and controllable malolactic fermentation and quantitative sensory 
evaluation methods for wine production. As shown in table 18-1, eight 
of the twenty-five top-grossing University of California patents as of 
2015 were agricultural—six varieties of strawberries and one each of 
citrus and pistachios. Ninety percent of California’s wheat, 65 percent 
of California’s strawberries, and 40 percent of strawberries worldwide  
 
 
                                                     
12 “Cultivating California,” Division of Agriculture and Natural Resources, University of California, 
2012, https://perma.cc/23FN-J9QU. 
13 Maynard A. Amerine, “Hilgard and California Viticulture,” Hilgardia 33, no. 1 (July 1962), 
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14 Verne A. Stadtman, The University of California, 1868–1968 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), pp. 
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are University of California varieties.16 The enormous growth of the 
California wine industry over the last fifty years to reach wines of the 
highest quality and worldwide distribution with a huge expansion in 
sales is directly attributable to research at UC Davis, and that campus 
has now trained most of the leading viticulturalists and oenologists of 
California, as well as many around the world.17, 18 California wine sales 
in 2016 were 236 million cases with a market value of $34.1 billion.19  
 
Cooperative Extension 
In agriculture, as in many other areas, there is a vast middle 
ground between the results of agricultural research and fundamental 
knowledge, on the one hand, and utilization and successful commercial 
application, on the other hand. This gap has been very effectively 
addressed within the United States by the Cooperative Extension 
System, which was set up through the Smith-Lever Act passed in 
1914.20 For over one hundred years, the University of California has had 
a very extensive cooperative extension effort.  As of 2015 it 
encompassed 9 research and extension centers, 57 local offices 
throughout the state in nearly every county, 130 campus-based 
cooperative extension specialists, and 200 locally based cooperative 
extension advisors and specialists. These experts work at the interface 
between research, on the one hand, and growers and processors, on 
the other hand, to help bring advances and knowledge from research 
into practice and to enable growers and processors to achieve 
economies and improved products. They also bring their knowledge of 
needs and opportunities in the fields back to inform university 
research. Some of them are researchers themselves. 
                                                     
16 “Investing in California,” loc. cit. 
17 See, e.g., Lisa Lapin, “A Fine Blend,” UC Davis Magazine 19, no.2 (2002), https://perma.cc/9LGR-
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18 Lapsley and Summer, 2014, loc. cit. 
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https://web.archive.org/web/20160513203125/http://openjournals.libs.uga.edu:80/index.php/jh
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As but one example of the impact of cooperative extension, Taylor 
et al.21 examine the economic impact stemming from the role of 
cooperative extension in bringing drip irrigation into use in California. 
Drip techniques were introduced in 1969. By 1988 5 percent of 
irrigated acreage in California used drip techniques, but as of 2010, 
almost 40 percent of irrigated land used them. Improved yields, 
notably of tomatoes, have come from drip irrigation. Taylor et al. 
conclude that $78 to $283 million per year are now saved in California 
through the use of drip irrigation. Given the predictions that global 
warming will accentuate drought conditions in California, research into 
efficient use of agricultural water will become even more vital. 
 
 
THE CALIFORNIA DIGITAL LIBRARY 
 
As was noted in chapter 2, when the University of California 
developed its digital library in the latter part of the 1990s, it took pains 
to provide the maximum access to the public of California that would 
be consonant with provisions for licensed content. The library was 
intentionally designated as the California Digital Library, connoting that 
it serves the entire state rather than just the university, and it was 
developed and announced as a joint project of the University of 
California and the California State Library.22 Public users can access 
public material through personal computers and from libraries and 
schools around the state. 
The University of California has been a strong participant in major 
mass-digitization projects. Supporting the open access movement, UC 
is a founding partner of HathiTrust23 , 24  and was one of the six 
universities to join with Google for the creation of the Google Book 
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23 “UC Libraries and HathiTrust FAQ,” California Digital Library,” 
https://web.archive.org/web/20161009221747/http://www.cdlib.org/services/hathi/faq.html. 
24 “Our Partnership,” HathiTrust Digital Library, https://perma.cc/297F-GRQM. 
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Project25 and the Google Books Library Project.26 These projects have 
created large amounts of digital material for libraries and open 
access,27 putting many books in open-access electronic form or partial 
electronic form and greatly enhancing the abilities of scholars and 
other users to screen the contents of books. 
The public services available through the California Digital Library 
grow continually and as of June 2016 included the following: 
 The Online Archive of California (OAC)28 contains materials placed 
in the electronic collection by over two hundred different 
institutions 29  throughout California, including libraries, special 
collections, archives, historical societies, and museums, as well as 
collections maintained by University of California campuses. It 
provides free public access to primary research and record sources, 
such as manuscripts, photographs, artwork, and scientific data, 
through more than 38,000 collection guides and 200,000 digitized 
images and documents from sources throughout the state. It is a 
primary portal for both general information and scholarly research. 
 Calisphere30 is a public gateway to thousands of digitized primary 
sources, including photographs, documents, newspaper clippings, 
and works of art from UC museums and libraries and other cultural 
heritage institutions across California.31 As of May 2017 there are 
about 850,000 digital images, texts, and recordings in Calisphere. 
 eScholarship32 contains open-access publications deposited by UC 
faculty members. These include prepublication articles; articles 
already published for which copyright has been retained; online 
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https://web.archive.org/web/20170329160637/http://escholarship.org/.  




journals33 started by UC faculty, staff, or students; data sets; and 
even entire books by UC authors that are originally published on 
the e-scholarship website or which were previously published and 
for which the author has held or obtained back copyright rights.34 
Many authors are choosing e-scholarship as the primary or only 
place of publication, counting upon readers using links on the 
authors’ own websites and/or search engines to find the papers 
readily. Low- or zero-cost (for direct downloads) publication should 
increase readership. Publishing units within UC can develop hybrid 
open-access business models for their publications. Books and 
journals can be freely accessible via eScholarship while being 
simultaneously offered for sale in print-on-demand and e-book 
formats at low cost via e-commerce storefronts and retail affiliates 
providing those services, as is the case for this book. 
 The Web Archiving Service (WAS) was launched in 2007 as a means 
of capturing, analyzing, and preserving web (Internet) content, and 
as of March 2016, 600 million web files had been archived. As of 
January 2015, WAS became part of the Internet Archive’s “Archive-
It,”35 also known as the Wayback Machine.36 A group of leading 
universities, including UC, is working with the Internet Archive to 
assure that services there meet the needs of research universities. 
 
 The holdings and the services provided by the California Digital 
Library are growing rapidly. They are increasingly becoming central 
components of scholarship as well as offering entirely new approaches 
to scholarship and publication. In the public arena, with the financial 
pressures on local public libraries, increased digitization, more lenient  
 
                                                     
33 Such journals can be peer reviewed, if the editors so desire, and many are. Open access does 
not equate to not peer reviewed; they are different matters. 
34 For example, a widely used chemical engineering textbook, Separation Processes, which the 
author published with McGraw-Hill in 1971 and 1980, went out of print in the early 2000s. The 
author obtained the copyright back from the publisher and posted the entire book in 
eScholarship. (The 850-page book had already been scanned by the Google Book Project.) It now 
receives over 150 downloads per month, a volume somewhat higher than the average monthly 
sales volume when it was in print with the original publisher, despite that fact that it is now over 
thirty-eight years old. 
35 “Archive-It—Web Archiving Services for Libraries and Archives,” https://perma.cc/Q6ZN-BS36. 
36 Wayback Machine, Internet archive, https://archive.org/index.php. 
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licensing policies, and the convenience of working from one’s computer 
rather than traveling to sites with different holdings, one can expect 
this digital library and others like it elsewhere to become the primary 
library source for the public as time goes on. The digital-library 
initiative has so far been a major success for UC. Comprehensive digital 
libraries are among the best services that universities can provide to 
the public and thereby generate continual recognition and appreciation 
of the university as a knowledge bank. 
 
 
EDUCATION PARTNERSHIPS AND OUTREACH 
 
The University of California has long had programs of liaison to 
high schools and thereby to precollege students. As noted in chapter 
15, this began with the 1884 decision to accredit high schools formally, 
a policy that remained in place for almost eighty years until 1963. 
Functionally, another relationship grew, also described in chapter 15, 
whereby the appropriate high school curriculum for college-going 
students was defined through the A-G courses, which students must 
take and in which they must achieve a sufficient grade point average in 
order to be eligible for admission to the University of California or the 
California State University. 
During the second half of the twentieth century, California 
became much more diverse ethnically, with demographers concluding 
that the Latino population became larger than the white population as 
of 2014 (39.0 percent Latino, 38.8 percent white, 13 percent 
Asian/Pacific Islander, 5.8 percent black; <1 percent Native 
American).37 High school completion rates vary sharply by ethnicity, 
with 2011–12 data for California showing 90 percent for Asians/Pacific 
Islanders, 86 percent for whites, 73 percent for Latinos, and 66 percent 
for African Americans.38 College-going rates also vary considerably by  
 
                                                     
37 Mark Hugo Lopez, “In 2014, Latinos Will Surpass Whites as Largest Racial/Ethnic Group in 
California,” Pew Research Center, January 24, 2014, https://perma.cc/V5L4-KURF. 
38 “State High School Graduation Rates by Race, Ethnicity,” https://perma.cc/WX4T-KQKP. 




ethnicity and by county within the state.39 Enrollment of 2008–09 high 
school graduates in a postsecondary institution within sixteen months 
of high school graduation ranged from 32 percent in Kern County to 80 
percent in San Francisco County, and from 66 percent for Latinos to 86 
percent for Asian Americans.  
Eligibility rates for the California State University and the 
University of California also vary greatly, both geographically and by 
ethnicity. The percentage of high school graduates successfully 
completing the A-G college-going courses in 2015 (one of the 
requirements for CSU and UC eligibility) was 43.4 percent statewide, 55 
percent in Alameda County, 31 percent in Kern County, and below 25 
percent in Mendocino, Mono, Inyo, and some other counties.40 As 
noted in chapter 15, there are also huge racial differences in eligibility 
for UC and CSU. 
These disparities and the greater awareness of civil rights issues 
that arose in the 1960s in the United States led to many efforts by the 
university as a whole, campuses, and groups of faculty that were 
started in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s and aimed at increasing college-
going and eligibility rates among Latinos, Blacks, and Native 
Americans—the underrepresented minorities. Filipinos and Pacific 
Islanders have also been included in such efforts. A 1995 report41 
created in the UC Office of the President tallied these programs, finding 
over six hundred with combined budgets of about $60 million. A history 
of these efforts up to the year 2000 is also available.42 
The three largest of these programs are university-wide and have 
achieved considerable size and renown. 
 Mathematics, Engineering, Science Achievement (MESA) was 
founded at Berkeley in 1970 by engineering professor Wilbur 
Somerton and equal opportunity director William Somerville to 
                                                     
39 Joanna Lin, “College-Going Rates Vary Widely in California,” California Watch, accessed 
November 5, 2015, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20160825175058/http://californiawatch.org/dailyreport/college-
going-rates-vary-widely-california-13121.  
40 Lucile Packard Foundation for Children’s Health, “College Eligibility in California,” 
https://perma.cc/6XW7-ZU6T.  
41 Leanne Parker, “The Schools and UC: A Commitment to the Future of California,” University of 
California, Office of the President, 1995. 
42 “Outreach at the University of California: A Retrospective,” Office of the President, University of 
California, https://perma.cc/7DAE-VWSR. 
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generate a support system for minority precollege students who 
might become majors in STEM (science, technology, engineering, 
mathematics) fields. The program began at Oakland Technical High 
School. As of 2010 California MESA served twenty-one thousand 
students at twenty-two school program centers, thirty-three 
community colleges, and thirteen four-year universities. 43  In 
addition to California, MESA now exists in ten other states. 
 The Puente Project44 was started in 1981 at Chabot Community 
College in Hayward, California, and now serves thirty-four high 
schools, a majority (sixty-four) of community colleges in California, 
and about fourteen thousand students in all with writing, 
counseling, and mentoring components. It was headquartered at 
the UC Office of the President for many years and in 2012 moved 
to the UC Berkeley campus. 
 The Early Academic Outreach Program (EAOP)45 was founded in 
1976, operates through individual UC campuses, and has become 
UC’s largest outreach program. It provides four basic types of 
service: (1) academic advising to help students complete the 
college preparatory courses and become eligible for admission, (2) 
academic enrichment to help students with basic skills and study 
habits, (3) preparation for the standard examinations (SAT or ACT) 
required for UC admission, and (4) information on financial aid and 
writing of college applications. Two models are used—working with 
cohorts of individual students and with entire schools. 
 
 As noted in Chapters 2 and 15, in 1995 the Regents of the 
University of California passed two resolutions barring any use of race, 
religion, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in admissions and 
employment, and sixteen months later, California voters adopted the  
 
 
                                                     
43 “MESA Fall Middle/High School New Advisor Training,” University of California, Irvine, undated, 
https://perma.cc/Q5LA-KR6M. 
44 “Puente,” the Puente Project, Center for Educational Partnerships, University of California, 
Berkeley, https://web.archive.org/web/20161004230256/http://puente.berkeley.edu/. 
45 Brenda Iasevoli, “Making Colleges More Diverse Even without Affirmative Action: Lessons from 
California’s Early Academic Outreach Program,” The Atlantic, February 28, 2014. 




initiative constitutional amendment prohibiting “preferential 
treatment to any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, 
ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment, 
public education, or public contracting”. These actions necessitated 
major changes in admissions (chapter 15) and outreach policies. 
Section 146 of the first of the two regents’ resolutions stated, 
“The president, with the consultation of the Board of 
Regents, shall appoint a task force representative of the business 
community, the university, other segments of education and 
organizations currently engaged in academic ‘outreach.’ The 
responsibility of this group shall be to develop proposals for new 
directions and increased funding for the Board of Regents to 
increase the eligibility rate of those currently identified in section 
four [i. e., disadvantaged students].” 
 
Outreach Task Force 
The university then moved to create the Outreach Task Force to 
identify programs that could increase the eligibility and attendance of 
disadvantaged students in a race-neutral context. The president and 
the chair of the regents decided that the task force would be cochaired 
by the provost (the author) and a prominent person from the private 
sector. Richard Clarke,47 an ex-CEO of Pacific Gas and Electric Company, 
was chosen as that cochair and was both effective and dedicated. 
The UC administration decided to recommend a relatively large 
task force (36 people) that drew from many different backgrounds 
inside and outside the university so as to obtain trust and respect for 
the ultimate recommendations of the task force. Through consultation 
with the chair of the regents, four regents were included on the task 
force, both to obtain their input early and hopefully to enhance 
acceptance of the product by the regents. 
 
                                                     
46 “Text of UC Regents' Resolutions”, University of California, Berkeley, https://perma.cc/ZT39-
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47 Pacific Gas and Electric Company, “Richard A. Clarke, Former PG&E CEO and Environmental 
Leader, Dies at 72,” December 17, 2002, https://perma.cc/M3L6-D3WA. 
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Meetings of the Outreach Task Force were construed legally to be 
public meetings, with the result that several representatives of the 
media attended and wrote about the first several meetings. 
Attendance by the media tapered off after a few meetings. The internal 
dynamics of the task force proved to be challenging, since the entire 
spectrum of views was present, resulting in tensions among members. 
Because of sheer size, cost, and dilution of effort, it would not be 
possible to have effective outreach programs that extended more or 
less equally to all school districts and all portions of the state. The 
deliberations of the task force and the underlying staff work by the 
Office of the President sought methods of targeting outreach that 
would reach the most essential sectors and yet be compatible with the 
regents’ resolutions and the constitutional amendment. Addressing 
this goal required considerable thought about the purposes of 
outreach and public education. A method of targeting would have to 
be acceptable to those with views across the spectrum. The task force 
finally decided to target by educational disadvantage—that is, to target 
the student populations of those schools having low values of various 
academic measures (enrollment rates in college-going courses, SAT 
scores, percentage of graduates attending UC, etcetera).  
In addition to this recommendation, the report48 of the task force 
identified desirable program areas and needs for increases in funding 
as follows: 
 school-centered partnerships ($27.2 million per year), focused upon 
schools meeting educational-disadvantage criteria and designed to 
increase preparation and college-going rates from those schools 
 academic development ($17.9 million per year), designed to build 
upon programs such as MESA and Puente to work with individual 
students from educationally disadvantaged schools 
 informational outreach ($7.9 million per year), aimed at students 
and family to create awareness and understanding of college going 
 research, program evaluation, and information technology 
capabilities ($7.55 million per year) 
                                                     
48 Outreach Task Force, “New Directions for Outreach,” University of California, July 1997, 
accessed November 5, 2015, https://perma.cc/6ZNP-2335.   The measures of educational 
disadvantage are on p. 12 of the report. 




In all, additional funding of $60.55 million per year was 
recommended, with primary uses being for school-centered 
partnerships and student development programs. Those two sorts of 
programs had political appeal to Republicans and Democrats, 
respectively. Thereby there was political contention between 
supporters of the two sorts of programs. Rather than funding at the 
levels requested, the final resolution between to two political parties 
was to apply the full funding of $60 million individually to each of the 
programs, thereby considerably exceeding the university’s request. As 
noted above, funding from a variety of sources for outreach of all sorts 
before the report had been about $60 million per year. By 2000–01 it 
had grown to $328 million per year, of which $184 million was from 
state and UC internal funds.49 
This rapid escalation of funding created a situation where the 
university needed to design, institute, and build major new outreach 
programs over a very short period. This was done remarkably well, 
considering the challenge. A commissioned evaluation report50 in 2003 
found that the programs had been generally effective in providing 
educationally disadvantaged and underrepresented students increased 
access to UC. 
The rapid escalation of funding also created expectations for 
immediate increases in college-going rates that could not be fulfilled. 
Development of schools and students through outreach are long-term 
propositions, since work with students in schools must start years 
before their graduation. In an era of term limits, politicians do not want 
to wait that long for results. Also, because of the zero-sum aspects of 
eligibility, students would have to improve enough academically to 
displace previously eligible students. The outreach programs became 
the object of sharp differences between the political parties, with the 
result that the decisions as to whether and how much to fund them 
would be held hostage until the very final negotiations among the Big 
                                                     
49 Patricia A. Pelfrey, Entrepreneurial President: Richard Atkinson and the University of California, 
1995–2003 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012), 83–84. 
50 Strategic Review Panel on Educational Outreach, “Forging California’s Future through 
Educational Partnerships: Redefining Educational Outreach,” University of California, February 
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Five51 on the budget. The annual delay and uncertainty in budget 
determinations created job-security concerns for the employees of the 
programs. Unfortunately, before the new outreach programs could 
take root and yield the substantial results that they did eventually 
produce, state budget stringencies hit again, and funding was greatly 
reduced. Current (2016) state funding for educational partnerships is 
about $25 million per year. A description of current university-wide 
programs is available.52 
There is, however, one very clear measure of success that became 
available only after the substantially reduced funding had hit. The CPEC 
Eligibility Study for the high school graduating class of 2007 (chapter 
15) showed eligibility rates of 6.3 and 6.9 percent for black and Latino 
students respectively, whereas the study for the 1996 high school 
class53 had shown 2.8 and 3.9 percent for black and Latino students, 
respectively.  The study for the high school class of 200154 had shown 
4.3 and 5.5 percent for black and Latino students, respectively. The 
surge in outreach efforts of the University of California approximately 
doubled UC eligibility rates for black and Latino students from 1996 to 
2007. 
The ups and downs of state funding for eligibility-enhancing 
efforts and the political limelight that fell on these activities both 
complicated matters considerably. In addition, the university’s efforts 
so far have dealt with school improvement and with counseling and 
advising students, yet the underlying issues that lead to disparities in 
college-going rates cover much wider aspects of society, including 
poverty, cultural traditions, home life, and even public health. For the 
                                                     
51 As the last step in the annual state budget process, the governor, the speaker of the assembly, 
the president pro tempore of the senate, and the minority-party leaders of the two houses of the 
legislature work as the “Big Five” to resolve disagreements among the two houses of the 
legislature, usually by creating deals in which one party yields on an issue so as to gain on another. 
See “Big Five (California Politics),” Wikipedia, https://perma.cc/R4HL-JGJ3. 
52 “Diversity and Engagement,” Office of the President, University of California, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20160815052139/https://www.ucop.edu/diversity-
engagement/index.html. 
53 “Eligibility of California’s 1996 High School Graduates for Admission to the State’s Public 
Universities,” Report no. 97-9, December 1997, California Postsecondary Education Commission, 
https://perma.cc/SU3T-K7XG. 
54 “University Eligibility Study for the Class of 2001,” Report 05-9, September 2005, California 
Postsecondary Education Commission, https://perma.cc/799G-MALT. 








CALIFORNIA COUNCIL ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 
 
The state of California has no equivalents of the presidential 
science advisor or Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), 
National Science Board, or National Science Foundation that exist at 
the national level for the United States. However, in 1988 the California 
Council on Science and Technology (CCST) 55  was established by 
legislative resolution.56  
The roles of the council defined by that resolution are to “identify 
long-range research needs for sustaining the state’s economic 
development and competitiveness and provide direction for new 
scientific and technological activities; and…[to] assess private 
sector/university relations and technology transfer, particularly with 
respect to California’s economic development, leadership in research 
and development, and capacity to retain vital industries and scientific 
talent in California.” 
The council is overseen by a board with members from 
universities, industry, and national laboratories, appointed and 
overseen by the president of the University of California, in 
collaboration with the presidents of the University of Southern 
California, the California Institute of Technology, and Stanford 
University and with the chancellors of the California State University 
and the California Community Colleges. 
The council works in ways that are analogous to the functions of 
the US National Research Council, now known as the Program Units of 
the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine.57 
Studies are carried out on various subjects by teams composed of 
California leaders in science, engineering, and science policy. These 
                                                     
55 “California Council on Science and Technology (CCST),” 
https://web.archive.org/web/20171026155707/https://ccst.us/. 
56 “CCST Legislative Charge,” https://perma.cc/3PZQ-SAAM. 
57 “Organization,” National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, 
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studies are usually requested by an executive agency, legislative 
committee, or one or more legislators of the state government. 
Sponsorship through such a request is a mark of true interest in the 
results. A few studies are done at the initiative of the council itself 
when there is a strong belief that information and/or interest need to 
be generated. Studies are of two general types—examination of a 
specific current subject and examination of the current situation of the 
state in a broader area. 
Funding for the core administrative activities of CCST comes from 
the six sustaining higher-education members. The contribution of the 
University of California is twice as large as those of the others, 
reflecting the size of UC. Project funding comes from state government 
agencies or appropriations, or from other external entities. 
Although the operations of CCST resemble those of the National 
Academies in many ways, there are two notable differences. One is 
that CCST as of 2017 has a paid staff of only eleven people. It is highly 
reliant upon the work of volunteers. Whereas the National Academies 
staff typically carry out much research for the projects that the 
academies undertake, CCST is more dependent on the knowledge 
already acquired by its selected volunteer committee members. The 
second difference is that the National Academies maintain an arms-
length relationship with sponsoring government agencies, having 
essentially no contact, or very little, with the sponsoring agency during 
the course of a study. This approach is used to make it clear that the 
academies are something apart from, and uninfluenced by, the political 
process. CCST studies do maintain contact with the state agencies or 
other components of government that are affected by a study, in the 
belief that the contact is useful so that the study is grounded and has 
full information. 
Examples of recent studies in the more specific arena are “An 
Independent Scientific Assessment of Well Stimulation in California” 
(i.e., “fracking”), “Digitally Enhanced Education in California: Creating a 
Vision for Integrating Digital Media into California’s Teacher 
Preparation System,” and “Health Impacts of Radio Frequency from 
Smart Meters.” Examples of those in the more general category are 
“California Water—Achieving a Sustainable California Water Future 
through Innovations in Science and Technology,” “California’s Energy 




Future—the View to 2060,” and “Innovate 2 Innovation—an 
Assessment of California’s Innovation Ecosystem.” 
CCST reports have had impact at the state level and do 
occasionally receive media attention, as was the case for the fracking 
reports. 
The California Council on Science and Technology is relatively 
unique among state science policy functions. Approaches of the 
different states within the United States for systematically utilizing 
science and technology for economic development have been 
reviewed by Geiger and Sá.58 
 
 
IDENTIFICATION AND DOCUMENTATION OF ECONOMIC IMPACT 
 
The importance of the research mission of research universities for 
society and the economy is a compelling story that needs to be 
communicated to the public and governments in clear and engaging 
ways, as an avenue to public understanding and also as a means for 
sustaining public funding. 
 
The University of California 
The University of California as a whole and the individual 
campuses have commissioned or carried out numerous studies 
identifying and documenting the economic impacts of the university 
and the campuses on the state. Many of these are classical economic-
impact reports that deal with employment and spending by the 
university and university employees without attempting to identify the 
quantitative impacts of university research and service on industry, 
economic development, and/or social benefit.59 A report from the Bay 
Area Council Economic Institute analyzes the contributions of  
 
                                                     
58 Roger L. Geiger and Creso Sá, “Beyond Technology Transfer: US State Policies to Harness 
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59 See, for example, Economic and Planning Systems, “The University of California’s Economic 
Contribution to the State of California, September 12, 2011, https://perma.cc/FDW8-NCD9, and a 
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companies formed by faculty, alumni, and affiliates of the Berkeley 
campus. 60  Other studies have been aimed at identifying the 
contribution of university research, graduates, and/or faculty members 
to the development of specific industries. A portion of the budget of 
UC’s Industry-University Cooperative Research Program (chapter 18) 
was devoted to determining quantitatively the contributions of 
University of California research and people to the development of new 
industries in California. The most attention was given to the 
biotechnology industry, the results for which are presented by Yarkin61 
and build upon the facts presented in chapters 10 and 18 to 
demonstrate the vital role of University of California research in the 
early development of that industry. An oral history collection62 on the 
development of the California biotechnology industry contains much 
related anecdotal information. A similar analysis has been made for the 
biotechnology industry on a global scale.63 Working in a more popular 
vein, Professor Conrad Rudolph of the UC Riverside campus has 
provided a PowerPoint display of many of the most important and 
visible impacts of University of California research on society, including, 
inter alia, flu vaccine, the Internet, the computer CPU, the ground-fault 
interrupter, the wet suit, the nicotine patch, safer freeways, the bar 
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Wider Afield  
On the national and international scales, beyond just the state of 
California, a line of economics research over the years has served to 
give at least semiquantitative insight into the contributions of 
research—and within it, university research—to economic growth in 
the United States and the world. This work began with Robert Solow at 
MIT and Moses Abramowitz at Stanford. It was pursued more deeply 
by Edwin Mansfield and coworkers at the University of Pennsylvania 
and then by Paul Romer, who was at the time at UC Berkeley. The body 
of research has become known as new growth or endogenous growth 
theory. 
Among the conclusions from this line of research are the following: 
 Most economic growth, potentially as much as 85 percent, from 
1890 to 1950 is attributable to technological progress rather than 
labor, capital, and other measurable inputs65, 66, 67 
 The increase of over tenfold in productivity over the past century in 
the United States, measured as output per worker per unit time, is 
largely attributable to technological change.68 
 About 50 percent of the improvement of economic growth in the 
G-5 emerging-economy countries (Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and 
South Africa) between 1950 and 1993 can be attributed to 
increased research intensity, and rising educational attainment of 
the population accounts for more than another 33 percent.69 
 The social rate of return from new products and processes (i.e., the 
return to society as a whole) is much greater than the returns to 
the individual firms themselves.70  This result reflects spillover  
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benefits from one company’s or institution’s research to another 
company’s. It also creates the rationale for public funding of 
research rather than leaving all research to private investment. 
 Published estimates of annual return on investment (ROI) for 
publicly funded R&D are 28 percent for academic science and 
engineering research aggregated together,71 from 20 to 67 percent 
for agricultural research, and over 30 percent for pharmaceutical 
research.72 
 In seven major manufacturing areas, including information 
processing, pharmaceuticals, and petroleum, academic research 
was directly responsible for about 11 percent of new products and 
9 percent of new processes.73 These estimates are almost surely 
conservative, since it is very difficult to trace the diffusion of 
influences from new ideas and the cross flow of ideas from one line 
of endeavor to another. 
 Among metropolitan regions in the United States, 65 percent of the 
differences in economic growth can be accounted for through 
“high-tech” developments, with research centers and institutions 
being the most important factor in incubating high-tech 
industries.74 
 
Overviews of the content and implications of this line of economics 
research are given by the 2007 Rising above the Gathering Storm75 
report of the Committee on Science, Engineering, and Public Policy  
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Committee (COSEPUP) of the US National Academies, by Crow and 
Dabars,76 and by Pelfrey and Atkinson.77 
A comprehensive book78 by former Columbia University provost 
Jonathan Cole deals with the impacts of university research on life in 
the United States and explores many specific advances attributable in 
part or in whole to university research. 
The American Academy of Arts and Sciences (AAAS) recently 
completed the Lincoln Project,79 which examined the state of public 
research universities in a time of reduced state funding and made 
recommendations for their future. One output was an informative 
report on the contributions of research universities to society.80 
From this discussion it is apparent that much useful information 
and good analyses do exist concerning the importance and impact of 
university research. However, public understanding of these effects is 
sorely lacking. What has been, and will be, needed, are effective means 
of conveying the essence of these understandings to voters and thence 
to their elected representatives in government. 
                                                     
76 Michael M. Crow and William B. Dabars, Designing the New American University (Baltimore, 
MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2015), pp. 145–158. 
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Support from the State 
 
 
The people of California, as much as if not more than the people of any 
other State, have supported their colleges and their universities and 
their schools, because they recognize how important it is to the 
maintenance of a free society that its citizens be well educated. 
—John F. Kennedy, Address at Charter Day, University of California, 
Berkeley1 
 
In the decade following the war, the University of California 
transformed itself from a first-rate regional university into a first-rate 
world university, and did this, in significant measure, because the 




It was…a period of prosperity in California and of strong gubernatorial 
support particularly from Earl Warren and Edmund G. (“Pat”) Brown. 





The people and the state government of California have been 
remarkably supportive of the University of California at critical points in 
its history. They have also reflected confidence in the abilities of the 
university and California higher education in general to define 
themselves and carry out their missions in ways that best serve the  
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needs of the state. Seven notable aspects reflect the support and 
confidence of the state and the public. These factors have all been vital 
for the development of the University of California to the level of 
excellence that it has attained. They are also unusual in comparison 
with the rest of the United States. 
 The university has been given rights of self-governance, insulated 
for the most part from political interests and actions (chapter 4). 
 At critical points in its history, particularly in the period following 
World War II but also in the Progressive era of California in the 
early part of the twentieth century, the state has given the 
university high financial priority in ways that have been crucial for 
enabling its achievement of high academic stature, expanding 
enrollment, and serving the needs of the state broadly. 
 The state accepted the goal that the university should be of a 
caliber equivalent to the best universities in the country, public or 
private. This goal has until recently been embedded in the level of 
financial support and notably in the policy that faculty salaries 
should be targeted toward the average of eight leading 
universities, four of them private and four public. 
 The state accepted the differentiation of mission that was spelled 
out in the Master Plan of 1960 and allowed that plan to be created 
by California higher education itself. As part of the differentiation 
of mission, the state accepted an eligibility rate of 12.5 percent of 
graduates of California public schools for the University of 
California—the lowest of any major public research university in 
the country. 
 In the late 1950s and at the request of the university, the state 
agreed to there being multiple general campuses of the university, 
even though this was a more expensive path. Enrollment caps were 
placed on individual campuses so as to sustain the quality of 
education and the college experience. 
 The state has consistently adopted an enabling, rather than 
prescriptive, science and technology policy. The University of 
California has the status of being the research arm of the state. The 
state therefore supports research at the university at a high level, 
and places most of its own research with the university. 
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 As federal support of research grew after World War II, the state 
agreed to let the university retain a large fraction of overhead 
funds from extramural grants even though many of the costs which 
they recognize are funded through the state budget. These monies 
could be used flexibly as an “opportunity” fund. 






One of the main outgrowths of the turbulence and contentions 
surrounding the university in the 1870s (chapter 2) was to embed 
governance autonomy for the University of California in the 1879 state 
constitution (chapter 4). This status gives the university a level of 
independent governance rivaled in the US by only the public 
universities and colleges in Michigan and the University of Minnesota. 
The authority for governance lies with the Board of Regents. Although 
eighteen of the twenty-six members of that board are appointed by the 
sitting governor with confirmation by the state senate, and four more 
are elected statewide officials, long terms of twelve years and the 
checks and balances in the appointment process for the appointed 
regents have served to remove the political process from the board to 
a substantial degree. There have of course been some exceptions over 
time, which are described in chapter 2. 
By contrast, in some other states (chapter 4) regents are elected by 
popular vote (Michigan, Colorado, Nebraska, and Nevada) or by the 
legislature (e.g., Minnesota). Matters that come before those boards 
are judged to a greater extent by projections of their appeal to the 
electorate. Since most other public universities in the United States do 
not have the degree of constitutional autonomy that the University of 
California has, the state legislatures in other states are, on the whole, 









HIGH PRIORITY FOR RESOURCES AND INVESTMENT 
 
Until recent decades, the University of California has largely been 
given high priority for both one-time and ongoing financial support 
from the state, particularly at two critical times in its history. The first 
of these periods was the early part of the twentieth century, during the 
time of the California Progressive movement4 and the UC presidency of 
Benjamin Ide Wheeler (chapter 2). One of the foundations of the 
Progressive movement was belief in the benefits of widespread public 
higher education.5  
The time of the Progressives coincided with the latter portion 
(1912–19) of the period that Benjamin Ide Wheeler was president of 
the University of California and resulted in both substantial funding for 
higher education and a major increase in enrollment throughout 
California public higher education. By 1920 California had the highest 
public higher-education enrollment in the country, despite being still 
only tenth in population.6 Much of Wheeler’s building of the University 
of California to distinction, including the launch of UC into the first tier 
of academic research through Gilbert Newton Lewis and other faculty 
recruitments (chapter 9), was enabled by the attention paid by the 
Progressives to widespread public higher education. Before 1900 
annual operating funds provided to UC from the state were no greater 
than the yield of the endowment for the university. As of 1900 state 
funding started to grow, and then during the period 1910 to 1920, rose 
from about $800,000 per year to $3.1 million per year (i.e., by a factor 
of about four.)7 
The next great period of investment by the state in the University 
of California came as a result of World War II and the policies of two 
forward-thinking governors, Earl Warren and Edmund G. (Pat) Brown, 
                                                     
4 Kevin Starr, Inventing the Dream: California through the Progressive Era (Oxford University Press, 
1986). 
5 John Aubrey Douglass, The California Idea and American Higher Education: 1850 to the 1960 
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both of whom gave public higher education great priority. In World 
War II, there had been much buildup of wartime manufacturing and 
military bases in California. The change to the state was enormous. 
Gerald Nash 8  observed, “In four short years the war brought a 
maturation to the West [and in particular California] that in peacetime 
might have taken generations to accomplish.” The wartime surge also 
brought a huge surplus to California’s state treasury. 
After the war there was a large downturn in wartime 
manufacturing, and a surge of returning veterans needing 
employment. Earl Warren,9 who was governor from 1943 until 1953, 
devoted much attention to postwar planning. Warren was himself a 
graduate of the University of California, which had provided him the 
classic public-university route for upward mobility following very 
humble beginnings as a child of a Norwegian immigrant family in 
Bakersfield, California. Warren was a UC classmate of UC president 
Robert Gordon Sproul, with whom he had a longtime association and 
friendship. He had strong nonpartisan abilities, was a popular and very 
accomplished governor, and was the beneficiary of the cross-filing 
initiative of the Progressives when he was nominated for a second term 
as governor by both major political parties in 1946. He was elected to a 
third term in 1950 and then left the governorship when he was 
appointed by President Eisenhower as chief justice of the US Supreme 
Court. Warren himself was an adherent of the Progressives and their 
principles as he entered his political career. In 1944 Warren launched 
the Postwar Reconstruction and Reemployment Commission. Working 
with the commission and with George D. Strayer, an emeritus professor 
of education from Columbia Teachers’ College, he identified two major 
“shock-absorber” programs—modernization of infrastructure and 
enlargement of public higher education—that would bring 
employment and betterment for the returning veterans and invest in 
the human infrastructure for the future economic growth of 
California. 10 , 11  At the peak of the enrollment surge of returning 
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veterans in 1947, veterans constituted just over half of the enrollment 
of the University of California.12 Coresponding figures for the state 
colleges and community colleges were 70% and 36%, respectively.13 
With the continued support of Governor Warren, the UC Board of 
Regents and the State Board of Education launched a three-person task 
force, composed of Strayer and two longtime senior officials from the 
University of California and California state colleges—Monroe Deutsch 
and Aubrey Douglass,14 respectively. The charge to the task force was 
to outline the ways in which public higher education in California could 
be sharply increased. The resulting report15 delineated the functions of 
the three segments of California public higher education and provided 
an ambitious road map for the path ahead. It also concluded that the 
desired expansion was financially feasible, given the resources that the 
state had at the time. 
Between 1942 and 1948, the state had built up a budgetary surplus 
of $813 million, more than the entire state operations budget for 1948. 
These accumulated funds went very largely to the two shock-absorber 
programs, with about one-third going to public higher education to 
fund the greatly increased enrollments and necessary construction. 
Enrollment increases in the state colleges were especially large, with 
state college enrollment surpassing University of California enrollment 
for the first time in 1954.16 
There was another large source of financial support for the 




                                                                                                                     
11 Douglass, 2000a, loc. cit., chapter 6, “Postwar Planning and Higher Education.” 
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16 Douglass, 2000b, loc. cit. 
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as the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act. A classic voucher plan, the GI 
Bill paid the costs of higher education for the large number of returning 
World War II veterans. California had both the highest percentage and 
the highest absolute number of veterans in public higher education 
among the states of the United States. California public higher 
education was a very large beneficiary of the GI Bill. 
As measures of this huge investment and growth, Geiger18 notes 
that appropriations by the state to the university increased by an 
average of 24 percent per year between 1946 and 1951; that the 
amount that UC received from the GI Bill ($11.5 million in 1946–47) 
exceeded the combined instructional budgets of the two main UC 
campuses, Berkeley and UCLA; and that the Berkeley instructional 
budget expressed as spending per enrolled student grew by 56 percent 
from 1946 to 1950 and then another 45 percent by 1954. As well, the 
state provided over $120 million of construction funds during the years 
1946–50, of which $25 million was spent at Berkeley, much of it to 
provide modern facilities for the physical sciences. 
After the intervening gubernatorial term of Goodwin Knight (1953–
59), Edmund G. (“Pat”) Brown19 was governor from 1959 to 1967. His 
term coincided with the tenure of Clark Kerr as UC president. Although 
Brown and Kerr started with a tense relationship,20 they shared the 
desire for continued growth of higher education and worked together 
on the two major initiatives: the 1960 California Master Plan for Higher 
Education and the creation of three new campuses of the University of 
California in San Diego (La Jolla), Irvine, and Santa Cruz.21  
Smelser22 examined the large growth and change in California 
higher education over the two decades, 1950–70. What had been a 
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combined enrollment of 200,000 in all three sectors of public higher 
education in 1950 became almost 500,000 in 1960 and then over a 
million in 1970, a huge rate of growth. The level of state support for 
the three sectors rose by over a factor of ten from $62.6 million in 1950 
to $756.8 million in 1970, neither figure counting capital outlay, which 
was in addition and also large. The budgetary surplus from World War 
II and the GI Bill covered this growth up to about 1960, when 
considerations started being made of year-round operations, increased 
fees, and imposition of tuition as additional ways of addressing the 
growth financially. The situation was also helped by the fact that 
external sources, most notably federal research support, assumed a 
greater portion of financing starting in the 1960s. 
Later, Gray Davis, who was governor from 1999 to 2003, made 
education a high priority, including higher education and research. He 
brought about the funding for the California (now Governor Gray Davis) 
Institutes for Science and Innovation (chapter 14). 
Financing of public higher education by the state of California is the 
one of these seven factors that has slipped the most in recent years, an 
issue that is considered in chapters 2 and 21. 
 
 
MAINTAINING THE CALIBER OF THE BEST UNIVERSITIES, PRIVATE OR 
PUBLIC 
 
From the start, California sought for its public university to be the 
equivalent of the best, with Yale and the University of Michigan being 
two early role models. Yale had been the institution of many of the 
university’s founders, including Presidents Durant and Gilman. As 
noted in a quote at the beginning of chapter 15, at the start the 
Trustees of the College of California made the criterion that courses of 
instruction should be “equal to those of the Eastern colleges” a 
condition for merging their institution with the new University of 
California. Michigan was the model for the incorporation of 
constitutional autonomy into the constitution of 1879. These 
aspirations remained largely qualitative until the twentieth century, 
when they became quantitative in two main ways—faculty and 
administrative salary scales and the budgeted student-to-faculty ratio. 




 Since 1920 faculty salaries for the University of California have 
been established by quantitative comparison with other highly 
distinguished US universities. The history of the quantitative- 
comparison methodology for setting University of California faculty 
salaries is laid out in the appendix to a policy document23 that was 
adopted in 1969 by the California Coordinating Council for Higher 
Education (CCHE, the predecessor body to the California Postsecondary 
Education Commission, CPEC). 
Starting in 1920 the University of California adopted an academic 
salary scale that was derived from comparison with five other 
distinguished universities—Chicago, Columbia, Harvard, Michigan, and 
Yale—denoted as the “Big 5.” Note the overall high level of distinction 
of the comparison universities. Only one of them was public, and even 
it was generally regarded as the best of the other publics. Faculty 
salaries are generally higher at the leading private universities than for 
public universities. These comparisons were the basis for the state 
budget requests that the university made to the legislature and were 
generally accepted as a valid approach. In 1960 Chicago was replaced 
in this group by Princeton. 
With the arrival of the California Master Plan for Higher Education 
in 1960, the matter of the quantitative-comparison methodology 
became a responsibility of CCHE and then its successor body, CPEC. The 
principle of comparability as the means for setting salary scales was 
accepted by CCHE in 1962. There then became concern that there 
should be a broader group of comparison universities and that public 
institutions should be better represented within the comparison group. 
In 1967 the comparison group was expanded in number to eight 
through the addition of Illinois, Cornell, and Wisconsin, so that publics 
now constituted three of the eight. In 1968 Stanford and SUNY–Buffalo 
replaced Columbia and Princeton, so that now there were four publics 
and four privates.24 
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In the referenced 1969 report, CCHE took the position that the 
comparison group for UC should be expanded from eight to nineteen, 
with the nineteen comparison universities being Stanford, Chicago, the 
entire Big Ten, and the seven Ivy League universities other than 
Dartmouth—ten public universities and nine private universities. 
The Comparison 19 did not last long, and the methodology 
reverted back to a Comparison 8, which has now for decades been 
composed of Harvard, MIT, Stanford, and Yale as the four private 
universities and Illinois, Michigan, SUNY–Buffalo, and Virginia as the 
four public universities. That set of comparison institutions was 
developed by an advisory committee that consisted of members from 
CPEC, the State Legislative Analyst’s Office, the State Department of 
Finance, and administrative and UC Academic Senate leaders from UC 
and CSU.25 
What is important to recognize from this history is the principle, 
formally accepted by the State of California, that the University of 
California and all its campuses should have parity of faculty salaries 
with the mean of both the leading private research universities and the 
leading public research universities. Thereby it would have salaries a 
cut above the leading public universities. The fact that the resultant 
salary scales would apply equally on all campuses of the university 
would underscore the intention that all campuses should be able to 
rise to top stature. 
Figure 17-1 shows the actual trace of faculty salaries over the 
thirty-year period from 1980 to 2010, in comparison with the averages 
of the four private and four public institutions. For many years the 
comparison was made and endorsed by CPEC until CPEC ceased 
operations in 2011. Historically, including years before the start of the 
chart, faculty salaries were maintained close to the average of the 
Comparison 8 institutions, but as of about 2002, they started lagging 
and are now closer to the average of the four public comparison 
institutions than to the average of the full Comparison 8. Also apparent 
from the figure is that faculty salaries for the four comparison private 
universities have diverged upward from faculty salaries at the four 
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public comparison institutions during recent decades, reflecting a 
national trend.  
Total compensation, including nonsalary factors such as retirement 
and other benefits, is also computed and compared periodically 





Figure 17-1. Average professorial series faculty salaries (assistant, associate, 
full), general campus only, University of California and comparison eight 




 During the years of statewide coordination by CCHE and CPEC, 
guidelines for administrative salaries were also computed through a 
similar comparison methodology, as is shown in the last such report 
from CPEC.28 From 1992 until this final survey in 2004, there were 
twenty-six comparison institutions for UC—all leading universities, with 
fourteen of them public and twelve private. The current (2015) 
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guidelines for setting salaries of academic deans within the University 
of California are available.29 
State-Budgeted Student/Faculty Ratio and State Funding per Student 
 Per-student funding from the state, expressed in part by the 
budgeted student-to-faculty ratio, is an important measure of the 
commitment of the state to higher education and can be traced 
through the various periods of the history of the university. As reported 
by Clark Kerr, 30  the state-budgeted student-faculty (S/F) ratio at 
Berkeley up to 1950 was typically in the range of 22 to 25 students per 
faculty member. After a surge due to the postwar enrollment of 
veterans returning from World War II, the budgeted S/F ratio fell to 
about 18 students per faculty member in 1953, 16.5 in 1962, and 14.5 
in 1966. The 14.5 figure could be compared to the typical private-
university S/F ratio of 8 to 12 students per faculty member, and to 
typical public-university S/F ratios of 18 to 20 students per faculty 
member at the time—again about halfway in between. Kerr credits 
both Governor Pat Brown and the Board of Regents as being very 
supportive of this move toward a lower S/F ratio and hence improved 
quality of education. This was very tangible strong state support for the 
university and was of considerable importance for the building of the 
university through the 1960s and 1970s. 
More recently the S/F ratio for UC has slipped back to higher values 
because of stringencies in state funding. The target ratio agreed to 
between the university and the state had risen to 17.5 students per 
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DIFFERENTIATION OF MISSIONS 
 
The formal differentiation of missions among the three sectors of 
public higher education in California, formalized through the Master 
Plan of 1960, enabled the University of California to be the one 
designated research university within the public system. The Master 
Plan focused both the research mission and state research support on 
the University of California. Because of the role of the California State 
University (CSU), the Master Plan could fix the eligibility rate of high 
school graduates for the University of California at 12.5 percent. That 
low percentage enabled the University of California to develop in 
research-based graduate and professional education without being 
flooded with undergraduate students. However, as discussed in 
chapter 5, the 12.5 and 33 percent eligibility rates for UC and CSU, 
respectively, now place California very low in the percentage of the 
population receiving four-year bachelor’s degrees, too low for 
supporting the high-tech economy of the state. 
 
 
CREATING MULTIPLE CAMPUSES AND CAPPING THEIR ENROLLMENTS 
 
A second general (i.e., all-purpose) campus in Los Angeles was 
chartered in the early part of the twentieth century because of the 
growth of the population of the greater Los Angeles area and the 
distance from there to the original campus in Berkeley. As enrollments 
grew rapidly after World War II, the obvious question was whether to 
let these two general campuses grow to the large sizes that would be 
required to serve the purposes of the public research university in a 
fast-growing state or to continue to create additional general campuses 
for a multicampus university. The latter path was chosen, and led to 
the conversion of Davis, Riverside, and Santa Barbara to general 
campuses; the development of San Diego, Irvine, and Santa Cruz as 
new general campuses; and the selection of 27,500 as an enrollment 
cap for any one campus. That path was followed further with the 
creation of the Merced campus. The total campus enrollments drifted 
upwards by 2016 to 40,200 for Berkeley and 45,000 for UCLA. In 2016 





general campuses are lower in enrollment, either because of 
agreements with the community (Santa Barbara, Santa Cruz) or still 
having capacity left for development (Riverside, Merced). 
While part of the motivation for the multicampus approach was 
clearly political and designed to serve the various populated regions of 
the state with local campuses of the university, Kerr33 makes it clear 
that it was also a matter of avoiding large campus size so as to provide 
better education to students. From the standpoints of Berkeley and 
UCLA, the decision to go further down the road toward multiple 
campuses was enabling for development and enhancement of 
academic stature, because it relieved them of the very large enrollment 
burdens that would otherwise have come their ways. 
There are multicampus universities in some other states. A few 
(e.g., Illinois, Nevada) are universities with a common mission and 
similar expectations for multiple campuses, but none have the large 
number of campuses with the same research mission that the 
University of California has. The University of California is unique in 
that sense. 
The multicampus approach was more expensive, but was enabled 
by the affluent times, the strong support of Governors Earl Warren and 
Pat Brown for the university, and favorable budget decisions of the 
state government in the 1950s and 1960s. 
 
 
AN ENABLING STATE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY 
 
State policy for science and technology in California has been 
analyzed by Zumeta34 and by Geiger and Sá,35 who compare California 
with New York, Arizona, and Georgia. The latter book expands upon an 
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earlier paper36 by the same authors treating science policies among the 
states in general. The California Council on Science and Technology 
(see chapter 16) analyzes the state climate for science, technology, and 
innovation periodically.37 
Despite an intense and sometimes heated political climate, 
California has in various ways over the years seen fit to pursue a 
multifaceted policy of enablement of research and innovation, rather 
than a more prescriptive approach. This relatively nonpolitical 
approach has been of considerable value to both the University of 
California and the California research community. The partnership of 
the state with the university and with the research community in these 
areas has been built on performance, confidence, and trust, 
recognizing that the institutions themselves can best determine what 
to do and how to do it. One very auspicious result from these policies 
and other factors has been that California has more than 20 percent of 
national R&D expenditures, despite having only 13.5 percent of 
national gross domestic product (GDP) and 12 percent of the 
population of the United States.38 
The initiative in 2000 for the California (now Governor Gray Davis) 
Institutes of Science and Innovation (chapter 14) left the definitions of 
the institutes and choice of subject matter to the University of 
California. The university then solicited proposals with both those 
aspects remaining undefined and subject to proposals and competition 
through peer review. Similarly, when Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger 
worked with the legislature to provide state funds in the amount of $40 
million in support of the proposal of the Berkeley-led group for the BP 
Energy Biosciences Institute (chapter 18), the allocation was made 
without attempts to influence the content of the proposal. Several  
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authors39, 40, 41 have analyzed policy and implementation of policy in 
other states. For many states, there have been political definitions of 
what would be done and who would be selected for large research 
institutes of similar nature to California’s, without the elements of 
definition by the research community and peer-reviewed competition. 
California itself is not entirely without that problem, having established 
the California Institute for Regenerative Medicine (CIRM),42 a grant-
funding entity for stem-cell research, through a 2004 ballot initiative43 
that created a $3 billion bond issue. This was made possible by 
California’s well-used initiative process. 
Another aspect of the enablement of the University of California by 
the state was the de facto establishment of the university as the official 
research arm of the state. In this regard, state funding built the 
infrastructure that made the University of California highly competitive 
for federal grants as they grew in the years following World War II.44 It 
was a fortunate coincidence for California that the period during which 
federal funding for research grew so much coincided with both the 
postwar state budget surplus and the willingness of Governors Warren 
and then Brown to provide the funds to build the university in both size 
and infrastructure. 
By virtue of the university’s role as the research arm of the state, it 
was natural for the California (Governor Gray Davis) Institutes for 
Science and Innovation (chapter 14) to be placed within the university 
when they were formed in the year 2000. As well, the state places a 
large amount of research of its own in the university, in the forms of 
support for specific initiatives, seed money, matching funds, and 
general support for agricultural research. The total amount of state 
funding designated annually for research projects one way or another 
in recent years has been about $600 million. Some of the larger specific 
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Support from the State 
601 
 
items from the 2015–16 budget are $4.8 million of administrative 
support funds for the Governor Gray Davis Institutes and $11 million 
each for tobacco-related disease and breast cancer programs 
administered by UC with grants inside and outside UC. An additional 
$200 million comes to the university from the budgets of state agencies 
(notably Health Care Services, Social Services, Transportation, Food and 
Agriculture, and Education) for specific research areas and projects. 
State funding accounts for about 13 percent of total research funding 
within UC, a substantial fraction. 45 
One can view the research funding as a form of support for, and 
confidence in, the university from the state. However, the research is 




RETENTION OF A SUBSTANTIAL PORTION OF INDIRECT COSTS FROM 
CONTRACTS AND GRANTS 
 
As, has already been noted in Chapter 14, as the volume of grants 
from the federal government to the university grew during and after 
World War II, the Board of Regents created a special fund to hold the 
associated indirect-cost revenue, with expenditures from the fund 
going both to the units generating the projects and a variety of special 
purposes. In 1954 this special fund had grown to over $13 million 
annually, and its existence was challenged by Governor Goodwin 
Knight since the indirect costs, in fact, reimbursed expenses that were 
already being made largely from the state budget. The regents 
vigorously defended the fund because of its flexibility and utility for 
building the quality of the university. In a compromise it was agreed 
that 55 percent of the net receipts46 of indirect costs would be used by 
the university to offset what would otherwise be state-budget 
expenses and the other 45 percent would remain with the university,  
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named the Regents’ Opportunity Fund and now renamed the 
University Opportunity Fund.47 The Opportunity Fund has been used 
very effectively over the years for a variety of special purposes 
including seed monies and faculty start-ups and retentions. 
Faculty members sometimes bemoan the “loss” of half the indirect 
costs from grants to the state, but the nominal commitment for the 
state might have been to return just those portions of the indirect costs 
that are not for services that are funded within the state budget or for 
costs of research administration itself. Because it retains 45 percent of 
the net revenue from indirect costs, the university does then effectively 
receive a substantial Opportunity Fund allocation from the state.  The 
net benefit to the university from this agreement has been reduced 
over the years as a cap on reimbursement of administrative costs by 
the federal government has come into effect while unfunded 
administrative needs created by government management and 
reporting requirements have increased.48 
The concept and history of indirect costs and policies for both the 
University of California and the Berkeley campus are spelled out in a 
summary document.49 
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RELATIONS WITH INDUSTRY, TECHNOLOGY 
TRANSFER, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
We are just now perceiving that the university’s invisible product, 
knowledge, may be the most powerful single element in our culture, 
affecting the rise and fall of professions and even of social classes, or 
regions, and even nations. 
—Clark Kerr, in 19631 
 
The most important thing a state government can do to improve local 
economies is to support research universities. 
—Gray Davis, Governor of California2 
 
With some of the world’s finest universities and research institutions, 
the Golden State has more scientists, engineers, and researchers and 
invests more on research and development than any other state. As a 
leader in developing new technologies, California will reap tremendous 
rewards for our economy and environment from this investment in our 
innovation infrastructure. 
—Arnold Schwarzenegger, Governor of California3 
 
These questions troubled me then. They trouble me still, now that the 
past decade has brought forth fresh reports of universities partnering 
with venture capitalists to sell Internet courses at a profit and medical 
schools taking money from pharmaceutical companies in return for 
allowing them to help design educational programs for physicians. 
Observing these trends, I worry that commercialization may be  
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changing the nature of academic institutions in ways we will come to 
regret. By trying so hard to acquire more money for their work, 
universities may compromise values that are essential to the continued 





University research has become increasingly important as a source 
of new discoveries and inventions that can become commercialized 
innovations that lead and build the economy as well as aid society.  The 
large magnitude of that effect is documented by the various 
endogenous-growth studies described in chapter 16.  Yet good 
pathways for bringing university research into social and economic use, 
which is known as technology transfer, are varied and still being 
developed.  California has some remarkable success stories, including 
Silicon Valley, the hi-tech makeover of the San Diego economy, and the 
development of the biotechnology industry in both the San Francisco 
Bay Area and San Diego.  The University of California has been a central 
actor.  This chapter is devoted to these topics, along with a trace of 
how technology transfer has developed in the University of California. 
 
 
THE CHALLENGES OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER FOR UNIVERSITIES 
 
The areas of technology transfer and relations with industry can be 
complex and challenging for research universities, especially public 
universities. Many factors are at play. On the positive side, some of 
them are the following: 
 Moving discoveries stemming from university research into 
commercial use is valuable to the economy and society. 
 It is politically effective for a public research university to 
demonstrate clearly to the government and the populace the 
                                                     





ways in which its research has been important to society and 
the economy of the state. 
 In engineering, many sciences, economics, business, and some 
other fields, close contact with industry provides faculty 
members with a grounding of realism, awareness of current 
issues in the industrial world, and a source of ideas for high-
impact university research. 
 Leaders of industry can be effective for gaining support for a 
public university at the state level, reflecting their needs for 
educated manpower and research in their areas of interest. 
They can also be valuable members of advisory boards and 
sources of direct support for research of interest to the 
company. 
 There is revenue to be derived from licensing successful 
patents. That usually comes without restrictions and can 
therefore be used flexibly for university needs. This source of 
funds is unpredictable and chancy, but can be particularly 
valuable in times of budgetary stress. 
On the negative side these are some of the issues at play: 
 Interactions with industry, and particularly funding to 
universities from industry, may alter the essential purposes of 
the university or taint it in other ways. Industrial desires, 
coupled with industrial funding, may affect administrative 
decisions, undermine academic needs, and affect choices of 
research. Bok,5 Newfield,6 and Kirp7 are among those who have 
explored these concerns. Of course faculty choices of research, 
particularly in the sciences and engineering, have always been 
influenced by the availability of funds to finance the research, 
starting with funding by foundations before World War II, 
continuing through the large-scale government funding that 
came into being after World War II, and on through the rise in 
industrial funding of research that started around 1980. 
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 Greater relations with, and funding from, industry benefit 
different disciplines within the academy to different extents, as 
is also the case for government funding of research. The 
growth of research funding from government and industry has 
been challenged as a major factor leading to current concerns 
about the future of the humanities and liberal education in 
research universities, particularly public ones.8 
 If a faculty member or a university administrator has a financial 
interest in a company (e.g., ownership, consulting, or receiving 
licensing royalties) and receives funding for and/or carries out 
research relevant to that company, then a conflict of interest 
may exist. Furthermore, if a faculty member devotes excessive 
time, energy, and focus to a corporate interest or is an officer 
of a company, then a conflict of commitment exists. 
 For a publicly funded university, there can be issues relating to 
whether the university is improperly favoring one or a few 
companies or industries in the state in comparison with others. 
This array of difficult, complex, and overlapping issues calls for 
structures and policies that enable faculty members to interact 
synergistically with industry and that enable and promote movement 
of university inventions and research into the commercial world. There 
should be mechanisms that enable and facilitate patentable inventions 
to be disclosed, recognized, written as successful patent applications 
for optimal coverage, licensed, and moved effectively into and through 
the marketplace. At the same time, the essential values of the 
university must be preserved, the marketplace must be treated 
equitably, and conflicts of interest and commitment must be 
controlled. Finding the appropriate balance and policies has been a 
continual part of my own career.9 
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WHAT IT TAKES TO “TRANSFER” TECHNOLOGY 
 
Transferring university-generated technology to industry for 
commercial use is not straightforward. Typically faculty research stops 
with the discovery of new knowledge or the codification of it. Between 
that point and commercial usage, there must usually be many back-
and-forth steps. These steps include awareness, further R&D heavy on 
the D (development) side and decisions to fund that R&D, combined 
technical and commercial evaluation by sufficiently knowledgeable 
persons, assessment of the likely competition, convincing 
demonstrations of utility and market, and both decisions and 
negotiations to license the technology.10 The word innovation is often 
used in the business world to reflect the totality of these steps.  For 
good reasons this gap between research and implementation has 
become known popularly as the Valley of Death. 
Many mechanisms have been devised and utilized by universities, 
corporations, and would-be brokers or other middlemen in efforts to 
bridge this gap effectively. Consulting by faculty with industry is a time-
tested and effective method. The flow of people, whereby university 
graduates go to companies for employment after graduation, is 
another method. Sometimes the faculty member who is associated 
with an invention leaves the university temporarily or permanently to 
start a company, but more often faculty inventors involve themselves 
with such companies as prime consultants. Academic research may be 
sponsored by industrial companies, who intend to stay close to the 
research and continually evaluate possible commercialization. In some 
cases consortia of companies have funded research, to be close to it 
but with recognition that no one of the companies enjoys an advantage 
over the others. Industry-university partnerships may be formed for 
research that the company believes has potential for innovations, and 
in some instances colocated university-industry partnerships, such as 
                                                                                                                     
the faculty founders. (For further information on Engenics Corp., see Martin Kenny, 
Biotechnology: The University-Industrial Complex [New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986], pp. 
48–49.) I participated centrally in policy development for these matters for the Berkeley campus 
and then university-wide. I was also a member of the founding committee of the Council for 
Chemical Research (CCR) as of 1980 and was subsequently chair of CCR in 1989. 





the BP Energy Biosciences Institute at UC Berkeley described later in 
this chapter, have come into being. 
Starting with the California Institutes for Science and Innovation 
(chapter 14) in 2000, there has been a wave of major research 
institutes at universities accompanied by substantial industrial funding 
and interaction. Some universities have also created industrial parks to 
bring companies close to university researchers and to facilitate the 
formation of start-up companies that will utilize university research. A 
prime example is Stanford Industrial Park (see below). Another within 
UC is the Irvine Corporation’s University Research Park,11 which adjoins 
the campus of the University of California, Irvine. Before the Irvine 
Research Park was formed, Hitachi Corporation’s Plumwood House 
research laboratory became located in the biomedical research 
complex of the University of California, Irvine,12 opening in 1990. 
More recently, incubator facilities on university campuses have 
come into vogue, usually as dedicated laboratory space and with 
available consultants. These incubators are designed as places where 
ideas from research can be given initial study and tests toward ultimate 
commercialization. Some universities have created groups of advisors 
and/or seed-funding programs to help bring university inventions 
further along to the point where they will be licensed. 
National laboratories and the federal agencies overseeing them 
have seen precommercial development of new technology as one of 
their roles, particularly through the mechanism of cooperative research 
and development agreements (CRADAs)13 with industry. There was 
particular emphasis on this structure in the 1990s, and the mechanism 
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is still very much in use. Some successes have been achieved, but often 
industry does not see government as a desirable partner in 
precommercial development. 
There is no single answer. What works best is specific to the area of 
technology and even the characteristics of a particular invention, and 
what worked well in one case will not necessarily work well for 
another.  One important consideration is the amount of time, effort, 
and expense needed to bring a product to market.  Another is to whom 
that expense would be an attractive investment. 
 
 
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AT THE 
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 
 
In the early days of the University of California, faculty members 
interacted with industrial companies through public service roles and 
consulting services. One example is Willard Rising, the initial professor 
of chemistry after Ezra Carr. Rising specialized in analytical chemistry 
and performed analyses for industry for a fee that he did not take as 
personal income. He also helped local communities improve the quality 
of their water, provided public testimonials for products such as Royal 
Baking Powder, and was even simultaneously appointed both state 
analyst and analyst of the State Board of Health.14 As already noted in 
chapter 9, chemistry professor Frederick Cottrell invented the 
electrostatic precipitator while he was consulting with the DuPont 
Company at its sulfuric acid plant in Pinole, California, in the 1900s 
under an arrangement that did not give ownership of the resulting 
patents to DuPont. Rather than capitalizing on the invention himself, 
Cottrell decided that the proceeds from royalties on licensing of his 
resulting patents should be plowed back into research, and he 
therefore formed the Research Corporation,15, 16 dedicated to that 
purpose. The Research Corporation handled patents for the University 
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of California and other universities for many years and also sponsored 
research itself. 
Gilbert Newton Lewis, who arrived in Berkeley in 1912, had 
negative attitudes toward industrial liaisons. They were colored by the 
vivid dispute between William H. Walker and Arthur A. Noyes that he 
had experienced at the Research Laboratory for Chemistry at MIT 
(chapter 9). He may also have been influenced by the contentions17 
that he had with Irving Langmuir of the General Electric Company 
concerning attributions of credit within overlapping areas of interest. 
Lewis therefore discouraged industrial involvements for the College of 
Chemistry, and that attitude spread to much of the rest of the 
university. Ernest Lawrence had also not seen interacting with 
industrial companies as being useful as he built his cyclotrons and his 
laboratory; his financial support came from foundations and then the 
government. Consulting with individual companies by individual faculty 
members did continue to exist, however, particularly in areas such as 
engineering. 
The situation at Berkeley in the first half of the twentieth century 
with regard to industrial interactions contrasts sharply with that at MIT. 
There, as described in more detail in chapter 9, the Research 
Laboratory for Applied Chemistry had been created by William Walker 
expressly to build and cement ties with industry, and the financial plan 
of President Richard Maclaurin for the entire institute relied upon 
relations with industry and consequent financial support. Going back 
into the late 1800s, relations with industry had been institutionalized 
through visiting committees 18  reporting directly to both the 
corporation (board) of the institute and the administration. These 
visiting committees contained leaders of industry as well as some 
academics and other alumni. A prime example of industrial innovation 
resulting from consulting by Walker’s successors in chemical 
engineering at MIT was the contribution of Warren K. Lewis and Edwin 
R. Gilliland to the invention and development of fluid-bed catalytic 
cracking while they were consulting with Standard Oil Development 
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Company in the late 1930s.19, 20 That invention became the backbone of 
the petroleum-refining industry. The histories of industrial relations at 
MIT and the University of California, Berkeley, as well as those at 
Stanford and Penn State, have been contrasted by Matkin 21  in 
comparing how technology transfer was built at those institutions. 
The development of what is now effective patenting and 
technology transfer at the University of California was late blooming 
and involved a de facto trial-and-error process with various initiatives 
along the way. The following sketch of the early history of the 
University of California patent policy and administration is taken from 
the report of a 1994 ad hoc committee:22 
Since 1926, the University of California has required certain 
employees to report patentable inventions to the University. 
Initially the patent program’s focus was limited to meeting 
contractual obligations to research sponsors, and the 
University had no mandatory assignment policy. Authority 
over intellectual property was under The Regents at this time, 
and the Patent Policy was administered by the General 
Counsel’s Office. 
The University adopted a mandatory assignment policy in 
1963, which required all University employees or researchers 
using University funds or facilities to assign their inventions to 
the University. In 1973, responsibility for the administration 
of the patent program was moved to a Board of Patents, 
consisting of administrators and faculty appointed by The 
Regents. As the patent program grew, a more complex 
administrative structure was required. The UC Patent, 
Trademark and Copyright Office (PTCO) was founded in 1979 
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to meet the regulatory compliance requirements of 
sponsoring agencies, primarily the Federal Government, and 
to assist individual inventors in the commercialization of their 
patentable ideas. From 1979 to 1985, PTCO reported to The 
Regents and was advised by the Board of Patents. 
The primitive nature of patent oversight at the University of 
California before 1979 is conveyed by descriptions of the interactions 
between Stanford and UC as patent coverage for the Boyer-Cohen 
recombinant-DNA discoveries was being considered and pursued.23, 24 
Niels Reimers, who headed Stanford’s Office of Technology Licensing, 
became aware of the discoveries through a New York Times article that 
was forwarded to him by an administrative colleague in May 1974. 
When he became interested in securing in patent coverage,25 he found 
out from Cohen that Boyer (of UCSF) was a co-inventor, and so he 
contacted UC’s patent office. That office, the precursor to PTCO, was a 
two-person office that had a substantial number of inventions 
disclosed from within UC but no way to deal with them effectively and 
essentially no marketing efforts at all. With regard to the Boyer-Cohen 
invention, the UC office took the position that it could not participate 
in the risks associated with seeking patent coverage, not even sharing 
the filing costs. So an arrangement was made between the two 
institutions that Stanford would get 15 percent of any revenues off the 
top so as to recognize that it took the risks by covering patent-
procurement and marketing costs, and then after this deduction, the 
remaining income would be split evenly between the two universities. 
Given the foundational role of the Boyer-Cohen patent for the  
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biotechnology industry, that 15 percent off the top was a large loss of 
income for UC. 
In 1979, Roger Ditzel, who had headed international agricultural 
business development at Monsanto Corporation and had overseen 
research and patents at Iowa State University, became UC patent 
administrator, heading PTCO and still reporting directly to the Board of 
Regents.26 
In the period from 1977 to 1983, several important changes 
occurred in the United States on the national level. First of all, decisions 
were made by a number of major corporations to wind down or level 
off in-house research operations and to emphasize to a greater extent 
new technology that could be acquired elsewhere, including from 
universities. The consent-decree breakup of the American Telephone 
and Telegraph Company (AT&T) materialized in early 1982 and created 
a tenuous situation for Bell Laboratories, 27  which had been the 
industrial research star of the nation. As a result several organized 
efforts to facilitate interactions between industry and universities were 
started in various areas, a prominent example being the Council for 
Chemical Research,28 for which discussions were started in 1979 and 
which came into being in 1981. 
The Bayh-Dole Act29 of 1980 with amendments in 1984 established 
that universities had ownership rights for inventions stemming from 
university research carried out under federal government grants and 
contracts. This was important because previously the government itself 
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in the public domain unless the university had successfully completed 
an institutional patent agreement with the federal agency concerned. 
For inventions that have large up-front costs for commercial 
development, a lack of ability to own or obtain an exclusive license is a 
major discouragement. Further discussion of the Bayh-Dole Act is given 
by Mowery et al.,30 Geiger,31 and Geiger and Sá,32 among many others. 
Finally, at about this time technology transfer, connoting active 
efforts to move university inventions out into the marketplace, became 
an emphasis for many universities, and universities sought to make 
themselves more active partners with industry and more able to move 
university discoveries and inventions into commercial use. 
The University of California was no exception. In 1985 the reporting 
line for the patent office was moved from the Board of Regents to the 
president. In 1985 and again in 1987, the firm Peat Marwick was asked 
to review PTCO operations and make recommendations. In 1991 the 
name of PTCO was changed to Office of Technology Transfer to reflect 
a more active role in moving university technology out into the 
marketplace and industrial use. The volume of invention disclosures 
grew substantially, from 134 in 1978,33 to 345 in 1989,34 to 865 in 
2000,35 and to 1,769 in 2014.36 
In 1989, UC hired Carl Wootten to succeed Roget Ditzel, with an 
understanding that Wootten would considerably increase patent 
marketing efforts. Wootten had been CEO of University Technology 
Corporation, affiliated with Georgia Tech, the University of Maryland, 
Kansas State University, the University of Connecticut, and the 
University of Iowa. Previously he had directed the Patent  
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Administration Office at Duke University. Wootten’s five-year tenure 
was a time of change and turbulence, as is documented by Matkin.37 
Patent-related revenues rose from $10 million in 1989 to $45 million in 
1993. Wootten and Senior Vice President Ron Brady, to whom PTCO 
reported, advocated creating a not-for-profit foundation to take over 
the existing roles of PTCO with fewer restrictions from the university 
legal structure and policies. This foundation would be supplemented by 
a for-profit corporation to be known as the California Technology 
Ventures Corporation (CTVC), which would provide both development 
monies for underdeveloped technologies and venture capital for start-
up companies, as well as assembling management teams for new 
companies. These are now well-established private-sector roles.  
As is described by Matkin, these proposals encountered difficulty 
getting buy-in from the Academic Senate, administrative committees, 
and the regents. The problems related to both the nature of the 
proposal and the manner of approach. The proposal also engendered 
resistance from campuses to the strong centralization of functions 
within the university that they represented and the evident strong 
convictions of Wootten in that direction.38 Even though the university 
reached an agreement with the state whereby the proposed 
operations would be funded in part by the state relinquishing what was 
then its share of patent-royalty income, the proposals never came to 
fruition. 
This situation was further complicated by the involvement of Ron 
Cowan, the developer of the large Harbor Bay Isle project (near 
Oakland Airport), to which the Office of Technology Transfer moved in 
1989. The distance (eight miles) and travel time (twenty-five minutes) 
from that location to the Office of the President and the fact that it was 
still further removed from any campus fed impressions that OTT was 
working on its own rather than in concert with the rest of the 
university. There were charges of favoritism to Cowan and others that 
gave enough appearance of substance to warrant an internal UC 
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investigation. Although Wootten was cleared of most of these charges, 
he left the university soon thereafter.39 
About a year before Wootten’s departure, ex-chancellor Theodore 
Hullar of the Davis campus had been brought into the UC Office of the 
President to review the university’s technology transfer efforts. The Ad 
Hoc Technology Transfer Advisory Committee, referenced above, was 
formed. Its report40 carried through with recommendations that had 
been stirring for some time, namely that many of the functions of the 
university-wide Office of Technology Transfer should be devolved to 
technology-transfer offices on individual campuses. The objectives 
were to place technology-transfer operations in closer proximity to the 
inventors themselves and to restore a close working relationship with, 
and confidence within, the academic enterprise. The functions that 
would remain centralized were legal counsel, policy development and 
coordination, and other technology-transfer functions for campuses 
not yet having their own office. 
The recommendations from the 1994 report were adopted. Initially 
two campuses—Berkeley and UCLA, which had already established 
campus offices in 1990—chose to maximize the allowable distribution 
of functions to the campuses. By 2002, six campuses (Berkeley, Los 
Angeles, San Diego, Irvine, Davis, and San Francisco) had independent 
offices,41 and now all campuses have them, including the new Merced 
campus. The university-wide Office of Technology Transfer moved back 
from Harbor Bay Isle to the Office of the President building in Oakland 
when its lease at Harbor Bay ended. A president’s retreat for senior 
university administrators and faculty was held in January 1997 and 
served to help iron out differences. The report from it is available with 
selected parts online.42 The reporting relationship of the university-
wide office was transferred from the business side to the provost and  
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executive vice president for academic affairs in 2007, again to reflect 
the tie with academic functions of the university. In May 2016 it was 
moved again to report to a new position created by President 
Napolitano, senior vice president for innovation and 
entrepreneurship, 43  which added promotional functions and gave 
industrial relationships and entrepreneurship their own senior position 
within the university-wide administration. 
In 2004, the Berkeley campus office was renamed the Office of 
Intellectual Property and Industrial Research Alliances (IPIRA), bringing 
together the support functions for all relations with industry, including 
establishing research agreements and managing patents and licensing. 
Other campuses have also moved in this direction, and even the 




All employees of the University of California are required to sign 
and adhere to the UC patent policy.44 That policy acknowledges that 
inventions made under university employment or using university 
facilities belong to the university and indicates that the employee will 
assist the university fully if it chooses to pursue patent protection. The 
decision whether or not to patent is made by the university. In some 
cases the university will release patenting rights to the inventor if the 
university chooses not to pursue patent coverage. 
After the costs of procuring, protecting, and preserving the patent 
have been recovered, the University of California pays 35 percent of 
the net royalties and fees per invention to the inventor or splits that 
amount evenly among inventors. An additional 15 percent of net 
royalties and fees per invention is allocated to the inventor’s campus or 
national laboratory for research-related purposes. On the Berkeley 
campus, the latter portion of royalty income is passed on to academic 
departments. 
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INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY COOPERATIVE RESEARCH 
 
The Industry-University Cooperative Research Program (IUCRP)45 of 
the University of California was set up at the initiative of President 
Richard Atkinson upon his arrival in office in 1996.46 It bore similarities 
to, and held the same name as, a program that had been established at 
the National Science Foundation in the 1970s during Atkinson’s tenure 
as deputy director and then director of NSF. The program received 
state funding through a series of budgetary initiatives put forward to 
the state by the university for consideration as part of the Board of 
Regents’ annual state budget proposals in the era of partnerships and 
compacts (chapter 6). 
IUCRP served to fund research projects for which industrial support 
would be paired with state support, thereby leveraging both the 
industrial and the state funds. Projects were selected from annual 
rounds of proposals through a peer-review process. Four areas were 
initially identified for the program: biotechnology, telecommunications, 
digital media, and information technology for life sciences. Over time, 
the program subsumed the MICRO program (described below) and 
grew further to add energy, health and wellness, and nanotechnology 
as eligible fields. At its height, IUCRP drew about $20 million in 
industrial funds per year, matched with $17 million from the state of 
California, which in turn were matched by $3 million taken from within 
the university’s general budget. Following university policy, all 
intellectual property from IUCRP projects was owned by the University 
of California but could be licensed to firms under standard terms. The 
MICRO program continued its already-established policy of waiving UC 
overhead costs, but in the other areas, full indirect costs were 
recovered. An annual report for IUCRP from 2003 is available online.47 
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The program, by then renamed the Discovery Grant Program, was 
discontinued in 2008 as a budget cut during a time when state funding 
for the University of California considerably declined. However, by any 
measure the program was a considerable success during its era. 
 
 
REGIONAL INFLUENCES: TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION AND 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
 
Two prime examples display the roles that University of California 
campuses have had in regional economic development stemming from 
technological innovation. They are Silicon Valley in the San Francisco 
Bay Area and the San Diego/La Jolla area in southern California. 
 
Silicon Valley 
The area generally known as Silicon Valley lies in the southwestern 
portion of the San Francisco Bay region, roughly from Redwood City on 
the north to San Jose on the south and incorporating San Mateo and 
Santa Clara counties. It does not have sharp boundaries. The area is 
well known as the heart of innovation for the electronics and 
computing industries. The reasons why Silicon Valley blossomed as it 
did are complex and have been explored by authors such as Saxenian,48 
Kenney, 49  Lee et al., 50  Adams, 51  and Isaacson. 52  Saxenian also 
comparatively examined the dynamics of development and the relative 
degrees of success of Silicon Valley and Route 128, which surrounds 
Boston, Massachusetts. 
The Early Development of Silicon Valley. Stanford University had 
the essential and catalytic role in the initial development of Silicon 
Valley. The area had roots in radio engineering dating back to the early 
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days of that field, one of them being the Federal Telegraph Corporation 
and Lee DeForest’s work therein on developing vacuum tubes.53 One of 
the people most active in advancing knowledge about radio was 
Frederick E. Terman, who authored the leading textbook of the time on 
the subject and carried out research that was both forefront and 
practical in orientation. Terman was professor of electrical engineering 
as of 1927, dean of engineering from 1945 to 1955, and then provost (a 
newly developed post) from 1955 to 1965, all at Stanford University.54 
With the full support of then-president Wallace Sterling, Terman 
operationally designed and led the building of Stanford as an academic 
powerhouse.55, 56, 57 He is also usually given major credit for enabling 
and indirectly leading the events that primarily led to Silicon Valley. 
However, Terman’s primary endeavor was to build Stanford, and his 
contributions to the launch of Silicon Valley are in some ways a side 
benefit of the ways in which he chose to reach that main goal. 
One great need for Stanford in the aftermath of World War II was 
to build revenue, since Stanford held much less endowment and was in 
a more precarious financial situation than was the case for other major 
private US universities such as Harvard, Johns Hopkins, and MIT. 
Terman had carried out his doctoral work with Vannevar Bush at MIT 
during the 1920s and had spent World War II as director of the Radio 
Research Laboratory at Harvard. During those periods he had learned 
about the finances and academic-building approaches of Harvard and 
MIT. From his relationship with Bush, he recognized that federal 
government funding of research would probably continue and grow 
substantially after the war. He directed the building of Stanford toward 
opportunities for coupling excellent, well-regarded research with areas 
of available government funding, notably those areas favored by the 
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Office of Naval Research, which was the largest government funder of 
academic research immediately after the war. 
Terman saw a need for close relations with industry in order to 
further the goal of building research that was meaningful and informed 
by possibilities for commercial application. He and others at Stanford 
recognized the opportunity that would be afforded by creating an 
industrial park on land owned by Stanford and adjoining the university. 
An industrial park would make financially beneficial use of Stanford’s 
prime asset, which was 8,200 acres (32.8 square kilometers) of land, 
much more than was needed for the campus itself.58 The industrial 
park would provide rent as income to the university, industrial 
consulting opportunities for the faculty, and a way of fostering industry 
that would build upon the knowledge generated at Stanford. The 
industrial park was opened in 1951 with Varian Associates as the first 
tenant and Eastman Kodak as the second. As of 2004 the park, which 
had by then become known as Stanford Research Park,59 consisted of 
700 acres (2.8 square kilometers), which was 8 percent of Stanford’s 
land, with 10 million square feet (930,000 square meters) of building 
space and 23,000 employees of 150 companies distributed among 162 
buildings.60 A map of Stanford Research Park, built around Page Mill 
Road in Palo Alto, is available along with a list of current tenants.61 The 
success achieved by the Stanford Research Park touched off the 
creation of numerous university-affiliated research parks elsewhere in 
the United States and the world. Geiger62 analyzes university-industry  
 
                                                     
58 The land was left to Stanford University in the estate of Leland and Jane Stanford, who named 
the university for their deceased son, Leland Stanford Jr. Leland Stanford was one of the “Big 
Four” who built the portion of the first transcontinental railroad west of the Rocky Mountains and 
was also a governor of California. Another substantial use of Stanford land is faculty housing. 
Today 60 percent of Stanford land remains as open space (“About Stanford,” Stanford University, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20160611003910/http://facts.stanford.edu/about/lands. 
59 “Stanford Research Park,” Stanford University, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20170711214159/http://stanfordresearchpark.com/. 
60 Jon Sandelin, “The Story of Stanford Industrial/Research Park,” International Forum of 
University Science Park, China (2004), https://perma.cc/4PSM-R73X. 
61 “Our Neighborhood,” Stanford Research Park, Stanford University, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20160616114518/http://stanfordresearchpark.com/explore. 
62 Roger L. Geiger, Knowledge and Money: Research Universities and the Paradox of the 





clusters elsewhere in the United States in light of the Silicon Valley 
phenomenon. 
Terman also was a leader in the formation of the Stanford Research 
Institute (SRI), which was created in 1946 to provide more practical 
services for industry that did not fit with faculty research programs. SRI 
was so successful that it became independent of Stanford in 1970 and 
acquired RCA Laboratories in Princeton, New Jersey, in 1988. Now, as 
SRI International,63  it is a nonprofit, independent research center 
serving government and industry, with 2013 revenues in the amount of 
$540 million. 
The result of Terman’s policies and initiatives, defense contracting, 
the Stanford Industrial Park, and the Stanford Research Institute was 
that by the 1950s a vital nexus had formed among Stanford, the 
Department of Defense, and the nascent electronics industry nearby, 
riding the wave of the future in a very fast-growing area of 
technological and economic development.64 The timing was vital for 
what was accomplished. 
Another chain of events critical to the emergence of Silicon Valley 
started with the 1954 departure of William Shockley,65 one of the 
inventors of the transistor, from Bell Laboratories in New Jersey to 
form the Shockley Semiconductor Company, which was also located in 
the Stanford Industrial Park in Palo Alto. He built a team of top-notch 
engineers, but his management style was off-putting. Eight of these 
engineers, including Gordon Moore and Robert Noyce, left in 1957 to 
launch the Fairchild Semiconductor Company, which developed and 
marketed the monolithic integrated circuit.66 Then in 1968 Moore and 
Noyce, taking Andrew Grove with them, left Fairchild and formed Intel 
Corporation, which succeeded mightily in its goal of producing large 
amounts of inexpensive semiconductor memory. 67  Two other 
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companies that also had much to do with the development of Silicon 
Valley and its culture were Apple Computer and Xerox PARC (Palo Alto 
Research Center), the latter of which is also located in Stanford 
Research Park.68, 69 
Although today Silicon Valley is correctly envisioned as the premier 
location for corporate start-ups in the world, that was not the focus at 
the start. Instead, there was a much greater representation of firms 
headquartered elsewhere that opted to create branches in the Silicon 
Valley area for proximity to other firms, Stanford, and, in some cases, 
UC Berkeley. 
Sustaining University Roles. There are vigorous, ongoing 
relationships between Silicon Valley firms and California universities, 
most notably Stanford and the Berkeley campus of the University of 
California. The interactions take a number of different forms including 
 consulting by faculty, 
 licensing by companies of technology stemming from universities, 
 participation by faculty and/or alumni in the formation of new 
companies, 
 attracting to the region first-class graduate students who then stay 
and go to Silicon Valley firms for employment,  
 recruitment of faculty from industry, 
 continuing education for professionals, 
 university advisory boards composed of people from industry, and 
 sponsorship of research at universities by industrial companies or 
groups of companies. 
 
The term technology transfer evokes a concept of one-way transfer 
of university-generated technological innovations and concepts to the 
world of industry, but the interactions are very much a two-way street. 
Not only is technology effectively transferred from universities to 
industry, but university researchers also learn much from their 
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interactions with companies that is useful to their own formulations of 
research and building of knowledge. Those characteristics are not 
limited to Silicon Valley. They are features of university-industry 
interactions in general. 
The MICRO Program. An important mechanism for semiconductor 
research at the University of California was the MICRO 
(Microelectronics Innovation and Computer Research 
Operation/Opportunities) program. MICRO was started in 1981 as a 
partnership between the state of California, the microelectronics 
industry, and the University of California. The state provided funds, 
ultimately about $5 million per year, to be used to match and lever 
industrial funding for University of California research projects, which 
were selected through peer review of proposals. The University of 
California waived overhead requirements on MICRO grants, thereby 
indirectly contributing what would otherwise have been its own funds. 
Jerry Brown, the governor at the time, regarded MICRO as an effective 
defensive measure against loss of the microelectronics industry from 
California to other countries. In 2001–02, ninety-six companies 
invested $6 million in cash and equipment to fund ninety-eight 
different MICRO projects.70 As has already been noted, the program 
was then blended with the Industry-University Cooperative Research 
Program of the University of California. Along with IUCRP, it was ended 
in 2008. 
UC Berkeley and Silicon Valley. The interactions between the 
Berkeley campus of the University of California and Silicon Valley are 
robust and now rival in number and intensity those between Stanford 
and Silicon Valley. 
Lécuyer71 explores the quite different ways in which semiconductor 
innovation and entrepreneurship stem from each of three University of 
California campuses—Berkeley, Los Angeles, and Santa Barbara. He 
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notes that by virtue of the proximity of Berkeley to Silicon Valley, 
researchers at that campus focused upon silicon-integrated circuits, 
especially communications circuits, and on the software tools required 
to design complex microchips. Because of the proximity of UCLA to 
large defense-industry firms, researchers there brought in technologies 
from those companies and developed strengths in chips for broadband 
communications. Researchers at Santa Barbara, a later and 
geographically more isolated entrant, concentrated on compound 
semiconductors, thereby differentiating themselves from the other two 
campuses. 
Kenney, Mowery, and Patton72 examine the various modes of 
engagement over the years between the Department of Electrical 
Engineering and Computer Science (EECS) at UC Berkeley and Silicon 
Valley industrial firms. They do this through analysis of six specific 
major research projects that span a period of fifty years, starting with 
the early history of computing. In so doing, they give a picture of how 
interactions between EECS and what became Silicon Valley evolved 
over time. They show as well the importance of three more specific 
factors—government funding for research that ultimately leads to 
technological innovation and economic development, the flow of 
people over time, and the ways in which university-industry 
interactions have evolved in Silicon Valley. The differences among the 
projects also display the rapid rate of advances in computing. The six 
projects are as follows: 
 California Digital Computer Project (CALDIC), 1948–54. This 
project, sponsored by the US Office of Naval Research soon 
after World War II, constructed the first digital computer at a 
West Coast university. The most important contribution to the 
economy consisted of the graduates who had worked with the 
project, several of whom became leaders of the computing 
industry. Three joined the new IBM research laboratory in San 
Jose and were key to the development there of IBM’s moving-
head, hard-disk drive technology. 
                                                     
72 Martin Kenney, David C. Mowery, and Donald Patton, “Electrical Engineering and Computer 
Science at UC Berkeley and in the Silicon Valley: Modes of Regional Engagement,” in Martin 
Kenney and David C. Mowery, eds., Public Universities and Regional Growth: Insights from the 





 Project Genie and Commercial Time Sharing, 1964–68. The US 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) funded 
research in EECS at Berkeley to develop time-share computing. 
This laid groundwork for the Scientific Data Systems (SDS) 
Corporation in Los Angeles and for Tymshare, a successful 
time-share company in Cupertino, California. Three of the 
students involved in the creation of the GENIE software 
developed in connection with this project went to Xerox PARC 
to become the core of the firm’s computer research group, 
which in turn developed the first computer workstation. 
 Interactive Graphics and Retrieval System Project (INGRES) 
and the Relational Database Industry, 1973–80s. The 
relational database industry stems from competitive research 
by the IBM San Jose Laboratory and Berkeley EECS, with the 
Berkeley work sponsored by the US Department of Defense 
and the National Science Foundation. The results, which came 
to fruition during the 1970s, resulted in a tidal wave of new 
entrepreneurial firms in the San Francisco Bay Area, primarily 
in Silicon Valley (Oracle, Ingres, Britton Lee, Sybase, PeopleSoft, 
and so forth). Previously the data-base industry had been on 
the East Coast of the United States. With the relational data-
base work and start-ups, the industry moved to the West 
Coast. 
 Reduced Instruction Set Computing (RISC), late 1970s to mid-
1980s. IBM pioneered the concept of reduced instruction set 
computing as a way of accelerating the processing speed of 
integrated circuits. Competitive DARPA-funded research by 
David Patterson at Berkeley and John Hennessy at Stanford 
(where Hennessey later became president) greatly improved 
the technology and resulted in large growth of Sun 
Microsystems (working with Patterson) and the start of Silicon 
Graphics (working with Hennessey), as well as a number of 
other start-ups. The technology ultimately led to the ARM 
microprocessor that has been widely used in cell phones. 
 Berkeley UNIX Software Distribution (BSD), 1973–95. UNIX is a 
multi-task, multiuser computer operating system that was 




1956 consent agreement stemming from earlier antimonopoly 
legal considerations preceding those that led to the breakup of 
AT&T, nontelephone technology of Bell Laboratories was 
placed in the public domain. UNIX fell in that category and was 
therefore included. Working closely with Bell Labs, Berkeley 
EECS greatly improved the UNIX technology to a form known as 
Berkeley Software Distribution UNIX (BSD UNIX). DARPA made 
UNIX the standard for the ARPANET computer network that 
was the forerunner of the Internet. William Joy of Berkeley 
EECS had worked on BSD UNIX and became a founder of Sun 
Microsystems in Silicon Valley. Sun adopted BSD UNIX as its 
operating system, thereby helping to lead BSD UNIX to wide 
adoption and a foundational position for the Internet. BSD 
UNIX was made publicly available, so UC received no licensing 
fees or royalties. However, firms such as Sun have made major 
donations of research equipment and funding to Berkeley 
EECS. 
 Redundant Arrays of Inexpensive Disks (RAID), 1987. Three 
Berkeley EECS researchers (Randy Katz, David Patterson, and 
Garth Gibson) developed a methodology for using vast arrays 
of smaller discs as a superior alternative to very large hard 
drives for massive data storage. This research was 
commercialized by several existing large firms (IBM, DEC, and 
EMC), as well as through at least forty-five start-ups, most of 
which are in the San Francisco Bay Area. 
A seventh case73 is analyzed by Lécuyer. With support from the 
Army Research Office, the National Science Foundation, and the MICRO 
program, software for the design of integrated-circuit microchips was 
developed at Berkeley by Donald Pedersen and associates in the 1970s. 
This led to a widely used public-domain simulator known as SPICE 
(Simulation Program, Integrated Circuit Emphasis). SPICE, evolutions 
from it, and successors to it became the foundation of microchip 
design and led to numerous start-up companies concentrated in Silicon 
Valley. 
                                                     





Why Does Silicon Valley Surround Stanford and Not Berkeley? 
Since many faculty members from both UC Berkeley and Stanford have 
been intellectual partners with Silicon Valley firms going back to early 
days, it is logical to consider the factors that made Silicon Valley arise in 
the immediate environs of Stanford, rather than Berkeley. Adams74 
postulates that Terman at Stanford adopted a strategy of business 
orientation, demonstrating that he understood what would build 
industry-university interactions and the industrial economy of the 
Stanford region most effectively. In contrast, the leadership at Berkeley 
and UC was more oriented toward the politics of Sacramento and 
preservation of UC’s role vis-à-vis other components of the public 
higher-education sector. Stanford had not yet established a secure 
financial base, whereas Berkeley and UC had what was, at the time, a 
comfortable financial base with the state of California. But the most 
important factor was the fact that Stanford owned land and could 
readily devote a large tract to the development of an industrial park, 
which it saw as an immediate source of revenue but also turned out to 
be the magnetic hub of Silicon Valley. There is little buildable land 
available in the immediate vicinity of the Berkeley campus and none 
that would be a large, contiguous block. 
Overall Employment Needs.  High-technology industries need a 
spectrum of employee expertise, much more than just the graduates of 
research universities.  Scott, Kirst, et al., 75  have explored the 
connection between those needs and San Francisco Bay Area higher 
education, including California State University campuses, community 
colleges, private non-profit and for-profit institutions, online 
institutions, and corporate in-house programs. There have been 
continual needs for new skills and “reskilling” of employees.  The pace 
of change in the industry has been much faster than the natural 
capacity of the regional higher education system to respond, making 
adaptable continuing education more and more of a need. 
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San Diego/La Jolla 
San Diego is located in the extreme southwest corner of the United 
States, sufficiently to the south of greater Los Angeles so that it is a 
distinct and separate region. Historically, the economy of San Diego 
was centered around tourism associated with the natural beauty and 
pleasant climate of the area. A large number of military installations 
came into being in the first half of the twentieth century as the Panama 
Canal was completed and then as World War II developed in the Pacific 
arena.76 An aircraft-manufacturing industry had grown up as well, 
interacting closely with the military. With the end of World War II in 
1945, many of the military operations wound down or ceased, and the 
area was left with a problematic economy that was in clear need of 
diversification and rebuilding. 
The story of the development of the San Diego campus of the 
University of California is told in chapter 10. The Scripps Institution of 
Oceanography provided a strong scientific foundation upon which the 
campus could grow. Part of the plan for the San Diego campus was for 
a medical school that would be based heavily upon fundamental 
scientific faculty research. This portion of the plan enabled UC San 
Diego to take a strong role at the forefront of the wave of advances in 
molecular and structural biology that ultimately became the 
foundation for the biotechnology industry (see section below). The 
approach of the medical school was also important for the 
establishment of San Diego’s first biotechnology company, Hybritech. 
The longest-serving (1980–95) chancellor of UCSD, Richard Atkinson, 
took a particular interest in university-industry relations and their 
effect upon the economy.77, 78 
In the 1950s and 1960s, a series of industrial consolidations and 
redirections also brought important research activities in the private,  
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commercial sector. Notably, in 1952 General Dynamics Corporation 
was formed as a merger of several companies that had been involved 
in military production during World War II, including Consolidated-
Vultee and the Aviation Corporation (aircraft), Electric Boat 
(submarines), and Atlas (guided missiles). The CEO of General 
Dynamics, John Jay Hopkins, was a major force in recreating the San 
Diego economy and in working with Roger Revelle to bring about the 
San Diego campus of the University of California. General Dynamics and 
Hopkins also spawned General Atomics Corporation, to pursue basic 
research and development relating to atomic energy and other fields 
such as medical applications, transportation, and space flight. It too 
was located on Torrey Pines Mesa in La Jolla. General Atomics proved 
to be prolific in producing spin-off companies, more than sixty of them 
by the early 1980s. 79  One General Atomics spin-off was Science 
Applications International Corporation (SAIC). SAIC, General Atomics, 
and a number of other companies formed from these roots have been 
accomplished government contractors and creators of new technology. 
Yet another important corporate thread stemmed from Henry 
Booker, one of the first faculty hires at UCSD and a physicist working in 
the electronics of radio, communications, systems, and control. One of 
Booker’s early recruitments in that program area was Irwin Jacobs, an 
associate professor at MIT working on digital communications. Jacobs, 
in turn, formed Linkabit Corporation together with two UCLA faculty 
members, Andrew Viterbi and Leonard Kleinrock. Linkabit was initially 
intended to pool the consulting of the three faculty members, but 
moved into satellite encryption devices and television scrambling 
systems.80 More than seventy-five direct or indirect Linkabit spin-off 
companies have been identified,81 a number even greater than for 
Fairchild Semiconductor in Silicon Valley. One of these spin-offs, 
founded by Jacobs, Viterbi, and others, was Qualcomm, which achieved 
a premier position in cellular telephone technology and now (2017) has 
over $22 billion in annual sales. All told, from 1984 to 2004, more than 
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two hundred communications companies were founded in San Diego, 
the largest concentration in the United States. 
There is also a reciprocal relationship between the successes of 
Linkabit and Qualcomm and the fact that Irwin Jacobs came from 
UCSD, in that Jacobs has donated hundreds of millions of dollars to 
UCSD for various purposes, and the School of Engineering at UCSD is 
now the Jacobs School of Engineering (figure 10-12).82 
The profusion of expertise and leading-edge technology 
development in wireless communications in the San Diego area made 
UCSD a strong contender and a winner in partnership with the 
University of California, Irvine, in the competition for the California 
Institutes on Science and Innovation in the year 2000 (chapter 14). 
Facilitating Technology Transfer. Walshok and Lee83 identify five 
catalytic factors that they believe were preconditions for the rise of 
high-tech entrepreneurism in the San Diego area, as follows: 
 Regional Land-Use Decisions. The San Diego City Council designated 
and donated prime oceanside land on the Torrey Pines Mesa 
adjoining the existing Scripps Institution for Oceanography for high-
tech development. This step joined with the acquisition of a 
decommissioned US Marines rifle range (Camp Matthews) on 
Torrey Pines Mesa to create the land that was provided to UC for 
its San Diego campus and to the Salk Institute, General Atomics, 
what became the Scripps Research Institute, and the Sanford-
Burnham Institute. This foresighted and focused land-use planning 
contrasts starkly with the more politically contentious and 
piecemeal approaches that have been taken in many other recent 
military base-closure and reuse situations in the United States. 
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Figure 18-1. Aerial view of University of California, San Diego, campus, with 
Geisel Library in the upper-left quadrant and the Salk Institute at the top 
across Torrey Pines Road84 
 
 
 Building Globally Competitive Research Institutions from the 
Ground Up. The Salk Institute and General Atomics were start-ups 
established in the 1950s and 1960s, as was the San Diego campus 
of UC. The Revelle plan for UCSD brought in academic superstars 
from the start, and those faculty members and their initial hires 
brought an entrepreneurial spirit with them, leading to faculty 
hires such as Irwin Jacobs and Ivor Royston (Hybritech). 
 A Local Culture of Collaboration among the Academic, Public, and 
Private Sectors. In its efforts to redirect and build the economy 
after World War II, San Diego benefitted greatly from the interest  
 
 
                                                     





and willingness of civic, corporate, and university leaders to work 
together synergistically as a team. This helped greatly in the land-
use decisions for the Torrey Pines Mesa, both in convincing the 
University of California to undertake most of the unusual and 
expensive Revelle plan to give the San Diego campus a running 
start at the highest level of academic quality and in adding to the 
general appeal of the area for research institutions and corporate 
start-up ventures. 
 Continuous Private-Sector Commitment to Engage with UCSD on 
Supporting High-Tech Entrepreneurship. This was primarily carried 
out through UCSD CONNECT, described in the following section. 
 A Powerful Sense of “Place” That Binds All Inhabitants. Because of 
San Diego’s location in the extreme southwestern corner of the 
United States and its geographical separation by mountain ranges 
and other features, San Diegans have historically had a sense that 
they are integrally linked and must work together. This gives rise to 
the culture of collaboration mentioned above. 
 
UCSD CONNECT. The research institutions had important roles in 
drawing science-based companies to the San Diego area, although 
there were no programs or priorities of the university or the research 
institutions toward fostering commercial development until the 1980s. 
Instead it was more a matter of what individuals did upon their own 
initiatives. There was also no substantial venture-capital community in 
San Diego until the 1990s. In part because of this lack, in 1985 UCSD 
worked with the local community to create UCSD CONNECT. CONNECT 
is an organization that brings together all participants in the innovation 
and commercialization process—scientists, corporate pioneers, 
venture capitalists, law firms, and providers of various other services—
with the aims of creating a favorable environment for innovation and 
formation of new commercial ventures, as well as providing specific 
advice and help to persons wanting to commercialize technological 
developments.85 In 2005, CONNECT, now with about twenty employees 
and an annual budget of $3 million, was spun off from UCSD to achieve 
independent status. The university retains the same strong degree of 
                                                     





involvement. Since its founding, CONNECT has assisted more than 
three thousand start-up companies in attracting over $2 billion of 
investment capital. CONNECT has achieved a very positive reputation 





The biotechnology industry stems heavily from California and has a 
uniquely close involvement with universities. The San Francisco and 
San Diego campuses of the University of California have both had major 
roles in the birth and continued development of the industry in their 
respective regions of the state. Stanford University, UC Berkeley, and 
the University of Southern California have had significant roles, and 
there were also contributions from Caltech and other University of 
California campuses. The three largest clusters of the biotechnology 
industry in the United States, in order, are the San Francisco Bay area in 
California, the Boston area in Massachusetts, and the San Diego area in 
California. 87  That fact is strongly related to the nature of the 
universities located in those areas and activities within those 
universities. With regard to other leading universities, Breznitz88 has 
provided an analysis of how the technology-transfer operations of 
Cambridge University (United Kingdom) and Yale University have 
differed and how they have contributed to the development of the 
biotechnology industry in those areas. 
The biotechnology industry was launched through the technology 
for recombinant DNA that came from the collaborative research of 
Herbert Boyer at UCSF and Stanley Cohen at Stanford.89 As was noted 
above, that technology was protected jointly by Stanford and the 
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University of California through a patent that was applied for in 1974 
and issued in 1980 and is now among the most licensed of all time.90, 91 
Patenting of such a fundamental biological technique was a novelty at 
the time and was controversial in several respects. 
Here we shall explore the ways in which the biotechnology industry 
formed around the San Francisco and San Diego campuses of the 
University of California. Casper92 provides an insightful analysis of the 
ways in which these two largest actors participated in the creation of 
the industry. Interestingly, the methods and dynamics have been 
strikingly different in the two locales. 
 
UC San Francisco 
In chapter 10 the development of research excellence at UCSF was 
examined, in particular the contributions of the leadership of William 
Rutter and the research that produced three Nobel Prizes and led to 
the discovery of recombinant DNA, jointly between UCSF and Stanford 
researchers. By building a research faculty in the manner that he did, 
Rutter leapt over the issues that other universities faced in needing to 
promote transdisciplinary research, expand interests to more complex 
organisms, and/or integrate with clinical research. Jong93 analyzes the 
differences between UCSF, Berkeley, and Stanford in biochemistry and 
molecular biology at the time of the recombinant-DNA revolution. He 
contrasts Rutter’s approach at UCSF with those at Stanford and 
Berkeley. At Stanford the disciplines remained separate in research, 
and the interests of the principal figure, Arthur Kornberg, remained on 
simpler organisms. At Berkeley developments were hampered by 
organizational and geographic separation of researchers. Berkeley  
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ultimately in the early 1980s had to reorganize twenty biological 
departments that were based on species and applications into three 
departments based upon structural scale. These changes enabled 
forefront research, modernized facilities, and sufficient interactions 
and access to key instrumentation (see chapter 12). 
Commercial biotechnology in the San Francisco Bay Area started 
with the decision by Herbert Boyer of UCSF and Robert Swanson, a 
young and itinerant venture capitalist, to form Genentech Corporation, 
which in 1976 became the first substantial biotechnology company.94 
As already noted, Boyer was codiscoverer, with Stanley Cohen of 
Stanford, of recombinant DNA. The founders of Genentech worked on 
an open-science model in which research and scientific information 
were shared freely, through open publication and through close 
interactions with researchers in universities and elsewhere. This was a 
natural outgrowth of the atmosphere that Rutter and coworkers had 
established at UCSF, and which had worked so well for advancing 
science there. In fact, cofounder Boyer maintained his UCSF 
professorship and research rather than transferring to Genentech. 
Open science was the natural way of working in the universities from 
which the Genentech scientists had come, and it had the added 
advantage of keeping everyone at the forefront of knowledge without 
restrictions of secrecy. It leads to a constant flow of ideas and people 
back and forth between universities and companies.  
This nonsecret mode of operation was acceptable and even 
appealing to the San Francisco Bay Area venture capitalists involved in 
financing the start of the industry since it was also the working mode of 
the Silicon Valley electronics industry, with which they were heavily 
involved and that was already flourishing. From a business standpoint, 
the idea was to gain fame and start-up investments by exhibiting 
scientific capabilities and promise. Thus, one of the first undertakings 
of Genentech was to enter and win in 1978 an open competition held 
by the Eli Lilly pharmaceutical company for the development of human 
insulin, the technology for which was then licensed by Lilly.95 
                                                     
94 Sally Smith Hughes, Genentech: The Beginnings of Biotech (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2011). 
95 Stephen S. Hall, Invisible Frontiers: The Race to Synthesize a Human Gene (New York: Atlantic 




Universities now have policies on relations with industry, on what 
will and will not be done under contracts or grants from industry, and 
on the uses of space and resources within the university. In the early 
years of Genentech, experiments for company purposes including the 
human-insulin work for the Eli Lilly competition were performed in 
Boyer’s UCSF laboratories. Research supporting faculty entrepreneurial 
ventures was performed in other UCSF laboratories too, leading to 
controversies within the university, introspection, and eventually 
policies forbidding use of space and resources for nonuniversity 
purposes and governing conflicts of interest (see below).96, 97, 98 
The success of Genentech, the research atmosphere at UCSF, and 
the fact that both Berkeley and Stanford biological sciences were 
evolving in the research direction of UCSF resulted in a flood of other 
new biotechnology companies. At least seventy-nine companies 
licensing UCSF technology were founded between 1976 and 2003, and 
UCSF faculty members were directly involved in the founding of forty-
one of them.99 One of these companies, Chiron, was successfully 
founded by Rutter himself, along with Pablo Valenzuela of UCSF and 
Edward Penhoet of UC Berkeley. The open-science approach was also 
followed by most of these other Bay Area biotech start-up companies. 
One reason is that many of the founders were faculty members. Also, 
venture capitalists would often seek managers and scientists from 
firms already in their portfolio to staff new start-up companies. 
Genentech itself was a particular source of scientists and leaders. 
Genentech was sold in 2009 to Roche for $46.8 billion,100 and Chiron 
was acquired by Novartis in 2006 for $5.4 billion.101 
Oral Histories. As noted earlier in this chapter, there is a rich 
collection of oral histories of those connected with the start of  
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California biotechnology, especially in Northern California.102 Those 
represented include persons from both the business world and 
universities, with particular emphasis on Genentech and Chiron. 
 
UC San Diego 
Due to the timing and nature of the founding of its campus, UCSD 
was also able to get a running start toward the sort of molecular and 
structural biology research that would launch the biotechnology 
industry. Following the Revelle plan, David Bonner, an outstanding 
molecular biologist from Yale, was hired and arrived in 1960, at the 
start of the campus. His vision was to build in much the same way that 
Rutter had at UCSF, with emphasis on bringing the relevant disciplines 
and subdisciplines together and on integrating modern biology 
research into what would be the new research-based School of 
Medicine. UC San Diego actually had ten faculty positions in the School 
of Medicine that were controlled by the campus Biology 
Department.103 As for UCSF, modern biology at UCSD became the 
catalyst for launching a biotechnology hub within the region. 
However, the way in which the industry came about in the La 
Jolla/San Diego area was substantially different from what happened in 
the San Francisco Bay area. The industry developed much more on a 
proprietary model without open science or free flow of information. 
That ownership approach fits the fact that most products of 
biotechnology require large up-front investment before there can be 
sales and revenue, mainly because of the extensive needs for clinical 
trials preceding approval of the product by the US Food and Drug 
Administration. In fact, this need has caused the open-science model in 
San Francisco Bay Area biotechnology to evolve toward a proprietary 
and ownership model over the years. 
The creation of the biotechnology industry in the San Diego area 
started with the 1978 formation of Hybritech by Ivor Royston, who had 
that same year joined the UC San Diego School of Medicine as assistant 
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professor.104 The subject area for Hybritech was molecular medical 
diagnostics, using target-specific monoclonal antibodies. This technique 
had come from 1975 work at Cambridge University in England by Cesar 
Milstein and Georges Köhler that was recognized by the 1984 Nobel 
Prize for Medicine. Cambridge chose to dedicate that invention to the 
public domain. Equipped with that knowledge, with cell lines from his 
postdoctoral work at Stanford, and with the services of his former 
Stanford associate Howard Birndorf, Royston worked with Brook Byers 
of the venture-capital firm Kleiner Perkins to form Hydritech and 
commercialize the technology. Howard (Ted) Greene of Baxter 
International was hired as CEO and brought with him several other 
persons from Baxter. The Baxter background was useful because of 
Baxter’s policy of moving employees among positions so as to give 
them diverse and comprehensive experience; 105  thus, they were 
versatile. 
Hybritech was a large success, so much so that it was bought by Eli 
Lilly in 1986 for about $400 million. That acquisition was not a happy 
one, since it generated strong tensions between the conservative, 
midwestern management of Lilly and the more free-wheeling approach 
of the Hybritech people in San Diego, leading to the comment of one 
senior Hybritech scientist that “it was like Animal House meets The 
Waltons”. That result was unhappy for Lilly and for the future of 
Hybritech, but it greatly stimulated the biotechnology industry of the 
San Diego area as former Hybritech managers spread out to form other 
biotechnology companies, often in concert with scientists from UC San 
Diego or one of the other strong biotech research institutes in La 
Jolla.106 A 2002 study found over forty biotechnology companies in San 
Diego with a senior manager or board advisor linked to Hybritech.107 
 
Large-Scale Research Linkages—UC Berkeley 
Another approach that started in the early days of biotechnology 
was for major corporations to undertake formal, in-depth, and 
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potentially long-term large-scale linkages with major universities or 
academic research centers in order to stay close to developments in 
molecular and structural biology and become aware of new 
developments earlier than they otherwise might. At first these 
partnerships were primarily with private institutions in the eastern and 
midwestern portions of the United States, and in particular Harvard 
and MIT, although there was also a $30 million research agreement in 
1980 between Johnson & Johnson and the Scripps Clinic and Research 
Foundation in La Jolla directed toward synthetic vaccines. Those early 
linkages and the Whitehead Institute, a privately funded adjunct of 
MIT, are described and compared by Kenney.108 The early approaches 
had mixed results, and renewals of the relationships were hindered by 
changes in corporate organization, management, and strategy. Over 
the years subsequently, large companies have gotten into the 
biotechnology business more by purchase of successful start-up firms 
than through large-scale partnerships with universities. 
Two more recent large-scale university-industry partnerships on 
biotechnology research, both centering on the Berkeley campus of the 
University of California, are agreements with Novartis and with BP, 
which are described in the following sections. 
Berkeley-Novartis Agreement. In 1998, a research agreement was 
made between the Berkeley campus of the University of California and 
Novartis, a large Swiss pharmaceutical and biotechnology company. 
The arrangement was unusual in its design and because it made such a 
sizeable contract between a commercial firm and a public university. 
The arrangement was controversial, has been thoroughly analyzed by 
several parties, and is probably the agreement of this nature that is 
most thoroughly documented in public media. It is therefore both 
worthy and valuable for consideration as a learning experience. A 
useful and insightful analysis of the drivers for the arrangement and of 
the benefits and concerns has been made by Berkeley political science 
professor Todd LaPorte.109 
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In the first unusual step, the initiator of the process was not the 
company but instead the College of Natural Resources of the Berkeley 
campus, which established a two-year period in which it solicited 
proposals from six major corporations. Novartis was selected after 
consideration of more detailed proposals from the four of those 
companies that responded with interest. By the terms of the ultimate 
agreement, Novartis contributed $5 million per year for five years, or 
$25 million total, for support of research in Berkeley’s Department of 
Plant and Microbial Biology (PMB). This turned out to be about 30 
percent of the total extramurally funded research budget of the 
department during those years. The portion of the funds devoted to 
overhead was 33 percent—that is, a 50 percent indirect-cost rate—
covering renovations, support of the general graduate program, and 
general campus and university overhead. These indirect costs were 
divided fifty-fifty between the university-wide and campus 
administrations of UC,110 with most of the campus portion being used 
for graduate-student fellowships in the Department of Plant and 
Microbial Biology. 
Another very important component of the agreement was access 
by Berkeley researchers on a confidential basis to the Novartis 
agricultural genomic database. This was coupled with the expectation, 
which never materialized, of $3 million for a Novartis facility near the 
campus with workstations through which that database could be 
accessed and advisory Novartis employees who would help with 
access. The value of this aspect of the arrangement lay in the fact that 
a substantial amount of genomic data was at the time confidential to 
large companies. This placed the academic researchers in a situation 
where they would normally carry out research without full access to 
the then-existent knowledge base. 
In return, Novartis received first rights to license a fraction of 
inventions from research in the department, whether or not supported 
with actual Novartis funds. That fraction was the ratio of the Novartis 
funding to the total departmental extramural research support, cited 
                                                                                                                     
Workshop (Washington, DC: National Research Council, National Academy Press, 2000), pp. 66–
84, https://perma.cc/JCZ5-4RG4. 
110 This was before the 1995 change to distribute 94 percent of indirect costs to the campuses 





as a method of calculation recommended by National Institutes of 
Health guidelines for arrangements involving both NIH and private 
support. Novartis also received the conventional thirty-day opportunity 
to review potential publications for patentable items and an additional 
sixty days if the decision was made to seek patent coverage. 
The project was overseen by a six-member advisory committee 
with three members from the campus (the vice chancellor for research, 
the dean of the College of Natural Resources, and a noninvolved faculty 
member) and three members from Novartis. There was also a five-
member research committee, three of whom were from the campus 
and two from Novartis, to select among proposals and award actual 
grants. 
A number of concerns were expressed at the time and throughout 
the term of the agreement. These are summarized by LaPorte111 and in 
the 2002 report112 of an internal UC Berkeley administrative review. 
Many of the concerns dealt with academic freedom, notably the right 
of faculty members to choose and pursue research as they saw fit. 
Other concerns dealt with possible influence of corporate interests on 
the governance and academic workings of the PMB Department and 
with the possibility of Novartis “cherry-picking” from among all 
discoveries within the department, whether or not Novartis had 
actually supported the research. Those concerns eventually formed the 
lead items for an aggressively hostile story113 in the Atlantic Monthly, 
which eventually was expanded into a book.114 
As the controversy continued, there was the aforementioned 
internal administrative review commissioned by the Berkeley campus, 
followed by an external review undertaken at the behest of the 
Berkeley Division of the Academic Senate with the concurrence of the 
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administration. That external review,115 subsequently published as a 
book,116 concluded that academic freedom and the academic conduct 
of the department had not been seriously compromised. The reviewers 
also made a number of recommendations, one of which was that the 
university should consider avoiding industry agreements that involve 
complete academic units or comparable large groups of researchers. 
The agreement, the reviews, and lessons learned have also been 
discussed by Geiger and Sá.117 
During the five-year period of the agreement, there was a major 
restructuring of Novartis that eliminated the unit that had made the 
agreement. Hence renewal of the agreement beyond the five-year 
period became moot. 
In addition to the academic-freedom issue, which was probably 
well enough addressed with regard to the specifics of research, 
essential questions surrounding this venture remained: To what extent 
should public institutions, and entire departments within those 
institutions, pair themselves with private corporations? Can academic 
objectivity be maintained amid such a presence? Is it appropriate to 
“sell” research liaisons with a department competitively to the highest 
bidder? And is it appropriate for a public institution that derives 
substantial taxpayer support, including corporation taxes, to match 
itself so visibly with one corporation? Conversely, it can be argued that 
a large amount of the total revenue of public universities (on order of 
77 percent for the University of California) comes from sources other 
than the state budget and student fees, and that corporations within 
the state thereby do receive the benefit of their taxes, even when such 
arrangements are made with a single corporation. Another substantive 
issue is how confidential data (in this case, the Novartis agricultural 
genomic database) can be used in publishable research while fulfilling 
simultaneously needs for the openness of science and the ability for 
others to reproduce results. 
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Institutes for Science and Innovation. The creation and selection 
processes for the California (subsequently Governor Gray Davis) 
Institutes for Science and Innovation have been described in chapter 
14. One of these (QB3) is in the area of quantitative biotechnology. 
There has been a very large component of industrial interaction for 
these institutes, and indeed, most of the matching funds for creating 
the institutes have been derived from industry. The modes of 
interaction of these institutes with industry fall within overall 
University of California policies and include features such as member, 
affiliate, and partner programs with benefits such as participation in 
workshops, visiting fellow programs, seats on scientific advisory boards 
and industrial advisory councils, and collaborative start-up and 
incubation programs, as well as research grants for individual 
projects.118, 119, 120, 121 
Energy Biosciences Institute. In 2006, the multinational energy 
firm BP (formerly British Petroleum) announced an intention to create 
a major research operation in conjunction with one or more major 
universities. After preliminary explorations, BP invited five universities 
worldwide to form teams to submit proposals to join with BP in an 
Energy Biosciences Institute (EBI), which would be funded by $500 
million spread over ten years. This institute would bring BP researchers 
together with university researchers and would emphasize innovative 
means of creating and producing fuels from biological sources. In early 
2007, the competition was won by a team headed by the University of 
California, Berkeley (UCB), which also included the Lawrence Berkeley 
National Laboratory (LBNL) and the University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign (UIUC). The proposal submitted by this partnership to BP is 
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available online,122 as is a business-school case study123 describing the 
process and the factors surrounding it.  
BP spokespersons indicated that important factors in the selection 
of the Berkeley-led team were the large and diverse array of 
distinguished researchers, the tradition of technological innovation and 
entrepreneurship in the San Francisco Bay Area, and the history of 
successful, large multidisciplinary science projects at LBNL.124, 125 The 
existence of QB3 was also important, since it already had a positive 
reputation and an established team within it that could write the final 
proposal within the specified short time interval of sixty days. The 
attention given at the time to the UC Berkeley Artemisinin Project and 
the firm Amyris Biotechnologies,126 for which the CEO was a former BP 
employee, may have been helpful as well. The inclusion of the 
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory served to bring the federal 
government into the arrangement. 
The full agreement between BP and the Regents of the University 
of California is also available.127 Elements of the arrangement and 
governance include the following: 
 A new building was built on university-owned land adjacent to the 
Berkeley campus to house the Energy Biosciences Institute. 
Construction of the five-story, 112,800-square-foot building ($133 
million) was financed by a combination of $40 million dollars in 
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state lease-revenue bonds, external financing primarily from British 
Petroleum, and private gifts.128 The building belongs to UC and 
during the EBI project has been a form of state and university cost-
matching to the project. It does require substantial debt servicing. 
There was a similar space provision for the portion of the project at 
the University of Illinois. 
 The building space was to be divided into open and proprietary 
(BP) research portions, with up to fifty BP personnel doing BP 
proprietary research accommodated in the building along with UC 
and LBNL scientists for the duration of the agreement. 
 Up to 30 percent of the total funding from BP was to be spent on 
the BP scientists (i.e., $150 million out of the total of $500 million). 
 $100 million of the total funding was to be used at UIUC to fund 
research on crops for ethanol and other biofuels. 
 The director was to be both a UCB faculty member and a faculty 
senior scientist at LBNL, the associate director a BP employee, and 
the deputy director a UIUC faculty member. 
 A governing board was composed of eight senior persons from the 
various participating organizations (two from BP; one each from 
UCB, LBNL, and UIUC; and the director, associate director, and 
deputy director of the institute). 
 There were to be twenty-five themed research teams, with seven 
of them located at UIUC. 
 Full institutional overhead was to be paid to UCB and UIUC on all 
open research funded by BP, with 75 percent of these indirect 
costs returned by those institutions to the Energy Biosciences 
Institute for administrative purposes. 
 Intellectual property was to be owned by the participating 
institution that generated it, with BP having the right to license, 
royalty-free and nonexclusively, inventions made by researchers 
supported with BP money. Joint inventions were to have joint 
ownership. 
 BP had the right to take royalty-bearing exclusive licenses on 
patented inventions in a time-limited fashion. 
                                                     





An apparent motive for BP in setting up such an institute was close 
access to leading-edge research in an area that was seen as vital to the 
future of the corporation, with a high premium placed on intimate day-
to-day interactions of BP researchers with those from the other 
institutions. The interest of BP in this form of research relationship was 
probably stimulated by the fact that the chief scientist of BP at the time 
was Steven Koonin, a noted physicist, who had been provost of Caltech 
and was subsequently under secretary of energy for the United States 
and is now director of the Center for Urban Science and Progress of 
New York University. 
There were a number of concerns to be dealt with in the 
relationship. One was how to handle proprietary corporate research 
that is being carried out in close proximity with academic and national-
laboratory researchers. The presence of proprietary corporate research 
on or adjacent to a university campus was not unprecedented, 
however, having been done, for example, at Hitachi’s Plumwood House 
research laboratory in the biomedical research complex of UC Irvine, 
mentioned earlier in this chapter. A second concern, familiar from the 
Novartis agreement described above, was the preferential position 
given by a public university to a single private corporation with regard 
to the research of a large number of distinguished faculty members. A 
third concern was the need to ensure academic freedom in the choice 
and conduct of research. Recognizing these issues, the Berkeley 
campus developed both the proposal and the ultimate agreement in 
close consultation with the leadership of the faculty Academic Senate, 
something that had not been done for the Novartis agreement. Both 
the administration and the Academic Senate were usefully informed by 
the experience gained in the earlier Novartis project. The Academic 
Senate chartered a special committee to develop a guidance 
document129 on university-industry relationships. The document was of 
considerable use to the administration in the negotiations with BP130 
and provides guidelines for future relationships. 
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Although there was predictably some criticism131 from one of the 
sources that had criticized the UC Berkeley-Novartis agreement, it was 
apparent that the university had undergone a learning experience with 
the Novartis partnership, and this agreement with BP was, on the 
whole, far less controversial than had been the one with Novartis. 
Both the financial circumstances of BP and the world energy 
situation changed during the ten years of the agreement, 2007–17. BP 
experienced its Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 
April 2010, leading to major financial liabilities and a much more 
precarious financial situation for the company. There was also a sharp 
drop 132  in oil prices associated with developments in pressurized 
hydraulic fracturing of shale (“fracking”) and OPEC (Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Companies) policy, deferring the advent of large-
scale commercial use of biotechnology for fuels further into the future. 
BP chose not to renew the contract beyond 2017, also exercising a 
contract option to reduce its funding by one-third in 2015 to just $5 
million per year beyond that, followed by an extra year to smooth the 
transition.133 
It is important that universities recognize that industrial needs and 
financial situations do change and that large-scale industrial 
partnerships should be viewed as a one-time package when they are 
established. This factor has been apparent throughout the entire 
history of large-scale university-industry partnerships. A university 
cannot hitch its wagon to an industrial star for the long run. 
Another aspect to be stressed from a larger view of the Energy 
Biosciences Institute story is that success breeds success in building 
research prominence. As noted, the fact that QB3, the Governor Gray 
Davis Institute, already existed and had already brought together a 
team greatly facilitated preparation of what became the winning 
proposal for the Energy Biosciences Institute. The existence of QB3 and  
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the fact that the Energy Biosciences Institute would be in Berkeley 
considerably enhanced Berkeley’s position in the nearly simultaneous 
selection by the US Department of Energy of locations for its three 
Bioenergy Research Centers, which led to the Joint Bioenergy 
Institute134 in Emeryville, California, led by the Lawrence Berkeley 
National Laboratory. 
The reduction and then cessation of BP funding left the Energy 
Biosciences Institute with several challenges. It had excellent biological 
and chemical laboratory spaces in a new building but a mission that 
was now hampered by low oil prices and less immediate interests of 
the business world in biofuels. Meanwhile, it had strong faculties at 
Berkeley and Urbana-Champaign with wide and diverse capabilities. In 
that sense it is a good research facility with abilities to involve strong 
researchers from any of many areas, now assessing its mission and 
seeking one or more new sponsors.  
In 2017 it was announced135 that Shell had concluded a $25 million 
partnership with UC Berkeley, $5 million per year for five years with the 
Energy Biosciences Institute, to “pursue fundamental research in the 
areas of solar energy transformation, advanced energy storage in novel 
synthesis routes to create new products, and to leverage new 
capabilities in computational material science and biosciences and 
bioengineering.” Obviously this commitment and opportunity will draw 
in a substantially different mix of researchers. 
These large-scale arrangements have been followed by additional 
industry-university arrangements, now tending to be much more 
targeted and not of such large size.  For example, two subsequrnt 
arrangements involving Berkeley’s College of Chemistry have been the 
California Research Alliance (CARA) by BASF (2014, renewed for five 
more years in 2017) involving inorganic materials and bioscience,136 
and the Novartis-Berkeley Center for Proteomics and Chemistry 
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Technologies, aimed at new chemistry directed toward difficult drug 
targets.137 
 
Biotechnology, Agriculture, and Medicine in the University of 
California Patent Portfolio 
The patents from which the University of California derives 
licensing income are heavily in biotechnology, agriculture, and 
medicine, with the portion attributable to biotechnology having risen 
over the years as the field has developed. The twenty-five top-earning 
inventions for the fiscal year 2015 are shown in table 18-1.  As tends to 
be the case, this list is dominated by a few inventions with very large 
licensing volume, a feature that makes performance comparison 
among universities difficult.  
The top-earning UC inventions since licensing began were reported 
in a presentation to the Board of Regents in January, 2012.138 
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Table 18-1. University of California top-earning inventions, 
fiscal year 2015139 
[Invention (Campus), Royalty & Fee Income ($1,000s)] 
 
1. Prostate Cancer Drug (LA) $65,513 
2. Device for the Treatment of Atrial Fibrillation (SF) $19,518 
3. Hepatitis-B Vaccine (SF)                                                                              $10,080 
4. Bovine Growth Hormone (SF) $6,697 
5. EGF Receptor Antibodies (SD) $7,058 
6. Nephropathic Cystenosis Treatment (SD) $4,280 
7. Chromosome Painting (LLNL) $3,121 
8. Tango Mandarin (RV) $2,504 
9. San Andreas Strawberry (DA) $2,458 
10. Firefly Luciferase (SD) $2,358 
11. Dynamic Skin Cooling Device (IR) $2,157 
12. Detection of Mycoplasma (IR) $2,141 
13. Albion Strawberry (DA) $1,586 
14. Monterey Strawberry (DA) $1,427 
15. Micro Implant for the Treatment of Glaucoma (IR) $1,375 
16. Tear Osmometer for Dry Eye Disease Diagnosis (SD) $1,139 
17. Golden Hills Pistachio (DA) $1,137 
18. Yeast Expression Vector (SF) $1,030 
19. Energy Transfer Primers (BK)  $937 
20. Camarosa Strawberry (DA)  $821 
21. Macromolecules for Drug/Diagnostic Delivery (SD)  $661 
22. Ventana Strawberry (DA)  $637 
23. Portola Strawberry (DA)  $611 
24. Gate Field Plate Fabrication (SB)  $516 
25, Optical Network Switch (DA)  $507 
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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA POLICIES AND ADMINISTRATIVE 
STRUCTURES PERTAINING TO RELATIONS WITH INDUSTRY 
 
Institutional Oversight 
The University of California develops policies through highly 
consultative and interactive processes involving the Academic Senate 
and groups of persons with like administrative functions on the 
different campuses, coordinated through the administrative chain of 
leadership (see chapters 6 and 8). University-wide policies are 
incorporated into the Academic Personnel Manual or other compendia. 
Enforcement of policies is achieved through mandatory disclosure 
policies, such as the annual Supplement to the Bio-bibliography,140 
which is a comprehensive report on activities that each faculty member 
must make each year. Department chairs are responsible for reviewing 
the bio-bibliography forms for inclusiveness. Faculty members must 
also disclose any potential conflicts of interest at the time grant 
proposals are submitted for campus approval and submission. 
Situations thereby disclosed are reviewed and judged by specially 
constituted university committees, deans, and/or department chairs, 
as appropriate to the situation. The review committees can be either 
standing or ad hoc. 
Many policies or policy envelopes are determined for the entire 
ten-campus university, while other implementing policies within 
university-wide policy envelopes are campus-specific. There are two 
different categories of policies—those for the relationship of the 
University of California as an institution with industry and those 
governing relationships with companies by faculty members and other 
researchers, individually or as groups. 
 
Policies for Institutional Interactions 
For years institutional interactions with specific companies were 
evaluated on an ad hoc basis, following what seemed at the time to 
make good academic sense. An example was the aforementioned 
relationship between the Berkeley Department of Plant Biology and  
 
                                                     




Novartis Corporation. Before the subsequent BP agreement was put 
into place, the Berkeley campus administration worked with the 
Academic Senate to codify policy ground rules for large-scale campus 
interactions with industry, thereby producing the document referenced 
above which now exists as guidance for the future as well. 
 
Policies for Faculty Interactions with Industry 
Consulting. The most common form of faculty interaction with 
industry is private consulting. The Berkeley campus statement of policy 
for faculty consulting141 is extensive and includes 
 limits on consulting time, 
 intellectual property aspects including the opportunity for the 
university to review disclosures to assess whether to assert 
ownership, 
 a requirement of annual reporting, 
 review for conflicts of interest, and 
 counsel for the faculty on what to seek in consulting 
agreements. 
Consulting is further restricted for certain health-sciences (e.g., 
medical) faculty members whose clinical activities are included in a 
comprehensive compensation plan that includes practice142 and for 
those faculty members in agricultural areas whose appointments 
involve advisory work through Cooperative Extension.143, 144 
Principles. Several general concepts have driven the generation of 
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 In line with the nature of a public university and to avoid 
suspicion, the university emphasizes transparency and strong 
rules on full disclosure. Potential conflicts of interest must be 
revealed and analyzed. Judgments of potential conflicts are 
typically done by committees of faculty peers from a variety of 
disciplines. 
 Economic and societal benefits are major outgrowths of a 
strong public research university. Hence, public service is 
encouraged, as is consulting, within appropriate limits. 
Research leaves by faculty for business start-ups are also 
encouraged, but all these activities are subject to limits. 
 Time paid for by the university should be used for purposes 
that serve the university and a faculty member’s roles within it. 
Leaves without pay can be considered when faculty members 
are engaged in nonuniversity matters, but should be limited in 
duration. 
 The university is open and, in general, does not engage in 
secret or confidential research. Both the University of 
California and its Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory have 
no classified (i.e., military secret) research. 
 There should be clear rules about graduate student 
involvement which ensure that students can interact freely 
with faculty and peers, without information being withheld. 
A list of UC policies governing university-industry relations for faculty 
members is available. 145  Brief descriptions of the most pertinent 
specific policies follow. (See earlier in this chapter for the patent 
policy.) 
Copyright. Following the tradition that scholars own their own 
writings or other output subject to copyright, the University of 
California copyright policy gives ownership to academic employees 
producing books, papers, works of art, and so forth. For externally 
sponsored work, the university may assert ownership, but only for 
reports or other work stemming directly from the sponsored project 
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and still not for resultant books or journal articles. The university may 
give its ownership to a sponsoring firm in an agreement. 
Conflict of Interest. Conflict of interest falls under an array of 
policies reflecting university-wide and campus policies, as well as 
California state law. Any application for approval of a research proposal 
to an entity in which a principal investigator has a financial interest 
requires submitting a California state form for review by a campus 
faculty Conflict of Interest Committee. A determination that there is a 
conflict of interest does not doom a research project, since there are 
mechanisms for managing conflicts of interest. 
Conflict of Commitment. Policies covering conflict of commitment 
and faculty leaves are given in Section 025 of the UC Academic 
Personnel Manual. 146  Faculty members on the usual nine-month 
academic-year appointment are limited to thirty-nine days of outside 
activities during the academic year (an average of one day per week), 
and are required to seek and be granted leave without pay when 
exceeding this limit. That limit becomes forty-eight days for faculty 
members on year-round appointments. There are no considerations or 
limits in this policy concerning the amount of compensation that 
faculty members can receive from external activities. Faculty members 
cannot, in general, hold an executive or managerial position for a 
private firm. Leaves of absence without pay may be obtained for 
purposes such as active participation in the start-up of a company, and 
are usually granted for the first and even a second year but are 
normally not approved beyond the second year. The faculty member 
must then make a basic career decision—company or university. 
Use of University Resources. University facilities and resources 
cannot be used for outside purposes, except for desks, computers, and 
routine use of telephones. 
Publication. It is expected that research results will be published in 
full without limitations. A sponsor cannot specify that any methodology 
or results cannot be published, except for the restrictions regarding 
confidential items described in the next paragraph. A publication delay 
of up to sixty days is acceptable so that a sponsor may review 
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publications and offer comments or suggestions and/or determine that 
proprietary data are not inadvertently disclosed. In either case, the 
final decision on content must rest with the author. A delay of up to 
ninety days can be allowed so that the University, the sponsor, or both 
may screen proposed publications for possibly patentable ideas. If both 
ninety- and sixty-day delays are applicable, the total period of delay 
should not exceed ninety days. 
Confidential Materials and Information. Access to and/or use of a 
sponsor’s proprietary data or materials are accepted only if regulations 
regarding access, use, and protection of such data or materials do not 
restrict the full dissemination of scholarly findings made under the 
grant or contract or put the University in a position of assuming 
financial liability.147 
Licensing. University of California licensing guidelines for 
intellectual property are posted.148 In some cases the University of 
California will take equity in a firm, particularly a start-up firm, instead 
of a licensing fee. The policy149 governing such situations is designed to 
avoid issues of favoritism toward financial gain of a faculty member 
and any influence of a faculty inventor on the university’s decision, and 
to reduce the amount of risk assumed by the university as well. 
 
 
MECHANISMS FOR ASSISTING COMMERCIALIZATION OF RESEARCH 
AND CORPORATE START-UPS 
 
As a public research university, the University of California 
encourages utilization of its research by industry and the business 
world, both in California and worldwide. Licensing and technology-
transfer policies are designed to maximize commercial and societal 
uses of research results, rather than maximizing royalty income per se. 
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University of California campuses have a number of programs that 
are designed to assist faculty members and students in developing 
entrepreneurial skills and bringing their accomplishments and ideas 
along to commercial ventures. University-wide lists of incubators and 
accelerators150 and entrepreneurship151 programs are available. As an 
example, the Berkeley campus as of 2017 had the following programs. 
SkyDeck152 is an accelerator program, designed to help faculty and 
student entrepreneurs move ideas into commercialization effectively 
and efficiently. A team of consultants is available to advise and help. 
Elements of the accelerator program include the Product Story, Market 
Traction, Business Model, Team Development, and a Funding Plan. 
The Coleman Fung Institute for Engineering Leadership153 is an 
arm of the College of Engineering that provides full- and part-time 
master’s programs and continuing education in engineering as linked to 
entrepreneurship and the business world. The aim is to transform 
engineers and scientists into leaders who can take risks and develop 
technical, social, and economic innovations. 
The Berkeley-Haas Entrepreneurship Program and the Lester 
Center.154 This program serves as a hub for education and research 
relating to entrepreneurship in the business world. It is a component of 
the Haas School of Business. 
The Product Development Program 155  is a master’s degree 
program provided by the Department of Chemical and Biomolecular 
Engineering within the College of Chemistry. Students gain knowledge 
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and field experience in the complex process of transforming technical 
innovations into commercially successful products. 
Bakar Fellows156 are selected early-career faculty members whose 
work shows commercial promise in the fields of engineering, computer 
science, chemistry, biological sciences, and physical sciences, and in 
multidisciplinary work in these areas. The fellows receive discretionary 
research support of $75,000 per year for up to five years and 
participate in the network of other activities on campus relating to 
entrepreneurism. 
The Foundry@CITRIS157 is a technology incubator based at the 
Center for Information Technology Research in the Interest of Society 
(one of the Governor Gray Davis Institutes) to help entrepreneurs build 
companies at the intersection of hardware, software, and services. The 
Foundry provides access to design, manufacturing, and business 
tools within a community of mentors that transforms start-up teams 
into founders. 
The QB3 Garages158 are similar incubators supporting start-up and 
commercialization exploration activities in the area of biotechnology, 
affiliated with the California Institute for Quantitative Biosciences 
(QB3), another of the Governor Gray Davis Institutes. There are QB3 
Garages at UCSF Mission Bay and UC Berkeley, as well as a QB3 East 
Bay Innovation Center in Berkeley and a larger QB3@953 incubator 
facility in San Francisco. 
Big Ideas@Berkeley159 is an annual contest designed to provide 
funding, support, and encouragement to interdisciplinary teams of 
students who have “big ideas” that could lead to important 
innovations. The program was founded in 2006 and has a number of 
sponsors inside and outside the university. 
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The Development Impact Lab160 of the Blum Center for Developing 
Economies provides support to innovators to bring projects to a scale 





One of the most important missions of a major public research 
university is technology transfer, working cooperatively with industry 
and entrepreneurs to move inventions based upon university research 
into commercial use. This is a complex arena and one that universities, 
including the University of California, have learned by degrees through 
trial-and-error efforts over the past forty to fifty years. Technology 
transfer requires mechanisms to move discoveries along the path of 
initial development, continual synergistic interactions with industry, 
and a host of policies to avoid favoritism and various conflicts and to 
keep things generally within ethical bounds. The sequential 
developments at UC have included a very modest beginning under the 
direct auspices of the UC Regents, creation of an Office of Technology 
Transfer within the Office of the President, consideration and then 
rejection of auxiliary private ventures, decentralization of interactions 
with industry to the campuses so as to be closer to the faculty, 
recognitions that licensing should be integrated with other aspects of 
interactions with industry, and then active efforts to promote the 
efforts of would-be entrepreneurs in incubators created for that 
purpose on or near campuses. The MICRO Program developed in the 
1970s and the Industry-University Cooperative Research Program 
(1996–2008) leveraged state funds with industrial funds and thereby 
facilitated many beneficial relationships. 
Two major cases that led to massive high-tech economic 
communities—Silicon Valley and the Torrey Pines/La Jolla/San Diego 
area—are described with regard to the forces that brought them about 
and enabled such success. A similar analysis is made for the 
development of California’s biotechnology industry in the San Francisco 
                                                     






and San Diego areas, the first and third largest, respectively, of such 
clusters in the United States. University involvements are given 
particular attention. Two large-scale linkages of the Berkeley campus 
with industry—those with Novartis and with BP for the Energy 
Biosciences Institute—are analyzed as well, one serving as a learning 









In what became a set and nationally recognized raiding piece, 
candidates were lured to La Jolla, where they were given carefully 
orchestrated dinner parties in faculty homes, including [Roger] Revelle’s 
on the beach in mid–La Jolla and new ones in Scripps Estates…Then it 
was time for a walk in the eucalyptus groves adjacent to Highway 101 
that cut through the piece of Torrey Pines land Revelle wanted for his 
campus. He would shepherd marks onto the highest point, on Camp 
Callan land, marked by an “old, fallen brick chimney. I used to take our 
prospective professors up to this point, climb up on the old chimney, 
and look around, saying something like, ‘Can’t you see a great campus 
arising all around here?’” 
—Nancy Scott Anderson161 
 
The next contact that I had with UCLA came during a visit to the West 
Coast that my wife and I made in the fall of 1938. I’d recently gotten 
the Ph. D. degree and received an appointment as assistant professor at 
the University of Chicago. It happened that the National Tax 
Association was holding its annual convention in San Francisco…After 
the convention we came to Los Angeles. Of course, whenever I travel I 
always go to see the universities, so we came to Westwood. We were 
simply enchanted with the beauty of the community. At that time 
Westwood, you know, was a Mediterranean village, a suburban village, 
very quiet, and altogether delightful. We liked the Italian Renaissance 
buildings here on the campus. In fact, my wife and I remember saying 
to each other at that time, “This is where we want to live.” We were 
getting tired of the crush and the grime of Chicago. 
—Neil Jacoby, founding dean of the UCLA Graduate School of 
Management162 
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When he [David Saxon] was invited to become a member of the physics 
faculty at UCLA, he sought the advice of an older colleague. His 
colleague’s view was that UCLA was not a particularly distinguished 
institution, but it had the advantage of being located in sunny southern 
California, and if things did not work out he could always play golf. “But 
everybody says they’re going to build a great university and a great 
physics department out there,” David replied, and cast his fate with 
UCLA. 
 —Richard Atkinson163 
 
They [Mike Bishop, Harold Varmus, Herb Boyer, and Stanley Prusiner] 
did not choose UCSF because of its excellence as a place to do science—
excellence it could not claim at that time, in any case. Instead they 
chose it because San Francisco and California offered more freedom 
and more fun—sunshine, Carol Doda, Beat poets, fishing in the San 





In addition to the intellectual, academic, governance, and people 
factors that constitute the subject of most of this book, the 
geographical location of California and what has come with it have also 
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THE EARLY DAYS 
 
It was the gold rush of 1849 that first brought large numbers of 
settlers from the eastern portion of the United States into California. 
This was a rough crowd that traded little on knowledge and education 
and took law and “justice” into its own hands through vigilante groups 
and kangaroo courts. This setting was not an auspicious one for the 
development of an outstanding university. However, there were some 
among this influx of people who did care greatly about education, and 
the College of California that became the University of California had 
drawn some of them. 
As the new university developed, its California location betokened 
adventurism and opportunities for entirely new lives. The LeConte 
brothers, Joseph and John, were two of the ten initial University of 
California faculty members. As described in chapter 2, they came to the 
university because it was one of the few places in the United States 
where former Confederates could have a strong university teaching 
career. A very similar story, also told in chapter 2, applies to Eugene 
Hilgard, who placed California agriculture on a scientific basis and was 
an originator of the field of soil science. 
The fact that California was a land of new opportunity and new 
beginnings was a very important factor in drawing capable people to 
the university in its early days. But then as of the turn from the 
nineteenth century to the twentieth, it was primarily the status and 
promise of the university as a university, rather than the location and 
nature of California itself, that brought the next wave of intellectual 
builders, such as Benjamin Ide Wheeler (president, 1899–1919), and 
then Armin Leuschner, Gilbert Newton Lewis, Joel Hildebrand, and 




LARGE AND CONTINUAL GROWTH 
 
The continual large growth of California has in many different ways 







California has been in a continual state of large growth over the 
years, from the gold rush of 1849 through the start of Hollywood as the 
movie capital of the world in the early twentieth century and on 
through the influx of those fleeing the Dust Bowl era of the Depression 
in the 1930s, the great influx of returning World War II veterans to the 
San Fernando Valley in the late 1940s, the baby boom and its echoes 
associated with the children of those veterans, and booms and 
opportunities associated with high-tech industries. Table 19-1 shows 
US census data165 for the population at ten-year intervals and the 
percentage growth during the decades preceding each of those years. 
These numbers are unparalleled in the United States. 
With the growth in population has come corresponding growth in 
the economy and state revenue, along with needs for services including 
higher education. This has led to the necessity to create new campuses 
of the University of California and to increase capacity on existing 
campuses. Continual growth and building have until recent years 
brought constantly increasing state budgets for higher education, 
which have enabled continued improvements and opportunities to do 
new things. It is much easier to build and improve university education 
in a time of growth than it is in a time of stasis or contraction. 
 
Economy 
 The California economy has grown and diversified over the years 
in what has been a truly synergistic relationship between universities 
and industry, described in more detail in chapters 16, 17, and 18. 
Industries have provided employment and stimulated economic growth 
that have enabled continual building and development of universities, 
and research universities have provided many of the new ideas, 
processes, and products that have fueled industry. As well, the 
industries of California have been a substantial part of the attraction, 
drawing faculty, graduate students, and postdoctoral researchers to 
California. Those people who came to California universities have in 
turn become important founders and hires for industry. 
 
                                                     




Table 19-1. Historical population of California 
 
Census Year Population % Growth over Decade 
    1850                                   92,597 -- 
            1860 379,994 310.4% 
            1870 560,247 47.4% 
            1880 864,694 54.3% 
            1890                             1,213,398 40.3% 
            1900                             1,485,053 22.4% 
1910 2,377.549 60.1% 
1920 3,426,861 44.1% 
1930 5,677,251 65.7% 
1940 6,907,387 21.7% 
1950 10,586,223 53.3% 
1960 15,717,204 48.5% 
            1970 19,953,134 27.0% 
            1980 23,667,902 18.6% 
            1990 29,760,021 25.7% 
            2000 33,871,648 13.8% 
            2010 37,253,956 10.0% 
 
 
The synergy between universities and industry that builds the 
California economy has gone on through many waves: 
 the development and industrialization of California agriculture, 
 initiation and growth of specialized agriculture-based industries 
particularly suited to California such as wine, strawberries, and 
almonds, 
 the oil boom in southern California in the early 1900s, 
 the growth of aircraft and other war-related industries in 
World War II, 
 the launch of the movie industry, which then grew further 
through creation of program content for television and now 
streaming, 
 Silicon Valley and the electronics, computer hardware, and 
software industries, 
 the wireless telecommunications industry in San Diego, and 





 Interestingly, the effects upon the economy and industry have not 
been uniform around the state of California. Storper et al. compare and 
contrast the relative economic growths of the San Francisco and Los 
Angeles areas in recent decades, analyzing the reasons why the San 
Francisco economy has grown to a much greater extent.166 
 
Growth of Funding for the University of California 
As already noted in chapters 2 and 17, the booming California 
economy immediately following World War II provided the financial 
wherewithal for Governors Earl Warren and Pat Brown to give priority 
and devote so much of the state budget to the building of the 
University of California in the 1950s and 1960s, a period that happily 
coincided with the initial growth in support of university research by 
the federal government. 
 
 
THE LURE OF CALIFORNIA LIFE AND CLIMATE 
 
California has many features that are highly attractive for lifestyle 
and recreation. Seven of the ten campuses of the University of 
California are located in coastal areas along the Pacific Ocean. By virtue 
of the Pacific weather patterns and the Alaskan Current, the coastal 
regions have pleasant, fog-laced Mediterranean climates. Southern 
California is renowned for its outdoor-living lifestyle, well popularized 
through entertainment media. There is no snow toward the coast, but 
one can readily drive to snow and to excellent downhill skiing in the 
winter months. In the summer, the Sierra Nevada mountain range is 
John Muir’s Range of Light, beckoning for hikes and trips in a land of 
lakes, open country, and rugged granitic beauty. Sailing and other 
maritime activities are close at hand. Both the San Francisco and Los 
Angeles areas have excellent cultural attractions—symphony, art, 
opera, theater, and more. Santa Barbara is a well-recognized 
retirement community, as is the Monterey Bay area near Santa Cruz. As 
is noted in several of the quotes at the beginning of this chapter and in 
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the description of the recruitment of Nobelist chemist Willard Libby to 
UCLA (chapter 10), these aspects of pleasant living have been vitally 
important recruitment tools for drawing faculty to the university. 
University of California faculty members hardly ever move away when 
they retire. 
The more interior campuses have attractions of their own. Merced 
is only two hours away from Yosemite Valley by automobile. The Davis 
campus, well known as the capital of knowledge relating to agriculture 
in California, is a stable and pleasant community. Riverside, the city 
once plagued by the midday arrival of photochemical smog from traffic 
in the Los Angeles Basin, has been largely freed of that problem by the 
catalytic converter and the removal of lead from gasoline, and now is a 
seat of the vibrant and still developing Inland Empire. 
 
 
THE SIERRA NEVADA MOUNTAINS AND CONSERVATION 
 
For many the draw was the magnificent natural values and 
mountains of California. There is a longtime confluence among faculty 
and graduates of the University of California, the Sierra Nevada 
Mountain Range, and various conservation movements. The early days 
of these activities is being documented by Merritt.167  An original 
University of California faculty member, geologist Joseph LeConte, led 
university excursions to Yosemite Valley and environs within the 
mountains for years. The LeConte Memorial Lodge of the Sierra Club in 
Yosemite Valley is named for him. The LeConte bond between the 
university and the Sierra Nevada continued through Joseph LeConte’s 
son, Joseph N. LeConte, who was a professor of mechanical 
engineering at UC. Joseph N. LeConte and his wife, Helen Gompertz 
LeConte, were avid explorers and even makers of first ascents. 
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University of California faculty members were heavily involved in 
the start of the Sierra Club, the noted conservation organization that 
started as a protector of the Sierra Nevada Mountains. Joseph N. 
LeConte, J. Henry Senger (professor of philology), and Cornelius B. 
Bradley (professor of English) were all among the small group of 
founders of the Sierra Club in 1892, joining with John Muir and others 
from the San Francisco Bay Area.168 The university also had strong ties 
to the launching of the National Park Service as a branch of the federal 
government, as described succinctly by Martin, 169  more fully by 
Merritt,170 and in a video documentary series by Ken Burns.171 The first 
two directors of the National Park Service—Stephen Mather and 
Horace Albright—were both graduates of the University of California 
and closely tied to it. By virtue of its rich and varied terrain, California is 
home to nine wilderness national parks—Yosemite, Kings Canyon, 
Sequoia, Lessen Volcanic, Redwood, Joshua Tree, Death Valley, Channel 
Islands, and Pinnacles—and a national seashore (Point Reyes). 
The distinguished Berkeley field biologist and zoologist, Joseph 
Grinnell, was the founding director of the Museum of Vertebrate 
Zoology at Berkeley with the financial support of Annie Alexander, who 
had also supported James Meriam in starting the Museum of 
Paleontology at Berkeley (see chapter 9). Grinnell participated with the 
National Park Service in establishing a program of public instruction in 
the parks, which went on for a number of years. As well, he used the 
parks as a laboratory, establishing a scientific mission for them. 
For many others, including this author, the Sierra Nevada mountain 
range has provided a strong recreational attraction binding them to 
California. 
Many University of California faculty members have been drawn to 
conservation efforts, in part as the colleges of agriculture have  
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expanded mission to include natural resources, with there now being 
an almost complete switch in that direction at Berkeley. The interests 
have been contagious. Highly successful efforts to save San Francisco 
Bay from encroachments and landfill were launched and led for 
decades by Sylvia McLaughlin, Kay Kerr, and Esther Gulick—spouses of 
a regent, a president, and a Berkeley faculty member, respectively172 
The Sierra Nevada Research Institute has been a valuable founding 
organized research unit for the Merced campus (chapter 10). 
 
 
THE PACIFIC RIM 
 
One major trend of the 150 years that the University of California 
has been in existence has been the development of the economy and 
global influence of the Pacific Rim. The opening of the Panama Canal in 
1914 greatly facilitated commerce between a Eurocentric world and 
Pacific Asian nations, as well as the West Coast of the United States, 
which had been reached earlier by the US transcontinental railroad. It 
was natural for California to develop close ties with Asian countries. 
Within the University of California, the Pacific Rim has proven to be 
a rich area for intellectual development. As examples, the following 
organized research units and formal research centers on the Berkeley 
campus  deal specifically with the Pacific Rim nations. 
 
Asia Business Center 
Center for Buddhist Studies 
Center for Chinese Studies 
Center for Japanese Studies 
Center for Korean Studies 
Center for Southeast Asia Studies 
Institute for South Asia Studies 
Institute of East Asian Studies 
Pacific Earthquake Engineering Research Center 
Richard B. Gump South Pacific Research 
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UC San Diego has a very well respected School of Global Policy and 
Strategy173 that focuses upon the Pacific Rim. 
Recognizing the importance of the Pacific Rim for the University of 
California and for California itself, UC president David Gardner in 1986–
87 established the Pacific Rim Program “with the goal of fostering and 
enhancing research on the economic, political, social, trade, finance, 
cultural, security, and related issues pertaining to this region and its 
interactions with the world.”174 This program thrived for over two 
decades before falling victim to the UC state budget reductions and the 
decision to focus university-wide research funding on new initiatives. 
Another measure of the importance of the Pacific Rim to the 
University of California is the large student enrollment from the region. 
In fall 2016, 86.5 percent of enrolled undergraduate international 
students came from Pacific Rim countries, with 65 percent of total 





 Among the individual states, California has had one of the most 
positive relationships with Mexico, and thus the geographic location of 
California adjacent to Mexico has been important to the University of 
California. Since 2003, the university has maintained Casa de la 
Universidad de California en México,176 located in Mexico City a short 
distance away from the National Autonomous University of Mexico, 
UNAM. This building complex houses the UC Education Abroad 
Program in Mexico, is a headquarters for UC researchers doing 
research in Mexico, and provides a meeting space available for various 
purposes. The facility is designed to be catalytic to UC-Mexico  
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interactions in research and teaching. A multicampus research unit, UC-
MEXUS is headquartered at the Riverside campus and serves to foster 
and financially support University of California research on Mexico, 





California is earthquake country, being on the Pacific Ring of Fire. 
Superficially, this fact would probably be viewed as a liability rather 
than an attraction, except that the location has made the university a 
principal home of research on seismic matters and earthquake-
resistant structures. The University of California has thereby drawn a 
number of noted researchers in these areas and has several research 
institutes devoted to the subjects, most notably the Pacific Earthquake 
Engineering Research Center, consisting of ten core partner 
universities, of which five are University of California campuses, with 
the Berkeley campus as lead institution.178 
 
 
VARIED CLIMATE AND TOPOGRAPHY 
 
California has extremely varied topography. The lowest (Badwater 
in Death Valley, 279 feet below sea level) and highest (Mount Whitney, 
14,505 feet) points in the contiguous United States are 156 miles apart 
from one another within California. Rainfall varies from that of the 
coastal redwood forests of the northwestern part of the state to that of 
the Mojave and other deserts of southeastern California. Given the 
very different distributions of population and rainfall, California moves 
an immense volume of water from the north to the south. The 
California Aqueduct alone, flowing from the Sacramento River to the 
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Los Angeles area, has a capacity of 13,000 cubic feet (370 cubic meters) 
of water per second.179 
The diverse terrains and climates have created marvelous outdoor 
laboratories, which draw many researchers of different types. The 
Natural Reserve System of the University of California maintains 
760,000 acres in thirty-nine such sites. A few examples are 
 Hans Jenny Pygmy Forest on the ecological staircase of the 
Mendocino Coast; 
 White Mountain Research Station with locations at altitudes of 
4,108 feet, 10,151 feet, 12,470 feet, and 14,242 feet (1252, 3094, 
3,801, and 4341 meters); 
 Boyd Deep Canyon Desert Research Center, a major drainage 
system descending from the high peaks of the Santa Rosa 
Mountains down to the Colorado Desert; and 
 Merced Vernal Pools and Grassland Reserve, associated with the 
newest campus and with preserving unique San Joaquin Valley 
terrain (chapter 10). 
 
The coastal locations in California attracted and enabled the 
Scripps Institute of Oceanography, which preceded the UC San Diego 
campus, and the strong marine biology programs which initially built 
research on the Santa Barbara campus. 
                                                     








The purpose of this chapter is to draw on the contents of the 
foregoing chapters so as to look at research universities from three 
standpoints: 
 Why are well-respected research universities important? What 
are the essential features? What are world trends? 
 What general features are most conducive to the development 
of outstanding research universities? 
 What have been the most important specific factors in the 
development of the University of California, and how do they 
contrast with what has occurred in other potentially similar 
states in the United States? 
 
 
THE IMPORTANCE OF RESEARCH UNIVERSITIES 
 
The Rush toward Research Universities for Economic Development 
A strong research university brings a core of intellectual activity 
and potential innovation to the surrounding area. If the university has 
research that is important for sparking and/or supporting innovations 
in the business world, it can draw research-based businesses. When 
coupled with venture capital and the other support services needed for 
start-ups, a research university can become a key catalyst for new 
business development and societal improvements. It provides an 
attractive source of higher education, which can draw outstanding 
indigenous students, countering the possibilities of a brain drain to 
other countries or, in the United States, to other states. It should also 
produce a more enlightened, thoughtful, satisfied, and broadly capable 
population. 
University-associated research parks and government-organized 
development laboratories can also become key players in industrial 
start-ups. Some well-known successes in California are Silicon Valley, 





San Diego/La Jolla area, both described and analyzed in chapter 18. 
Some of the other examples in the United States are the MIT/Route 
128 combination in Massachusetts, the Research Triangle in North 
Carolina, and the Austin, Texas, area. In other countries, success stories 
have included the Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI) and 
the surrounding Hsinchu Science and Industrial Park in Taiwan,1, 2 
Cambridge University and the adjoining “Silicon Fen” development in 
the United Kingdom, and the many developments in Bangalore, India. 
The reputations of very positive economic and developmental 
impacts from these endeavors have spawned a rash of new 
developments around the world. Typically, these involve a central, and 
often new, research-university campus with a business or research park 
in the close environs. Some examples are 
 King Abdullah University of Science and Technology (KAUST) 
and the King Abdullah Economic City (KAEC) in Saudi Arabia, 
 KAIST (an acronym for what was formerly Korea Advanced 
Institute of Science and Technology) and the surrounding 
Daedeok Science Town in South Korea, 
 Skolkovo Institute of Science and Technology and Skolkovo 
Innovation Center near Moscow in Russia, 
 the new Mission Bay campus of the University of California, San 
Francisco, and its industrial-research environs, 
 the development of high-tech industry around UNICAMP Brazil, 
 Nazarbayev University in Kazakhstan and its associated 
Nazarbayev University Research and Innovation System, and 
 the recently (2016) approved Sparrow Hills research center in 
Moscow, involving Moscow State University and the Russian 
Academy of Sciences. 
Other very large and extensive initiatives are in China. Project 985 
promotes the development of what are now forty world-class research 
universities, many with surrounding industrial parks and/or  
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development centers. A companion effort, Project 211, aims to 
strengthen about one hundred research universities. There are also 
developments in China that are being driven by the establishment of 
industrial or research parks (e.g., the Shanghai Zhangjiang Hi-Tech 
Park). The list goes on. 
But can all these ventures succeed? Do they involve a sufficient 
amount of all the necessary and helpful features? And what are the 
necessary features? One approach to answering the latter question is 
that of this book—to infer and generalize important factors from an 
examination of the University of California. 
 
 
ACADEMIC EXCELLENCE AND RANKINGS 
 
For better or for worse, the projects identified above and the 
associated ambitions are pointed toward what is essentially a single 
definition of world-class universities (“WCUs”) and role models, with a 
spate of quantitative rating and ranking systems having strong 
influence as a means of setting goals and measuring success. These 
systems are considered in the appendix.  New ratings continually crop 
up. These approaches tend to combine different selections among, and 
weightings of, the same or similar factors, most of which are subject to 
relatively simplistic measurement. Some systems focus in addition or 
instead upon reputational surveys. 
In a World Bank report3 Salmi presents the general features that he 
concludes are needed for the development of WCUs, placing the needs 
in three broad categories, as follows: 
1. a high concentration of talent (faculty and students), 
2. abundant resources to offer a rich learning environment and to 
conduct advanced research, and 
3. favorable governance features that encourage strategic vision, 
innovation, and flexibility and that enable institutions to make 
decisions and to manage resources without being encumbered 
by bureaucracy. 
                                                     






The World Bank has important roles for financing projects in 
developing countries; hence Salmi’s analysis has been influential for 
planning in many nations. 
Paradeise and Thoenig4, 5 have examined the internal sociological 
dynamics in universities relating to matters of academic excellence and 
reputation. Using the Berkeley campus of the University of California 
and MIT as prime examples, they paint the picture of a total focus on, 
and commitment to, academic and research quality as being a prime 
characteristic of top-rated research universities. 
Douglass6, and Douglass and Hawkins7 have also recently analyzed 
the drive toward WCUs. Douglass stresses that needs differ for 
different countries and has suggested approaches and measures that 
may be more suitable for leading universities to be most effective for 
their own countries.  Douglass and Hawkins consider these issues for 
Asian universities expressly.  
As noted by these and other authors, attention to the various 
rating and ranking systems tends to drive competing universities and 
countries toward a large degree of sameness—a single conforming 
model. That fact is unfortunate for several reasons. First, a mix of 
diverse approaches is much needed in both universities and research. 
That diversity has long been considered a valuable hallmark of higher 
education in the United States, and the same should be true in the rest 
of the world, especially with such great differences in the levels of 
development, cultures, traditions, resources, and goals of different 
countries. Different students fit better with different forms of 
education, and research-university education is not for everyone. In 
research, differences in organizational structures and approaches help 
to foster innovation of different sorts. Secondly, by the very nature of 
rankings, only a few universities can be at the top, and to have a 
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hundred or more universities vying for those top positions is a recipe 
for frustration for most of them.  
This situation is accentuated by the fact that there is very little 
turnover, even from decade to decade, at the top. Top-rated 
universities are attractive to faculty members because of the 
inspiration and collaboration that can be gained from outstanding 
colleagues, the prestige associated with the institution, and the ability 
to have outstanding student and postdoc coworkers. Graduate 
students and postdocs are drawn to top universities because of the 
perception that experiences there will be more intellectually 
stimulating and valuable and because it adds to one’s résumé. As well, 
granting agencies or corporations may find value in associating with 
top-ranked universities. All these factors discourage turnover in 
rankings across the years. 
 
 
THE RATIONALE FOR RESEARCH UNIVERSITIES: SYNERGY 
 
A research university combines three missions—education, 
research, and service. Those missions can be described succinctly as 
follows: 
 Education instills new concepts, knowledge, creativity, working 
methodology, and habits in students. 
 Research discovers and codifies new knowledge. 
 Service involves using knowledge and understanding to 
address issues and problems of society, both outside and inside 
the university. 
Each of those broad functions has multiple components. Graduate 
education is different and more intense and specialized than 
undergraduate education. Professional education and continuing 
education are different yet. The nature of research differs among 
fields, particularly among the professions and among the social 
sciences. The service mission is relatively new in many parts of the 
world, but it is long established for public research universities in the 
United States, having typically started with support of agricultural 
practice and allowance and encouragement of government service by 





consulting services to industry and government, participation 8  in 
studies made by the National Academies, community service, and 
service to disciplinary or professional societies. 
For several reasons, it is advantageous to combine these three 
seemingly separate missions into a single institution. The processes of 
discovering and codifying new knowledge create a thorough mastery of 
existing knowledge en route, and they keep faculty members both 
current and at the forefronts of their fields. One of the best ways of 
developing creative abilities is by doing research, especially formulating 
new research questions and avenues toward answering them. Guided 
tutorial participation in research and the joint student-faculty research 
done in the sciences and a growing number of other fields are time-
tested intensive methods of developing creativity and research abilities 
in individuals. Service requires and utilizes a mastery of knowledge and 
keeps faculty members up to date on current issues and realities of the 
world, thereby informing teaching and research. Having one type of 
institution serve these multiple purposes is efficient, and it creates 
synergy, since fulfilling each of the missions provides important 
wherewithal for the other missions. The synergies and the complexities 
and multidimensionalities of research universities were classically 
analyzed by Clark Kerr in his 1963 Godkin Lectures at Harvard which 
became his book The Uses of the University.9 
There are, of course, institutions that serve one or two, but not all 
three of these purposes. A liberal arts college will emphasize teaching, 
but without much research, and can supply much greater attentiveness 
to individual students. However, it cannot instill research awareness 
and creativity in the same ways. Institutions such as the national 
laboratories of the United States or the Max Planck Institutes in 
Germany are focused on research without the teaching component. 
They cannot as effectively provide the next generation of researchers 
and leaders of industry and society, and they for the most part miss 
intellectually valuable student coworkers. Colocation of a national 
laboratory and a leading university, as at Berkeley, is therefore a 
valuable synergy. A company like the Rand Corporation or 
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organizations such as agricultural extensions can emphasize service. 
But in terms of gaining synergies and efficient use of resources by 
grouping these three functions together, there seems to be general 
recognition that the research university is the most effective 
mechanism that has been devised so far. 
 
 
FEATURES OF SUCCESSFUL, HIGH-IMPACT RESEARCH UNIVERSITIES 
 
An outstanding high-impact public research university will carry out 
highly respected and influential research as viewed by peers, have the 
essential characteristics to educate and nurture the full capabilities of 
succeeding generations of excellent researchers and leaders of society 
and industry, be perceived as highly useful by industry and 
entrepreneurs, and have good means of interacting with industry and 
entrepreneurs to help in the development of new technology and new 
companies. 
 
Accomplishing Research of the Highest Quality 
 The sine qua non for an outstanding research university is having 
faculty members with high research ability and accomplishment. That 
ability takes the form of the insights and creativity needed to define 
promising research that can lead to new discoveries, new 
understanding, and/or new and powerful codifications of knowledge. 
Those abilities are best identified, cultivated, and evaluated in other 
people by leading researchers themselves. Measures of that ability 
include candid opinions of peers and various national and international 
recognitions such as awards from professional societies, national 
academy memberships, and Nobel and other major worldwide prizes. 
These measures are represented in many of the rating and ranking 
systems. 
Excellent faculty members must be sought, identified, recruited, 
supported, and sustained. They should be continually incentivized, 
reviewed, and rewarded. Efforts should be made to interest people of 
all sorts to go on in higher education and to consider academic careers. 
Native creative talent is everywhere. Searches for potential faculty 





means of recognizing and assessing talents and abilities by leading 
researchers themselves. In the development of first-tier research in the 
physical sciences at Berkeley, critical assessments by people such as 
Gilbert Lewis, Raymnd Birge, Joel Hildebrand, and Griffith Evans were 
essential (chapter 9). The University of California system of continual, 
career-long advancement reviews involving Academic Senate 
Committees on Academic Personnel (chapter 11) has been particularly 
effective for providing independent, evidence-based assessment, 
incentive, and reward. 
A culture of excellence and respect for accomplishment should 
pervade the institution, and continual steps should be taken to enable 
and reinforce that culture. The involvement of a large fraction of the 
faculty in shared governance through the Academic Senate and in the 
academic advancement system has been effective for that purpose 
within the University of California, since it gives faculty members 
continual reminders of the shared values of excellence. It is very 
important for the institution to have an intellectual meritocracy rather 
than a civil-service-like system of nearly automatic advancement that 
limits opportunities for exceptional advancement. Continual objective 
program reviews (chapter 12) serve a similar purpose of involving many 
faculty members and reinforcing high standards. 
There should be policies and support services in a research 
university that best enable faculty members to do research limited only 
by their own creativity and not by other extraneous constraints. Faculty 
members themselves should select their areas of research and 
conceive their own new lines of research, rather than being assigned 
areas of research or research topics. It is the faculty member who 
understands her or his field best and can most effectively recognize 
new opportunities. That goal is not meant to suggest that faculty 
members should work in isolation. They need continual interaction 
with peers to assure a good flow of new thoughts and ideas. 
Particularly in the social sciences, faculty researchers need insulation 
against political interference. 
Outstanding researchers draw outstanding coworkers—faculty 
colleagues, graduate students, and postdoctoral researchers. That fact 
was well demonstrated in the initial development of the San Diego 




graduate students, and postdocs draw outstanding faculty members. It 
is a chicken-and-egg situation, and, as already noted, has been one of 
the key reasons why there is surprisingly little turnover in the lists of 
outstanding research universities from year to year. 
Part of enabling faculty members to pursue the leads that they, 
themselves, identify and choose is ample and diverse availability of 
financial support for research. The US approach of support from a wide 
array of government agencies, private foundations, and industrial 
companies has proven to be effective in enabling support of a wide 
range of research, with other sources to try if one source fails. 
Competitive and selective allocation of research funding based upon 
strong peer-review assessment gives faculty members much incentive 
to think their proposals out fully and choose striking, high-impact 
research.  It is also important that provisions be made in peer review 
processes to enable sufficient grant support for entry-level faculty 
members. 
As knowledge has grown, disciplines, subdisciplines, and areas of 
research have tended to become narrower and more 
compartmentalized. Yet many of the most critically needed areas of 
research are highly multidisciplinary. It is therefore important for a 
research university to have organizational structures, facilities, and 
review mechanisms for promoting multidisciplinary research. For the 
University of California, those include organized research units with 
reporting lines that differ from those of academic departments, 
national laboratories, and large research institutes. 
Among the draws for top-notch researchers can be unique user 
facilities, such as the Advanced Light Source at the Lawrence Berkeley 
National Laboratory and the UC-Caltech Keck telescopes. The King 
Abdullah University of Science and Technology (KAUST) recognized the 
value of this approach as it started up de novo with the aim of rapidly 
becoming a first-tier research university. Cutting-edge facilities and 
major instrumentation were provided at the start and served as lures 
for recruitment of highly regarded faculty members.10 
                                                     







Finally, it is valuable to establish a Silicon Valley–like culture where 
failures are recognized as essential components of the route to 
success—that is, where risk taking in the selection of research is 
rewarded rather than viewed as a stigma when things don’t work out. 
High impact often comes from high risk. 
 
Educating and Attracting Capable Researchers, Potential 
Entrepreneurs, and Inquiry-Aware Citizens 
 A research university should have several educational missions 
that relate closely to its research mission. The most basic is to educate 
all its students to value intellectual curiosity, research inquiry, and 
healthy skepticism. A second is to interest, identify, and cultivate the 
researchers of tomorrow. And a third is to supplement an education 
and a research understanding with the personal knowledge and skills 
that can make successful innovators, entrepreneurs, and citizens. 
Ways of accomplishing these goals at the undergraduate level are 
well spelled out in the Boyer Commission Report of 1998. 11  To 
accomplish these goals, research universities should stress the 
incorporation of inquiry and research concepts and examples into 
courses, seminars, and student projects. As one example, for almost a 
hundred years, it has proven particularly effective at Berkeley to follow 
a policy of matching faculty members who are both outstanding 
researchers and outstanding teachers with the freshman chemistry 
course, a tradition that started with Joel Hildebrand and the forty 
thousand students that he taught in freshman chemistry over many 
years. 
Research experiences for undergraduates can come about in many 
ways, ranging from small research projects within courses to longer-
term experiences with a faculty research group. Participants in 
research groups can either have an independent project or take part in 
a larger research project with a pedagogically capable graduate student 
or postdoc. Effective ways of providing undergraduate research 
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experience are considered in a recent National Academies report.12 
Douglass and Zhao13 utilized data from the Student Experience in the 
Research University survey (SERU) 14  to measure the degree of 
involvement in research of undergraduates at the nine undergraduate 
University of California campuses and six other leading research 
universities. They found that 81 percent of undergraduates had carried 
out at least one project or written a research paper as part of a course, 
39 percent had taken at least one student research course, and 40 
percent had assisted faculty in research with or without course credit 
and with or without pay. 
Research and the development of research and creative abilities 
are of course the main goals of doctoral education. There and in 
postdoctoral education, it is vital to involve students as full intellectual 
partners in research, both for their own education and for what they 
can and will bring to the research themselves. If the student is not a full 
partner in defining and guiding the research, a vital pedagogical 
opportunity is lost. 
 
High Economic Impact and Regional Development 
 There are avenues that a research university can and should 
pursue internally to promote economic and societal impact of its 
research. Active ways should be sought to promote the use of the fruits 
of university research for economic development and societal 
improvement. This requires marketing efforts and knowledgeable staff 
members who can help university researchers achieve technological 
liaisons with companies. University relations with industry need to be 
wider than just licensing of patents and processing of research grants 
and contracts. As noted in chapter 18, technology-transfer and patent- 
 
                                                     
12 Undergraduate Research Experiences for STEM Students: Successes, Challenges, and 
Opportunities (Washington DC: National Academies Press, 2017), https://perma.cc/R6DM-NLFM. 
13 John A, Douglass and Chun-Mei Zhao, “Undergraduate Research Engagement at Major US 
Research Universities,” Research & Occasional Papers Series, no. 14.13, Center for Studies in 
Higher Education, University of California, Berkeley, November 2013, https://perma.cc/J8HM-
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licensing offices have become much more sophisticated over the years 
and can doubtless improve further. 
Other activities in the region near a university greatly influence 
whether or not that region can be fertile for technological innovation 
and entrepreneurism. Multidimensional resources and services must 
be available to support corporate start-ups, including venture capital, 
specialized legal and financial services, flexible laboratory facilities, a 
skilled workforce, leaders experienced in start-up ventures, and a 
culture that is supportive of technological ventures and risk taking. 
There must be ways in which the large middle ground between 
discovery and commercialization can be bridged. One possibility is for 
industrial corporations in the area to have strong in-house capabilities 
for development of research discoveries and innovations toward 
commercialization. Alternatively, as was well demonstrated by the 
Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI) in Taiwan,15 inclusion of 
an “intermediary” technological laboratory and/or demonstration 
facility along with a university and a surrounding corporate park can be 
effective. Yet another approach is large-scale multidisciplinary 
university research institutes like the four Governor Gray Davis 
Institutes for Science and Innovation at the University of California.  
A research university can take steps to work synergistically with its 
region to develop regional innovation and entrepreneurism. The UC 
CONNECT operation (chapter 18) started by the San Diego campus of 
the University of California was highly effective for that purpose and 
helped turn San Diego from a military, wartime economy into the 
multidimensional, high-tech economy that exists there today. Campus-
located or campus-affiliated incubators can help faculty members and 
students turn ideas into successful corporate ventures. A university can 
also seek faculty members who will develop areas of research that fit 
the attributes and resources of the region. 
 
Government Roles 
 In California, the role of government with regard to higher 
education itself and economic and societal benefits stemming from 
university research is largely one of enablement rather than any more 
                                                     




hands-on or limiting approach. Constitutional autonomy and the fact 
that it was the higher education community itself that developed the 
1960 Master Plan for Higher Education have both been important, as 
have been the relatively long appointment terms of the regents (twelve 
years, formerly sixteen years). 
For public research universities, involvement from the political 
processes of government invariably gets in the way of development 
and maintenance of academic quality, because it turns attention to 




THE ATTRIBUTES MOST IMPORTANT FOR THE UNIVERSITY OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
What I believe are the most essential factors for the success of the 
University of California were listed at the start of this book in table 1-1. 
This section summarizes these factors and compares them with 
situations for public research universities elsewhere in the United 
States, working serially through the factors. 
The Best and the Brightest. Attention to hiring the best and the 
brightest faculty members is hardly unique to the University of 
California; it is a goal expressed by essentially all leading research 
universities. But the University of California—through resources, 
policies, and practices—has paid particular attention to enablement of 
its faculty to have the resources, facilities, and time to do outstanding 
research and teaching, with the goal of having their own capabilities be 
the only limitation. That is one important reason for the overall general 
success of UC faculty members. 
Single University with Multiple Campuses. The structure of the 
University of California as a single university of ten campuses, all with 
the same mission and aspirations, is unique. Most multicampus state-
university systems in the United States are composed of separate 
universities or multicampus universities (e.g., New York, Illinois, Texas, 
Texas A&M) with missions that differ, either through specification or de 
facto. The University of Illinois and the University of Nevada, as 





recognized and accomplished research institutions. The State 
University of New York has three such campuses (Buffalo, Stony Brook, 
and Albany) among its sixty-four components. The University of North 
Carolina has two major research campuses (UNC Chapel Hill and North 
Carolina State University at Raleigh), originally separate universities. 
The State University System of Florida, formed through amalgamation 
in 2003, contains multiple research universities with varying degrees of 
distinction. But no state even approaches the ten substantial research-
university campuses of the University of California or the number of 
campuses ranked near the top. 
The structure as a single university with multiple campuses all 
having the same mission has advantages in several ways. It allows new 
campuses to be formed from within (see below). It enables a focus on 
the research-university mission without the distraction of additional 
missions. It enables a single budget with internal methods of 
distributing that budget, thereby minimizing extramural pressures. It 
provides single voices to the state and federal governments. On the 
other hand, systems of campuses and universities with a variety of 
missions can potentially do a better job of articulation for transfer 
education within the system. 
Shared Governance. Shared governance exists in name in nearly all 
major universities and is generally stronger in public universities than in 
private ones. But I have found no other university in the United States 
where it is as organized and as comprehensive as at the University of 
California. The UC structure serves many beneficial and stabilizing 
purposes. It enables the faculty themselves to have responsibility for 
overseeing the academic quality of the institution and results in the 
involvement of more good minds in governance. It promotes faculty 
allegiance to the university. It continually involves faculty members in 
considerations where the common purpose is assessing and sustaining 
the academic quality of the institution, thereby sustaining that 
purpose. It has in many instances enabled faculty members from 
different disciplines to find common interests and participate together 
in multidisciplinary research, teaching, or both. The clearly recognizable 
importance of shared governance within the University of California 
brings intellectual leaders from the campuses into it. Indeed, it was the 




sciences, who met with the Board of Regents in 1919 to establish the 
modern structure of shared governance for the university. 
Career-Long Peer Review of Faculty Members. One of the key 
aspects of shared governance at the University of California is the 
continual career-long academic-performance review of faculty 
members by peers, an elaborate process that is described in chapter 
11. That structure provides strong incentives for faculty members to 
excel, serves as a constant monitor and reminder of the academic 
quality of the institution, and provides a thorough and fair process 
where the views of no one individual can carry untoward weight. It also 
provides post-tenure review, something that is often recognized as 
needed but is contentious and difficult to implement in the rest of the 
academic world. This system of continual reviews throughout one’s 
entire career is at least unusual among major research universities and 
may be unique. 
Building from Within. The University of California has been almost 
completely built from within, whereas many other public-university 
systems or multicampus universities have usually been built by bringing 
together preexisting institutions. Some examples of the latter approach 
include the State University of New York, the University of Texas, the 
University of North Carolina, and the University System of Florida. The 
differences between the two approaches may seem subtle, but they 
are not. It is very difficult to change the culture of an existing 
institution or to upgrade it academically. By contrast, the formation of 
new University of California campuses occurred with a set of standards 
and policies for personnel evaluation and other academic needs being 
present from the start and being brought into play through the 
Academic Senate structure by faculty members from existing 
campuses. Initial faculty members for the new campus were hired with 
reviews from Academic Senate committees composed of faculty 
members from existing campuses, with the high standards of those 
existing campuses being applied. The rapid rises of many of the UC 
campuses to high stature and reputation reflect this fact. 
Historically High Levels of Support from the State of California. 
The state of California has, over the years and until recently, given 
strong support to the University of California. That support stems from 





and the establishment of constitutional autonomy in 1879, on through 
the interest of the Progressives of the early twentieth century in public 
higher education. Three factors fortuitously coexisted after World War 
II – a large state budgetary surplus, two governors (Earl Warren and Pat 
Brown) who gave the University of California very high priority, and a 
surge of returning veterans and immigrants from other states, which 
necessitated and enabled a large expansion of the university. 
In many of the eastern states of the United States, strong private 
universities were already in existence when the Morrill Act of 1862 
facilitated the creation of public land-grant universities. The existences 
of these strong private universities provided a rationale for allowing a 
lesser degree of distinction for the public universities when they were 
formed. Because of its newness as a state and the rough-and-ready 
way in which it came to be, California had no strong private universities 
at the time of the Morrill Act, and resources and attention were 
devoted instead to the public university, the University of California. 
The strong private universities—Stanford University, Caltech, the 
University of Southern California,  and others—came later, after the 
role, mission, and desire for distinction of UC had been established. 
Constitutional Autonomy. The incorporation of constitutional 
autonomy for the University of California into the state constitution of 
1879 served to assure self-governance under the Board of Regents 
without a way for the state legislative process to impose requirements 
or limitations on the university. There is of course still an annual 
budgeting process for the university as part of the state budget 
proposed by the governor, considered and enacted by the legislature, 
and subject to line-item veto by the governor. But the prohibitions 
against the legislature getting into other areas and the governor acting 
independently of his or her role as one member of the UC Regents 
provide a considerable amount of self-determination to the university. 
The level of constitutional autonomy for the University of California is 
rivaled in the US only by the constitutional situations for the University 
of Minnesota and all public universities in Michigan. 
Master Plan for Higher Education. The 1960 California Master Plan 
for Higher Education formally differentiated the missions of the three 
sectors of public higher education, creating economic efficiency and 




also confirmed a wide reach of higher education by virtue of the 
transfer route and a role for the University of California that solidified 
its position as a preeminent research university. Important factors for 
UC were (1) the preservation of the research role and nearly all of 
doctoral education to UC, such that UC could determine how best to 
organize and manage it; (2) lessening of what would otherwise have 
been huge enrollment pressure for UC through of the roles of the 
California State University and transfer education; and (3) the concepts 
of eligibility and guaranteed access, which defined high school college-
going curricula and established a clear rationale regarding which 
students could take part in UC (and CSU) education. The California 
Master Plan has no parallel in other states of the United States. 
Location. Several aspects of the location of the University of 
California have been important to the university. The fact that 
California has been regarded as a land of opportunity and has had 
continual, stunning population growth has created an ever-increasing 
enrollment and ever-increasing resources for higher education until the 
stringencies of recent years. The sanguine climate of coastal California 
has been a strong attraction for recruiting faculty, as have the many 
recreational opportunities of the state. The Silicon Valley phenomenon 
and areas of economic growth such as biotechnology and the wine 
industry have created a strong synergy among the university, industry, 
and the economy within the state. 
Multidisciplinary Opportunities. Due to the ever-increasing depth 
of knowledge in the various disciplines and the fact that many of the 
most pressing societal needs involve multiple disciplines, progress is 
often most effectively achieved by bringing the full power of several 
disciplines together in a well-integrated fashion. Thus universities must 
facilitate faculty members from different disciplines working together 
in both research and teaching. The University of California has had a 
good start down this road in several ways. The cyclotron work of 
Lawrence led to a large multidisciplinary laboratory on the hill east of 
the Berkeley campus, which became a national laboratory and moved 
into many other multidisciplinary fields such as energy, environment, 
and biotechnology. The university was one of the first to establish 
organized research units (ORUs), most of which are multidisciplinary, as 





Governor Gray Davis Institutes for Science and Innovation, established 
in 2000, moved the university further along these lines and positioned 
it well for subsequent competitions, such as the worldwide 
competition for BP’s Energy Biosciences Institute. 
Integration of Professional Fields with the Academic Disciplines. 
One way in which the University of California did not model the great 
eastern universities, notably the Ivy League universities, was by 
providing professional schools with the same status as academic 
departments. Faculty members from professional schools participate 
fully in shared governance with the faculty from the rest of the 
campus. Review committees for appointment, promotion, and 
advancement of faculty members contain both professional-school and 
academic-discipline faculty members. Faculty members from 
throughout the campus participate in organized research units 
together. This situation contrasts with universities such as Harvard 
where professional schools are much more independent in governance 
and are “tubs on their own bottoms” financially. In the University of 
California, the professional schools and academic disciplines reinforce 







The Future for the University of California and 
Public Research Universities 
 
 
Higher education is the engine driving America to a better future for all 
its citizens—not a consumer good but a public investment—and a 
public good. It is the single most important driver of opportunity and 
prosperity at home, and for American influence and idealism abroad. 
 —Robert M. Gates1 
 
These days students pay more of the cost of attending public 
universities than state governments …The money public colleges collect 
in tuition surpassed the money they receive from state funding in 2012. 
Tuition accounted for 25 percent of school revenue, up from 17 percent 
in 2003. State funding, meanwhile, plummeted from 32 percent to 23 
percent during the same period. 
—Washington Post, 20152 
 
As the story goes, if you put a frog into a pot of boiling water, he will 
jump out immediately. But if you put the frog into the pot of water and 
then turn on the heat, he won’t realize it is boiling until too late…That 
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If…public institutions are no longer state supported, who owns them? 
Who should govern them? Who[m] should they serve?…The defunding 
of public higher education by the states inevitably inaugurates a new 





There are cogent reasons for concern about the future of public 
research universities and public higher education in the United States. 
The University of California is not immune from these concerns.  This 





The most obvious cause for alarm is the decline in state funding to 
public colleges and universities that has occurred during the early years 
of the twenty-first century. It has presented serious financial challenges 
to all of public higher education and shows little likelihood of 
improvement. Between the years 2000 and 2014, there was a 
cumulative decrease of 30 percent in state funding for all public 
universities and colleges in the United States. 5  There are other 
fundamental forces as well, some of which derive from the fall in public 
funding. For example, governments, reflecting ever-tighter state 
budgets, increasingly seek accountability and performance-based 
funding. Even though they may themselves have participated in 
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objecting to the resultant increases in tuition. Yet desires for partaking 
of public higher education remain strong.  
Declines in state funding have brought about increased tuition for 
public institutions.  Higher tuitions for both public and private 
universities have increased student debt, to an extent where the 
amount of that debt is now a major national issue. As well, the spread 
in the distribution of wealth in the United States steadily becomes 
greater, having now reached an all-time high, increasing the financial 
needs associated with assuring access for those with lower incomes. 
There are also forces in the US that can lead to a reduction in 
government research funding.  These include growing suspicions of 
science and of universities themselves, as well as a severe tightening of 
the federal budget, both of which may or may not be short-term 
effects associated with the unusual national administration and power 
structure of the federal government in 2017 as this book is completed. 
Beyond the drop in public funding, there are broader ills. Mettler6 
has traced the development of two other factors that have interacted 
with decreased state funding in the United States and student-debt 
issues to reduce the access of low-income students to higher education 
and thereby accentuate class differences, despite favorable access 
policies of public universities and the large Pell Grant program of the 
federal government. One of these factors is the lack of policy updating 
at the congressional level that has resulted from polarized national 
politics and that has badly delayed needed modernization of the Pell 
Grant program, the main vehicle for financial aid to low-income 
students. The second trend is the huge subsidization by the federal 
government of for-profit institutions of higher education, many of 
which have business plans based upon the widespread availability of 
government loans to students. Many for-profit institutions avidly seek 
and enroll students, many of them low-income and minority, who 
obtain federal student loans to pay high tuitions. Then many of those 
students do not graduate and/or cannot find employment of a sort that 
gives them the wherewithal to repay the loans. They are then saddled 
with debt that cannot be waived or reduced. The federal government 
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thereby enables an industry that could not sustain itself on its own. The 
issue is enmeshed in the politics of Congress, since there are large 
contributions by for-profit institutions to political campaigns.  
Another bothersome trend is the tendency for governments (and 
other institutions such as the stock market) to look at matters from an 
immediate, short-term viewpoint rather than dealing effectively with 
the longer term. California and other states have adopted term limits 
for legislators, which serve to exacerbate this tendency.7 Term-limited 
legislators tend to want demonstrable results now and are less 
concerned with what may happen after their terms end. So, while they 
may recognize that reducing public funding for a university and/or 
urging it to take additional, unfunded enrollment will cause a loss of 
quality, it seems that the decline will not be precipitous and probably 
will not harm constituents greatly while the legislator is in office.  
Similarly, shifting facilities costs from up-front payment to bonding 
saves immediate capital costs but creates a continuing operating-cost 
burden for repayment on the bonds that is over and above costs of 
instruction and day-to-day operation. The use of long-term bonds 
makes repayment of principal less of an issue but leaves a university 
with the interest as a component of the operating budget for the entire 
term of the bonds. Issuance of more such bonds then compounds the 
burden on the operating budget. On a statewide scale, increases in 
retirement benefits as an alternative to increases in current wages in 
contracts negotiated with public-employee unions reduce the 
immediate cost for wages at the expense of future retirement 
obligations. Ever-larger future obligations are being created and 
pushed along in time in these ways. 
These issues raise the question of whether public research 
universities in the US can continue to compete in academic quality with 
private research universities over the long term and can continue to 
perform their essential access function.  
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PROSPECTS FOR IMPROVEMENT 
 
State Funding 
State budgets in the United States are under considerable pressure 
because of many competing demands, growing costs, debt loads, 
longer lives bringing mounting costs of health care and retirement 
benefits, growing commitments far into the future, and political 
reluctance to raise taxes. In California the initiative-referendum system 
has increased unfunded obligations and has taken most of the budget 
away from direct legislative control. As described in chapter 2, higher 
education further suffers by being part of what is now in California the 
very small discretionary portion of the budget, which is also subject to 
high year-to-year volatility in revenues. The tax issue is further 
complicated by a well-organized bloc of older voters resisting taxes, 
insufficiently offset by the younger, more heavily minority and 
immigrant, voters who could benefit from government services. There 
does not appear to be much prospect for marked improvement of state 
funding of the university.  
 
Federal Government Policies 
There is more hope over the longer haul for ultimate change in 
federal government policies and politics that have led to the perverse 
situation for low-income and minority students described by Mettler8 
and considered above. Zumeta et al.9 have discussed both the need 
and potential paths for gaining policies that will enhance access to 
higher education and provide more balance in income level and 
ethnicity among those partaking of higher education. What is required 
is a greater spirit of cooperation between the political parties on policy 
development, something that should be attainable if voters recognize 
that the antidote to polarized politics is to elect more solution-oriented 
people as their government representatives.  
During the Obama administration (2009–16), the federal 
government moved against the practices of for-profit universities, but 
as of 2017 there has been a reversal of those actions, resulting from 
                                                     
8 Mettler, 2014, loc. cit. 
9 William Zumeta et al., Financing American Higher Education in the Era of Globalization 





the composition of Congress and a president who himself created a for-
profit university.  Hopefully future administrations and congresses will 
recognize that situation for what it is and deal with it. 
 
Paying More Attention to the Future 
The principal issues impeding more attention to the future are the 
problems posed by term limits and the need for government leaders 
who will look more responsibly further down the road. The two issues 
are strongly linked, and both relate to the need for the general public 
to give more priority to the future. It remains to be seen whether and 
how much the liabilities associated with term limits and mortgaging the 
future will be recognized and acted upon by the public. 
 
 
PREDICTIONS AND ADVICE FROM MANY QUARTERS 
 
Given the stresses imposed by sharply reduced state funding and 
the rapid changes brought about by advances in information 
technology and globalization of all sorts, analyses and forecasts on the 
future of higher education abound. As a sampling, Christensen and 
Eyring10 take Christensen’s concepts of disruptive innovation and apply 
them to universities with dire predictions that the universities will lose 
both market and primacy. Selingo11 predicts major change brought 
about through decoupling higher education by means such as massive 
online open courses (MOOCs), adaptive learning, project-based 
learning, and unbundling of degree credits, including competency-
based certification. Brady has made a more balanced consideration of 
the likelihood and consequences of unbundling the various aspects of 
higher education,12 and has compared and contrasted the situation of  
 
 
                                                     
10 Clayton M. Christensen and Henry J. Eyring, The Innovative University: Changing the DNA of 
Higher Education from the inside Out (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2011). 
11 Jeffrey J. Selingo, College Unbound: The Future of Higher Education and What It Means for 
Students (New York: New Harvest, 2013); “Rebuilding the Bachelor’s Degree,” Chronicle of Higher 
Education, April 13, 2016. 
12 Henry Brady, “Rebundling Higher Education: A Critical Move to Avoid the Fate of the 
Newspaper”, The EvoLLLution, April 4, 2013, https://perma.cc/N92E-LEMV.   
The Future for the University of California and Public Research Universities 
697 
 
universities with changes undergone by the railroads, newspapers, and 
health care.13 Fethke and Policano14 believe that public universities will 
have to transition toward a private-university model, with high tuition 
coupled with high student financial aid, greater use of adjunct and 
temporary faculty, reduced program scope that is differentiated among 
universities, tuition differentiated by program within universities, more 
and better student services, increased accountability, and governance 
that is less shared and much more top-down. Earlier, Garland had 
made similar recommendations and added changing the form of state 
funding to portable voucher scholarships belonging to the student and 
usable at any university, presumably public or private, within that 
state.15 In return, Garland proposed that universities would set tuition, 
determine salaries, establish enrollment and admissions guidelines, 
and assume greater autonomy over capital expenditures.16 Zemsky et 
al. 17  explore many of the ways in which market forces affect 
universities and how they may be used to advantage. On the other 
hand, Newfield 18  argues that it is the introduction of business 
methodology, attention to markets, and close interactions with the 
private sector that have degraded US higher education. Bowen and 
McPherson19 identify a number of national needs—including overall 
higher levels of educational attainment, increased college completion 
rates, reduced time to degree, equality among races, affordability and 
student debt, and leadership capacity—and then go on to discuss 
desirable approaches, including greater use of instructional technology 
and altered governance. The fully online Western Governors 
                                                     
13 Henry Brady, “Let’s Not Railroad Higher Education”, PS: Political Science and Politics, v. 46, no. 
1, pp. 94-101, 2013, https://perma.cc/XH9P-EW9W. 
14 Gary C. Fethke and Andrew J. Policano, Public No More: A New Path to Excellence for America’s 
Public Universities (Stanford, CA: Stanford Business Books, Stanford University Press, 2012) 
15 A voucher approach for partial coverage of tuition was instituted in the state of Colorado in 
2004 for resident undergraduate students attending the state’s public institutions, as well as 
resident Pell Grant recipients enrolled at eligible private nonprofit institutions. See, e.g., Brian T. 
Prescott, “Is Colorado’s Voucher System Worth Vouching For?,” Change, July-August, 2010. 
16 James C. Garland, Saving Alma Mater: A Rescue Plan for America’s Public Universities (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2009), pp. 189–215. 
17 Robert Zemsky, Gregory R. Wegner, and William F. Massy, Remaking the American University: 
Market-Smart and Mission-Centered (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2005). 
18 Christopher Newfield, The Great Mistake: How We Wrecked Public Universities and How We Can 
Fix Them (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2016). 





University20 has been in operation for almost twenty years, and it 
thereby affords another model. In the extreme, Thiel Fellowships21 pay 
highly capable people $100,000 not to go to college and instead 
proceed directly into a world of commercial innovation. 
Much of the debate centers, tacitly or more explicitly, around the 
extent to which college or university education should now be viewed 
more as preparation for a career as opposed to enlightening the mind 
for all elements of a lifetime and honing abilities for critical thinking. 
Delbanco22 gives a strong and well-reasoned defense of the latter need, 
couched in the United States tradition of liberal education. Cole23 
explores that subject as well, citing the thoughts of Hannah Holborn 
Gray expressed in her Clark Kerr Lectures at Berkeley, as follows: 
The modern view sees the liberal arts as, literally, liberating, 
as freeing the mind from unexamined opinions and 
assumptions to think independently and exercise critical 
judgment, to question conventional doctrines and inherited 
claims to truth, to gain some skill in analysis and some 
capacity to deal with complexity, to embrace a certain 
skepticism in the face of dogma, and to be open to many 
points of view.24 
Careerism has served to increase enrollments in fields such as 
computer science and engineering, while decreasing student interests 
in humanities. Yet the humanities are a vital component of liberal 
education. Decreasing enrollments in humanities majors at the 
undergraduate and graduate levels raise the question of whether those 
fields will be able to continue production of both good scholarship and 
succeeding generations of faculty members.25 
                                                     
20 “Western Governors University, WGU,” 
https://web.archive.org/web/20170823063248/https://www.wgu.edu/. 
21 “The Thiel Fellowship,” https://perma.cc/XJ3A-TWN5. 
22 Anthony Delbanco, College: What It Was, Is, and Should Be (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2012). 
23 Jonathan R. Cole, Toward a More Perfect University (New York: Public Affairs, 2016). 
24 Hannah Holborn Gray, Searching for Utopia: Universities and Their Histories (Berkeley: Center 
for Studies in Higher Education and University of California Press, 2012), p. 43. 
25 MLA Task Force on Doctoral Study in Modern Language and Literature, Report of the MLA Task 
Force on Doctoral Study in Modern Language and Literature, Modern Language Association, May 
2014, https://perma.cc/3YDW-7326. 
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Current trends are toward career preparation. However, as is 
argued in chapter 13, liberal education is of great value not only for 
illuminating the mind for all aspects of a lifetime but also for the broad 
understanding that enables a graduate to work effectively in a 
multidisciplinary setting and to change roles and even careers during a 
lifetime. The ever-more-rapid changes attributable to technological 
advances, globalization, and other factors, as well as to the interactions 
among them,26 make a strong case for education that equips university 
graduates to adjust to new employment situations and opportunities as 
these changes occur throughout their working lifetimes. 
Using developments at Arizona State University during the 
presidency (2002–) of Michael Crow as the model, Crow and Dabars27 
promote the concept of very large public research universities, where 
the scale promotes both access and efficiency of operation, while 
giving the benefit of the research atmosphere to all students and 
faculty. In a sense, those authors endorse combining what in California 
are the University of California and California State University, which 
would provide the attributes of a research university to CSU students 
as well. This proposal logically leads to the question of whether there is 
a desirable benefit from keeping UC and CSU separate with distinctly 
different missions. It also raises the issue of whether the advantages of 
education on a campus of, for example, twenty-five to thirty-five 
thousand students outweigh the impersonal aspects of a very large 
campus with, say, seventy-five thousand enrolled. The California 
Master Plan did indeed achieve a substantial cost efficiency through 
mission differentiation and also enabled the high research stature that 
the University of California has achieved. For these reasons the 
California approach should be preferable. 
 
 
TWO FUNDAMENTAL UNCERTAINTIES 
 
Two large issues with yet-to-be-known ultimate outcomes strongly 
affect both the nature of universities and future prospects for public 
                                                     
26 Thomas L. Friedman, Thank You for Being Late (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2016). 
27 Michael M. Crow and William B. Dabars, Designing the New American University (Baltimore, 





funding of higher education. Both are currently very much in play, but 
the answers are not yet clear. 
 
Perceptions of Public versus Private Benefits 
The question of the relative extents to which higher education 
provides private (i.e., personal) and public benefits underlies views on 
public funding for it. Higher education is a private or personal benefit 
to the extent that it enhances a person’s career, earning power, and 
richness of life experience. It is a public benefit to the extent that it 
benefits society and the economy in general. Both sorts of benefits do 
of course accrue. The public benefit was the rationale through which 
public higher education came into being in the United States and was 
fostered through the Morrill Act of 1862. It is as well the main reason 
why higher education in most of the rest of the world is publicly 
funded, either entirely or in large part. Public funding extends 
opportunities for higher education to the most capable and deserving 
people in the entire population, without regard to their ability to pay. 
Public higher education has had much to do with the development of 
the United States and the opportunities and assimilation that it has 
provided for immigrant people. The United States has historically been 
a land of upward social and economic mobility, with public-university 
higher education being used to achieve that mobility. In that regard the 
United States has been a model for the rest of the world. 
Attention to careerism and personal benefits has increased in 
recent years as pressures on state budgets have grown and costs to 
individuals for higher education have risen through resultant tuition 
increases.  Government-sponsored loans have become more prevalent 
through the rationale that they can be repaid through the increased 
earning power that is engendered by a college degree (i.e., the private 
benefit). Unfortunately, the ready availability of government loans has 
also launched an industry of for-profit higher-education with the 
attendant problems already noted.  
An extensive economic study of the benefits of higher education 
was carried out by McMahon,28 who found that the public benefits are 
                                                     
28 Walter W. McMahon, Higher Learning, Greater Good: The Private and Social Benefits of Higher 
Education (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009). 
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much higher than are ordinarily recognized and that over half the 
benefit is public rather than private. The societal benefits of bachelor’s 
degrees on an individual basis were calculated as about $28,000 per 
year in 2007 dollars, including such things as lower crime, improved 
environment, political stability, reduced inequalities among people, 
promotion of human rights, and greater civic participation. Allowance 
for the effects of higher education and research from research 
universities on growth of the economy, as ascertained through the 
studies described in chapter 16, would make the amount of public 
benefit still greater. McMahon’s work is summarized by Lambert,29 who 
further explores the public-versus-private benefit question. The subject 
is also discussed by Bowen and McPherson,30 who bring out the work 
of Moretti31 which also shows a substantial societal benefit attributable 
to higher education. Cole32 also considers the point. 
The United States must come to grips with the issue of private 
versus public benefits of higher education, and the balance between 
public funding and tuition can and should be set accordingly. This will 
probably be accomplished indirectly through many piecemeal decisions 
and contentions on numerous more specific issues, but the process 
must occur. 
 
Uses of Instructional Technology in Higher Education 
Remarkably rapid advances in the capabilities of information 
technology (IT) have strongly affected almost everything in the world 
and certainly higher education. In contrast with the striking continual 
advances in computing hardware that have occurred through transistor 
packing reflecting Moore’s “Law,” it has been much more difficult to 
predict the developments of approaches and software that will most 
effectively deploy IT in various fields of endeavor. Higher education is a 
case in point. 
                                                     
29 Matthew T. Lambert, Privatization and the Public Good: Public Universities in the Balance 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard Education Press, 2014). 
30 Bowen and McPherson, 2016, op. cit., pp. 75–77. 
31 Enrico Moretti, “Estimating the Social Return to Higher Education: Evidence from Longitudinal 
and Repeated Cross-Sectional Data,” Journal of Econometrics 121, nos. 1–2 (2004): pp. 175–212, 
https://perma.cc/9LUN-DHWH. 





Fully online courses have come into large-scale use. As of 2013, 
eleven percent of all US students seeking undergraduate degrees were 
in online-only programs, and 27 percent took at least some of their 
classes online.33  There is even greater use of online courses for 
continuing education and career-oriented master’s degrees. University 
extension, the continuing-education arm of the University of California, 
provided thirty-two hundred online courses with total enrollments of 
eighty-four thousand as of 2013, counting all ten campuses.34 Saxenian 
prepared a thoughtful analysis35 of the status and potential of online 
education technology for the Berkeley campus in 2012. Online 
education is here and much in use, but the extents and rates of further 
growth, the roles assumed by it, and especially the financial 
implications for the future remain unclear. 
Initial efforts to share online instructional material among 
institutions and individuals included the OpenCourseWare (OCW)36  
initiative started by MIT in 2001. Following that, massive open online 
courses (MOOCs) have been given much attention, and companies such 
as Coursera, Udacity (both venture backed and for-profit), and edX (not 
for profit, open-access and -source) have been founded on the 
concept. MOOCs can be taken as is by individuals alone or imported to 
a remote location, where discussion, amplification, and further 
interpretation can be provided by a resident instructor in what has 
become known as a flipped-classroom approach. MOOCs have been 
hailed by some as the low-cost panacea for undergraduate education, 
but they are not yet that and are unlikely to become so. They are one 
useful potential component of the educational model. Some of the 
issues relating to the use and further development of MOOCs are 
                                                     
33 Data from the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) of the US Department 
of Education as cited by David Figlio, “A Silver Lining for Online Higher Education?,” Brookings 
Institution, November 10, 2016, https://perma.cc/KM6Q-4W3L. 
34 “Online Education at the University of California,” Office of the President, University of 
California, Oakland, CA, August 20, 2013, https://perma.cc/89CQ-LZJ4. 
35 AnnaLee Saxenian, “Can Online Education Technology Improve Excellence and Access at 
Berkeley?”, March 2, 2012, https://perma.cc/STK3-JW72. 
36 MIT OpenCourseWare, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, https://perma.cc/QC4T-3YN5. 
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discussed by Cole under the heading “Will Clicks Eliminate Bricks?,”37 
and are considered in greater detail by Rhoads.38 
Present-day conclusions about MOOCs cited by Richard Levin,39 ex-
president of Yale and until recently president of Coursera, are that they 
work well for developing mastery and retention of knowledge but are 
less effective than traditional education for developing critical thinking 
skills. Thille et al. conclude that “although they can provide much richer 
learning experiences than a printed book alone, current MOOCs pale in 
comparison with face-to-face instruction by a thoughtfully invested 
human instructor.”40 For mature, goal-oriented students taking career-
oriented or “how-to” courses, online delivery has been found to work 
well, particularly if the course material has substantial interactive, 
connective, and exploratory components (cMMOCs) as opposed to 
being more simply web-cast versions of traditional classroom courses 
(xMOOCs).41  
For undergraduate students, fully online courses have worked less 
well. Undergraduates in traditional higher education benefit from, and 
have their attention held by, classroom, seminar, and office-hours 
contact with faculty members; by contact with one another outside the 
classroom; and by other aspects of structure. Yet with more lectures 
and supplemental material migrating online, there is a growing 
tendency for undergraduate students in traditional universities to skip 
classes and work instead from the online material, probably with the 
same problem of not sticking to the structure of the coursework 
sufficiently and thereby with less educational value. On the other hand, 
in parts of the world where traditional undergraduate education of 
sufficient quality is simply not available, online instruction at the 
undergraduate level can be the best alternative available. These  
 
                                                     
37 Cole, 2016, op. cit., pp. 148–162. 
38 Robert A. Rhoads, MOOCS, High Technology, and Higher Learning (Baltimore, MD: Johns 
Hopkins Press, 2015). 
39 Richard Levin, “MOOCs and the Future of Higher Education,” seminar given at Center for Studies 
in Higher Education, University of California, Berkeley, April 26, 2017, video accessed June 5, 2017, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TABDlb6eEQw. 
40 Candace Thille, John Mitchell, and Mitchell Stevens, “What We’ve Learned from MOOCs,” Inside 
Higher Education, September 22, 2015, https://perma.cc/VTC7-YT32. 





conclusions are supported by the fact that for Coursera two-thirds of 
MOOC takers are between ages twenty-two and forty-five, 77 percent 
are from countries other than the United States, and a full 46 percent 
are from developing countries.42 
Creators of MOOCs are presently concentrated in elite universities, 
and such courses may not be suitable for all types and levels of 
students. 43  In any event, prolific use of the same course and 
instructional methodology for all students and in many different 
settings is not in line with the US tradition of an institutionally diverse 
system of higher education. 
Financial Aspects. Online courses have a financial structure that is 
very different from that of traditional classroom instruction. Both 
require that the instructor first organize and extend her or his 
knowledge into a logical form that is effective for conveying it to 
students. For online instruction the instructor must go much further 
before the course can be given. The presentation and arguments must 
be tested and refined since discussion will be much less possible in an 
online offering. Media-creation expertise is needed to devise and 
implement the online format. Although online courses can be 
continually improved through trials and subsequent adjustment, it is 
more difficult and expensive to change them than it is for traditional 
classroom instruction. On the other hand, the marginal cost of 
instructing an additional student is much less for online courses than it 
is for conventional classroom courses. There is also a question whether 
the economic advantages of even large-capacity online courses 
outweigh those of conventional approaches on a cost-benefit basis, 
taking into account the current trends toward more use of lecturers 
and adjunct and part-time faculty members within colleges and 
universities.44 
The most attractive financial model for MOOCs delivered to 
individuals or interinstitutionally remains unclear. OCW and edX are 
free, so participating in them provides no direct financial incentive to 
                                                     
42 Levin, 2017, loc. cit. 
43 Rhoads, 2015, loc. cit. 
44 Rita Kirshstein and Jane Wellman, “Technology and the Broken Higher Education Cost Model: 
Insights from the Delta Cost Project, Educause Review (September/October 2012): pp. 12–22, 
https://perma.cc/7UCM-76JM. 
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the providing institutions. While individuals taking courses from 
Coursera do pay for enrolling, they can also apply for a waiver of fee. 
The large portion of current Coursera enrollments coming from 
developing countries does not, in itself, suggest a large source of 
income. Levin45 has expressed the view that supplying in-house courses 
to corporations, government, and the military is likely to become a 
more reliable and effective source of revenue. 
Hybrid Courses. Online courses have benefits of scale and can 
afford a digital enrichment of content beyond what has been typical for 
conventional courses, whereas conventional courses have benefits of 
much greater and more flexible and personalized interactions between 
instructor and student and more ways of instilling critical-thinking 
skills. Thus, the two modes of instruction are presently complementary, 
and hybrid courses can be more effective than either type alone. Many 
hybrid courses do exist, stemming from original efforts such as the 
digital enhancements of chemistry courses described by Whitnell et 
al.46 and Harley et al.47 But hybrid courses are also more expensive than 
are courses in either mode alone. 
Research Universities. Information technology provides effective 
ways of bringing research into the classroom or for research to be 
given as assignments for individual study. Faculty members in research 
universities, being creative souls with strong mastery of their subject 
matter, will have their own ideas as to how instruction is best done and 









                                                     
45 Levin, 2017, loc. cit. 
46 Robert M. Whitnell et al., “Multimedia Chemistry Lectures,” Journal of Chemical Education 71 
(1994): pp. 721–725. 
47 Diane Harley et al., “Costs, Culture, and Complexity: An Analysis of Technology Enhancements in 
a Large Lecture Course at UC Berkeley,” Center for Studies in Higher Education, University of 







There are two basic approaches for dealing with the fundamental 
issue of reduced public funding. Reduce expenses, possibly with 
sacrifice in ability to meet the mission, and/or derive revenue from 
other sources.  We will consider them serially. 
 
Expenditure Reduction 
Cost Control. Cost control is a vital issue for universities for many 
reasons. In addition to the efficiencies and synergies that can be gained 
by good cost management, there is a major issue of image. Public 
universities are now in the vulnerable situation where tuitions are 
rising percentagewise much faster from year to year than are the 
actual costs of operation, which may actually decrease. The underlying 
reason has been the continual reduction in state support, which casts 
more burden on tuition and other sources of revenue just to keep 
expenditures even. The causes and effects at play are not well 
understood by the public,48 and hence there is a tendency for people to 
conclude that expenditures are rising, out of control, at the same 
percentage rate as tuition. Universities cannot expect better public 
financial support if they do not demonstrate convincingly that they are 
attentive to costs and are managing them well. 
In a classic work49 extended from an earlier study of the performing 
arts,50 Bowen concluded that the labor-intensive aspect of higher 
education and the lack of productivity increases attainable with the 
traditional methods of instruction serve to assure that costs of higher 
                                                     
48 There is even a postulate known as the Bennett hypothesis, put forward originally by William 
Bennett, which postulates that increases in federal financial aid availability drive tuition upward 
more demonstrably than reductions in public funding. See Jason Delisle, “The Disinvestment 
Hypothesis: Don’t Blame State Budget Cuts for Rising tuition at Public Universities,” Brookings 
Institution, June 1, 2017, https://perma.cc/3W6T-VRUQ.  However, there is a demonstrable cause-
and-effect relationship when state funding is reduced, and in response part of the loss is covered 
by an increase in tuition with no increase (and probably a reduction) in expenditures. The Bennett 
hypothesis seems to apply more to for-profit institutions of higher education than to public or 
non-profit private universities. 
49 William J. Bowen, The Economics of Major Private Universities (Berkeley: Carnegie Commission 
on Higher Education, 1968). 
50 William J. Baumol and William G. Bowen, “On the Performing Arts: The Anatomy of Their 
Economic Problems,” The American Economic Review 55, no. 1/2 (1965): pp. 495–502. 
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education rise faster than the rate of inflation. The infrastructure of 
this issue is more complex and subtle, however, since universities’ 
staffing patterns can and do change51 and information technology is 
becoming used more and more in various ways in instruction. 
Ehrenberg, 52  looking primarily at elite private not-for-profit 
universities, identified and analyzed several other cost drivers. Among 
these are (1) the race toward the top in academic rankings, (2) shared 
governance, (3) federal government policies (especially for private 
universities), (4) budgetary control being placed at the decanal level, 
where local sub-optimizations can occur, (5) excessive deferral of 
maintenance, (6) defined-benefit retirement plans and longer lives, (7) 
the nature of scientific research and the factors surrounding it, (8) 
inter-university recruitment of faculty, and (9) practices for appointing 
and evaluating deans.  Several of these factors are also very positive 
contributors to institutional academic quality and hence to impacts of 
the university and its graduates on the economy and society. 
Consequently, answers regarding them must lie in cost-benefit 
analyses.  
Massy53 considers cost control in universities in a way that does 
seek to balance considerations of cost with those of academic quality. 
He urges that universities dig into their cost structure and obtain 
deeper understanding by using modern capabilities and concepts of 
data science and the availability and further creation of large 
databases. He observes that most research and analysis on costs in 
universities has been focused upon teaching, whereas research and 
service are also major components of research-university activities. 
Research excellence in particular relates to academic quality and 
stature. For analyzing teaching, he promotes a concept that he names 
                                                     
51 Donna M. Desrochers and Rita Kirshstein, “Labor Intensive or Labor Extensive? Changing 
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activity-based costing (ABC). Massy also has substantial previous work 
on this subject, including a sequence of proposed initiatives.54 
Another effort to analyze university costs has been the Delta Cost 
Project, from which several reports and analyses are available.55 Some 
of the earlier findings from this project are summarized by Kirshstein 
and Wellman.56 Here and elsewhere,57 Wellman points out that cost 
per degree is a more appropriate objective function than is cost per 
student enrolled. By this logic, inefficiencies in moving students from 
initial enrollment to ultimate degrees are real costs, and greater 
attention should be paid to increasing graduation rates, rates of course 
completion by students, and successful transfer of would-be transfer 
students from community colleges to four-year institutions. 
In many situations gains in efficiency are where there will be the 
best payoff per amount of effort exerted. Impressive examples are the 
large gains in graduation rate and the evening out of graduation rates 
among ethnic groups achieved by Georgia State University through 
relatively inexpensive means such as data analysis and targeted 
counseling.58 A similar effort made in California could have a big payout 
in student success, especially for transfer. 
Berkeley. The University of California campuses have taken various 
steps toward cost reduction in recent years as the financial crisis has 
worn onward. One of the most systematic approaches has been at 
Berkeley, where, to launch an initiative denoted Operational 
Excellence, the campus commissioned the Bain Corporation to support 
and coordinate a major study of costs in all areas except core 
academics and course delivery. The report from the diagnostic phase of 
                                                     
54 William F. Massy, “Stretching the Higher Education Dollar,” Special Report 1, Initiatives for 
Containing the Cost of Higher Education (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 2013), 
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55 Delta Cost Project, accessed June 4, 2017, 
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56 Kirshstein and Wellman, 2012, loc. cit. 
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commissioned background research for “Securing the Public Trust: Practical Steps toward Higher 
Education Finance Reform in California,” College Futures Foundation, 2016, 
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https://perma.cc/V25N-HUNH. 
The Future for the University of California and Public Research Universities 
709 
 
that study is available in the form of a large PowerPoint presentation.59 
Five specific areas were identified for particular attention—
procurement, organizational simplification (including human resources 
and finance), information technology, energy management, and 
student services. Efforts were pursued in all of these areas. 
As part of addressing organizational simplification, the Berkeley 
campus undertook the campus-wide Shared Services initiative, 
described in chapter 6, which as of 2017 is being pulled back to a level 
where the sharing is within groups of kindred units. Another move has 
been to include funding of projected maintenance costs in the costs for 
construction and, where possible, renovation projects. 
Program Pruning and Consolidation. Universities should 
continually review and modify academic programs using procedures 
such as those described in chapter 12. Among the many reasons for 
regular reviews is that, left alone, academic program elements will 
almost surely multiply, a phenomenon that Smelser explored in some 
depth and labeled “accretion.”60 Furthermore, programs not subjected 
to review are much less likely to stay current and on the forefront of 
knowledge. Program-review processes are very valuable academically, 
but are usually not a good route toward major budgetary savings 
achieved over a relatively short period of time. Recommendations are 
at least as likely to cost more rather than less in the short run, and 
major program reduction is a sensitive process which, if done, usually 
needs to be carried out over time. Consolidation of smaller academic 
departments into larger ones is perhaps the route that is most 
achievable for short-term budget reduction, but the savings are likely 
to be relatively small. 
One of the larger program reductions in the United States came 
when, as a result of severe budgetary difficulties, New York University 
(NYU) sold off its Washington Heights campus in the Bronx in 1973 and 
concomitantly eliminated its School of Engineering and Science. That 
school then merged into Polytechnic Institute of Brooklyn, which  
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thereby became Polytechnic Institute of New York. That dynamic came 
full circle when Polytechnic University, as Polytechnic Institute of New 
York had been renamed, was acquired by and merged into NYU in 
2008.61, 62 
 A prominent instance of attempted program reduction that did 
not succeed was Yale University’s attempt in the early 1990s to reduce 
the size of the faculty of Arts and Sciences selectively by 11 percent for 
budgetary reasons, largely to release funds for use in renovating aging 
university buildings. A select committee chaired by Yale’s provost 
heard much input from around the campus, but did not engage in any 
substantial two-way consultation before formulating and releasing its 
plan. That plan was to close the departments of linguistics and 
operations research, reduce the sociology faculty by 40 percent, reduce 
and merge three separate engineering departments into one, and scale 
back and merge the departments of physics and applied physics.63 The 
plan led to great faculty contention and controversy, ultimately 
resulting in the successive resignations of the dean of Yale College, the 
provost, and the president.64 It is interesting to conjecture whether this 
effort could have been more successful if based upon the traditions 
and consulting mechanisms that are associated with the Academic 
Senate of the University of California. At the very least, the degrees of 
impact and unhappiness would have been found out earlier, giving an 
opportunity for modifications to be made.65 
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Outsourcing. In some situations it is more economical to outsource 
an activity to the private sector rather than for a university to perform 
it in-house. This can be a sensitive issue for a public university, 
however, because of concerns by labor unions—and in California, 
hence the state government—about job losses. The University of 
California has guidelines66 on outsourcing and submits annual reports67 
to the legislature. 
A particularly large example of outsourcing is the Merced 2020 
project to build additional facilities to enable continued growth of 
enrollment at the Merced campus. That project, described in chapter 
10, is contracted to a single development team that designs, builds, 
and partially finances the entire project and then operates and 
maintains the resultant buildings through a thirty-nine-year, 
performance-based project agreement.  Since it is an add-on, the 
outsourced project does not eliminate internal jobs. 
Coordination and Mutual Support among Universities. There are 
various ways in which efficiencies and hence cost reductions can be 
achieved by cooperation among universities in the areas of academic 
program and support services. 
As has been pointed out by Fethke and Policano,68 a logical route 
for budgetary control within universities is to focus upon program 
areas that fit the institution particularly well while leaving coverage of 
other areas to other colleges and universities. Most states have 
statewide planning and coordination mechanisms for public 
universities that provide an avenue through which program 
differentiation of this sort among public institutions can occur. 
Programmatic offerings and access to them can also be coordinated 
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by the Western Interstate Commission for Higher Education69 whereby 
students participating across state lines do not have to pay full 
nonresident tuition. 
Cole70 has urged the formation of leagues or associations to share 
and mutually reinforce intellectual activities among cooperating 
universities. Such associations could enable member institutions to 
share, consolidate, and differentiate programs and enhance library 
access. An association of this sort that already exists is the Big Ten 
Academic Alliance (BTAA),71 formerly known as the Committee on 
Institutional Cooperation (CIC), which consists of fourteen major 
midwestern state universities. CIC was initiated in 1958 by the member 
universities of the Big Ten athletic conference to share expertise, 
libraries, and specialized courses. The alliance also gives common 
access to the education-abroad programs of the member universities. 
The academic support services for the campuses of the University of 
California provided by the Office of the President, such as the digital 
library, interlibrary sharing of materials, Education Abroad Program, 
Washington Center, and Sacramento Center, have similar functions and 
characteristics to those of the BTAA. 
There are also a number of instances where cross-registration has 
been established among universities, allowing students to take courses 
at the other member institutions as well as their own. As examples, 
MIT has long had a program of cross-registration with Wellesley, and a 
similar program exists for the BOW Collaboration (Babson, Olin, 
Wellesley) in the Boston area. The Lincoln Project of the American 
Academy of Arts and Sciences has urged more similar collaborations for 
public universities as an avenue for cost reduction.72 There is also a 
longstanding cross-registration program for the Claremont Colleges in 
Southern California. 
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It can make good economic sense for colleges and universities to 
share support services of various kinds if they are located close enough 
to one another. For more than ninety years, the Claremont Colleges 
Consortium 73  has provided shared support services to the seven 
separate private institutions that make up the Claremont Colleges 
complex. There are now over thirty such services, including the library, 
information technology, student-support services, safety, and financial 
and administrative services. The Atlanta University Center 74  has 
provided similar services to Clark Atlanta, Morehouse College, Spelman 
College, and the Morehouse School of Medicine in Atlanta, Georgia. 
Several other such arrangements are described by Gose.75 
Consolidation, Mergers, and Dissolutions. A book edited by Martin 
and Samels76 gives a variety of perspectives on consolidation, synergy 
through partnerships, mergers, and even termination of colleges and 
universities. In view of the increasing financial pressures on both public 
and private institutions, these events can be expected to occur more 
frequently than they have so far. Some of the most noteworthy such 
actions over the past seventy years have been the 1948 formation of 
the State University of New York (SUNY) from twenty-nine previously 
unaffiliated institutions, the 1967 merger of Carnegie Institute of 
Technology and the Mellon Institute to form Carnegie-Mellon 
University, and the convoluted sequence of events involving New York 
University and Polytechnic Institute/University of Brooklyn/New York, 
described above. There have also been a number of instances where an 
existing university has acquired a formerly freestanding medical school 
(e.g., UC Irvine, chapter 10) or law school (e.g., the acquisition of 
McGeorge School of Law by the University of the Pacific in 1966). 
More recently the University System of Georgia has taken a 
systematic approach toward consolidation of a large number of 
individual state institutions of higher education. The process and 
recommendations are described in a combined presentation to the 
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Regents of the University System of Georgia. 77  The largest such 
consolidation so far is the integration of Georgia Perimeter College into 
Georgia State University.78 Some of the cultural issues involved in these 
mergers are recounted by Gardner,79 who also notes that the cost 
savings were not large. 
As noted throughout this book, mergers or incorporations of 
existing colleges or universities into another university encounter the 
problem of merging existing cultures, which can be difficult and take a 
long time. 
 
Altering the Distribution of Expenses and Revenue 
Management of Cross Subsidies. Universities’ budgets are typically 
structured so that academic programs are cross subsidized, meaning 
that their expenses are not matched to the income that the programs 
themselves generate through enrollments and in other ways. Instead, 
revenues from the state, tuition, and some other sources are usually 
mingled and allocated as budgets to academic units by the central 
administration on the basis of assessments of programmatic need. An 
exception is institutions, notably Harvard, that follow an “every tub on 
Its own bottom” (ETOB) approach.80 Another semiexception is the 
concept of responsibility-center management (RCM)81 that is being 
used at some universities to give everything, including space, a cost 
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Fethke and Policano82 predict that, as public universities in the 
United States adapt to their new financial world, subsidized academic 
programs will be more vulnerable and subject to elimination. Strictly 
matching budgets for academic units to the revenue they generate 
favors disciplines matched with high-income fields and thereby 
impedes the concept of a broad or liberal education. It also discourages 
multidisciplinary and interdepartmental efforts unless there are 
specific economic incentives for them. Hence, cross subsidies should be 
regarded as normal and needed, but it can still be useful for 
administrative leaders to be aware of them and monitor them for 
possible inefficiencies through means such as RCM. 
Differential Program Fees. As part of the initial response to 
declining state funding in the early 1990s, the University of California 
instituted higher tuition for some professional-degree programs.83 
Higher fees were originally set for degrees in high-paying professional 
areas such as law, medicine, and business. The rationale was that 
graduates could readily repay loans taken to cover the higher fees 
through the high wages generally associated with the profession. The 
concept has now been widened beyond those initial programs, and as 
of 2015-16 there were higher fees for sixty-four programs on the 
various campuses, including some lower-salaried fields such as public 
policy and social welfare.84 
The Faculty Budget. The traditional University of California model 
has been that members of the tenure-track faculty are expected to do 
both teaching and research, in approximately equal amounts (chapter 
11), with the recognition that the two functions inform and reinforce 
one another. Adherence to this model means that teaching and 
research remain in effectively constant proportions to one another, 
independent of faculty size. There are, of course, ways in which the 
proportion can be altered by using other types of faculty positions. For 
example, lecturers and adjunct faculty do teaching without research, 
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and research professors or members of the University of California 
Professional Research series85 do research without teaching. 
Because of budget stringencies and the desire to reduce long-term 
commitments, there has been a trend in the United States toward 
proportionately greater use of non-tenure-track and part-time faculty 
members for teaching.86 There are conflicting reported results as to 
whether this trend is helpful or damaging to teaching quality.87, 88, 89 
Present University of California policy for placing faculty academic-
year salaries on nonstate funds is relatively conservative. Beyond state 
funding and tuition revenue, the only other allowable sources for 
regular faculty positions are endowment income, fee income from 
high-fee graduate professional programs, and income from fully self-
supporting degree programs (see below). There is a limit of 7 percent 
of the total faculty positions on a campus that may be funded from 
these other sources and a limit of 15 percent within any one college or 
school. In addition, at least 10 percent of the faculty funding base must 
be used for temporary appointments, thereby providing a safeguard 
against effects of funding fluctuations on the ability to fund the regular 
faculty positions.90 
The 2007 Hewlett Foundation gift of $113 million to the Berkeley 
campus, described in chapter 2, is a prime example of using private 
money for sustained coverage of faculty salaries. That gift provided half 
the costs of each of one hundred endowed chairs, with much of the 
proceeds going into the faculty salary pool to relieve what would 
otherwise be state funds. The Hewlett Foundation made this gift 
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expressly for the purpose of helping to preserve high-quality public 
higher education in California. 
Other universities, most of them private, have at times required or 
strongly urged that members of their regular faculty who are capable 
of securing government grants defray substantial amounts of their 
academic-year salaries through recharges to government grants. That is 
common practice everywhere in the United States for summer salaries 
of the faculty, but requiring it for academic-year salaries is both riskier 
and more controversial for tenured faculty members, since 
government grants do end and the process for getting new grants is 
highly competitive. However, using grant funds toward academic-year 
salaries is allowed under policies of the National Science Foundation91 
and some other federal government agencies. The practice is most 
prevalent in health-sciences disciplines. Moving more to “soft” 
research-grant money to support faculty positions raises questions of 
faculty allegiance and equity.92 
While not all campuses have the same access to private money, the 
University of California policy does have substantial room for additional 
funding of faculty positions from the three sources considered by the 
UC policy statement cited above. Consideration should also be given to 
increasing the 7 percent limitation and/or allowing some other sources 
such as guaranteed support for the duration of a faculty member’s 




The most obvious way for public universities to replace public 
funding is to move in various ways toward the financial model of the 
leading private universities, although that model is itself also under 
stress.93 Moves in this direction are typically called “privatization,” 
without much attention being given to the various meanings of the  
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word or the differences among forms of privatization. In that the 
alternative to public resources is, by definition, private resources, 
nearly all steps to gain resources from other sources can be called 
privatization. But it is also important to distinguish financial resources 
from mission. To whatever extent public universities “privatize” 
resources, their goal should be to retain as much of the public mission 
as possible, notably facile access without regard to ability to pay. 
The word “privatization” can also be taken to imply running 
universities more like a corporate business, although that is not the 
meaning adopted here. Newfield94 argues that acceptance of business 
models and practices from the corporate world, along with associated 
corporate thinking and priorities, is the fundamental reason for the 
decline in the situations of public universities in the United States. 
The two principal sources in the revenue portfolios of private 
universities that public universities have to substantially lesser extents 
are tuition and yields from endowment. Fethke and Policano95 contend 
that higher tuition is the only viable replacement for state funding and 
that it is feasible only to the extent that demand for admission is 
sufficiently inelastic with respect to cost of attendance. As state 
support has dwindled, public universities have raised tuition to make 
up for some of the loss. The limits to raising tuition are considered in 
the following section. 
Endowment is a different matter. Comparison of the sizes of 
endowments of leading private universities with those of leading public 
universities is striking, particular if placed on a basis of endowment per 
enrolled student.96 Leading private universities have built up large 
amounts of endowment over many years. It will not be possible for 
public universities to do this over a few years or even a few decades. 
But they should get started and make development of endowment a 
high priority. Many are making intensive efforts to do just that and 
have been doing so since the 1980s and before. This objective requires 
the same staffing and intensity of fund-raising activities that have been  
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characteristic of major private universities. In that sense, building fund-
raising capacity is an investment and may not pay off all that well in the 
early years while institutional capability and cultivation of donors are 
developed. Offsetting the fact that public-university graduates may be 
less prosperous on the average is the fact that there are individual 
donors and foundations who are attracted by the public mission itself. 
The ins and outs of privatization in the sense of maintaining the 
public mission have been considered by Matthew Lambert,97 vice 
president for institutional advancement at the College of William and 
Mary, who carried out in-depth studies of the states of Virginia, North 
Carolina, and California, including talking with about 150 legislators in 
those states to obtain their views. His book contains a chapter specific 
to California.98 
 
Increasing Tuition Revenue 
The Need to Build Financial Aid Simultaneously. If access is to be 
maintained in public universities, increases in tuition must be 
accompanied by increases in need-based financial aid. The approach 
used by the University of California is to devote one-third of revenue 
from tuition increases to need-based aid. Universities should also 
recognize that the upper level of family incomes that qualify a student 
as needy should also rise as tuitions rise. 
The Limits on Tuition for Public Universities. There are four 
plausible upper limits on the amount of tuition that can be charged by 
public universities following the model in which very substantial 
portions of increases in tuition are devoted to need-based financial aid. 
These are the market limit (the point at which enrollment cannot be 
sustained in view of higher tuition), the ability to maintain the public 
mission (access independent of ability to pay), the size of accumulated 
student debt, and political limits in various forms, some of them 
relating to access and debt. 
Fethke and Policano99 discuss various aspects of market response 
to higher tuition. More specifically for the University of California, as of  
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2016 eight of the nine undergraduate campuses (all except Merced) 
cannot admit all eligible applicants who apply and are therefore 
selective among eligible applicants. Therefore, by market analysis 
alone, they could raise tuition while sustaining enrollment. Some of the 
UC campuses are much more selective than others. The most selective 
campuses could, in principle, raise tuition much more than the others 
and still maintain enrollment. However, doing that would result in 
tuitions that differ among campuses, something that the university has 
not been willing to have. 
Raising tuition also brings extra costs beyond the need to devote a 
substantial amount of the tuition increase to financial aid. In order to 
avoid excessive elasticity of demand, another large expense area 
incurred with higher tuition should be for upgrading student services, 
moving toward the level provided by the leading private universities. 
The purposes are both to draw students and to cultivate satisfied 
alumni who will be supportive donors after graduation. 
Even when a substantial fraction of revenue from tuition increases 
is dedicated to need-based financial aid, higher tuitions will engender 
increased student borrowing and hence greater accumulated student 
debt. Student debt loads have now become high enough that they are 
a major national concern, financially and politically. That issue and how 
it might be overcome are described in the following two sections. 
Opponents of the higher-tuition, higher-aid approach argue that 
“sticker shock” from higher tuition will drive away low-income students 
and their families, who will not persist to discover the availability of the 
aid. They also note that, once a higher-tuition, higher-aid policy is 
established in a state, the aid component can be cut or withdrawn by 
the state government in times of economic stringency, leaving only the 
high tuition. 
Many people who are more affluent believe that low-cost public 
education is an obligation of the state, even for wealthier residents. 
Their votes may offset the votes of the low-income residents who 
would benefit from the high-aid portion of the policy. Thus the tuition-
aid structure is inherently a political matter. The political nature is 
underscored by the fact that Lambert100 found in his interviews with 
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state legislators that a number of them recognize and expect that 
higher tuition is needed to offset, in part, the loss of public funding for 
universities. However, they will still vocally oppose higher tuition 
because of the political benefits that they derive from so doing. Fethke 
and Policano101 report similar findings. To the extent that the state 
legislature has control over tuition, either directly or through the 
budget, politics can limit or severely impede higher tuitions even with a 
large portion of the tuition increase returned to aid. 
Political opposition to higher tuition should wax and wane 
depending upon legislators’ perceptions of public attitudes. It thus 
behooves public universities to find ways of spreading awareness of 
true costs to students and their families when tuition and living 
expenses are discounted by the available financial aid and to find ways 
of lessening student debt or making it more manageable. One 
approach, not without political danger itself, is tuition pricing that is 
differential by income level. 
In 2014 tuition for undergraduate, in-state students at the 
University of California was about 20 percent higher than for the 
average of the other twenty-eight public universities that are members 
of the Association of American Universities (AAU). However, UC tuition 
is still only about 28 percent as high as the tuitions of the twenty-six 
AAU members that are private universities.102 
A 2011 recommendation from a meeting of twenty-two former 
chancellors of campuses of the University of California considered new 
funding models for the university and went so far as to recommend a 
doubling of the tuition. This increase would be coupled with a 
rearrangement of state funding whereby all state support would be 
devoted to need-based financial aid. 103  In support of this 
recommendation, the former chancellors argued: 
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Under the model we are suggesting, the State’s current 
contribution of approximately $12,000 per student, 
traditionally used by UC as general institutional support for its 
education programs, would henceforth be used solely for 
financial aid. In effect, these State funds would become a 
subsidy to students who are California residents. This would 
enable the University to reallocate much, if not all, of the 
tuition income it has perforce returned to financial aid to 
preserve the quality of the education we provide for 
residents and nonresidents alike. 
By this rationale, state support would be directly tied to financial-
aid support for needy California-resident students, without the political 
opportunity to try to separate the two matters in the minds of 
legislators and voters. As already noted, a similar suggestion was made 
by Garland, with the state financial aid being in the form of portable 
vouchers that could be taken to the student’s institution of choice. As 
described by Hyatt 104  and in more detail by Garland, 105  Miami 
University of Ohio instituted a system whereby it charges the same 
tuition for residents and nonresidents of the state, but it has two forms 
of scholarships that are available only to residents: one the same for all 
residents and the other need-based. It should be noted, however, that 
this approach too runs the risk that the state-supported financial aid 
could be lost in a time of state financial crisis. 
Student Debt. Both the recent increases in tuitions and the 
marketing and financial practices of for-profit universities have 
increased student borrowing sharply. The situation has now gotten to 
the point where it is a major national issue in the United States, even 
reflected in political campaign stances for the 2016 presidential 
election. An October 2015 report106 based on a detailed annual study 
by The Institute for College Access and Success cites 1.3 trillion dollars  
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in accumulated student loans for the college class of 2014 that 
graduated from public and private not-for-profit colleges and 
universities. Sixty-nine percent of graduating seniors had accumulated 
student-loan debt, owing an average of $28,950 per borrower. 
Inclusion of private, for-profit institutions, from which it is much harder 
to obtain data, would have made the figures substantially higher. 
Strikingly, although women constitute about 56 percent of those 
enrolled in higher education, they account for 65 percent of 
accumulated debt.107 Among the states California has comparatively 
less debt per student, but the issue is still present in California. 
Most of the borrowing has been from government-sponsored or 
government-guaranteed loan programs. Much has been made in the 
media about the burden of repayment created by these programs and 
the fact that even bankruptcy does not relieve the obligation. The debt 
burden is not evenly distributed among students from different types 
of institution. A recent University of California accountability report108 
indicated that the 2011–12 cumulative debt level for UC 
undergraduates was $20,200 per student for those students graduating 
with debt, compared to $25,700 for other public four-year, $30,740 for 
private nonprofit four-year, and $37,840 for private for-profit 
institutions. The same source indicated that about 55 percent of the UC 
class of 2013–14 graduated with debt. 
It has been reported that nearly seven million Americans, or about 
17 percent of borrowers, have gone at least a year without making a 
payment on their federal student loans.109 Defaults are concentrated 
toward borrowers at for-profit schools and, to a lesser extent, two-year 
institutions and other nonselective institutions.110 
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Dynarski111 analyzed reasons for student debt and the difficulties 
that graduates in the United States have in repayment. The problem 
areas include a relatively short ten-year repayment period, which 
occurs while incomes are still low, as well as the fact that for the 
original program the required repayment amounts are constant over 
time and cannot be waived. As already noted, even bankruptcy does 
not relieve debt obligations for student loans. 
These blanket statements mask a more subtle and differentiated 
infrastructure of student debt, which is analyzed by Baum112 and by 
Akers and Chingos113  in work that is also briefly summarized by 
Supiano.114 They make arguments that the crisis is not as severe as the 
aggregate figures make it appear and that the debt is concentrated 
toward those who have taken loans to obtain advanced degrees and 
those who should not have sought college education in the first place, 
typified by students recruited avidly by the for-profit institutions. 
Income-Contingent Loans. Income-contingent student loans came 
into use on a widespread basis in Australia in 1989, during a time of 
financial difficulty in the national budget. Those loans are issued by the 
government and are repayable through income tax filings once the 
earnings of the former student have risen to a certain level after 
graduation. They thereby provide a clear and manageable path of 
repayment. The Australian system has been discussed by Harman,115 
and Chapman116, 117 has examined the approach in more general form.  
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The use of income-contingent loans for public higher education had as 
of 2016 spread to at least nine other countries, including New Zealand, 
South Korea, the Netherlands, and Great Britain.118 An approach with 
some similar characteristics was launched in the US by the Obama 
administration through PAYE (Pay As You Earn) loans (2012) and 
REPAYE loans (2015).  These loans have less favorable eligibility and 
repayment conditions than the Australian model and, as of 2017, are 
also in jeopardy of not being continued by the Trump administration.   
Income–contingent loans were also adopted in the state of Oregon in 
2013 on a trial basis.119 
Income-contingent loans in Australia tie repayment to the career 
earnings of the student, with formulae that keep the payments 
manageable and with the amount due remaining at zero if the 
graduate’s income never reaches the threshold level. Such a program 
requires that the government generate a sufficient amount of money 
up front to create the loan pool, such as through issuance of bonds. In 
the United States there needs to be a mechanism to sustain 
repayments even when graduates move among states. 
Widespread use of government income-contingent loans for 
student higher-education costs makes good sense for the United 
States, California, and the University of California. As things stand, the 
political limit is probably most restrictive with regard to UC tuition 
increases. Institution of a widely used, well-understood income-
contingent loan system would probably create enough sense of 
security among the public so that political stances against higher 
tuition would be mitigated significantly. 
It should also be recognized that income-contingent loans move 
the cost of higher education from resources available at the time of 
enrollment, which are probably parental resources, to the earning 
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Out-of-State and International Students. One of the steps taken by 
the University of California and other major public research universities 
in response to diminished state funding has been to increase 
substantially enrollments of full-fee-paying out-of-state and 
international students. Enrollment of those students provides sufficient 
net funds to subsidize the enrollment of additional state-resident 
students beyond those covered by state funding. The University of 
Virginia and the University of Michigan experienced difficulties in state 
funding earlier and successfully went down this road sooner. Public 
universities in some smaller states with less public funding have 
historically had very high out-of-state enrollment. The Universities of 
Vermont and Delaware have only about 25 percent 120  and 38 
percent121 in-state enrollment, respectively. 
From an overall national viewpoint, enrollment of out-of-state US 
students is a zero-sum game. There are students who will pay more for 
public higher education in another state for personal or family reasons 
or because they perceive it to be a better education for them.  
From another standpoint, many students who come to California 
from other states and countries have stayed and are important 
contributors to California’s economy. Many have themselves started 
California-based companies. Since the rise of Silicon Valley in the 1960s 
and 1970s, the California economy has had many very important 
contributions from immigrants. 
Because of political concerns that nonresident students take up 
enrollment spots that could have been used for eligible California 
students, and as already noted in chapters 2 and 15, the Regents of the 
University of California in 2017 adopted a policy limiting the 
percentage of nonresidents among undergraduate students to current 
values in the 19 to 24 percent range at Berkeley, San Diego, UCLA, and 
Irvine, and to 18 percent at the remaining general campuses. This was 
a political response to public and legislative concerns at the time. 
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But what are academically optimum levels of international and US 
nonresident students? And what levels are politically defensible? 
Figure 21-1 shows the percentage of state-resident, US-non-resident, 
and international students among undergraduates for Fall 2016 
enrollment for comparison public universities in the United States, 
along with the University of California as a whole and the average for 
AAU public universities other than UC.  
 
 
Source: UC Data Warehouse (UC numbers) and Common Data Set (comparator 
numbers). 
* UC’s public four comparison institutions. **AAU public average excludes UC 
 
Figure 21-1. Resident, US Nonresident, and International Undergraduate 
Enrollments at UC and Comparison US Public Universities, Fall 2016.122 
 
 
A survey 123  of 2015–16 international 124  enrollments at US 
universities shows several private universities, including Illinois 
                                                     






Institute of Technology and Carnegie-Mellon University, in the range of 
20–33 percent, with UC San Diego as the highest public institution at 23 
percent, followed among University of California campuses by Irvine at 
16 percent. 
In comparison with the values for other states shown in figure 21-
1, the figures for the University of California suggest that the 
percentages of nonresident students could logically be increased. But 
the population and political situation are different in California, the 
state is large, and the geographical location is more isolated. Those 
facts probably necessitate a limit for the out-of-state and international 
undergraduate student population that is lower than the 30 to 40 
percent range that is prevalent in the midwestern state universities. 
Any efforts to raise the enrollment of international and/or out-of-
state US students at the University of California beyond the levels set 
by the Board of Regents in 2017 will need to address the matter of 
perceived displacement of California-resident students from the 
campuses most sought by California residents. If displacement 
concerns can be dispelled, there should then be thoughtful analyses of 
the mix of students that is educationally best for UC undergraduates 
and of needs for attracting to California students who are likely to stay 
and be important to the growth of California’s high-tech economy. 
 
Enhancing Other Revenue Sources 
Broader Federal Government Support. The public universities in 
the United States belong to the states. The federal government funds 
universities (both public and private) by two primary means—research 
support and student financial aid. The financial aid largely takes the 
form of loans but also includes Pell Grants in direct support of students 
from low-income families. An obvious path to explore is whether the 
federal government could assume a wider role in supporting the 
nation’s public universities. The political process of the federal 
government would make it virtually impossible to create programs 
benefitting a few states at the expense of the rest. Broad-brush, 
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flexible support would probably be spread so widely that the net 
influence would likely be small, and as well there would properly be 
issues of accountability. The best approaches are probably new 
competitive, peer-reviewed programs targeted for specific purposes. 
Another useful approach could be cost matching with states, which 
would provide an incentive for state funding. A program for university 
facilities that matches state funding subject to a peer-review process is 
one possibility. This would address the reduction of spending for 
university facilities that has occurred in many states, including 
California. Tax policy could also be used advantageously. Tax 
preferences are already in place for private donations to qualified not-
for-profit universities and for industrial funding of research. Ways could 
be devised to increase these benefits further for individuals and 
companies. 
Foundation Funding. The foundations classically dealing with 
higher education, such as the Carnegie Corporation and the Mellon, 
Ford, and Hewlett Foundations, traditionally welcomed projects 
dealing with a variety of needs and opportunities, leaving the selection 
and development of the project area largely up to the proposing 
institution. This situation has changed significantly in recent years, with 
many foundations and a growing number of other philanthropic 
vehicles now working in an activist, agenda-driven way that prescribes 
not only the need but also the desired means of addressing it. 
Approaches of this sort have come to dominate the world of 
foundation philanthropy for higher education. The issue is not specific 
to higher education; it applies broadly within the charitable world.125 
As part of this trend, several major foundations dealing with higher 
education—most notably the Gates and Lumina Foundations and to 
lesser extents the Hewlett and Kresge Foundations—have taken strong 
interests in promoting access and greater participation in higher 
education. Their efforts should be beneficial toward those particular 
ends, which are important. 
The agenda-driven emphasis and the similaritiy of the agendas of 
different foundations reduce the possibilities for support of broader-
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based innovations in higher education that do not fit the methodology 
predefined by the foundation.126 Would-be grant recipients of course 
try to fit their proposals to the objectives and preferred methodology 
of the foundation to which they are applying, thereby reducing the 
overall diversity of projects. 
Foundation support should be regarded as valuable for carrying out 
research and launching innovations. Most foundations have policies of 
not providing on-going support or endowments. They also usually have 
policies that favor distributing their largesse widely rather than 
focusing in on a few beneficiaries. Despite growth in charitable giving 
and in the number of foundations, the amount of funding potentially 
available to universities from foundations remains only a small fraction 
of what comes through state support (for public universities), tuition, 
federal research grants, and collected, targeted private giving by 
individuals. 
Private Support from Individuals. Major gifts from individuals will 
continue as vital components of university funding portfolios and will 
grow for public universities as they devote more energy to the area. 
But gifts from individuals can rarely be used for general support of a 
university. Donors are more motivated by specific subjects and projects 
that are of particular interest to them. 
Employer Support. The people, discoveries, and innovations that 
come out of US research universities have been of great value to 
industry. The contributions of universities to society and the economy, 
including industry, have been documented in many ways, including the 
comprehensive book by Jonathan Cole,127 a study by the National 
Research Council,128 and the Lincoln Project of the American Academy  
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of Arts and Sciences (AAAS),129 It was the growth of university research 
in scientific areas that enabled many major companies to make the 
decisions that they did in the 1970s and 1980s to wind back and/or 
reorient in-house research. Yet research universities are funded much 
more by state and federal governments and by students and their 
families than by the ultimate users of the talent that comes from them. 
Of course, companies do pay taxes, and companies and industrial 
organizations do sometimes supply help to public universities in the 
state political process. But the general lack of direct financial assistance 
from industrial employers to higher education other than through 
sponsored research is still striking. It could make sense to tie a set 
portion of state corporate taxes directly to university funding, in the 
same way that California dedicates state gasoline taxes to road and 
transportation projects. This coupling might engender less resistance 
from industry to tax increases. The above-mentioned Lincoln Project of 
the AAAS has recommended creating state incentives for corporations 
to support scholarships at public research universities, or even 
following the model of agreements by corporations with employee and 
executive search firms, giving one-third of the first year’s salary to the 
university from which a new hire graduated.130 
 
Entrepreneurial Activities 
The area of greatest recent growth in generation of revenue by 
universities has been in what can be called entrepreneurial activities. 
These occur at both institutional and subinstitutional levels and 
generally take the form of efforts to market or otherwise utilize an  
 
 
                                                     
129 The Lincoln Project, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, “Public Research Universities: 
Serving the Public Good,” 2016, https://perma.cc/89ER-LGBF. 
130 The Lincoln Project, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, “Public Research Universities: 
Recommitting to Lincoln’s Vision—An Educational Compact for the 21st Century,” p. 22, 2016, 
http://perma.cc/UCD6-ES56. See also Robert Birgeneau and Henry Brady, “Public Research 
Universities: Recommitting to Lincoln’s Vision: An Educational Compact for the 21st Century,” 
video and slides of seminar, September 8, 2016, Center for Studies in Higher Education, University 
of California, Berkeley, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=onYh5n3Gd0o&t=0s&list=PLBCSDvIH2ZdX3fZp-Ov2f5e-





intellectual asset of the university, such as specific knowledge, 
educational know-how, or useful research discoveries. 
International Partnerships and Branch Campuses. Many 
international partnerships involving US universities have been initiated 
in recent decades. There are also a number of instances where US 
universities have launched branch campuses overseas. Most of these 
efforts relate to marketing US higher education and exporting the US 
model, and most provide substantial net income for the partner 
university in the United States. They can also serve the very useful 
purpose of providing international experience for US students in a 
period of increasing globalization. A few of the leading examples 
portray the varied nature and scope. 
 Carnegie-Mellon University, with its home base in Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania, had by 2016 developed operations in twenty-two 
other locations around the world, ranging from satellite 
campuses with free-standing degree programs to partnerships 
with universities in other countries.131 
 Education City132 in Doha, Qatar, is largely financed by the 
Qatar Foundation and is a cluster of complementary satellite 
operations of eight universities—Virginia Commonwealth 
University (fine arts), Weill Cornell Medical College, Texas A&M 
(engineering), Carnegie Mellon (business, computer science), 
Georgetown (foreign service), Northwestern (journalism, 
communication), École des Hautes Études Commerciales de 
Paris (business), and University College, London (archaeology, 
curation)—coupled with research parks and other activities. 
Education City fits the model of an “education hub,” which has 
been considered more generally by Knight and coauthors133 for 
the cases of Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Hong Kong, 
Singapore, Malaysia, and Botswana.  
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 New York University has satellite campuses in Abu Dhabi134 
and Shanghai, 135  along with eleven other global academic 
centers around the world. The design is that students and 
faculty should move interchangeably among the three 
campuses. 
 Yale-NUS College 136  is a liberal arts college formed as a 
partnership between Yale University and the National 
University of Singapore, designed to bring that form of 
education to Asia. Degrees are from Yale-NUS, not from Yale or 
NUS themselves. 
 Duke Kunshan University137 is a joint effort of Duke University, 
Wuhan University, and the city of Kunshan, China, to create a 
new liberal-arts-based research university. 
 KAUST (the King Abdullah University of Science and 
Technology)138 is designed to be a graduate-level-only version 
of Caltech. While not a partnership effort institutionally, the 
university was started (2009) with partnerships in various 
disciplines and research areas with universities around the 
world, each receiving substantial funding from KAUST to help 
with definition of programs and recruitment and screening of 
faculty in a particular academic area. 
Interestingly, most of these partnerships and branch campuses 
have so far been conducted by private, rather than public, universities, 
in the United States. This probably reflects the greater agility and 
acceptance of risk by private universities, as well as the obligation felt 
by public universities to pay first attention to their state. In all cases, 
there is substantial revenue to the US university partner. 
Data on international branch campuses are maintained by the 
Cross-Border Education Research Team at the University at Albany, 
State University of New York, who in 2017 recorded 247 international  
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branch campuses in operation, with the US (77) and UK (38) being the 
largest exporters and China (32) and the United Arab Emirates (32) 
being the largest importers.139  As of 2015 about 30 branches (12%) 
that had been created had been closed.140 
A quite different approach is a University of California university-
wide effort that supplies academic advice and oversight to the 
American University of Armenia,141 That university, started in Yerevan, 
Armenia, in 1991, is a partnership effort of the Armenian General 
Benevolent Union (a worldwide Armenian-diaspora charitable 
organization), the Regents of the University of California, and the 
government of Armenia. In contrast to the other examples, the 
University of California relationship is budget neutral (i.e., no money 
changes hands). The incentive to UC for its participation can be 
regarded as more political than financial; there is a substantial 
Armenian American population in California, and the governor at the 
time of the founding was an Armenian American.142 
Yet another approach is that of “microcampuses” overseas, 
currently being undertaken by the University of Arizona.143 The idea is 
to enable students from other countries to obtain a University of 
Arizona degree while living primarily or even exclusively in their home 
countries, thereby saving the considerable extra expense associated 
with relocating and enrolling at the home campus in the United States. 
As of 2017 the university had thirteen agreements with overseas 
universities in place, two of them already in operation, with plans to 
increase to more than twenty-five by 2020. The micro-campuses use 
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augmented by use of the flipped-classroom approach conducted by 
faculty members from the partner university. Currently three 
undergraduate majors—business, civil engineering, and law—are 
offered in a format wherein degrees can be obtained simultaneously 
from both universities. The plan is to increase the number of available 
majors over time.  
One of the ultimate intended features is for students from the 
home campus in Tucson, Arizona, to “study at any microcampus, and 
take courses with partner university students, while advancing 
seamlessly in their degree programs.”144 This micro-campus approach 
has the potential of enabling US students in very structured majors 
such as engineering to participate in study abroad, something that is 
difficult otherwise. The micro-campus approach, combining 
instructional and education-aboard aspects, could be attractive for the 
University of California, which as of 2017 had 402 Education Abroad 
programs in forty-two countries.145  
Self-Sustaining Specialized Academic Programs. Another new class 
of high-revenue programs offered by the University of California, akin 
to the previously mentioned high-fee professional degree programs, is 
self-supporting graduate professional degree programs. These 
programs focus on special needs, often advanced education for 
working professionals. They utilize no state support, and are therefore 
purely entrepreneurial academic efforts. There were sixty-two of these 
among the campuses as of 2016,146 a number that is continually 
growing. Fees for these programs are specific to the program and are 
set by campuses with approval by the president. 147  Both these 
programs and the high-fee professional programs provide revenue that 
is retained by the academic unit. They thereby contribute to a growing 
sense of different standards of living among academic departments. 
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Building on Research Discoveries. The existence of some well-
known blockbuster discoveries148 that have, or could have, reaped 
considerable value for the universities involved has inspired many 
research universities to seek to generate income from technology-
transfer patent-licensing activities. But the financial results of these 
ventures have been very chancy. Many university technology-transfer 
offices do not make sufficient money to cover their expenses, and 
studies have shown that only rarely do university inventions hit it big 
financially. There is no good way to predict winners in advance. It is 
better to let general relations with industry be the driver for the 
establishment of technology-transfer efforts and then to let 
adventitious serendipity take its course. Net income from technology 
transfer and licensing should not be incorporated into budgetary 
planning until it is actually realized. 
Some universities, including the University of California since 
2014,149 have gone still further by investing directly in companies 
commercializing technology based on university research. For UC this 
enables taking equity in return for use of university facilities and 
services, such as incubators, during the initial development phases. 
There are of course other, less direct ways in which universities 
derive revenue from the impact of their research. Land-rich 
universities, such as Stanford and the Irvine campus of the University of 
California, have received rents and land-usage fees from companies 
that choose to locate on university-owned land near the campus 
because of the attractiveness of being near university researchers. That  
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desire was the genesis for Stanford Industrial Park (chapter 18). The 
impact and attractiveness of a university’s research can also be 
credited as much of the reason that various large research 
arrangements have been made between industrial companies and 
universities, ranging from Monsanto’s early involvement with Harvard 
forward to the BP Energy Biosciences Institute at Berkeley (chapter 18). 
Expanding Horizons and Acquisitions. Another route for deriving 
new revenue and/or creating the wherewithal to generate it is to 
expand the activities of a college or university into new activities. A 
striking example has been Southern New Hampshire University,150 a 
relatively new public university that has now devoted considerable 
attention to building and expanding online education and now has over 
eighty thousand online students along with three thousand plus on-
campus students. Its activities are primarily professional education with 
only limited research. There are currently schools of business, 
education, and arts and sciences. 
A very different venture to build online education has recently 
been taken by Purdue University, which in 2017 acquired Kaplan 
University from Kaplan, Inc.151 Kaplan was a for-profit university and is 
one that has been subject to accusations and lawsuits claiming overly 
aggressive marketing and profiteering so as to derive income through 
government loans to students for tuition payment. It has fifteen in-
house locations in the United States, largely in the Midwest, and a large 
online program. 
Upon acquisition by Purdue, Kaplan University (KU) became a 
nonprofit public benefit corporation, with academic design and 
oversight by Purdue and support services and some budgetary control 
by Kaplan, Inc. By act of the Indiana State Legislature at the time of 
acquisition, KU became exempt from public records laws and several 
other public accountability measures. This is a striking, but allowable, 
status for a unit of a public university. Through this action KU will not 
have to file financial information with the Securities and Exchange 
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Commission (SEC) as it did in its former status.152 There is to be no state 
funding for KU, but Indiana residents will receive discounted tuition. 
Uncertainties include whether, when, and to what extent Purdue 
can derive net revenue from the arrangement; how much the Purdue 
brand will help the bottom line for KU, which presently loses money; 
and what will come from approval processes such as accreditation.153 
Positive aspects of the arrangement cited by Purdue are 
positioning Purdue for growth in online education, serving those who 
cannot now get on-campus degrees, and in effect moving toward a 
new, more comprehensive public-university mission suited to the 
information age.154  Levine155  cites upgrading the overall quality of 
online education, a useful learning experience for Purdue, and 
recognition of the transition to a digital society. Among the concerns 
raised have been the unusual latitude and secrecy afforded to KU, the 
potential for sullying Purdue’s name through continuation of KU’s 
marketing practices, too much control remaining with Kaplan, Inc., and 
the risk of substantial long-term financial losses for Purdue.156 
From a governance standpoint, the Purdue administration did not 
consult with their (faculty) university senate before the acquisition and 
did not inform the senate leaders until very shortly before the deal was 
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Pitfalls for Entrepreneurial Presidents. Experience so far on 
institutional-partnership entrepreneurial activities has identified some 
of the principal impediments to success. These include (1) the 
institutional leadership getting too far out in front of the faculty and 
not being able to deliver what has been promised, (2) reluctance of 
faculty members to travel or relocate, (3) proposed intellectual 
partnerships that do not blossom, (4) the president being too far out in 
front of (or behind!) the trustees, and above all, (5) issues of risk 
management. Presidents will do well to seek true, attractive benefits 
for all parties and not just revenue, to work in synergy with their 
faculty, and to enable rather than prescribe. 
Activities at the Level of Academic Units. Except for the KAUST 
partnerships, the entrepreneurial activities described so far all involve 
entire educational institutions. Of at least comparable importance are 
the myriad entrepreneurial efforts that are stemming from academic 
departments or organized research units and even individual faculty 
members. Many of these are responses to reductions in state funding, 
as units look to “stay alive.” 
There are several good reasons why partnerships initiated by 
faculty members or groups of faculty members may ultimately be the 
most successful ones. The creativity of a research university lies with 
the faculty members. Within research universities it is easier to build in 
a bottom-up rather than in a top-down mode. And by starting small 
and then building up, one can evaluate and adjust while growing rather 
than trying to define fully out in front. Consequently, it should be 
possible to preclude large mistakes. 
One primary mechanism for entrepreneurship at the level of 
individual academic units is the provision of specialized courses. An 
example underlies the original development of this book. While the 
author was director of Berkeley’s Center for Studies in Higher 
Education, the center received budget cuts, and we developed week-
long courses on university structure, governance, and building and 
maintenance of quality for university and ministry officials from around 
the world as a means of generating offsetting revenue. 
Another common form of entrepreneurism among faculty 
members is the development of external partnerships, primarily in 





of the research is the driver.  In a recent study 157  of scholarly 
communication in seven academic disciplines (economics, molecular 
biology, astrophysics, political science, music, history, and 
archaeology), one question was about partnerships among faculty 
members at different institutions and the factors that make them most 
successful. Four factors stood out—complementary expertise, 
specialized facilities and/or instrumentation, the need to deal well with 
multidisciplinary grand-challenge issues, and facilitation of fieldwork 
and the locations of objects of study. 
When partnerships with other institutions are created by individual 
faculty members, groups of faculty members, or academic 
departments, the role of the campus administration becomes one of 
enablement—identifying which partnerships to foster in what ways 
and wisely monitoring partnerships through appropriate policies. 
Policy Needs. Entrepreneurial activities within universities are 
rapidly growing and do afford viable paths for revenue enhancement. 
However, they raise several issues for which policies need to be 
developed, similar to what was done during the 1980s and 1990s to 
govern interactions with industry. Policies, coordinating mechanisms, 
or both will be needed in areas such as these: 
 the use of the institutional “brand name,” 
 pricing structures, 
 avoidance or management of situations where the activities of 
one unit cause problems for other units within the university, 
 the proportion of a faculty member’s time devoted to 
entrepreneurial activities as opposed to usual university duties, 
 determination of what content is appropriate for 
entrepreneurial programs rather than falling within a 
university’s core public mission, 
 the appropriateness of additional salary from university 
entrepreneurial activities, and 
 payment for institutional services supporting such activities. 
                                                     
157 Diane Harley et al., “Assessing the Future Landscape of Scholarly Communication: An 
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It should help for a university campus to create what is effectively a 
minister of entrepreneurism—someone who will maintain awareness 
of what is going on; look for linkages, interactions, conflicts, and so on, 
within the university; encourage integration of efforts across the 
campus; look for policy needs; and initiate policy development where 
needed. 
 
Less State Control 
As public research universities have had to supplement state 
funding with ever larger amounts of revenue from other sources, some 
of them have sought to reduce the amount of state control, so as to 
give them needed flexibility for achieving efficiencies and funding from 
nonstate sources. A notable example took place in Virginia, where what 
was originally a charter university initiative for the University of 
Virginia, Virginia Tech, and William and Mary morphed during the 
process of political give-and-take into the Restructured Higher 
Education Financial and Administrative Operations Act of 2005.158, 159, 
160 Through it, public universities achieved one of three levels of 
flexibility in return for an acknowledgement of substantially lesser 
levels of state support and a general agreement as to deliverables. 
Leslie and Berdahl 161  describe the political sausage making that 
occurred through the process and question whether there was net 
positive benefit for the three public universities that undertook the 
initiative. 
An examination of the terms and delegations162 of the Virginia 
arrangement shows that essentially all of the flexibility that was given 
already exists for the University of California by virtue of constitutional  
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autonomy. For the University of California, greater flexibility is 
probably better achieved through changes in internal governance (see 
below), rather than seeking greater flexibility in the relationship with 
the state. One exception would be renegotiation of the student 
capacity to be maintained under the Master Plan. 
Another effort of a similar sort to that in Virginia was undertaken in 
2010–11 by Chancellor Biddy Martin of the Madison campus of the 
University of Wisconsin system.163  In an unlikely partnership with 
Wisconsin governor Scott Walker, who was generally regarded as 
unsupportive of public higher education, Martin endeavored to 
separate the Madison campus from the rest of the University of 
Wisconsin system and thereby obtain greater autonomy and flexibility 
for the Madison campus. This effort was predictably opposed by the 
other campuses of the UW system and was eventually abandoned. 
The data on such efforts so far are relatively slim but do indicate 
that the necessary political process to achieve increased flexibility may 
be too much of a damper for truly helpful arrangements to be 
achieved. A long-time University of California assistant vice president 
for state government relations has observed that the more the state 
budget for the university is cut, the more controversial the university’s 
coping actions become, and the more aggressive the state government 
becomes in seeking to block those actions.164 
 
Two Additional Issues for the University of California 
Several other issues bearing on the University of California relate 
closely to the changing bases of support. Two of them are the different 
situations of the different UC campuses for raising other sources of 
funding and the question of maintaining the Master Plan capacity. 
There are also some who push for dissolution of the single university, 
letting different campuses or groups of campuses go their own way, 
either as a confederation, as separate public universities, or somehow 
converted to private status. That proposal does not stand up well to 
analysis, because of the governmental and state-funding chaos that 
would be created as well as the loss of the many advantages of the 
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single-university structure noted in chapter 5 and the multifaceted 
services to the state that the university has provided. 
Differences among Campuses. The UC campuses have differing 
circumstances, brought about through different founding dates and 
hence different numbers and ages of alumni, different emphases, and 
different geographical locations. Berkeley and Los Angeles—the oldest 
campuses—have a full spectrum of ages of alumni; many of the 
younger campuses do not. That fact affects potentials for private fund-
raising. Berkeley, UCLA, and Davis have the most professional schools, 
many of which are productive for fund-raising. The programmatic 
dimensions of Davis and Riverside give them particular access to the 
agricultural community. The six campuses with medical schools—San 
Francisco, Los Angeles, San Diego, Davis, Irvine, and now Riverside—
have resultant opportunities for fund-raising, but they are also subject 
to the ups and downs of federal Medicare and state Medicaid funding. 
An ultimate question for UC as one university is whether state- 
and/or fee-generated resources will be distributed among campuses in 
a way that somehow recognizes these differences in access to other 
funds, rather than simply on a weighted-enrollment basis, as is the case 
now (chapter 6). Another issue, addressed later in this chapter, is 
whether the governance of the university should change to recognize 
these differences among the campuses. 
Yet another question is whether undergraduate tuitions should 
differ among the UC general campuses. As noted above, enrollment 
pressures from eligible students at UCLA, Berkeley, and San Diego in 
particular are high enough that these universities could raise tuition 
without losing enrollment. There are two counteracting forces. One is 
the desire of the elected officials in the state government to keep 
tuition from increasing. The other is that the public might infer that 
campuses with higher tuition have different education quality as 
opposed to just different application pressure. Adoption of different 
tuitions for different campuses is a complicated arena that is best 
avoided until there are no better alternatives left. 
Capacity for Students. Another major set of questions is whether 
UC can continue to meet capacity obligations under the Master Plan 
and whether the percentage of high school graduates to be 





be desirable for enabling UC education to serve a greater portion of the 
populace, or decreased, as may be necessary in view of funding 
limitations. The political pressures will be to take more students, and 
indeed taking smaller portions of students would serve to feed 
apprehensions that UC is elitist and not serving ordinary Californians. 
Growth means more campuses, larger campuses, and/or 
alternative ways of educating students. It is a particularly challenging 
issue because of the general reluctance of the term-limited state 
government to think ahead, reinforced by the 2011 defunding of the 
California Postsecondary Education Commission. 
Starting more campuses does not seem to be an option in the 
present fiscal climate.165 Even allowing for growth at Merced and 
Riverside, growth at other campuses will at some point require 
negotiation of long-range development plans with the communities, 
which has been a difficult process in the past. With 2016 UCLA and 
Berkeley enrollments at forty-five thousand and forty thousand 
students, respectively, there is also the matter of how large is too 
large—that is, to what extent the quality of the academic experience 
decreases with further growth. 
A better and more achievable approach is probably to foster 
transfer education, through more students choosing, or being required, 
to use the transfer route, coupled with a major upgrading of counseling 
and other ways of encouraging and supporting transfer. Another 
related alternative would be the use of lower division satellite 
campuses located in different but nearby communities.166 
 
 
GOVERNANCE CHANGES FOR CHANGING TIMES 
 
The increasingly varied and complex mix of revenues and the 
diminished proportion of state funds create a very different set of 
dynamics for public research universities in general and the University  
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of California in particular. Management and oversight of UC have 
become more multidimensional and specific to the natures and needs 
of the individual campuses. Some observers have suggested that 
internal university governance structures are too cumbersome and 
slow for the changes that have to be made and that a more corporate, 
top-down approach is needed for the issues that must be faced. The 
targets that they recommend for change typically include shared 
governance and what is sometimes described as an “hourglass” 
governance structure167  with powerful boards at the top, faculty-
dominated academic departments and senates at the bottom, and 
relatively weak central administrations in between. 
 
Shared Governance 
If it is well structured and well used, shared governance is a 
considerable asset rather than a liability. As is discussed through 
examples in chapter 7, the Academic Senate can be a valuable asset 
when change is needed because the senate provides process and an 
effective consultation mechanism, and its role can be structured so 
that it need not slow things down excessively.  
 
Sufficiency of the Central Administrative Role 
The Fethke-Policano hourglass model, mentioned above, may exist 
at some universities, but it does not have to be. Much depends upon 
the nature and skill sets of the top leadership of the university or 
campuses. When the leadership relates well with both the board and 
the faculty and effectively calls either or both of them into play at the 
right times on matters of importance, governance runs smoothly and 
can accomplish many things. But, as the central players in governance, 
university leaders must recognize when and in what ways they should 
best bring the other players in. The analogy is sometimes made to a 
skilled conductor of a symphony orchestra. 
 
Board-Level Governance 
The public universities of the United States were established by the 
individual states. Usually funding and governance came largely or 
                                                     





completely through the state.168 As the years went on, and particularly 
since World War II, funding sources have become much more varied 
and diverse. The percentage of public-university revenues that is 
received from the states has decreased considerably. This situation has 
come about both because states have been allocating lessening 
proportions of their state budgets to higher education and because 
universities have been successful in raising other revenue—notably 
private gift funds, federal and industrial support of research projects, 
and income from auxiliary enterprises—as well as increasing tuition 
and fees. Of the $26.7 billion of income received by the University of 
California in 2014–15, only 14.1 percent came from the state with 
another 11.7 percent coming from student tuition and fees.169 The 
remainder—7.5 percent from private support, 15.2 percent from the 
government (mostly federal and for research in various forms), 28.8 
percent income to medical centers, 20.8 percent from other sales and 
services, and 1.8 percent from other sources—was received at the 
campus level rather than university-wide. Revenue now comes 
substantially more directly to the campuses than university-wide. 
The Board of Regents operates at the university-wide level and has 
members primarily appointed by the governor and confirmed by the 
California State Senate. The university is so large and multidimensional 
and has so many critical issues within it that the regents cannot 
become familiar with all of them. Yet many issues of the individual 
campuses do require board-level attention and can benefit from board-
level attention. As has been noted, the campuses differ substantially in 
academic emphases, local situations, and needs. Board-level 
governance structure should recognize this fact. In accord with the 
principle of subsidiarity (chapter 6), both board and administrative 
decisions should be delegated to appropriate levels, where those 
making the decisions can be equipped with sufficient understanding.170 
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Public Research Universities in General. Nearly all public 
universities continue to have boards of the sort exemplified by the 
Regents of the University of California—appointed through processes 
of the state government or the electorate and responsible for 
representing the people of the state in the oversight of the university. 
In contrast with boards of private universities, the members of these 
public boards are not chosen particularly for their individual expertise 
or allegiance to the university. There are drawbacks of this governance 
structure for seeking, gaining, and responsibly overseeing the uses of 
the very large and varied amount of nongovernmental funds that come 
to the university. The fact that a public board will oversee funds is 
sometimes a discouragement to private donors who would prefer 
custodians of the donated funds to have less political susceptibility, 
greater business acumen, and/or other values. 
These issues can be addressed by two sorts of changes in the board 
structure of public research universities. The first is to gain varied and 
specific expertise on boards. Several ways of doing this were reviewed 
in chapter 4.  The second useful change is a tiered board structure, of 
the sort used in North Carolina and Florida, and in a different way for 
the State University of New York, as was also described in chapter 4. 
Overall governance and responsibility would remain with the state-
appointed or elected main board, but items more specific to individual 
campuses would be delegated to sub-boards for the individual 
campuses that would be created, appointed, and overseen by the main 
board. As well, some matters of governance that would now be 
handled internally by the campus (e.g., development policy, fiscal 
planning) could be matters for the campus boards. Doing so would 
yield more direct and specific knowledge of the individual campuses 
than the parent board would otherwise have. This approach has been 
discussed in more detail in chapter 4 and by the author elsewhere.171 It 
would be best for campus boards to have many of the characteristics of 
private-university boards in terms of appointment (by the main board)  
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–expertise, allegiance, and ability to help secure new sources of income 
and partnerships. The public responsibility would still be fulfilled by the 
oversight of the main board. 
 
Possibilities for the University of California 
In a book172 exploring new financial and governance models for 
public universities in the United States, James Garland, who was 
president of Miami University (Ohio) from 1996 to 2006, proposes 
formation of campus boards under the Board of Regents of the 
University of California. The author and four then-leaders of the 
Berkeley campus proposed a model173 of tiered-board governance for 
the University of California in which the regents would create sub-
boards on each of the individual campuses under the aegis of the Board 
of Regents. This option is available to the regents under the existing 
structure of the university, and no new legislation would be needed. 
The aim would be to gain the depth and individuality of attention to 
individual campuses and their needs described above, to delegate 
some of the more specific responsibilities of the regents to these 
boards so as to free time for the regents to deal with major university-
wide matters, and to gain for the campus boards some of the individual 
allegiance and support characteristic of private-university boards. 
Possibilities for the delegation of duties are suggested in the 
referenced paper but would of course be subject to further 
deliberation. In that paper it is suggested that regents be rotated as 
members among the individual campus boards. However, upon further 
reflection, I now believe that it would better preserve the role of the 
president to have no regents as campus board members; otherwise, a 
regent member of a campus board could bring a matter to the main 
Board of Regents without it having passed through the president. This 
tiered-board arrangement should fully preserve the structure of the 
University of California as a single university, with one budget, one set  
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of dealings with the state government, one set of policies and policy 
envelopes, and so on, while enabling the provision of more 
individualized attention and help to campuses. 
Planning. Planning, particularly academic planning, within the 
University of California has now been almost entirely delegated to the 
individual campuses. That is helpful to the campuses but is probably 
not the most effective approach for academic efficiency or on an 
overall economic basis. Economic efficiency is particularly important in 
times of fiscal stringency and/or rapid change. As urged already in 
chapter 12, it would behoove the university to reinstitute a more 
effective university-wide planning mechanism with the usual 
involvement of the Academic Council so as to develop issues for 
consideration with the campuses. 
 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Financing Public Research Universities 
Even with all the alternatives explored in this chapter, for public 
universities there is no real substitute for government funding. 
Revenue from any other source brings with it obligations and 
constraints. The discussion should focus on how to return to needed 
levels of state support, how to reduce services and functions with the 
least injury, and what other sources of revenue can be built compatibly 
with the public-university mission and academic quality. 
There seems to be little likelihood of a return any time soon to the 
levels of state financial support for public higher education that existed 
in the past for the United States; however, this should not be taken to 
mean that public universities should not present their cases to the 
state and press for funding using the most cogent arguments that they 
can make. The challenge is to find means and revenue sources that 
maintain academic quality and access to the greatest extents possible. 
The result otherwise will be a two-tier system of higher education in 
the United States, where the academic quality and research 
accomplishments of the top tiers of private universities will 
substantially outstrip those of the major public universities. Yet the 





reasons for the success that the United States has had in economic and 
social development, technological innovation, and upward mobility of 
its people. 
Research universities should continue to seek instructional 
enhancement and efficiency. The most obvious path is through uses of 
instructional technology, but progress there is still a matter of creating 
and trying different approaches to find what will work best for various 
purposes. Another factor is that, for undergraduates, present uses of 
information technology work best for enriching and enhancing 
traditional methods of instruction rather than for providing lower-cost 
instruction of the same quality. 
The move of public research universities toward the financial 
structure of the major private universities must continue through 
private fund-raising (development) with resultant building of 
endowment. Endowment provides steady revenue that is a secure 
economic flywheel, available through good economic times and bad. 
Most of it will be restricted to particular uses, however. 
Diminishing state support necessitates higher tuition, another 
move toward the financial structure of private universities. In order to 
maintain the access component of the public mission, it is necessary 
that large portions of increased tuition revenue be devoted to need-
based financial aid, leading to a higher-tuition/higher-aid model. It can 
be made clearer to the public and state government that state support 
provides access for those with less or no ability to pay by tying state 
support to need-based aid for state residents in the minds of the 
public, the legislature, and the governor. Two models for accomplishing 
this are the state of Ohio plan for Miami University and the 
recommendation made in 2011 by twenty-two ex-chancellors of 
University of California campuses. 
The political feasibility of the higher-tuition/higher-aid model can 
be enhanced by overcoming the very negative public image associated 
with current levels of student debt. Two avenues for accomplishing 
that are better control of for-profit higher education and income-
contingent loans that couple tuition repayment with the future earning 
power of graduates in ways that are manageable for graduates. 
Financial necessity creates entrepreneurship, especially among 
research-university faculty members who have been selected for their 
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creativity. Innovative, revenue-generating activities will continue to 
grow both at the grassroots and institutional levels, and policies will be 
needed to control them for academic nature, cost recovery, and 
political defensibility. Among these activities will be high-fee degree 
and certificate programs and highly specialized education. 
The budget for faculty salaries is a sufficiently large component of 
research-university expenditures that there will be substantial pressure 
on it. Resultant changes will include greater proportions of 
nonresearch faculty (e.g., lecturers and adjuncts) and more charging of 
faculty salaries to nonstate sources, such as endowment (through 
endowed chairs) and other sources that are secure during a faculty 
member’s career. 
Two sources that could potentially be increased are funding from 
the federal government, probably through specific programs such as 
competitive grants for facilities, and from employers of graduates, 
perhaps through direct linkage of corporate taxation to public-
university funding. 
Some aspects of research universities can be pooled among 
universities to gain economies of scale. This is already done with 
research telescopes, sharing among libraries, and consortia such as the 
Claremont colleges. Candidates for sharing include digital libraries, 
education-abroad programs, and specialized majors. Beyond that, 
mergers of universities themselves will probably also increase as ways 
of gaining more consolidation along with some economic efficiency. 
 
University Governance 
Shared governance remains a useful component of university 
governance and will remain effective as long as attention is given to its 
ability to move with the issues and sustaining positive approaches on 
both sides. Effective administrators can still maintain the central 
administrative role, staying in close contact with trustees, the faculty, 
and students as needed. 
State revenues for public universities are now outweighed by other 
revenue sources. Most newer sources of revenue come into multi-
campus universities at the campus level rather than centrally, and most 
come from private rather than public sources. These changes call for 





supportive of, individual campus situations, needs, and opportunities. 
It also calls for specific expertise on boards. For the University of 
California, it would make sense for the Board of Regents to create sub-
boards for each campus, control and approve membership on the sub-
boards, and delegate appropriate responsibilities to them in line with 





National and International Reputations, 
Ratings, and Rankings of Universities 
 
 
MEASURES AND SURROGATES OF STANDING AND ACCOMPLISHMENT 
 
The Qualitative 
The stature of a research university is essentially determined by the 
collective reputations of the individual faculty members, integrated 
with the reputations of individual departments and institutes 
composing the university. The accomplishments of graduates of the 
university are also important. Three interacting factors—the desires of 
students at all levels to gain admission to the university, the resultant 
selectivity in admissions, and the attractiveness of graduates to 
potential employers—are other measures. 
The two foremost missions of research universities are education 
and research, two topics that are closely intertwined because one of 
the prime objectives of research universities is to produce creative 
graduates—whether to be employed in higher education, industry, 
government, or independent research institutions, or to become 
individual proprietors or consultants. It is, however, specific research 
accomplishments that most readily capture attention and respect 
within the academy and outside the university. Because it is inwardly 
directed, teaching is much harder to assess in a way that can be 
compared among institutions. The importance of research 
accomplishments can be evaluated through awards, prizes, academy 
memberships, and other forms of peer recognition. These measures, 
and hence the reputations and standings of research universities, are 
determined by perceptions as to whether outputs of researchers at the 
institution generate important discoveries, new knowledge, or new 
codifications of knowledge that make it much more powerful. In 
general, a good measure would be how often the research evokes 
these responses: “That’s really important,” “That truly opens up new 





The fruits of university research enhance the economy and create 
other societal improvements. Other measures of success are therefore 
the extent to which research-based industries have chosen to locate 
near the university so as to foster and build upon the research and 
expertise resident there, and what founders of successful start-up 
corporations have come from the university. Classic examples are MIT, 
Harvard, and Route 128 in Massachusetts; Stanford University and 
Silicon Valley; and the biotechnology industry that has formed around 
the San Francisco and San Diego campuses of the University of 
California. As is discussed in chapter 18, there have also been studies to 
trace the threads of research, development, and commercialization 
that have led to major innovations. 
 
The Quantitative 
With the arrival of the twenty-first century, efforts to use objective 
and quantitative methods to rate and rank universities have 
mushroomed, both worldwide and within the United States. There 
have been varied motivations for these endeavors, including providing 
standards against which countries with developing university systems 
can measure themselves and gauge upward progress, furnishing 
information for students and families choosing colleges, and, in the 
case of the media, creating engaging stories. 
This plethora of rankings has been at best a mixed blessing. The 
ratings do provide guidance for those who are trying to build the 
stature of universities and for those who seek certain characteristics 
within universities. But they also tend to define academic quality 
through a small number of specific measures, and universities can 
distort themselves toward those measures to the detriment of other 
valuable things that they should be doing. The ratings become 
obsessive, in that institutions can devote great effort to improving their 
standings in the rankings, while paying less attention to more 
qualitative educational and research values. Having a single set of 
criteria also serves to promote a single model for universities rather 
than encouraging differences in mission, goals, and the very nature of 
universities. People and nations differ from one another, and they have 
different needs and goals. Society has a variety of different needs from 
National and International Reputations, Ratings, and Rankings of Universities 
755 
 
institutions of higher education. Hence, diversity among universities is 
important and should be nurtured.  
Nonetheless, it is useful to look at the various rating schemes to 
see what factors have been identified as reflective of the qualities of 
universities and university education for various purposes. After a 
discussion of general issues involved in ratings, I tally the factors that 
are incorporated in various combinations into current quantitative 
university rating and ranking schemes. The list is necessarily incomplete 
because of the large number of ranking efforts, varying degrees of 
prominence, and the fact that new rating and ranking systems 
currently appear virtually every month. 
Other summaries and comparisons of rating systems have been 
made by Salmi1 and by Paradeise and Thoenig,2 both of them with an 





Many broad issues pertain to the ratings systems, when viewed as 
a whole. Some of them are the following. 
 
Balance of Teaching and Research 
The ranking systems differ greatly as to how much attention they 
give to teaching and education, as opposed to research output. 
Research reinforces teaching and vice versa, but each deserves its own 
measures.3 
                                                     
1 Jamil Salmi, The Challenge of Establishing World-Class Universities (Washington, DC: World Bank, 
2009), https://perma.cc/9K8N-LL59. 
2 Catherine Paradeise and Jean-Claude Thoenig, In Search of Academic Quality (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2016), pp. 38–39. 
3 Lest we conclude that research standing and educational effectiveness are two entirely different 
things not much related, it is important to recognize the essential feature of research universities, 
which is that research and research abilities bear heavily on education, especially the education of 
researchers and other creative people. There are many examples of that connection in this book. 
Three of them are (1) the roles of G. N. Lewis in chemistry and Ernest Lawrence in physics at 
Berkeley in spawning students and other coworkers who themselves achieved Nobel Prizes and 
other major recognitions; (2) the roles of the star researchers hired early on by the UC San Diego 
campus in generating an excellent undergraduate program, including an effective residential-





Reputation versus Factual Data 
Early approaches to comparing universities through rankings dealt 
heavily with reputations of universities, as reflected by surveys of peers 
at other institutions. More recently there has been a movement 
toward quantitative data that can be measured independently rather 
than reliance upon opinions. That movement has been facilitated by 
continued development of large databases of information on colleges 
and universities, for example, the Integrated Postsecondary Education 
Data System (IPEDS) of the US Department of Education4, and the 
international data bases of Thomson-Reuters and now Clarivate 
Analytics such as Web of Science5 and InCites.6   Reputations are more 
comprehensive and multidimensional, are based upon different factors 
for different observers, and do tend to lag, since individual perceptions 
accrue over a lifetime. However, hard data measure rather few specific 
benchmarks, which can then be addressed by institutions to the 
neglect of other criteria that may be important.  As the nascent field of 
data science develops and massive data bases become more common, 
the quantitatative methods will probably grow in both number and 
complexity. 
 
Extensive versus Intensive Measures 
Some measures are dependent upon the size of an institution 
(extensive) and others are independent of size (intensive). Through 
intensive measures a small institution such as Caltech can be ranked on 
a more comparative basis with, for example, Stanford or Berkeley. 
 
Balance among Academic Fields 
Some rating systems are devoted almost exclusively to the 




                                                                                                                     
to move with changing times, for example, the reorganization of biology in the 1980s and the 
creation of the School of Information in the early 1990s at Berkeley (see chapter 12 for both). 
4 IPEDS Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System, US Department of Education, 
https://perma.cc/LG49-LB8B. 
5 Web of Science, Clarivate Analytics, https://perma.cc/W3W3-BVVF. 
6 InCites, Clarivate Analytics, https://perma.cc/G4DR-FB3M. 
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Inputs versus Outputs 
Measures such as research funding and alumni giving are inputs 
that show what the institution and the faculty have to work with. (Of 
course, they are also measures of what funding agencies and alumni 
think of the institution.) Measures such as awards won by the faculty 
are outputs in that they are actual academic accomplishments. 
 
How to Measure Instructional Effectiveness 
There are several well-accepted measures of research stature and 
accomplishments (e.g., awards, academy memberships, citations, and 
reputations among peers), but measurement of instructional 
effectiveness is more vague and controversial. Measures such as 
ratings by students, alumni, and faculty peers are all useful within 
institutions, but it is much more difficult to compare one institution 
with another on instructional effectiveness. In addition, different 
people learn in different ways, and what is effective instruction for one 
person may not be as useful for another. Surveys tend to look at input 
measures, such as the faculty/student ratio or institutional budget per 
student, without regard to how effectively these resources are used. 
 
Value Added 
There is always an issue as to what value has been added to 
graduates by an institution as opposed to the institution simply 
enrolling strong students. This may not matter to employers seeking to 
hire graduates, but it should be important to prospective students and 
families who are deciding among universities and colleges. 
 
Accomplishments of the Few versus the Many 
Measures such as the number of Nobel Prizes received by faculty 
members or alumni reflect singular accomplishments, but they do not 
say much about faculty or alumni in general. Measures such as 
citations of published papers reflect the faculty in more widespread 
fashion, although again they can be distorted by the accomplishments 
of very few faculty members, since landmark papers tend to be highly 
cited. Citations can also reflect characteristics other than the perceived 






Private versus Public Universities 
There are large differences between public and private universities. 
Private universities tend to stand higher on measures such as alumni 
giving, since they do not have direct support from the public treasury 
and have been doing private fund-raising much longer than have public 
universities. Public universities have the mission of creating access for 
all, whereas private universities can self-determine the population 
groups from which they most want to cultivate students, perhaps so as 
to increase graduation rates. There is also the issue of value received 
for money paid, i.e., cost-efficiency. 
 
Margin of Error 
Rankings are usually reported by the media in terms of the rank 
orders, not the actual numerical rating scores. The margin of error in 
measurement or in ranking methodology in any large survey nearly 
always exceeds the differences between adjacent institutions.  This is 
more and more of an issue as one goes further down on a ranked list.  
 
 
RANKINGS OF RESEARCH UNIVERSITIES 
 
Ranking Entities 
Different types of organizations carry out ranking efforts, with a 
variety of different motivations and varying announced objectives, such 
as measuring quality of the undergraduate expeience, the quality of 
research and/or the impact of that research, and value to the student 
for the money spent as net tuition.  Because new rankings continually 
appear, any list of them is necessarily incomplete.  Some of the entities 
producing rankings as of 2017 were the following: 
 Organizations of Universities.  The National Research Council and 
formerly the American Council on Education have for many years 
carried out reputational surveys in the United States. Another such 
effort is U-Multirank, funded by the European Commission and located 
at the Center for Higher Education Policy Studies at the University of 
Twente in the Netherlands. 
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Individual Universities or Components of Universities.  Among 
these are the CWTS  rankings of the Centre for Science and Technology 
Studies (Centrum voor Wetenschap en Technologische Studies) at the 
University of Leiden in the Netherlands, the Shanghai Jiao Tong Ranking 
of World Universities in China, the National Taiwan University Ranking 
of Scientific Papers, the Center for Measuring Performance at Arizona 
State University, and the Ranking Web of Universities of the 
Cybermetrics Laboratory of the National Research Council of Spain, 
which ranks universities by Internet presence and traffic.  
The Media.  Since 1983  U. S. News and World Report has carried 
out a Best Colleges ranking for US universities and college with 
attention to educational benefit.  As of 2015, U. S. News and World 
Report has also reported rankings of worldwide universities with 
research the major factor.  Times Higher Education ranks universities 
worldwide on research and education through both a World University 
ranking (WUR) and a World Reputational Rankings (WRR).  Times 
Higher Education also partners with the Wall Street Journal to produce 
rankings of 500 US universities in perceived quality of education. 
Reuters has rated and ranked worldwide universities in terms of 
innovations and contributions to the world economy. USA Today, 
Forbes, Washington Monthly, Niche.com and Money carry out rankings 
of US Universities.  Columnist David Leonhardt of the New York Times 
analyzes and rates universities on the basis of public access. 
Individual Researchers.  An example is the book by Graham and 
Diamond.7  
Independent Organizations and Corporations. The Center for 
World University Rankings, headquartered in the United Arab Emirates, 
carries our rankings of what it regards as the top 1000 universities. 
Quacquarelli Symonds (QS) Ltd. partnered with Times Higher Education 
from 2004 to 2009 to generate rankings of world research universities, 
following which the two organizations went their separate ways, with 
QS continuing the original methodology.  Scimago Lab maintains the 
Scimago Institutions Ranking as to assess what as of 2017 are 741 
worldwide universities and research-focused institutions. 
                                                     
7 Hugh Davis Graham and Nancy Diamond, The Rise of American Research Universities: Elites and 





Measures Utilized   
The different ranking systems draw in various combinations from 
the following sorts of measures.  Rather than link the individual 
measures with specific surveys, I categorize them by the qualities that 
they purport to measure. Some are inverse measures, in that lower is 
better.  No judgements of the worth of individual measures are 
implied.  Some do seem misleading. 
 
Reputation   
 Surveys of faculty, employers, and/or high school counselors  
 Global and regional research reputations 
 
Research Quality   
 Faculty, other academic staff, and/or alumni receiving Nobel Prizes 
and Fields Medals (Mathematics)  
 Memberships in National Academies  
 Researchers in the Thomson-Reuters list of Highly Cited Researchers  
 Numbers of papers published in Nature and Science  
 Papers indexed in Science Citation Index, and/or the Expanded and 
Social Science Citation Index   
 Papers in journals included in the Thomson Reuters Web of Science.   
 Total numbers of journal publications, books, and papers in 
conference proceedings  
 H-indices8 for individual researchers combined somehow, such as 
being weighted appropriately for length of career to date  
 Extramural research funding, total or scaled by staff numbers and/or 
normalized for purchasing-power parity  
 Ratio of doctoral to bachelor’s degrees  
                                                     
8 The h-index is that number of an author’s papers that individually have at least that number of 
citations in the literature. For example, an h factor of 44 means that the author has forty-four 
papers, each of which has been cited at least forty-four times in the literature. Like all attempts to 
quantify measures of academic quality, this too can be misleading and is probably overused. For 
example, one’s h-index is helped by working in a field where there are many other researchers to 
cite papers, by writing review articles, by measuring physical or chemical properties of matter that 
would be cited just for the values of those properties, by coauthoring papers, and by dividing 
one’s research up into smaller packets for publication. A text or reference book will also get many 
citations, while not usually being original research as such. On the other hand, a text or reference 
book typically takes much longer to prepare and write than does a research paper. But h-indices 
are at least qualitatively useful measures for obtaining first approximations of the research 
accomplishments of individuals. 
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 Number of PhD degrees awarded (total or per academic staff 
member)  
 The number and proportion of a university’s publications that, 
compared with other publications in the same field and in the same 
year, belong to the top 1 (or 10, or 50) percent most frequently cited  
 Number of grants and fellowships received in arts and humanities  
 Faculty awards 
 Postdoctoral fellows  
 Thematic concentration of publication output  
 Number of different authors represented in publications from the 
institution 
 
Educational Inputs9   
 Student/faculty ratio 
 Ratio of institutional income to number of academic staff members   
 SAT scores of incoming students  
 Proportion of faculty with the highest degrees in their fields 
 Average faculty salary, possibly counting benefits and adjusted for 
regional cost of living  
 Percentage of faculty who are full-time  
 Student admissions selectivity  
 Percent of accepted students who enroll  
 Reading and mathematics SAT or ACT scores  
 Portion of incoming students who graduated in the top 10 percent of 
their high school classes  
 Percentage of faculty members who are full-time  
 Degree of interaction between teachers and students as measured 
by student surveys  
 Number of accredited programs  
 Student ratings of faculty  
 Proportion of classes with fewer than twenty students 
 Proportion of classes with fewer than fifty students  
 
Educational Attainments   
 Six-year and/or four-year graduation rates  
                                                     
9 The methodologies in this and the following section favor private institutions over public 






 Graduation rates in comparison with other institutions that receive 
students with similar precollege records  
 Graduation rate versus graduation rate predicted by a variety of input 
factors  
 Percentage of first-year students returning for a second year 
 Percentage of alumni who have gone on to receive a PhD  
 Percentage of graduates becoming Rhodes Scholars or National 
Science Foundation or Fulbright Fellows 
 
Student Engagement  
 Size of ROTC programs relative to the size of the university 
 Number of alumni serving in the Peace Corps relative to the size of 
the university   
 Percentage of federal government work-study money that was spent 
on community-service projects  
 Number of students participating in community service and total 
service hours performed  
 Percentage of staff supporting community service  
 Percentage of courses that incorporate service   
 Whether the institution provides scholarships for community service 
 
Economic Betterment of Graduates   
 Starting salary “boost” in comparison with graduates in the same field 
from other colleges and universities  
 Midcareer salary “boost” by the same sort of comparison 
 Value added to graduate salary  
 Value added to student loan repayment rate  
 Earnings of graduates during the first five years after graduation and 
midcareer earnings  
 The same two factors adjusted for the mix of majors at the university  
 The same two factors adjusted for the economic and academic 
profiles of students  
 Career-services staffing per student 
 Having a program connecting job-seeking students with alumni  
 Brookings Institution’s calculation of the market value of the twenty-
five skills that graduates most often list on their LinkedIn profiles  
 Alumni appearing on America’s Leaders list  
 Student debt upon graduation  
 The odds that a student will not be able to pay back a student loan 
 




 Percentage of students who hold Pell Grants and graduate within six 
years  
 Percentage of students receiving Pell Grants normalized by the 
predicted percentage based upon SAT/ACT scores and percentage of 
applicants admitted.  
 Net price (tuition minus financial aid) of institution for recipients of 
Title IV aid  
 Student-loan default rate  
 Student diversity  
 Staff diversity 
 
Involvement of the Institution with Industry; Effect on the Economy10 
 Research income from industry per academic staff member  
 Patent applications filed  
 Portion of patent applications resulting in actual patents  
 Percentage of patent filings made with the US, European, or Japanese 
patent offices  
 Total citations of patents by examiners in the cases of other patents 
 Patent citation impact as determined from the Patents Citation Index 
and the proportion of patents that have been cited by other patents 
 Average number of times journal articles from an institution have 
been mentioned in patents   
 Citations of journal articles in articles written by authors in industry  
 Percentage of articles from a university that have industrial coauthors 
 
International   
 Percentages of international faculty, students, and/or papers with an 
international author  
 Portion of research output produced with international collaborators 
 
                                                     
10 This methodology is problematic in several ways. It takes no account of start-up ventures, which 
are a principal way in which innovation spreads from universities in the United States. It assumes 
that granted patents are the primary measure of innovation, yet most granted patents are 
worthless. Further, there are industries such as computing hardware and software, consumer 
electronics, and so on, where patents play only a small role in innovation. Most university 
research is fundamental and yet often provides the necessary first basis of understanding for 
eventual important innovations. Those initial inroads are most often not reflected in citations in 
patent applications or by patent examiners. Consulting by faculty with industry is not considered, 







 Value of endowment assets 
 Annual private giving  
 University financing per student. 
 
Internet Presence and Traffic 
 Volume of web contents for an institution  






Reviewing all the factors considered in these various ranking 
schemes reinforces the conclusion that the methods are arbitrary and 
lack precision. Although concerns can be raised about the factors in all 
categories, those relating to quality of education and innovation and 
economic impact are most problematic. The quality-of-education 
factors are nearly all input measurementss rather than reflections of 
actual accomplishments and they largely do not take into account the 
mission of publc universities. The innovation and economic-impact 
factors focus on patents and industrial collaborations, whereas most 
patents go unused. Measures of the involvement of faculty members 
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